1973 War
1. Lead-up: the differences with 1967
2. Why fight an unwinnable war?
3. War and diplomacy
4. Consequences
In our last lecture, we looked at one of the most important consequences of the 1967 war -- the re-emergence of an independent Palestinian nationalist movement as a factor in both the Arab-Israeli and the inter-Arab arenas. One of the reasons for that re-emergence was the realization in Palestinian circles that they could no longer rely upon the Arab states to represent their interests. With the Arab defeat in 1967, each of the "front-line" Arab states now had a new set of interests in the conflict; explicitly state interests in regaining their territories (Sinai, West Bank, Golan) lost to Israel. These state interests came to be placed above the Palestinian agenda in the policies of the Arab states. As early as the Khartoum conference, Nasir had obtained Arab approval for the possiblity of regaining the lost territories by negotiation. That approval was hedged with unacceptable conditions for Israel (the 3 no's), so it got nowhere. But the point is that even as implacable a foe of Israel as Nasir had realized that the new circumstances called for a change in the unbending Arab state commitment to maximum Palestinian goals.
It was this new element in the Arab-Israeli conflict -- the introduction of specific Arab state interests into the matrix of demands -- that led to both the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, and the subsequent negotiations leading to peace. While in 1967 Nasir risked war to bring about the end of Israel, in 1973 Sadat and Asad, with the help of King Faysal, risked war to regain Sinai, the Golan, and maybe, if they were lucky, the West Bank. The 1973 War was not a war to liquidate Israel, but a war to break the "no-war, no-peace" logjam that threatened the Arab rulers' domestic political positions (constant state of mobilization, economic commitment along with obvious political symbolism) and made the regaining of their lost territories more and more unlikely with each passing day. Sadat made very clear, both in his subsequent statements and in Egypt's war strategy, that he intended the war to be a limited one, meant to: 1) break out of the political-diplomatic stalemate, 2) shake Israel out of the belief that its military superiority robbed the Arabs of any war option, and 3) bring the superpowers more actively into the region's political process.
One of the most important differences between the 1967 and the 1973 war situations was the state of inter-Arab politics in the period leading up to the fighting. You will recall that in 1967, fragmentation and hostility characterized inter-Arab relations. [Egypt still had troops in Yemen, and was conducting an active propaganda war against Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Syria, under the radical Bacthist regime of Salah Jadid, was challenging Nasir's leadership by pursuing an actively hostile policy against Israel, a policy that eventually dragged Nasir into the conflict.] While there was a great rallying to Nasir's side by all the Arab regimes in the weeks preceding the war, there was no effective coordination in the military or the political spheres.
On the eve of the 1973 conflict, inter-Arab politics were completely different. The regime changes of 1970, which saw Anwar Sadat succeed Nasir and Hafiz al-'Asad push the more adventurous Bacthists out of power in Syria, altered the tone and content of Arab politics. Both these leaders had learned a lesson from the events of 1967 and 1970: that Arab fragmentation and hostility sapped the strength of their states and diverted resources and attentions from the task of recovering their lost territories. They set out to build a united Arab front behind the idea of recovering the territories, and to do this dropped the Nasirist-era campaign against "reactionary" Arab regimes.
The main beneficiary of this new turn in inter-Arab politics was Saudi Arabia. To encourage this trend, King Faysal gave his active support, both political and financial, to the Egyptian and Syrian regimes. It was this newly formed "Arab triangle" -- the Cairo-Damascus-Riyad alignment -- that fought the 1973 war and engaged in the post-war diplomacy. Egypt and Syria did the battlefield fighting; Saudi Arabia supported them with the oil weapon and did its best to keep the two parties together for subsequent negotiations. King Husayn was for the most part left out of this alignment. His regime benefitted from the relaxation in inter-Arab politics, but he was not brought in on the war planning (not trusted by others because of his relationship with Israel). The Jordanian front remained quiet during the entire war (Jordanian troops sent to fight on the Syrian front), a decision that turned out to be a major mistake (no part in negotiations). The PLO was also not a major partner in the war-planning or diplomatic stages. This was a battle of regular armies, not guerrilla formations, and was fought for Arab state interests, not for the Palestinian agenda.
