Domestic Change and Pan-Arabism:  The 1950's

1.       Domestic upheaval and the new elites
2.              Origins of Pan-Arabism
3.              The Baghdad Pact and the Suez War
4.              High Tide for Pan-Arabism -- 1958
5.              Pan-Arab Problems:  the 1960's.

I.  Domestic Upheaval and the New Elites

In our last lectures, we looked at the effect of World War II on the Middle East , and the climax of the Palestine conflict.  Today, we are going to look at the effects and results of these events on the domestic politics of some of the states of the region.  Social grievances that had remained dormant during the War, unable to emerge because of the reassertion of imperial power in the area, burst to the surface. In the Arab states, the defeat of Arab arms in 1948 discredited the existing regimes, further encouraging domestic political change.  The weakening of the imperial powers and this upheaval in domestic politics also encouraged the development of regional, inter-Arab politics as an independent force.  

Why, in a course on international politics, are we spending time on an essentially domestic phenomenon like upheaval in local politics?  Because the organization of political space in the Middle East -- the legacy of colonialism -- came to be challenged by new political movements emerging in the domestic politics of various Arab countries.  That challenge occurred on two important levels.  First, there was a challenge by new groups to the political control of their states by old elites, whose power was based, in many cases, upon a history of political office since the Ottoman Empire and possession of large landed estates, gained in the 19th century with the introduction of private property into the Ottoman legal code.  Second, these new elites challenged the political map of the region left behind by the colonialists, on Arab nationalist grounds.  This challenge was not simply to Israel; it was a challenge to the entire set of borders and newly created states between Egypt and Iran in the Arab world.  The rejection of the territorial and political status-quo by Arab nationalist movements and leaders was coupled with domestic weakness and incoherence in the existing states.  That domestic weakness and incoherence allowed these anti-state political forces to emerge and made it plausible to think that the status-quo in the region could be overturned.  It tempted local leaders, emulating the colonial powers and the superpowers, to interfere in the politics of their neighbors under the banner of Pan-Arabism.  It put the issue of domestic political organization on the international agenda of the Middle East.

In each case of domestic political change the international and regional environment is essential to understanding why the domestic upheaval took place; and conversely, in each case the domestic changes had significant consequences for international politics, the Arab-Israeli conflict and for regional inter-Arab politics.  The colonial legacy in the Arab world (and in Iran) weakened the old elites.  They were compromised by their cooperation with the colonial powers, particularly during World War II when Britain intervened directly in the politics of almost all the countries of the region to secure friendly regimes there.  These old elites, in the Arab world, were also weakened by their poor performance in the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli War.  The overthrow of these old elites were hardly revolutions.  They were basically military coups.  In one sense, what happened in Egypt and Syria, and later on in Iraq, was revolutionary.  The regimes that came to power in each of the Arab states set out, over time, to change the economic structure of their countries -- destroying the power of the old landed elites, instituting a much more intrusive role for the state in the economy and in society in general.  However, these changes occurred from the top down, by military elites and their allies. 

Whether you call them revolts, coups, revolutions or "revolutions from above", lets get into the specifics.  First, and foremost, Egypt . 

With the end of WWII, and then the humiliating defeat in 1948, domestic politics in Egypt took on a much more violent tenor than before.  Riots prevented the ratification of the 1946 Anglo-British treaty; anti-British riots also accompanied the 1948 War; Prime Minister Nuqrashi Pasha and the Cairo chief of police were both assassinated by a members of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1948; Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, suffered the same fate in 1949.  Guerrilla attacks on British forces in the Canal Zone in 1950-52.  A bloody incident in Ismailia in January 1952 sparked major riots in Cairo, during which many foreign-owned establishments were burned. 

The political stalemate was finally broken on July 23, 1952 , as a "Committee of Free Officers", led by a young colonel named Gamal cAbd al-Nasir ( Nasser ), led a military coup.  Over the course of the next two years, the monarchy was abolished, land reform (depriving the major landowners, a bulwark of both the Wafd and of the Palace-supported parties, of their estates) implemented, the other parties and political organizations outlawed and suppressed, and military control over the government solidified.

