Palestine Crisis/Creation of Israel/1st Arab-Israeli War
I. Zionism v. Palestinian Nationalism -- demographics, organization
II. Diplomacy and War -- 1947-48 (civil); 1948-49 (international)
III. Why no peace after 1949?
I. Zionism v. Palestinian Nationalism -- demographics, organization
As promised in our last meeting, today we will discuss what is in America the most hotly disputed and most emotionally felt issue of the Middle East: the Arab-Israeli dispute. We will look at the creation of the state of Israel, and the beginnings of Palestinian national feeling and organization. We will examine the development in the inter-war period of two competing nationalisms -- Zionist and Palestinian; and compare their social bases and forms of political and military organization. We will also assess the vacilating policy of Great Britain, the mandatory power, which in the end left Palestine with the enmity of both the Jewish and the Arab communities. We will conclude with a brief discussion of the events of 1947-49 -- the United Nations and United States diplomacy; the Zionist-Palestinian civil war in Palestine, which culminated in the May 1948 declaration of Israeli independence; and then the first Arab-Israeli war, which ended in 1949 with an expanded Israeli state, Transjordan in possession of substantial territories on the West Bank of the Jordan river, Egypt administering the Gaza strip, and no Palestinian political entity.
We can consider the growth of Zionism and Palestinian nationalism in mandate Palestine within the same framework that we used in looking at the development of other national movements in the Middle East -- the dynamic of local opposition to imperial rule. However, in the case of Zionism and Palestinian nationalism, we must consider an added twist. The two movements developed as much in reaction to each other as they did to the British mandatory authority; and in the end it was the military clash between them that decided the issue in favor of the Zionists. Each local movement appealed to the mandatory for help against the other, while at the same time opposing those aspects of mandatory policy which it perceived as hindering the achievement of its goals.
Let's first compare the Zionist and Palestinian movements in two vital areas that help to determine the outcome of polititcal competitions: demography and organization. On the demographic side, the Palestinians had a definite advantage throughout the inter-war period, right up to 1948. At the beginning of the mandate, 1922, the Jewish population of Palestine was around 80,000 -- a paltry 11% of the total population. Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann had told the Versailles Peace Conference that he expected an annual rate of Jewish immigration of between 70,000 and 80,000, but in the first 10 years of the mandate the Jewish population had increased by only somewhat more than 10,000 per year, on average. In 1927 and 1928, as a result of the severe economic downturn in Palestine, the number of Jews leaving Palestine actually exceeded the number coming in. By 1931, the Jewish population of Palestine stood at around 175,000, less than 20% of the total population.
The British mandatory authorities, in an effort to appease Arab opinion, had not exactly encouraged Jewish immigration during those years, and the unwillingness of the new Soviet Russian regime to allow unrestricted Jewish emigration undoubtedly kept the numbers lower than they might have been. But the unmistakeable conclusion we must draw from the numbers is that the Zionist movement during these early years held out little promise to most Jews, who were unwilling to uproot themselves for a difficult and uncertain existence in Palestine. However, European politics in the early 1930's changed this calculation. The rise of Nazism in Germany, and parallel anti-Semitism in other European countries, compelled or induced tens of thousands of European Jews to leave their homelands. While some made their way to America, a large number either chose, or were forced by circumstances, to make Palestine their new home. Between 1932 and 1939, more than twice as many immigrants came to the country as had entered it in the previous 12 years. During this period, what the Israelis call the Fifth Aliyeh, nearly 250,000 Jews came to Palestine. In 1939, the Jewish community in Palestine had grown to number nearly 450,000, about 30% of the total population. As important as the sheer numbers of the 1930's migration was the level of skill, education and capital that the new immigrants brought with them. It was this injection of new blood that transformed the Zionist movement in Palestine from a significant but manageable minority within an Arab state to a substantial, economically-independent community with a capacity to present a serious political and military challenge on the ground to the Arab majority.
