

KATE NOLFI

Curriculum Vitae

Department of Philosophy
University of Vermont
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AREA OF SPECIALIZATION

Epistemology

AREAS OF CONCENTRATION

Practical Reason, Metaethics, Philosophy of Mind, Food Ethics

EMPLOYMENT

Assistant Professor, University of Vermont

2014–Present

EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Philosophy University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill *2014*
M.A. in Philosophy University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill *2010*
B.A. in Philosophy (Honors) and Mathematics Williams College *2008*

PEER-REVIEWED PUBLICATIONS

“Why Evidence (and Only Evidence) Can Justify Belief”

Forthcoming in McHugh, C., Way, J., & Whiting, D. eds. *Normativity: Epistemic and Practical*. Oxford University Press. (Page numbers not yet available; word count: ~9,500) [Invited]

“Food Choices and Moral Character”

Forthcoming in Barnhill, A., Budolfson, M., & Doggett, T. eds. *Oxford Handbook on Food Ethics*. Oxford University Press. (Page numbers not yet available; word count: ~10,000) [Invited]

“How to be a Normativist about the Nature of Belief”

(2015) *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 96 (2):181-204.

“Which Mental States Are Rationally Evaluable, And Why?”

(2015) *Philosophical Issues* 25 (1):41-63. [Invited]

“Why Is Epistemic Evaluation Prescriptive?”

(2014) *Inquiry*, 57 (1):97-121. [Invited]

SURVEY ARTICLES, REVIEWS, AND ENCYCLOPEDIA ENTRIES

“Belief Self-Knowledge”

With Dorit Bar-On. (2016) *Oxford Handbooks Online*. (Page numbers not available; word count: ~10,000) [Invited] 50% contribution.

WORKS IN PROGRESS

“Epistemically Flawless False Beliefs”

“Why We Ought to Care About the Epistemic Status of Our Beliefs”

PEER-REVIEWED PRESENTATIONS

“Epistemically Flawless False Beliefs”

Conference on False but Useful Beliefs, London, UK

February 2016

“Why Evidence (and Only Evidence) Can Justify or Rationalize Belief”

Workshop on the Ethics of Belief, Cornell University

November 2014

2014 Annual Meeting, Canadian Society for Epistemology

November 2014

“Why the Epistemic Status of Our Beliefs Ought to Weigh With Us”

SWIP Analytic, CUNY Graduate Center

May 2014

2014 Annual Meeting, Southern Society for Philosophy & Psychology

February 2014

INVITED PRESENTATIONS

Comments on Ralph Wedgwood’s *The Normativity of Rationality*

Workshop on Ralph Wedgwood’s *The Normativity of Rationality*,
Université de Montréal

May 2016

“Why the Epistemic Status of Our Beliefs Ought to Weigh With Us”

Dartmouth Constitutivism Workshop

October 2016

Middlebury College

March 2016

“Epistemically Flawless False Beliefs”

Filosofie UQÀM Colloquium Series, Montreal, Canada

April 2016

2016 Eastern Division Meeting, American Philosophical Association

January 2016

Penn Reasons and Foundations in Epistemology Conference,

November 2015

University of Pennsylvania

“Why Evidence (and Only Evidence) Can Justify or Rationalize Belief”

Bled Epistemology Conference, Bled, Slovenia

June 2015

Williams College

December 2014

“Which Mental States Are Rationally Evaluable, And Why?”

Workshop on Critical Reflection and Belief, Union College

May 2015

Comments on Ram Neta’s “Basing and Treating”

2015 Pacific Division Meeting, American Philosophical Association

March 2015

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES AND SERVICE

Member, The Imperfect Cognitions Network, Project PERFECT	<i>2015–Present</i>
Mentor, The Job Candidate Mentoring Program for Women in Philosophy	<i>2015–Present</i>
Referee for <i>Mind</i>, <i>Pacific Philosophical Quarterly</i>, <i>Philosophical Quarterly</i>, <i>Erkenntnis</i>, and <i>Southern Journal of Philosophy</i>	<i>2014–Present</i>
Affiliate, Expressive Communication and the Origins of Meaning Research Group	<i>2010–Present</i>
Member, Organizing Committee for the annual Race, Gender, and Sexuality Conference at UVM	<i>2015, 2016, 2017</i>
Co-organizer, annual Food Ethics Conference at UVM	<i>2015, 2016, 2017</i>

FELLOWSHIPS AND GRANTS

Lattie F. Coor International Travel Grant	<i>Summer 2015</i>
\$500 grant to support travel expenses for presenting “Why Evidence (and Only Evidence) Can Justify Belief” at the Bled Epistemology Conference in Bled, Slovenia.	
Mellon/ACLS Dissertation Completion Fellowship	<i>Fall 2013, Spring 2014</i>
\$25,000 competitive fellowship to support a year of research and writing to help advanced graduate students in the humanities and related social sciences in the last year of PhD dissertation writing.	
Bertha Colton Williams Fellowship	<i>Fall 2012</i>
Fellowship to provide one semester of teaching relief during graduate study in philosophy at UNC-Chapel Hill.	
Horace Williams Fellowship	<i>Fall 2008, Spring 2009</i>
Fellowship to provide two semesters of teaching relief during graduate study in philosophy at UNC-Chapel Hill.	

HONORS AND AWARDS

SWIP Analytic Graduate Student Essay Prize	<i>Spring 2014</i>
Graduate and Professional Student Federation Travel Award	<i>Fall 2012</i>
John W. Miller Prize in Philosophy	<i>Spring 2008</i>

COURSES REGULARLY TAUGHT

Epistemology: Advanced Topics
Ethics of Eating
Feminism: Theories and Issues
Introduction to Logic
Introduction to Philosophy: Selected Topics
The Pursuit of Knowledge (UVM Honors College First-Year Seminar)