Political change in Syria at this time was not nearly as neat and ordered as that in Egypt, where the Nasir regime consolidated its rule with relative ease.  However, the changes in Syria were in many ways as important:  they set the stage for Syria to become a political battleground between numerous competing local parties, regional actors and outside powers.  It was in Syria that the political fallout of the Palestine debacle first occurred.  As in Egypt, new political formations had emerged to challenge the dominance of the old nationalist elite.  In 1944 two high school teachers, Michel cAflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, founded the Bacth Party, committed to the principles of Arab nationalism and a moderate socialism.  The party attracted a following among students, officers and the intelligentsia.  Meanwhile, other ideological strands were also gaining adherents: Antun Sacada, a charismatic speaker and political organizer, put together the Parti Populaire Syrienne (Syrian Social Nationalist Party) on a platform of Greater Syrian unity; the Communists, though small, also began recruiting in the army.

The debacle in Palestine had strengthened the appeal of the newer ideologies in the Army, as the corruption and hesitations of the old nationalist elite were blamed by many officers for the defeat.  In 1949 three military coups occurred.  Various military factions, in league with old political elites, the newer political parties, and other Arab countries (most notably Iraq, Egypt and Saudi Arabia) fought over political power and the foreign policy orientation of the state.  The coups in the end served to weaken the old political elite and ushered in an era of dominance by the new ideological parties.  It was not so much that any one of these groups (PPS, Bacth, Communists) could gain an electoral majority, or even that they could do it together.  However, they all had their adherents within the military, and, perhaps more importantly, had stolen the political and ideological initiative from the older elites.  Both the old and the new politicians sought out the support of various Arab countries and great powers in their domestic political battles, in effect inviting outside interference in domestic Syrian politics. 

The Egyptian and Syrian coups were the most startling domestic political changes of the late 1940's and early 1950's, but the pressures that brought them on were present in other Middle Eastern countries:  Arab nationalist, Communist and other ideological groups were active in Iraq and Jordan and Lebanon. Politics in those countries became more violent and more divided in the 1950’s, as we will see later.  So what can we make of the political upheavals of the late 1940’s and early 1950’s, in terms of international politics in the region?  Three things:

1) The new generation of politicians, be they reformist military officers or members of the new transnational parties like the Bacth, sought complete independence from the old colonial powers, with none of the defense or economic ties that the older elites had been willing to accept.  While not originally hostile to the United States, or friendly to the Soviet Union, these new political actors began to view the United States in light of its political alliance with Britain and France, and its apparent cooperation with those countries on Middle Eastern issues.  Likewise, they did not see the Soviet Union as much of a threat to them, and were willing to use a Soviet connection to offset what they perceived as hostility from the West.  They also tended to be socialist in orientation, looking to expand the role of the state in the economy.  While not Communists, they did not see the Soviet model as something that was all that bad.

2) Another interesting change:  the new movements had their genesis not only in a period of hostility toward the old colonial powers, but also in the shadow of the defeat of the Arab armies in 1948.  Of course, the nationalist political elites that preceded them were also opposed to Israel , but the new movements took this opposition to be a central part of their political platform, raising the level both of the anti-Israeli rhetoric and of military planning aimed, at least according to public statements, against Israel .  This period saw guerrilla attacks launched against Israel from Jordanian and Egyptian territory, and fierce Israeli counter-raids in response.  Far from going away after 1948, the Arab-Israeli issue remained central to the politics of the Arab states.

3) Finally, the combination of domestic revolt and loosening of the Great Power hold on the region produced a distinct and important realm of regional politics.  The British and the French had submerged regional politics in the Middle East through their effective control of the foreign policy of the states of the region.  Some tentative signs of regional political issues developing before WWII:  Hashemite unity plans; involvement of the Arab states in Palestine; the founding of the Arab League in 1945.  But with the Egyptian revolution, the end of French control in Syria and Lebanon, and the loosening of British controls on Iraq and Jordan, regional politics became an independent and important dimension of the Middle East problem.  It was a mixture of good old-fashioned balance of power politics overlaid with the strong emotional issue of Arab nationalism and unity, an explosive mixture, as we will see now.

