Selected Publications

In order for traditional rational choice theory to explain the production of collective action, it must be able to distinguish between two behaviorally identical possibilities: one, that all of the agents in a group are each performing behaviors in pursuit of a set of individual actions; and two, that all of those agents are performing those behaviors in pursuit of a collective action. I argue that RCT does not have the resources necessary to distinguish between these two possibilities. RCT could distinguish between these possibilities if it were able to account for commitments. I argue that successful rational choice explanations of collective action appeal to commitments, and distinguish this way of explaining collective action from a general class of explanations called plural subject theories.
Journal of Philosophical Research,2017

Recent Publications

(2017). Collective Action and Rational Choice Explanations. Journal of Philosophical Research.


(2017). Reid on the Autonomy of Ethics: From Active Power to Moral Nonnaturalism. J of the Am Philos Assoc.


(2017). Thomas Reid. The Routledge Companion to Free Will.

(2016). Realism and Antirealism. The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Social Science.

(2015). Why Pursue Unification? A Social-Epistemological Puzzle. Theoria.


(2014). Christine Korsgaard's Self Constitution. Journal of Moral Philosophy.


Recent & Upcoming Talks

Do Group Intentions Explain Collective Actions?
Mar 12, 2016 1:30 PM
Social Ontology and the Black Lives Matter Movement
Oct 22, 2015 11:45 AM


I am currently on sabbatical, and will resume teaching in Fall 2018.