The Gulf War (1990-91)
1) Background of
Kuwait-Iraq issue
2) Why did Saddam invade, and not back off?
3) Why did the US fight, and why did it stop when it did?
4) Alliance choices of others
5) Consequences
I. Background
-Kuwait under Al Sabah rule since 1760’s. Claimed by Ottomans as part of the province of Basra. But Ottoman control there almost non-existent. Sometimes, for their own reasons, the Al Sabah would fly an Ottoman flag and/or permit an Ottoman official into the country (quarantine officers, sometimes). 1899 Al Sabah ruler Mubarak the Great entered into a secret treaty with Britain making Kuwait a British protectorate. British did continue to negotiate with Ottomans right up to WWI about borders and spheres of influence in the Gulf, and an unratified treaty did put Kuwait in the Ottoman sphere (negotiators not informed of the secret treaty!).
-1922 Uqayr Conference: Sir Percy Cox draws the borders of Kuwait, Saudi and Iraq. Takes territory owned by Al Sabah and gives it to Iraq, but with very little outlet on the sea. Compensates Kuwait with desert territory. Draws neutral zones.
-Iraqi claims on Kuwait: 1938 under King Ghazi and Nuri al-Said – actually some support in Kuwait at that time (majlis movement); 1961 under Abd al-Karim Qasim at time of Kuwaiti independence. British send forces, Nasir supports Kuwait. A form of Iraqi recognition under the Arif brothers (with cash from Kuwait) – Iraqi embassy in Kuwait.
-Incidents in 1973 (Iraqi border post – rumors of cash settlement once again), during the Gulf War. But no major confrontation under the Ba’th. Kuwait strongly supports Iraq and Saddam in the Iran-Iraq War (Shi’a minority in Kuwait).
II. Why did Saddam Invade, and Not Back Off?
The real puzzle to me about the events of 1990-91 revolves around Saddam's
decisions to invade Kuwait and then not to withdraw in the face of overwhelming military power and apparent political will of the coalition. I find inadequate explanations that rest solely on the personality of Saddam Husayn. This is not to say that Saddam is not important. I do not want to go to the other extreme and say that anybody in a similar situation would have acted the same way. But I think that it is important to ask ourselves about the context of Saddam's actions -- what kind of situation did he perceive himself to face in 1990 that led him to react violently. We know that he is not simply irrationally violent. In 1975 the Iraqi regime, faced with a crisis in which Iran had superior military strength, backed down (Algiers Accord); in 1982, as Iranian troops were crossing the border, Saddam asked for an unconditional cease-fire. We know that in 1988, when the military advantage was apparently moving back to Iraq, he agreed to a cease-fire when the Iranians finally accepted one. The question is: what particular circumstances in 1990-91 led him to see the invasion of Kuwait as the best way to achieve his aims, and to see taking his chances against the coalition militarily as being more in his interests than retreating before the fight?
I also find inadequate explanations that rest completely on the opportunities Saddam saw for a gain. Obviously, he thought he could win, or he would not have done it. But that opportunity -- his military advantage over Kuwait -- had existed for some time. Moreover, in many ways he would have been better off if he had waited a year or two: his nuclear capacity would have been developed, perhaps the world picture would be less US-dominated (he saw that US dominance himself -- speech to ACC summit in February 1990). If he was simply calculating the costs and benefits, and the probabilities of success, he would have waited.
To me the essential starting point is understanding Saddam's view of his own position in Iraq, and Iraq's position in the region and the world. From your readings you can see that there was a serious revenue pinch in Iraq at this time. But let us be clear about the nature of that pinch -- it was in relation to Saddam's ambitious, not to his minimum revenue needs. The "loans" from the Gulf states were not going to be paid back, so that was not a big deal. His military costs were in the context of ambitious plans to maintain a very large military establishment. Yes, Iraq was indebted and facing financial pressures. But those pressures were not as extreme as might be made out. And the reaction to financial pressures does not logically have to be war to gain more resources -- it could be escalating a crisis and then accepting some kind of deal, as Saddam was offered at the Jidda meeting of late July 1990.
I think that our understanding of his understanding of his situation would be improved if we look at the financial situation as part of his overall political view. The end of the Iran-Iraq War did not bring Saddam the benefits and stature that he thought it would. In fact, having served his purpose in blocking the spread of Iranian revolutionary power, many of his allies began to distance themselves from him -- certainly less money from the Gulf, his ambitious military plans for the ACC never realized because of Egyptian hesitations, less central in superpower policies. In fact, he began to discern signs that there were efforts to destabilize his regime -- human rights debates in US and Europe, cutbacks on US grain credits, a new prominence in many Western media outlets and in Israel about the threat that Saddam and Iraq's nuclear plans presented to the region.