While this new Arab alignment was being forged in the early 1970's, the United States and Israel maintained their policy, developed after the Jordanian crisis, of relying upon a strong military deterrent to bring the Arab states to terms. By any standard Israel maintained a comfortable margin of military superiority over its Arab foes. This superiority to a certain extent blinded both Israel and the US to the changed political circumstances on the Arab side. The belief that the Arabs had no choice but to come to terms led both Jerusalem and Washington to discount the possibility of any Arab war option. This misplaced confidence also led both Israel and the United States to discount peace feelers sent out by Sadat in 1971 and 1973. The American administration saw Sadat's diplomatic proposals not as an opportunity to get diplomacy going, but as proof that the stand-pat strategy was working. Keep backing Israel, it was argued, and eventually the Arabs would have to come around. With no US pressure, the Israeli government could safely ignore Sadat's diplomatic openings. [open Canal idea; first Egyptian acceptance of contractual peace with Israel]
The diplomatic option, except on Israel's terms, was closed to the Arab states in the years before the 1973 war. However, the question still remains: why launch a war when you yourself know that the military situation is stacked against you? This was an enormous risk for Sadat and Asad. Both were relatively new leaders, whose regimes were still shaky. Defeat by Israel, a la 1967, could easily have meant the end of their rule. The rationale for the Arab decision to go to war was a mixture of domestic pressures, a favorable inter-Arab alignment, and gaps in the Israeli defense strategy.
The domestic pressures were heaviest on Sadat. He came to power not in his own right, but by the constitutional accident of being Nasir's Vice-President. In 1971 he faced a very serious conspiracy within the highest reaches of the Egyptian government, [led by ASU leader Ali Sabri] aimed at deposing him from power. Only by moving first against the conspirators was he able to consolidate his shaky position. Economic pressures were also weighing heavily upon him, as the Egyptian economy had been on a war footing for years, with no results to show for it. The public mood in Egypt was decidedly hostile to Sadat, as he had become something of a figure of public ridicule [student demonstrations against him]. He reacted with a series of what seemed to be improvisations and blunders, which only added to his domestic problems. He loudly declared that 1971 would be the "year of decision" in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and when the year passed without any change in the situation, he looked like a blustering incompetent. In 1971 he signed a treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union, something even Nasir had refused to do, and then in 1972 expelled all the Soviet military personnel, numbering nearly 15,000 from the country.
Asad's domestic situation, while not as precarious as that of Sadat, was also not particularly stable. He emerged as leader from the second intra-Bacth coup in Syria in 4 years. The party was weakened by the infighting, and Asad came to rely increasingly upon fellow Alawites to support his regime. He needed some success on the Israeli front to legitimize his regime within the party, to the Syrian military, from which he had come, and to the majority Sunni population
So domestic pressures played a major role in the decision to go to war on the part of Egypt and Syria. The fact that Sadat and Asad had a Saudi commitment to use the oil weapon in their favor was also an incentive to act. The inter-Arab configuration that led to Faysal's willingness to support the attack would not last forever, so Egypt and Syria had to take advantage of it while it did last. The Arab states' strategy was based on a gap in the Israeli defense plan. Israel needed 48-72 hours to fully mobilize its forces. If Egypt and Syria could gain the advantage of surprise, make some gains, and then dig in within this period, they could presumably withstand Israeli counter-attacks and inflict heavy casualties on the Israeli forces.
On October 6, 1973 (Yom Kippur) the Egyptian and Syrian forces launched their attack on Israel. Despite warnings by Israeli intelligence that something was up, both Jerusalem and Washington were caught by surprise. [Why Israel so caught -- focus on indicators of ability to fight all-out war, not a limited war.] In the first two days of the fighting, the Arab armies made early gains (the Egyptians establishing a beachhead in Sinai) and disrupted Israeli mobilization plans. October 8-10 saw major Israeli counter-attacks on both the Syrian and the Egyptian fronts. The effort on the Egyptian front was a failure, costly in men and material. The effort on the Syrian front was more successful, but the Syrian army conducted an orderly retreat, not breaking in the face of the Israeli advance. Given these setbacks, the mood in Israel came increasingly to be characterized by despair. The US strategy since the beginning of the war was to orchestrate an Israeli victory, but one that left the Arab regimes intact and willing to negotiate peace through US mediation. Thus, it looked on Israeli requests for more arms in those early days as unnecessary militarily and harmful to its overall political strategy. However, by October 12 the seriousness with which the Israelis viewed their situation had finally been communicated to Washington [nuclear warnings?], and shortly thereafter a massive American airlift of military goods to Israel began.
Just as the US airlift began, the tide on the battlefield began to change in Israel's favor. The Egyptians had begun an offensive toward the Sinai mountain passes, in response to Syrian and Soviet urgings to distract the Israelis from their advance on the Syrian front. This move took them out from under their anti-aircraft umbrella, and Israeli ground and air forces were able to turn the offensive back and open up new avenues of attack against the Egyptian forces. Israeli forces crossed over the Suez canal on October 15, in a flanking effort aimed at cutting off the Egyptian beachhead in Sinai. Sadat did not realize the precarious situation his forces were in until Soviet satellite evidence was produced for him on October 18. At that time, Sadat authorized the Soviet Union to seek an immediate cease-fire with the United States. Moscow had pressed Sadat at the beginning of the war to seek a cease-fire, in an effort to consolidate Arab gains before Israel could counter-attack, but Sadat had refused.
