Kate Nolfi
Department of Philosophy,
University of Vermont

70 South Williams Street
Burlington, VT 05401

"Epistemic Norms, All Things Considered"
       (2019) Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02485-2
"Another Kind of Pragmatic Encroachment"
       (2018) Kim, B. & McGrath, M., eds. Pragmatic Encroachment.
Routledge: 35–54.

"Moral Agency in Believing"
       (2018) Philosophical Topics. 46 (1):53–74.
"Why Only Evidential Considerations Can Justify Belief"
       (2018) McHugh, C., Way, J., & Whiting, D. eds.
       Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press.

"Food Choices and Moral Character"
       (2018) Barnhill, A., Budolfson, M., & Doggett, T. eds.
       Oxford Handbook on Food Ethics. Oxford University Press.

"Functional Belief and Judgmental Belief"
       (2017) Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1510-0
"Belief Self-Knowledge"
       With Dorit Bar-On. (2016) Oxford Handbooks Online.
"How to be a Normativist about the Nature of Belief"
       (2015) Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):181–204.
"Which Mental States Are Rationally Evaluable, And Why?"
       (2015) Philosophical Issues 25 (1):41–63.
"Why is Epistemic Evaluation Prescriptive?"
       (2014) Inquiry 57 (1):97–121.

Works in Progress
"Epistemically Flawless False Beliefs"
"An Action-Oriented Approach to Epistemic Theorizing"
"The Constitutivist Strategy"
Please email me to see the most recent versions of these papers.