During World War II and immediately thereafter the British limited Jewish immigration (in one of their typical half-measures which alienated one side and did not satisfy the other), so the increase from 1940 to 1947 averaged only about 15,000 persons per year. According to Israeli government figures, the total Jewish population of the state at the time of independence in 1948 was about 650,000. Since the beginning of the mandate, the Jewish community in Palestine had experienced remarkable growth and development, but still only accounted for about 1/3rd of the total population of Palestine. On the demographic score, at the outbreak of the Palestine civil war in 1947, the Arabs had a 2 to 1 advantage over the Zionists.
But demographics are not in themselves decisive, and in the organizational sphere the Zionist movement made up for its decided population disadvantage. In the terms of the League of Nations mandate for Palestine, there was established an entity called the Jewish Agency, which acted, in effect, as a proto-government in Palestine for the Zionist movement. The Jewish Agency encouraged immigration and organized settlement of immigrants; it officially represented Zionist interests before the Mandatory; it oversaw land purchases; it organized an underground military force which eventually became the army of the state of Israel. Under its auspices a thriving labor movement was established and a system of Jewish educational institutions set up. The Zionist goal was to develop a self-sufficient economic base in isolation from the surrounding Arab environment. They were only partly successful in this, but they had developed a rudimentary economy by the mid-1940’s. This economy provided (along with outside donations) the financial support for Zionist organizational efforts. In effect, the Zionist movement had, not a government in exile, but a government in waiting, in Palestine that could provide leadership and coordination for the thousands of committed and talented Jewish immigrants that came there.
This is not to say that there were not divisions within the Zionist movement. The partisan divisions which dominate Israeli politics today had their intellectual and organizational roots in the Mandate period. The main Zionist military force, the Haganah, was challenged by smaller military formations, the Irgun and the Stern Gang, which objected to the Haganah leadership and its relatively moderate line vis a vis the British authorities during World War II. But, comparatively, the Zionist movement in Palestine was well organized and disciplined, able to take the full advantage of the resources as its disposal.
The Palestinian national movement, on the other hand, was hampered by a number of organizational obstacles. First, the educational level of the native population was no were near that of its Zionist competitors, many of whom came to Palestine after achieving positions of intellectual and economic distinction, particularly in pre-Hitler Germany. Second, the Palestinians were organized politically in a segmented fashion, based upon a pyramidal network of families and clans. Political allegiance was normally given on the local level to a notable family or particular leader of stature in a village or town quarter, who would in turn maintain connections with a particular family or leader who had a regional or country-wide reputation. A distinguished historian of the Middle East, Albert Hourani, characterized this system of political organization, or in some cases, disorganization, in the Middle East generally as "the politics of the notables", and this is a very apt term.
While this type of organizational structure made for the quick communication of information up and down the social ladder (as was seen during the Palestinian general strike of 1936-37), it also made country-wide organization difficult. Each of these notables, at the various levels of society, was very jealous of his unofficial position and prestige, and of his personal independence. This made the process of political mobilization one of constant cajolery, negotiation and compromise -- a very difficult situation, given the responsive and disciplined organizational structure of the Palestinians' opponents.
In the Palestinian case, the politics of the notables presented a very specific organizational barrier, as there were two rival notable families vying for the leadership of the national movement -- the Husaynis and the Nashashibis. The Husayni clan of Jerusalem supplied the leader of the early Palestinian Arab congresses, Musa Kazim al-Husayni, whom the British had deposed as mayor of Jerusalem. The clan also supplied the most important and powerful of the Palestinian leaders during the mandate, Hajj Amin al-Husayni. Hajj Amin was an early opponent of the mandate and of British policy, but, in a bow towards Arab opinion, was appointed by the mandate authorities to the position of mufti, or chief Muslim religious figure, of Jerusalem. From that position Hajj Amin became president in 1922 of the Supreme Muslim Council, established in that year to control Islamic religious, legal, educational and endowment programs. From that position Hajj Amin became the most important, though certainly not the unchallenged, leader of the Palestinian community.