The Soviets government immediately invited Kissinger to Moscow for consultations on the war. Kissinger, not quite appreciating the decisive advantage that the Israelis now had, or the precarious position of the Egyptians, stalled a bit before agreeing to arrive on October 20. Saudi Arabia had up to that point refused to apply oil sanctions against the United States (at first because they were not needed, with Arabs doing well; then because they thought they had US assurances that it would not allow a decisive Arab defeat). However, on October 20, while Kissinger was in the air, Saudi Arabia announced a total embargo on oil shipments to the US. The Saudi action was most likely a response to the dire situation of the Egyptian forces, and America's apparent willingness to allow their destruction.
The oil embargo would have enormous effects on the Arab-Israeli conflict, inter-Arab politics, and even the world political economy. However, those effects took a least some time to show up, and did not immediately affect the course of the war's diplomacy. Kissinger, now in Moscow, put forward a proposal for a cease-fire in place combined with a commitment to new peace negotiations. The Soviets quickly accepted, and this agreement was approved by the UN Security Council as Resolution 338 on October 22. The Israelis, with discreet encouragement from Washington, ignored the cease-fire and continued moves to cut off the Egyptian forces. In response, on October 24, Sadat called on both the US and the USSR to send forces to Sinai to enforce the cease-fire. Brezhnev informed Nixon by letter that if the US refused to participate in such an effort, the Soviet Union would do so alone. Such a Soviet move would be unprecedented -- Soviet combat forces directly intervening in a Middle Eastern conflict, against Israeli forces. Kissinger's careful work to end the conflict with the US in a position to act as middleman between Israel and the Arabs would go up in smoke, and Soviet influence throughout the Arab world, including in the oil-producing areas, would increase. In response, Nixon ordered American forces around the globe, including nuclear forces, placed on a heightened degree of alert and sent additional naval forces to the Mediterranean. At the same time, the US privately sent urgent warning to Israel to desist in its violations of the cease-fire, which Israel did. The US thus faced down the Soviet threat while achieving the aim of getting an Israeli commitment to the cease-fire. The Egyptians were indebted to the US for preventing the destruction of their army; the Israelis pleased by the level of American support which had been forthcoming; and the Soviets pressured out of unilateral action without a direct confrontation. The stage was now set for American diplomatic efforts to begin a peace process.
The diplomacy of the immediate post-war period was dominated by American efforts to work out troop disengagement agreements, to stabilize the dangerous military situation (3rd Army still surrounded), to get the oil embargo lifted, and to set the stage for American-brokered peace talks. There were three major problems confronting the American diplomatic strategy: what to do with the Soviets, the matter of differing Syrian and Egyptian views of what negotiations should entail, and how to get the Israelis, who won the war on the battlefield, to make concessions. At this time, the Soviet issue was not that difficult to finesse. Both Sadat and the Saudis had made it clear that they preferred a unilateral American role in mediating the negotiations, and would be happy if the Soviets were shunted aside. The Israelis of course thought along similar lines -- it was only the Syrians who sought an active Soviet role. Moscow itself, interested in preserving detente and in stabilizing the battlefield situation (which was not favorable to its allies), agreed to a symbolic Geneva Conference in December 1973, after which negotiations would be conducted bilaterally. Most of the parties wanted an active US role. Even the party that did not (Syria) knew that only the US could deliver an Israeli disengagement. Therefore those bilateral talks were conducted exclusively by the US, with little if any Soviet input
The issue of differing Syrian and Egyptian views on the negotiations was harder to deal with. Sadat was anxious to move on to substantive discussions of final peace agreements, with the United States playing the main mediating role. Asad was much more cautious, looking to stabilize the military situation before engaging in any substantive talks, and anxious at all times to keep Sadat from cutting his own separate deal. [Syrian strategic position] Asad was also much more concerned about the Palestinian question, and much more interested in having a controlling role in its outcome, than was Sadat. Thus, there was a built-in tension in Egyptian-Syrian relations, based on their differing views of how peace negotiations should proceed. The complicating factor, from the US standpoint, in this tension was the position of Saudi Arabia. The Saudis were not so much interested in the details of a settlement, but were very concerned about keeping the Cairo-Damascus-Riyad alliance in tact. That cooperative framework was a welcome contrast for the Saudis from the days of Nasirist and Bacthist hostility to their regime, and gave Riyad extra weight in Arab politics as the middleman between the Sadat and Asad regimes. It was largely in deference to Saudi views that Kissinger committed himself, after negotiating the First Egyptian-Israeli disengagement of January 1974, to negotiate a similar Syrian-Israeli disengagement (May 1974, after a one month HAK shuttle). The Saudis agreed to lift the oil embargo only after Kissinger had made this commitment
Finally, on the Israeli side, the seeds of Israeli-American differences over the peace process had been sown. The United States was now committed, both in terms of interests (developing relations with Egypt, Saudi oil power) and in terms of prestige (HAK involvement), to coming up with some progress in the Arab-Israeli conflict -- first toward disengagement, then toward peace. This was a major change from the policy before the war of almost complete US-Israeli agreement on a stand-pat position. While the main US interest was in progress toward a settlement, with little concern for its specific details, on the Israeli side the details were everything -- essential matters of security and policy that were also explosive issues in domestic politics.