II.  Origins of Pan-Arabism

A little background on the idea of Arab nationalism and Arab unity:  The idea of Arab nationalism had its roots in the late 19th century flowering of local nationalisms throughout the Middle East .  Its political aims were nebulous and diffuse, but it clearly asserted that all the Arabs shared a common historical and cultural background that demanded some type of political recognition.  The first overtly political manifestation of this Arab feeling was the Arab Revolt of 1916, and the brief Arab kingdom based in Damascus.  Despite the creation of Arab governments throughout the Arab East, the domination of politics by the colonial powers prevented further political manifestations of a common Arab identity – as seen in the failure of Hashemite unity plans. It was only with the waning of imperial power, during and immediately after World War II, that the idea of an institutional expression of Arab identity could be revived.  We see it in the Fertile Crescent and Greater Syria plans put forward by the Hashemite regimes in Iraq and Transjordan during the war; we see it in the establishment and growth of the Bacth party; we see it in the formation of the Arab League in 1945; we see it in the widespread belief that a common Arab stand in the Palestine crisis was necessary.

However, the realities of politics served to restrain and restrict the political achievement of the lofty goals of Arab unity.  There was first of all the question of just what the goals of Arab nationalism were:  a single Arab state, fewer states, unity in terms of foreign policy, or just some general expression of fellow feeling?  Even in terms of minimal goals, the achievements in this realm during and immediately after WWII were, to many, disappointing.  The Arab states did not immediately form a greater Arab political entity -- those in control of each state had too much of a vested interest in their own positions. The Arab League, while a manifestation of common Arab feeling, was built on the notion of respect for the sovereignty of each Arab state.  The lack of cooperation among the Arab armies in Palestine, in fact, their conflicting and mutually exclusive strategies, gave the lie to brave assertions about Arab unity of purpose.

Arab unity was a real issue, despite the somewhat hypocritical stance on it by the Arab states.  A new generation of political leadership was nurtured on the rhetoric of Arab nationalism and unity, and saw it as a way to confront both Israel and the great powers.  Arab nationalism and unity became to a large extent the political orthodoxy not just of a new political generation, but of a growing political class -- graduates of new Arab institutions of higher education, who made their careers in the growing ranks of the Arab governments, the Arab armies, and quasi-public institutions like the press, the legal world, and state-sponsored economic projects. It was only to a new brand of Arab leader that this group, large in number but by no means a majority of the Arabs, could respond.  Gamal cAbd al-Nasir emerged, as much by accident as by design, as this leader.

III.  The Baghdad Pact and the Suez War

Nasir’s emergence as the leader of the Pan-Arab movement, a political phenomenon that would bring down some governments, seriously shake others, and bedevil the Western powers and Israel, was the result of a series of political events that began with American efforts in the early 1950's, after the failure of the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) plan, to construct a new Middle Eastern defense organization.  The Eisenhower Administration in 1954 sought to put together an alliance of Northern Tier states, bordering the Soviet Union , which could accommodate US air bases (nuclear strategy).  Dulles’ original intent was to limit such a grouping to non-Arab states like Turkey , Iran and Pakistan , mindful of the complications that Arab politics and the Arab-Israeli conflict had caused for the MEDO proposal.  However, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Sacid was anxious to join any Western-sponsored defense organization, and worked through bilateral diplomacy with Turkey and Britain to be included.  

Nuri had a number of reasons to join the proposed defense organization, despite the inevitable opposition such a move would engender among nationalist opinion:  substantial amounts of military aid, a convenient way to finesse his British problem, help in Iraqi efforts to be the dominant Arab regional power.  Nuri emphasized that adherence to such a defense grouping would strengthen Iraq and the Arab world as a whole in its continuing struggle against Israel.  What he left unsaid was that it would also strengthen Iraq vis a vis Damascus , Cairo and Riyad.

