Trends and Tensions in Middle East IR

1.  Trends
2.  Tensions
3.  Where to from here?

 

I.  Trends in Middle East International Relations
 

          1) Very high level of security tensions in the area over time:

a)    since WWII -- 7 significant Arab-Israeli Wars (48-49, 56, 67, War of Attrition 69-70, 73, 82, 2006); three major Gulf Wars; civil wars in Yemen, Oman, Lebanon, Jordan and now Iraq which drew in other regional powers.

                   b) Defense spending as part of GDP:  very high in the Middle East.  Of top 20 states on this, 10 are in the Middle East.  Some representative figures (2005):  Jordan (11.4%), Saudi Arabia (10%), Israel (7.7%), Syria (5.9%), Iran (3.3%).  For comparison:  Russia (4.4%), U.S. (4%), Pakistan (3.9%), India (3%), France (2.6%), UK (2.4%).  World average – 2%.

                   c) arms race, perhaps to nuclear level

                   d) Some progress on Arab-Israeli front, but not complete

 

          2) Continuing high level of outside power interest in the region – oil, strategic access, now with terrorism and transnational Islam.  Oil only seems to be growing in importance (China drawn into the area?).  Terrorism and transnational Islam are not going away, at least soon. 

                   a) Has unilateralism changed the dynamic?  Certainly has allowed the U.S. more freedom for use of its own military force – which leads into the next trend:

 

          3) Increasingly direct US military role in the region.  Not unusual historically, as there were important Great Power direct military roles in the area in previous periods.  But the story of the post WWII period is a story of increasingly direct American military involvement, particularly in the Gulf – Saudi and Iranian alliances after WWII, Twin Pillars after British withdrawal, Central Command and Carter Doctrine after the Iranian Revolution, US Navy deployment at end of Iran-Iraq War, Gulf War 1990-91, Iraq War of 2003 and occupation.

 

II.  Tensions in Middle East International Relations

 

          1) growth of state power v. persistence of transnational ideological importance

                   a) state is key, and pretty durable (maybe not Iraq now, but elsewhere).  Most Islamist movements accept the state framework (unlike al-Qaeda).

                   b) but transnational ties remain important – Arab and Muslim commitment to Palestine, Shi’a ties across borders, Kurdish ties across borders.  Invites meddling (in Iraq), invites seeking outside help, is a threat to existing ruling regimes.  Such ties could improve the economy (workers in 1970’s and 1980’s, perhaps capital now; but not much trade).

 

          2) globalized world economy v. state autonomy

                   a) oil states are fully globalized, for good or for ill, but mostly benefit from the global energy demand

                   b) non-oil states want the benefits of the global economy, but do not want to give up political control over their economies.  Rely on aid, which they can extract because of their strategic position  

 

3) wanting American protection v. wanting to be distant from U.S.

                   a) very few Middle East governments really want to be on the wrong side of the U.S.     

                   b) but local publics clearly do not support (except in some cases) closely following the U.S. political  line or allowing U.S. troops on their soil – for nationalist and Islamist reasons.

 

III.  Where to From Here?

          -continuation of trends and tensions
 

          -what could change patterns?

                   a) increasing state breakdown and revolution – probably increase level of violence and security fears

                   b) increased global multipolarity – probably reduce great power intervention, but not interest.  Local states will play parties off.

                   c) technological change that reduces world importance of oil – definitely reduce international interest and intervention.  Regionally, up in the air.

                   d) decline in power of Islamist ideologies – less regional tension, maybe movement on Arab-Israeli front