However, in the early months after the war, the Israeli government was inclined to go along with Kissinger's plans for limited disengagement agreements. The Israeli polity had been shocked by the war, and sought some respite from the conflict. The Labour party fought the December 1973 Israeli Knesset election on a peace platform, and needed to show some progress on that front to redeem its electoral pledges. Also, the course of the war itself had brought home to Jerusalem just how important the strategic tie with the United States was. Therefore, the government was more willing than it had been before, or has been since, to take into special account American strategic interests. Finally, the Israeli salient on the west side of the Suez Canal was exposed and far from Israeli supply lines. If a good agreement with Sadat on disengagement could be reached (and Sadat was forthcoming on terms), there was a good tactical argument for solidifying the Israeli lines. The same tactical considerations did not hold true on the Syrian front, and the disengagement negotiations there were much more difficult. But, in the end, for the larger strategic reasons I mentioned, the Israelis came around to the US view.
In future lectures we will look in greater detail at the oil embargo, and its consequnces on inter-Arab, Arab-Israeli and international politics; and at the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations that, after numerous twists and turns, culminated in Camp David and the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement. Let us conclude today's discussion with a brief consideration of the consequences of the 1973 war in each of the four areas of importance for Middle Eastern politics:
1) Domestically -- the war was a great boon to the Arab regimes that participated in it, giving each of them a credibility before their people which allowed, particularly in the Egyptian case, for much more flexibility in the subsequent negotiations. It is interesting to note that each of the Arab regimes that played a major role in the war is still in power -- Mubarak as Sadat's successor, Asad’s son as his successor, and the Saudi royal family. Conversely, the shock of the war and the domestic political pressures set off by the subsequent peace negotiations helped to break the dominant role played by the Labour Party in Israeli politics. Though Labour won the immediate post-war election, the next election in 1977 brought to power the Likud (for the first time in Israeli history). Since that time the two parties, with their fundamentally different views of an acceptable peace settlement, have been very equal competitors for power in Israel.
2) Arab-Israeli conflict itself -- the war established a new dynamic in the conflict, giving the Arab states the confidence and domestic political ability to consider real negotiations, particularly in the Egyptian case. On the Israeli side, the idea that the conflict had been stabilized by Israeli military gains and military superiority was exploded, making the idea of real negotiations (as opposed to Arab acceptance of Israeli positions) more acceptable to many in Israel. Without the war, it is impossible to imagine the subsequent peace negotiations. It is interesting to note that it was only between combattants that any diplomacy was possible. Neither Jordan nor the PLO, who were both cut out of the war planning, could edge their way into the negotiating process (despite attempts by both to do so).
3) Inter-Arab politics -- the war was both the high point and the beginning of the end of the Cairo-Damascus-Riyad axis that dominated Arab politics from 1971-1977. The differing Syrian and Egyptian views of the process and goals of peace negotiations would be a dominant motif of inter-Arab politics for the next decade. The oil embargo had thrust Saudi Arabia into the unaccustomed role of Arab leadership, a leadership which the Saudis could now no longer avoid. They strove to maintain the united Arab front which fought the war, using their political and financial leverage to smooth out Egyptian-Syrian differences, but in the end could not keep that united front together.
4) Great Powers -- the war and its outcome was a major political victory for the United States, ushering in a period of US dominance of Middle Eastern politics. The war strained the US-Israeli relationship, as differences in the two states views of an acceptable settlement came out, but it also strengthened it, as both Israel and America came to a better understanding of the strategic link between them. It was only through its relations with Israel that the US could be a broker between Israelis and Arabs. Sadat's move to align with the US, as the only power that could bring him peace, was an extraordinary shift in the regional balance. The oil embargo changed forever the US strategic view of Saudi Arabia, and established a link between the politics of the Gulf arena and that of the Arab-Israeli arena. Despite the setback of the embargo for US interests, the US strategic role in the Gulf (both Saudi Arabia and Iran) emerged intact from the events of 1973-74. In all these areas, the Soviets were forced into the role of marginal player. The 1973 war in fact was the starting point of American dominance (though not complete control) in the Middle East, that has lasted until today.