Between February and November 1955 the various bilateral and multilateral agreements were worked out, and the defense organization that came to be known as the Baghdad Pact came into being, with Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Great Britain as members.  The United States, though the original driving force behind the Pact, stayed out, both in reaction to strong Israeli opposition to the Pact, and in the hope that Washington might be able to bring Egypt along at a later date.  Nasir saw the pact as an indirect means for the continuation of British influence throughout the Middle East, and as a direct threat to Egypt's leadership of the Arab world because of the central role Iraq was playing in it.  Moreover, Nasir had become involved in the growing non-aligned movement (Bandung Conference of April 1955), which not only rejected the idea of defense agreements with the West, but held out the prospect of greater political freedom for smaller states by playing off the two superpowers.  Thus his opposition to the Pact could be explained both on strategic and regional grounds. What was most important about this episode was the way that Nasir chose to conduct his campaign of opposition to the Pact.

Nasir took his case against the Pact over the heads of the Arab rulers directly to their people, attacking it as an effort by the imperialists to continue their control, indirectly, over the Arab world.  His innovative use of the radio beamed his message directly to the masses throughout the Arab world, where the "transistor revolution" was just coming into its own.  Nasir found a receptive audience to his calls for public opposition to the Pact throughout the Arab world, touching the cord of Arab nationalism that had been developing among the politically relevant groups since WWII.  This strategy of appealing directly to the people against their own government was something new in inter-Arab politics.  There had of course been plenty of meddling in the domestic politics of other states, but it had all been done on the elite level and in relative secrecy.  Nasir was the first Arab leader to openly challenge the legitimacy of other Arab governments in public, aiming those challenges directly at the citizens of those other governments, in the hopes of forcing policy changes, or perhaps changes in the governments themselves.

Nasir encouraged political agitation in Syria and in Jordan against the Pact.  Both states, under serious public pressure and riots in the streets, renounced any intention of joining it.  Anti-Pact governments in both Syria and Jordan, with the support of the new nationalist parties like the Bacth and other left-wing groups, signed defense agreements with Egypt.  Nationalist sentiment in Jordan even led the young King Husayn to dismiss Sir John Glubb, the British officer who built the Jordanian Army, as its commander. [March 1956]

Nasir had in effect made the Baghdad Pact struggle into a referendum of Arab opinion -- a choice between Nuri's strategy of continued reliance on the West v. his own of "Arab solidarity" and "neutralism" that in fact tilted toward the Soviet Union.  Nasir's standing in this fight was greatly enhanced by the willingness of the Soviet Union to offer tangible support.  In September 1955 Egypt and Czechoslovakia agreed on a trade of Egyptian cotton for an undisclosed amount of heavy military equipment.  In this stroke Nasir broke the arms boycott imposed by the Western powers in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, and undercut Nuri's argument that only through alliance with the West could the Arab states build up their militaries.  The arms deal was an enormous propaganda coup for Nasir, and received widespread support throughout the Arab world.  The anti-Pact Syrian government quickly followed suit, concluding its own arms deal with the Soviets.  The arms deal marked the end of any realistic hope that other Arab states would join the Baghdad Pact.

With the arms deal and his victory in the Baghdad Pact battle, Nasir was now the dominant political leader in the Arab world.  His influence was seen as a direct threat to British interests, particularly in Iraq and Jordan.  His championing of the Algerian independence movement had earned him the enmity of France.  Palestinian guerilla raids on Israel from the Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip had led to a series of Israeli counter-raids in reprisal, escalating Arab-Israeli tensions.  Israeli leaders were also worried that the Soviet arms deal would upset the military balance in the region, thus making Nasir's Egypt an even greater threat to Israeli security.  Britain, France and Israel thus all had reasons to want to get at Nasir, and needed only an incident for this nascent anti-Nasir alliance to jell.