The great rivals of the Husaynis were the Nashashibis, a clan based in the town of Nablus. When the British deposed Musa Kazim al-Husayni as mayor of Jerusalem, his place was taken by Raghib Bey al-Nashashibi, thereby winning the enmity of the Husayni clan and the charge of collaboration with the British. While Hajj Amin consolidated his control over the various Palestinian political and social organizations, Raghib Bey formed his own party, the National Defense Party, which maintained the al-Nashashibi claim to community leadership. Examples of the cost of this factionalism are numerous. One in particular stands out: in 1934, as Jewish immigration was surging, the Arab Higher Committee, an ad hoc group of Palestinian leaders meant to coordinate political activity, broke up as a result of Husayni-Nashashibi rivalry.
One of the most important results of this rivalry was the inability of the Palestinian leadership to accept compromises which, while giving up some points, in effect would have given them the upper hand in their contest with the Zionists (the 1939 White Paper being the best example). The fear of losing out to local rivals, who could brand the compromisers traitors, combined with the deeply held view that any deals with the British meant acceptance of Balfour, led to the particularly "rejectionist" stance of the Palestinian leadership in their dealings with the British. While the two clans at times cooperated in matters of great urgency and importance, such as the organization of the 1936-37 general strike, their rivalry continued throughout the mandate period and seriously hampered the efforts at political organization and mobilization in the Palestinian community. [make point about why Palestinian rejectionism -- desire not to in any way condone Balfour]
Finally, one more obstacle to Palestinian organizational efforts must be mentioned. The issue of Palestine and Zionism excited great interest and feeling throughout the Arab world, feelings that were utilized and, in some ways, exploited by governments and political movements in the other Arab states. The Arab states picked sides within the Palestinian community, or injected themselves directly into the Palestinian-Zionist confrontation, encouraging factionalism and discouraging coordination. In effect, rivalries among the Arab states were played out within Palestinian factional politics. For example, the Iraqi government sponsored the small Istiqlal party, headed by veteran Arab nationalist Awni cAbd al-Hadi; Hajj Amin kept close contacts with the Saudi government; the Nashashibis allied themselves with King cAbdallah of Transjordan, who had territorial ambitions in Palestine. The Syrian government sponsored its own group of anti-Zionist fighters under Jamil Mardam, who were free agents in the Palestinian scene, and the Egyptian government allowed volunteers, many of whom were from the Muslim Brotherhood, to carry out their own cross-border activities into southern Palestine. The activities of the Arab governments also led to a belief in some Palestinian quarters that, in the end, Baghdad, Cairo and Amman could use their special relations with the British government to bring an end to the Zionist threat. This belief proved illusory -- an illusion which was exploded by events.
So, while the Palestinian community was united in its rejection of the Balfour declaration and of the British mandate, and could in moments of great urgency express that unity politically, such as in the 1936-37 general strike, in terms of general political organization it lagged behind its Zionist competitors. This organizational deficiency was especially telling during the 1947 civil war, when the Zionists were able to put more men in the field, under a tighter and more responsive command structure, then were the Palestinians.
II. Diplomacy and War -- 1947-48 (civil); 1948-49 (international)
We have discussed two determinant factors in political competitions, demography and organization, and now will take up a third, equally important factor -- outside support, or what we might call "diplomacy". In this section we will discuss British policy, and then the politics surrounding the UN decision to recommend partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, particularly United States policy, and finally the reaction of the Arab states to partition. As I alluded to before, British policy in the Palestine mandate was in large part a series of half-measures, aimed at placating the Arabs without giving up their support for the Zionist movement, half-measures which earned London the distrust of the Zionists and the enduring enmity of the Palestinians.
From the start, it was clear to the British authorities that the Arab inhabitants of Palestine would not accept their mandate as long as it included support for the Balfour Declaration. Arab riots against Balfour in 1920-21 led Winston Churchill, then Colonial Secretary, to apparently back away from the Balfour promises. After the inter-communal violence of 1929, various British commissions of inquiry suggested that strict limits be put on Jewish immigration and that the political rights of Arabs be emphasized in mandatory administration. However, British recognition of and support for the Jewish Agency on the ground, combined with its continued commitment to the Balfour Declaration, prevented any complete shift in mandatory policy toward the Arab position. In response to the general strike of 1936 (which lasted from April to October, in protest over increased Jewish immigration), the Peel Commission (July 1937) recommended partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state. While the Zionist movement exhibited a cautious approval of the partition suggestion, the Arab community rejected it immediately. Violence escalated, until by the early fall of 1938 the entire Palestinian community was in a state of rebellion against the British.
