"On The ‘Epistemic’: What Are Epistemologists Theorizing About?"
Forthcoming in Knowledge and Rationality: Essays in Honor of Stewart Cohen. Routledge.
"Epistemic Norms: What Are They? Why Do They Matter?"
Forthcoming in Philosophical Topics.
"Epistemic Constitutivism"
Forthcoming in Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd Edition.
"Knowledge Without Factivity"
(2024) in Borges, R. & Schnee, I., eds. Illuminating Errors: New Essays on Knowledge from Non-Knowledge. Routledge.
"A Victory (of What Sort) for Strict Purist Invariantism? Some Reflections on Gerken’s On Folk Epistemology: How We Think and Talk About Knowledge"
(2023) Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2023.2222948
"Epistemically Flawless False Beliefs"
(2020) Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02787-w
"Epistemic Norms, All Things Considered"
(2019) Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02485-2
"Another Kind of Pragmatic Encroachment"
(2018) Kim, B. & McGrath, M., eds. Pragmatic Encroachment.Routledge: 35–54.
"Moral Agency in Believing"
(2018) Philosophical Topics. 46 (1):53–74.
"Why Only Evidential Considerations Can Justify Belief"
(2018) McHugh, C., Way, J., & Whiting, D. eds. Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press.
"Food Choices and Moral Character"
(2018) Barnhill, A., Budolfson, M., & Doggett, T. eds. Oxford Handbook on Food Ethics. Oxford University Press.
"Functional Belief and Judgmental Belief"
(2017) Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1510-0
"Belief Self-Knowledge"
With Dorit Bar-On. (2016) Oxford Handbooks Online.
"How to be a Normativist about the Nature of Belief"
(2015) Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):181–204.
"Which Mental States Are Rationally Evaluable, And Why?"
(2015) Philosophical Issues 25 (1):41–63.
"Why is Epistemic Evaluation Prescriptive?"
(2014) Inquiry 57 (1):97–121.