That incident came in July of 1956.  One of the major development projects which the Nasir regime had proposed for Egypt was the building of a new dam on the Nile at Aswan, a project that would regulate the flow of the river for irrigation purposes and provide a massive new source of hydro-electric power.  Nasir had sought funding for the project from the US and the World Bank, which had originally been receptive. [Dulles wanted to woo Nasir]  However, Nasir's foreign policy actions led the U.S. to withdraw promised financial support. In a dramatic response, Nasir in July 1956 nationalized the Suez Canal.  Since the famous share purchase by Disraeli back in the 1870's, the Canal had been run private company made up primarily of British and French investors, the major one being the British government.  Nasir's plan was to use canal tolls to fund his dam project, and his nationalization was certainly legal under international law, as he committed Egypt to pay compensation to the company shareholders.

The British government of Conservative PM Anthony Eden was unconcerned with the legal issue, rightly seeing Nasir’s bold stroke as a major assault on Britain 's position in the Middle East .  Eden resolved upon action, and found ready allies in France and Israel, for the reasons set out above.  A plan was set under which Israel would attack the Sinai Peninsula, after which Britian and France would intervene militarily to "protect the Canal", all in hopes that these military shocks would bring down the Nasir government.  On October 29, 1956 Israeli forces invaded the Sinai, quickly capturing the entire Peninsula and neutralizing the Egyptian military forces there.  On October 31, after Egyptian refusals to accept French and British ultimatums about cease-fire and withdrawal of forces, British and French troops landed in Canal Zone.

Just when it seemed that Nasir’s goose was cooked, he was saved by the intervention of an unexpected party -- the United States .  The British and the French had acted without consulting the US in their invasion plan.  The British and French attack occurred just as the Soviets were sending their own troops into Hungary to quell the nationalist uprising there.  At a time when the US could have been having a propaganda field-day against the Soviets, the British and the French had diverted world attention and given a cover to the Soviet activities in Hungary.  Moreover, the Suez campaign began just days before a US presidential election, in which Eisenhower was running for re-election on a platform emphasizing his administration's keeping of the peace.  Washington exerted heavy pressure on France and Britain to end their military expedition, including discreet hints that American financial institutions would encourage a run on the British pound.  By November 6, both Paris and London had agreed to a cease-fire and withdrawal of their troops by Christmas.  The Eisenhower administration also put heavy pressure on Israel to give up its gains, including a threat to alter the tax-exempt status of contributions by Americans to the Jewish state.  Israeli withdrawal was followed by the stationing of UN forces along the border, which to some extent cut down on cross-border raids, and at Sharm al-Shaykh, to insure Israeli freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba/Eliat.

The political consequences of the Suez War were enormous.  Out of the jaws of defeat, Nasir snatched an unprecedented political victory.  His standing among the Arab populations soared to new heights.  The War was a devastating blow to French and especially British prestige in the area. 

IV.  The High Tide of Pan-Arabism -- 1958

The Unites States quickly realized that Nasirist Pan-Arabism supported by the Soviet Union could be as much of a threat to American interests as it was to British and French interests.  Washington attempted to fill the strategic vacuum created by the Suez War by in 1957 announcing the Eisenhower Doctrine.  This Doctrine stated that Washington was ready to come to the aid of any friendly country threatened by "international Communism".  In fact, international communism in the Middle East context meant Nasirist Pan-Arabism, which since the Suez War had taken on something of the nature of an inevitable political tide.

Under the Eisenhower Doctrine, the United States began a policy aimed at rolling back Nasirism.  With US and British support, King Husayn in effect staged a coup d’etat against his own government, dismissing Prime Minister Sulayman Nabulsi (pro-Nasir) and suspending the popularly elected parliament.  The King faced down a pro-Nasirist coup attempt in the army, and the United States expressed support for his actions, support reinforced by the deployment of the Sixth Fleet off in the eastern Mediterranean.  The Administration tried to duplicate its success in Jordan with similar moves in Syria, encouraging coup plotting within Damascus, moving the fleet to the Syrian coast, and coordinating troop concentrations by Turkey and Iraq on Syrian borders.  Unlike in Jordan, this effort failed, the US plotting was exposed, and the influence of pro-Soviet and pro-Egyptian forces strengthened in Damascus. 