Faced with the prospect of alienating the entire Arab world, at a time when it was increasingly clear that a world war with Germany was in the offing, London backed away from the partition recommendation. Rather, for the first time, the British government invited the participation of the Arab states, along with the Palestinian and Zionist movements, in consideration of the situation -- at the Round Table Conference of 1939. While no agreement among the parties could be reached, the British after the meetings unilaterally issued what came to be known as the 1939 White Paper, a major change in their Palestine policy. The White Paper called for an independent Palestinian state after a 10 year transitional period; a five-year quota for Jewish immigration, after which the Arab community would have to approve further Jewish immigration (in effect, ending it); and severe restrictions on Jewish land purchases. The White Paper reflected Britain's desire to maintain its Arab alliances during the upcoming war.
The Zionists were disheartened, immediately announcing their opposition, but given the realities of world politics at the time they had little recourse -- they certainly were not going to support Germany in the war. While the White Paper was an apparent victory for the Palestinians, and many of their leaders privately urged acceptance of it, Hajj Amin al-Husayni opposed it (it specifically prohibited his return to Palestine, from which he had been formally exiled by the British). His opposition in effect precluded any organized Palestinian acceptance of the terms. During the War, Palestine was relatively quiet, as Zionist formations supported the British war effort against the Nazis and most Palestinians did not rally to the calls of Hajj Amin, now an open Nazi ally in Berlin, to revolt.
With the end of the war, the increasingly well-armed and well-organized Zionist movement turned its attentions toward active resistance to the British mandatory authorities, whose policies were still governed by the 1939 White Paper, and who were actively discouraging Jewish immigration to Palestine. The Palestinian leadership was fragmented, with the return of Hajj Amin to challenge the Nashashibis and the Istiqlal party, and the involvement of the new Arab League and other Arab countries in Palestinian politics. Drained from its war effort, under pressure from the United States to increase Jewish immigration, and beset by armed rebellion by the Zionist movement, in 1947 the British turned the issue of Palestine back over to the successor organization of the League of Nation, the new United Nations. There, with US and Soviet support, the General Assembly voted to partition the Palestinian mandate into Jewish and Arab states.
The partition resolution in November 1947, quickly accepted by the Zionists, led to full scale civil war between the Arab and Jewish communities of Palestine. After some early reverses, the Zionist forces were able not only to consolidate their hold on the areas granted to them by the partition resolution, but also to gain more territory. Their position was helped by the gradual withdrawal of British forces, who for the most part aided Palestinian military efforts, but just marginally. The end of the British naval blockade enabled new immigrants to arrive and weapons from Czechoslovakia to be delivered. By May 1948, the Zionists had bested their Palestinian opponents and declared the independence of the state of Israel. The new state was immediately recognized by both the United States and the Soviet Union.
The declaration of the state of Israel was followed within hours by the attack of the 5 neighboring Arab states upon the new country, shifting the conflict from an inter-communal to an inter-national level of conflict. The beleagured Zionists were able to hold out against the combined strength of the Arab armies for three reasons:
1) the Arab armies did not cooperate in their military moves, in fact at times pursuing contradictory strategies. The hostility between the Transjordanian forces, who were clearly aiming at annexing as much Arab territory as possible to King cAbdallah's rule, and the forces of Egypt and Syria, rivals of the Hashimites, were almost as great as their shared hostility for the new state of Israel.
2) the Zionists were able, as strange as it seems, to field a larger force than the 5 Arab armies combined (30,000 v. 24,000). This disparity was the result of two factors: superior Israeli organizational and mobilizational techniques, and the constraints on the size of the Arab armies imposed by their colonial masters. [Bickerton and Klausner list figures that show the combined Arab armies as being slightly larger than the forces of the new state of Israel. I think that they are taking the total forces of the Arab armies, not the number committed to the war.]
