The U.S. Government has expressed concerns that participation in a Foreign Government Talent Recruitment Program could lead to undisclosed conflicts of interest or commitment, the inappropriate transfer of federally-funded research to foreign governments, violation of export control laws, and theft of intellectual property.

US Code 42 USC Part C Research Security: Requirements for Foreign Talent Recruitment Programs

The purpose of this US Code sets forth a path of actions to be taken that prohibit participation in any foreign talent recruitment program by personnel of Federal research agencies and to prohibit participation in a malign foreign talent recruitment program by covered individuals involved with research and development awards from federal agencies.

Covered Individuals meaning, Investigators and Key Personnel involved with research and development proposals and awards with federal funding.

The implementing vehicle is called the CHIPS Act of 2022 (Public Law 117-167) (PDF), relevant sections are noted below:

Subtitle D—Research Security

• Sec. 10631. Requirements for foreign talent recruitment programs.
• Sec. 10632. Malign foreign talent recruitment program prohibition.

Sec. 10631 (B), Requirements for Foreign Talent Recruitment Programs

(1) prohibit all personnel of each Federal research agency, including Federal employees, contract employees, independent contractors, individuals serving under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 1970 (42 U.S.C. 4701 et seq), Visiting Scientist, Engineering, and Educator appointments, and special government employees other than peer reviewers, from participating in a foreign talent recruitment program;

(2) as part of the requirements covered individuals to disclose if such individuals are a party to a foreign talent recruitment program contract, agreement, or other arrangement;

(3) prohibit research and development awards from being made for any proposal in which a covered individual is participating in a malign foreign talent recruitment program; and

(4) to the extent practicable, require recipient institutions to prohibit covered individuals participating in malign foreign talent recruitment programs from working on projects supported by research and development awards.

Sec. 10632, Malign Foreign Talent Recruitment Program Prohibition

(a) each Federal research agency shall establish a policy that, as part of a proposal for a research and development award from the agency;

(1) each covered individual listed in such proposal certify that each such individual is not a party to a malign foreign talent recruitment program in the proposal submission of each such individual and annually thereafter for the duration of the award; and

(2) each institution of higher education or other organization applying for such an award certify that each covered individual who is employed by such institution of higher education or other organization has been made aware of the requirements under this section and complied with the requirement under paragraph (1).

Foreign Government Talent Recruitment Program (FGTRP)

Currently there is not just one definition, the CHIPS Act directs the Office for Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to develop a standard definition of Foreign Government Talent Recruitment Program.  This definition will likely resemble the current definition in OSTP’s NSPM-33 Implementation Memo (PDF) as follows:

OSTP Definition: An effort organized, managed, or funded by a foreign government, or a foreign government instrumentality or entity, to recruit science and technology professionals or students (regardless of citizenship or national origin, or whether having a part-time or full-time position).

NSF Definition: Foreign Government Talent Recruitment Program
 

CHIPS Act Definition: Any program, position, or activity that includes compensation in the form of cash, in-kind compensation, including research funding, promised future compensation, complimentary foreign travel, things of non de minimis value, honorific titles, career advancement opportunities, or other types of remuneration or consideration directly provided by a foreign country at any level (national, provincial, or local) or their designee, or an entity based in, funded by, or affiliated with a foreign country, whether or not directly sponsored by the foreign country, to the targeted individual, whether directly or indirectly stated in the arrangement, contract, or other documentation at issue

And is a program sponsored by—

(1) a foreign country of concern (FCOC), currently defined as China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia;

(2) an entity based in a FCOC, whether or not the program is directly sponsored by the government of the FCOC; or

(3) an academic institution or a foreign talent recruitment program identified by the Department of Defense List on page 18-21 of the DOD Memo: Introduction to Policy on Risk-Based Security Reviews of Fundamental Research (PDF), adjusted each FY under the National Defense Authorization Act.

Disclose, Disclose, Disclose Your Participation in a Talent Program!

Disclosure to UVM and federal agencies is critical with respect to participating in a foreign talent recruitment program and researchers must be transparent.

The CHIPS Act requires OSTP and federal research agencies to implement policies requiring all PIs and senior/key personnel to disclose foreign talent recruitment program participation in the appropriate federal forms (Current and Pending/Other Support, Biosketches, etc.).

In practice, this means that foreign appointments are required to be included in Biosketches, and any form of compensation, in-kind or funded research support, or resource provided by the foreign entity must be included in the Current and Pending/Other Support form.

Many agencies already have this requirement, or something very similar, so the impact on researchers should be minimal, provided they are aware of and complying with the requirements.

It is critical that research key personnel provide complete and accurate information about involvement in any foreign talent recruitment program, per agency rules.

Beginning with the go live of UVMClick COI v10, in late Fall of FY24, all UVM researchers will be required to disclose whether or not they are participating in or planning to participate in a foreign talent recruitment program.

This disclosure will link to the UVMClick Funding Proposal and Award altering SPA staff to ensure the Funding Proposal is compliant with the agency’s disclosure instructions.

Coming soon will be the requirement that all key personnel on a research application certify they are not a party to a malign foreign talent recruitment program and further certify annually thereafter for the duration of the award.

Currently, UVM believes the annual UVMClick COI disclosure and Award Triggered Updates will satisfy this requirement. However, at this time we are unsure how the federal agencies will implement this certification requirement.

Is There an Official List of Talents Programs?

Yes and No. See the Department of Defense List on page 18-21 of the DOD Memo: Introduction to Policy on Risk-Based Security Reviews of Fundamental Research (PDF). The list is not exhaustive as it is not feasible to identify all foreign talent programs. 

NSF is behind the effort to develop research security training for the research community. The agency partnered with the National Institutes of Health, the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense on a solicitation seeking proposals for the development of online training modules that will provide recipients of federal research funding with information on risks and threats to the global research ecosystem — and the knowledge and tools necessary to protect against these risks.

UVM will require all Investigators and key personnel to complete the required Research Security Training when made available.

Department of Energy Prohibition

Department of Energy, which has tightly restricted talent program participation since 2019 with DoE Order 486.1A, updated 2020.

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contractor employees, including University researchers funded by DOE contracts or subcontracts (not grants at this time), are prohibited from participating in certain foreign talent recruitment programs that are sponsored or affiliated with a “foreign country of risk”.

In addition, the University must disclose to DOE whether applicable personnel are participating in a foreign talent recruitment program.

Department of Defense Prohibition and Decision Matrix

The Department of Defense (DoD) has issued a “Decision Matrix” that the department intends to use to inform how it will assess factors associated with a researcher’s collaborations in making decisions regarding fundamental research proposals submitted to DoD’s various components.

For the period after August 9, 2024, indicators of participation in a MFTRP meeting any of the criteria of the CHIPS and Science Act will be considered a “prohibited factor” for a researcher, which would preclude the researcher from receiving funding from DoD.

National Science Foundation, Prohibition and Decision Matrix

NSF has taken a range of actions against individuals and entities associated with foreign talent programs or organizations receiving foreign funding, based on recommendations by the OIG.

See: How NSF addresses research security violations.

See: Steps NSF Steps Taken where there is Concern with Foreign Component

National Institutes for Health

On July 10, 2019, NIH issued “Reminders of NIH Policies on Other Support and on Policies related to Financial Conflicts of Interest and Foreign Components,” again reiterating expectations for disclosure of other support, foreign components, and financial conflicts of interest.

Questions may be directed as follows.

Proposal Preparation and Submission: Julie Macy at spa@uvm.edu

Award Acceptance: Emily Trantum at spa@uvm.edu

Compliance: Brian Prindle or Victoria Jones at coi@uvm.edu