While these foreign machinations were going on, domestic politics within Syria were reaching the point of crisis.  The pro-Nasir, pro-Soviet grouping in Damascus that was controlling politics was a heterogeneous mix of Bacthists, nationalist army officers, Communists, and opportunistic politicians who hoped to ride the tide of Soviet and local Communist support to power (eg. Khalid al-‘Azm).  It was an unstable mix, held together more by a common sense of who the enemy was, than by any positive program on which its elements could unite.  The contest for power within the coalition was as fierce as that against its domestic opponents.  In that internal struggle, the Bacth felt the initiative slipping to its Communist and pro-Soviet rivals.  The party sought an escape from the dilemma through a strategy of Pan-Arabism, specifically calling for immediate unity between Syria and Nasir’s Egypt .  This was the part of the Bacth platform that had the highest level of popular, emotional support; and the party saw in Nasir a patron who would support Bacthist domination of Syrian politics. 

Under Bacthist prodding, the Syrian legislature issued a call in the fall of 1957 for unity.  The Communists, not wanting to be outbid, and confident that Nasir would refuse the offer, added their support.  The political feuds in Syria had by that time penetrated the armed forces, and army officers also looked to Egypt as an arbiter and a support against rival civilian politicians.  In early January 1958 14 top Syrian officers went to Egypt to support the call for unity, leaving behind an ultimatum to the cabinet to support their efforts. [evidence of increasing irrelevance of parliament and importance of the military, growing since 1949]  The union of Syria and Egypt into the United Arab Republic was proclaimed to wildly exaltant crowds in Damascus on February 1, 1958.

The effect of this declaration on the Arab world was like an electric shock.  The goal of unity propounded by Arab nationalists since the Great Revolt of WWI seemed to be becoming a reality. The Hashemite kingdoms of Jordan and Iraq did their own union in response, but to little avail.  In July 1958 army officers in Iraq overthrew the government, killed the members of the royal family and Nuri al-Sacid, and professed their commitment to the principle of Arab unity on a “progressive” basis.  Civil conflict in Lebanon escalated, and Jordan , now surrounded by what were seen in the circumstances as “Nasirist” governments, looked ripe for an Iraqi-style coup, or a Lebanese-style civil war.  The tide of Nasirism seemed unstoppable.

The United States and Britain acted quickly to prop-up the Lebanese and Jordanian governments, in an effort to stem the flood-tide.  British paratroopers were sent to Jordan, and, at the request of President Chamoun, American Marines landed in Beirut.  King Husayn rode out this crisis, and in Lebanon the US brokered a transition to a new government that promised to follow Nasir’s foreign policy lead, but not to enter into any unity agreements.  Saudi Arabia , at first an ally of Egypt in an anti-Hashemite alliance, had begun to perceive Nasir as a greater threat.  With the events of 1958, however, even the Saudis seemed to line up more with the Egyptian president.  King Saud, who had been implicated in an effort to assassinate Nasir, was forced to cede government power to his brother, Crown Prince Faysal, who was thought at the time to be closer to Nasir.  By the end of 1958, Nasir was the undisputed master of the Arab world, but that situation would not last for long.

V.  Pan-Arab Problems in the 1960's

At the moment that he had ascended the heights, Nasir began to face challenges to his dominance of Arab politics.  In a certain sense, this was built into the political circumstances of the Middle East.  In each state the leadership elite had a vested interest in the continued independence of its state; some of these elites even saw themselves as having as much right as Nasir to claim leadership of the movement.  The leader of the new regime in Iraq in fact did challenge Nasir leadership of "progressive" Arab politics.  The geopolitical rivalry between Iraq and Egypt that had emerged when both countries were monarchies did not disappear now that both were revolutionary military regimes. Egypt ’s army, given its own limits and the Israeli threat, was not in a position to act as the Prussian army had in German unification, or the Piedmontese army had in Italian unification.  Nasir’s inability to continue the unity momentum is a telling example of both the strengths and the weaknesses of the idea of Pan-Arabism.