3) the leaders of the new state of Israel had been holding secret negotiations for some time with King Abdallah of Transjordan about how to dispose of the Arab territories of Palestine. While the Israelis and Transjordanians fought fierce battles around Jerusalem, an area that had not been the subject of their negotiations, in most of the areas promised to the Arabs by the UN resolution the Israelis and the Transjordanians did not come into conflict. Jordan in fact stayed out of the last round of the fighting, from November 1948 to January 1949, as the Israelis pushed the Egyptian army out of Negev. Israel, though with a clear military advantage, did not after this round of fighting, turn against Transjordan (even though some in Israeli military – Moshe Dayan in particular – urged it).
Hostilities drew to a close with the Israelis in control of over half of the mandate territory; Jordan held the West Bank and Egypt the Gaza strip. U.N. armistice agreements led to a formal end to the hostilities in the summer of 1949. [eg. of Arab lack of cooperation -- Egypt signing armistice without consultation]
Another important element of the Israeli victory in the 1948-49 War was the diplomatic and material support of the two new world superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Why did they support partition and recognize the new state of Israel? In the Soviet case, it was a clear, if in the end, mistaken notion of realpolitik. The Middle East at that time was dominated by Britain and France, and Israeli independence would break the strangle-hold of the old colonialists on the region. Moreover, there was some wishful thinking in Moscow that the Zionist movement, dominated then by the socialist-oriented, Labour party leadership, might be open to good relations with the USSR. Hence, the shipment of Czech arms and planes to the Haganah during the civil war, and Soviet recognition of Israeli independence immediately after it was announced.
The United States case is much more complicated, and much more controversial. We can hardly do it justice here. We do know that the State Department and most of the official foreign policy community opposed partition and recognition of Israel. President Truman overrode this opposition. Now, whether he did it because he recognized that, given the strength of the Zionist movement on the ground, partition was the only practical solution; or because he sympathized with the horrible plight of the Jews in Europe under Hitler; or because such a position would strengthen his domestic political position during a difficult election -- all of this is a matter of still vigorous and frequently tendentious debate. Suffice it to say that some combination of those reasons probably influenced Truman to come to the decisions that he did.
III. Why No Peace After 1949?
Why was there no formal peace treaty after the war between Israel and the Arab states? There were attempts to strike a deal. During the UN armistice talks and at the Lausanne Conference (April-Sept. 1949), Egypt and Jordan both broached the idea of mutual recognition, but in exchange for territorial adjustments and for the return of the Palestinian refugees. Israel was not prepared to accept those terms. Beyond those first tentative contacts, the Arab states had no interest in such a formal recognition of Israel. Normally, in war, the defeated party is enjoined to come to terms because, if it does not, the stronger party will continue its attacks upon it. In this case, the new Israeli state was too exhausted to continue the war, and the Arab states had the protection of the international community, represented by the UN, in the 1949 armistice. The Israelis, owing their international legitimacy to the UN, were at that time loathe to contravene its dictates. That being the case, the Arab governments had nothing to gain from formal peace, but much to lose, in terms of domestic politics and in terms of the chance to reorganize their forces for another round of fighting in the future.
The one exception to this analysis was Jordan, which gained a great deal of territory in the fighting and had an interest in gaining Israeli recognition of its conquests. In fact, King cAbdallah did engage in secret negotiations with the Israelis for a treaty, a draft of which was concluded in 1950. Abdallah could not find a government willing to implement the treaty, so it remained a secret agreement, and in some respects a dead letter. When Abdallah was assassinated in 1951, Jordanian-Israeli negotiations, at least for this period, ceased.
What we have seen is the growth of two nationalist movements, their relations of support and hostility with the mandatory power, and their eventual test of strength between themselves. We then saw the change of the Arab-Israeli conflict from an inter-communal conflict to an international one, with the armed entrance of the Arab states into the fighting. The conflict remains today both a civil and an international conflict. Finally, we saw the important entrance into the Arab-Israeli arena of the two new superpowers, the US and the USSR.