Meanwhile a number of officers who had distinguished themselves in the war with Iran were either "retired" to house arrest or died in mysterious helicopter crashes -- including Saddam's cousin and brother-in-law, Adnan Khayrallah, who was Defense Minister. In this context, Saddam's financial problems, and the fact that some Gulf states were producing more oil than their OPEC quota -- thus keeping prices down -- could be integrated into Saddam's view of the threats facing his regime as just one more effort to weaken and marginalize him.
I think that Saddam came to the conclusion that the status quo would lead to the end of his regime, and that he had to do something to shake that status-quo up. That is where the invasion of Kuwait comes in. It was easy militarily; and he thought that he could withstand the opposition of the United States because he thought that the Saudis would not be able domestically to invite an American force to their borders.
-1990: No source places the decision to go to war earlier than March 1990; some place it later. Evidence from within Iraqi ruling circles that there was not much preparation. At a meeting of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council and Bacth party leadership on January 24, 1991 Taha Yasin Ramadan told his colleagues "I am not saying that August 2, 1990 was the best day for the mother of battles. We had not studied the situation for a year, or even for months, preparing for the mother of battles. But it was the will of God that decided the date" (al-Bazzaz 1996: 200, quoting from minutes of the meeting). One would not dare to criticize a decision of Saddam Hussein in his presence, the implication being that Saddam himself recognized that the decision was rushed. The Bacth party apparatus also circulated an analysis to ranking party members after the war ended in February 1991 that admitted that Iraq was forced to take a quick decision to invade Kuwait, because of the pressures it was under, even though all necessary preparations for the confrontation had not been made (al-Bazzaz 1993: 34).
b) Why not Withdraw?
-The hypothesis that SH invaded Kuwait because of a sense that things were trending against him and his regime is strengthened if we consider his decision not to withdraw from Kuwait in the face of superior coaliton forces. If the offensive realist/expected utility explanation were superior, presumably he would have grabbed one of the diplomatic ropes thrown to him by the French, the Soviets, others from mid-January through mid-February
a) up to mid-January believed he could hold out
b) after mid-January, and reports that indicated his military was in a desperate position, he held on because he did not believe that withdraw would end the efforts to weaken him and oust him from power
c) comparison with 1975 -- backed down then because in doing so he strengthened himself domestically
III. Why Did the U.S. Fight, and Why Did It Stop?
United States certainly pursued a soft line on Iraq in the period leading up to the war, despite indications that things were not going right. The major reason was fear of Iran (some commercial incentives mixed in, particularly when we talk about Congress). Thus Glaspie was certainly following the policy line when she saw Saddam for the first and only time a few days before the invasion. But I do not think that was the major reason why Saddam fought; nor do Iraqi sources. Rather, they saw the U.S. as threatening the regime. Had the U.S. acted differently, would Saddam have moved? If U.S. troops were in Kuwait, perhaps not. But that was not on the agenda.
Why did the US fight? Standard geopolitical explanations are sufficient. The only question was whether Bush would be able to get a Congressional OK. I think that much of American diplomacy in the war -- the Tariq Aziz-Baker meeting, for example -- was to bring Congress along.
Why stop? Coalition factors, UN factors. But in the end fear that Iran would benefit from further destabilization in Iraq, and belief that Saddam was going down anyway. I think exaggerated fear.
Why the world-wide condemnation: norm of sovereignty. Everybody has an interest in it. Middle Eastern states, where the norm has competitors (Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamist platforms): not hard to figure Saudi, Egyptian decisions. Basic realism, balance of power politics can explain it. These were overdetermined decisions. Jordan, Syria, PLO and Iran are interesting:
1) Jordan -- pro-West, financially dependent. Economic ties to Iraq and political opening as the reasons; figuring that King can always get back in US good graces on A-I stuff.
2) Syria -- intra-Bacth rivalry, reading of the changed geopolitical circumstances
3) PLO -- still a puzzle to me. Clearly public opinion was part of it, but the risks were great. Did Saddam have something on Arafat? (Assassination of Salah Khalaf, Abu Iyad, during crisis).
4) Iran -- neutrality to great geopolitical benefit, despite some voices calling for confrontation with US. Regional geopolitics and domestic politics (siding with Saddam?) trump the elite’s ideological commitment to anti-Americanism.
V. Consequences
1) real end of the Cold War in the region.
2) changed position of Gulf states toward US, at least publicly. Ushered in a period of very close cooperation between US and Gulf states. Also set the framework for Usama bin Ladin’s opposition to Saudi monarchy and thus, indirectly, was an earlier contributing factor to 9/11
3) But not that much geopolitical change in the Gulf. Saddam is still there. Iran still under Islamic Republic, and hostile to U.S. (and vice versa).
4) Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islam -- dead? Why not so effective? Feelings still there, but complicated by the issue (no real consensus on use of force for unity). But also the strength of the states – see Syrian decision, which did go against public and party opinion.
5) movement on Arab-Israeli issues: Madrid Conference