Setbacks, before 1967 war, for Nasir’s Pan-Arab campaign:

a) break with Iraq from 1958 to 1963, when Abd al-Karim Qasim challenged Nasir’s leadership of Arab “progressives”

b) Syrian secession of 1961 from the United Arab Republic

c) “social revolution” theme from 1961, which alienates Saudis and Jordanians

d) Yemen intervention in 1962, quickly turning into a draining war of attrition for Egyptian army

e) failure of unity talks of 1963 with Syria and Iraq

f) Islamic conference proposal of 1965 by Saudi Arabia , supported by Turkey , Iran , Pakistan and Jordan :  An effort to dilute Nasir’s Arab appeal by broadening the context of regional politics.

The BIG Question:  Why the failure of the Nasirist moment?

a) inter-Arab rivalry -- structural (multi-polar anarchy; Iraqi ambitions) and ideological (Bacthists v. Nasir, "progressives" v. "reactionaries")

b) strengthening of the Arab states from their 1950’s weakness to their more oppressive and socially-controlling status through 1960’s and into 1970’s

c) inability of Egypt to play the role of military unifier ( Israel blocking Egypt geographically; failure in Yemen )

d) opposition of the superpowers (differing in intensity at different periods, but never a period when both superpowers were favorably disposed to Nasirist plans)

In conclusion, what can we make of the Nasirist moment in the Middle East?  That he was the dominant player in Middle Eastern politics for two decades cannot be denied.  Nor can it be denied that his call for Arab unity hit a responsive cord throughout the Middle East.  His approach to the whole issue of unity changed the context in which it was understood at the time. He changed Arab politics with his direct appeals to people over the heads of their governments. Before Nasir, inter-Arab politics had much of the character of a game played among political elites -- an important game, but a game nonetheless.  By involving the Arab "masses", Nasir transformed inter-Arab politics from a game to a deadly serious matter of regime survival and regional dominance.  His championing of Arab nationalism gave new life to Arab opposition to Israel after the dispiriting defeat of 1948-49, keeping the issue alive and cutting off any chances of Arab moves toward peace.  His emphasis on non-alignment and Arab self-reliance made a political liability out of the close relations many Arab states had with Western countries, and, paradoxically, opened up the Arab world to relations with the Soviet Union. 

Yet, while Nasir was strong enough on the political, military and ideological levels to dominate the politics of the Arab world, he was not strong enough to achieve his goals of unity, or even a minimum level of all-Arab agreement on foreign policy issues.  Inter-Arab rivalry was during Nasir’s time, and still is, as inevitable as the calls for Arab unity and Arab cooperation.  Geographical and political barriers exist (Israel, deserts). The variety of domestic political systems among the Arab states is a further impediment to real unity, and an incentive to rivalries for Arab leadership on the ideological level.  The obstacles to unity are as real as the feeling among many Arabs that unity at some level is an obligation.  Thus, the tension between rivalry and cooperation in the Arab world is particularly severe, and has characterized Middle Eastern politics before, during and after the Nasir period.  What Nasir did was to make this tension the most salient issue of Middle Eastern politics during his period of regional dominance.

The Nasirist tide was the most serious threat thus far to the legitimacy of states like Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iraq that had very little background in history and tradition.  Yet, the state system continued in the Middle East unchanged.  The governing elites in each of these states had a real interest in the preservation of their own independence.  They were willing to brave the wrath of Nasir, and at times of their own people, to maintain it.  This was a major block to Nasir’s ambitions.

And, over time, these states have been able to extend that feeling of identification with and interest in the state to a wider range of their citizens.  State-controlled economic benefits have become more widespread; institutional structures like the bureaucracy and ruling political parties have been strengthened; the passage of time has made thinking of a future without the current states more difficult.  Even the current Islamic movements do not talk about a united Islamic state, but rather Islamic government in existing borders.  So while it might yet be premature to talk of a widespread feeling of a Syrian, Jordanian, Iraqi or Saudi “nationalism,” there has been in the post-Nasir era a growing public acceptance of the legitimacy of the particular states themselves (if not in the people who lead them) and an increasing material interest of larger numbers of people in the existing state structures.  Political agendas had tended to become more localized as the state has become more important.  Arabs might not like their governments, but they see their political interests, for good or for ill, increasingly tied up with the existing states.