Kate Nolfi
Department of Philosophy,
University of Vermont

70 South Williams Street
Burlington, VT 05401

"Functional Belief and Judgmental Belief"
       Forthcoming in Synthese
"Why Evidence (and Only Evidence) Can Justify Belief"
       Forthcoming in McHugh, C., Way, J., & Whiting, D. eds.
       Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press.

"Food Choices and Moral Character"
       Forthcoming in Barnhill, A., Budolfson, M., & Doggett, T. eds.
       Oxford Handbook on Food Ethics. Oxford University Press.

"Belief Self-Knowledge"
       With Dorit Bar-On. (2016) Oxford Handbooks Online.
"How to be a Normativist about the Nature of Belief"
       (2015) Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):181-204.
"Which Mental States Are Rationally Evaluable, And Why?"
       (2015) Philosophical Issues 25 (1):41-63.
"Why is Epistemic Evaluation Prescriptive?"
       (2014) Inquiry 57 (1):97-121.

Works in Progress
"Epistemically Flawless False Beliefs"
"Epistemic Norms, All Things Considered"
"Another Kind of Pragmatic Encroachment"
"The Constitutivist Strategy"
Please email me to see the most recent versions of these papers.