1)
Preface: Livy surveys the Causes and Stakes of the War
2)
Carthaginian Generals and History
3)
Portrait of Hannibal
21.1 (222 b.c.)
I consider myself at liberty to commence what is only a section of
my
history with a prefatory remark such as most writers have placed at
the very
beginning of their works, namely, that the war I am about to describe
is the
most memorable of any that have ever been waged, I mean the war which
the
Carthaginians, under Hannibal's leadership, waged with Rome. No states,
no
nations ever met in arms greater in strength or richer in resources;
these
Powers themselves had never before been in so high a state of efficiency
or
better prepared to stand the strain of a long war; they were no strangers
to
each other's tactics after their experience in the first Punic War;
and so
variable were the fortunes and so doubtful the issue of the war that
those
who were ultimately victorious were in the earlier stages brought nearest
to
ruin. And yet, great as was their strength, the hatred they felt towards
each other was almost greater. The Romans were furious with indignation
because the vanquished had dared to take the offensive against their
conquerors; the Carthaginians bitterly resented what they regarded
as the
tyrannical and rapacious conduct of Rome.
Portrait of Hannibal (21.4)
Hanno's proposal received but slight support, though almost all the
best men
in the council were with him, but as usual, numbers carried the day
against
reason. No sooner had Hannibal landed in Spain than he became a favourite
with the whole army. The veterans thought they saw Hamilcar restored
to them
as he was in his youth; they saw the same determined expression the
same
piercing eyes, the same cast of features. He soon showed, however,
that it
was not his father's memory that helped him most to win the affections
of
the army. Never was there a character more capable of the two tasks
so
opposed to each other of commanding and obeying; you could not easily
make
out whether the army or its general were more attached to him. Whenever
courage and resolution were needed Hasdrubal never cared to entrust
the
command to any one else; and there was no leader in whom the soldiers
placed
more confidence or under whom they showed more daring. He was fearless
in
exposing himself to danger and perfectly self possessed in the presence
of
danger. No amount of exertion could cause him either bodily or mental
fatigue; he was equally indifferent to heat and cold; his eating and
drinking were measured by the needs of nature, not by appetite; his
hours of
sleep were not determined by day or night, whatever time was not taken
up
with active duties was given to sleep and rest, but that rest was not
wooed
on a soft couch or in silence, men often saw him lying on the ground
amongst
the sentinels and outposts, wrapped in his military cloak. His dress
was in
no way superior to that of his comrades; what did make him conspicuous
were
his arms and horses. He was by far the foremost both of the cavalry
and the
infantry, the first to enter the fight and the last to leave the field.
But
these great merits were matched by great vices inhuman cruelty, a perfidy
worse than Punic, an utter absence of truthfulness, reverence, fear
of the
gods, respect for oaths, sense of religion. Such was his character,
a
compound of virtues and vices. For three years he served under Hasdrubal,
and during the whole time he never lost an opportunity of gaining by
practice or observation the experience necessary for one who was to
be a
great leader of men.
21.5
>From the day when he was proclaimed commander in chief, he seemed
to regard
Italy as his assigned field of action, and war with Rome as a duty
imposed
upon him. Feeling that he ought not to delay operations, lest some
accident
should overtake him as in the case of his father and afterwards of
Hasdrubal, he decided to attack the Saguntines. As an attack on them
would
inevitably set the arms of Rome in motion, he began by invading the
Olcades,
a tribe who were within the boundaries but not under the dominion of
Carthage. He wished to make it appear that Saguntum was not his immediate
object, but that he was drawn into a war with her by the force of
circumstances, by the conquest, that is, of all her neighbours and
the
annexation of their territory. Cartala, a wealthy city and the capital
of
the tribe, was taken by storm and sacked; the smaller cities, fearing
a
similar fate, capitulated and agreed to pay an indemnity. His victorious
army enriched with plunder was marched into winter quarters in New
Carthage.
Here, by a lavish distribution of the spoils and the punctual discharge
of
all arrears of pay, he secured the allegiance of his own people and
of the
allied contingents.
At the beginning of spring he extended his operations to the Vaccaei,
and
two of their cities, Arbocala and Hermandica, were taken by assault.
Arbocala held out for a considerable time, owing to the courage and
numbers
of its defenders; the fugitives from Hermandica joined hands with those
of
the Olcades who had abandoned their country this tribe had been subjugated
the previous year and together they stirred up the Carpetani to war.
Not far
from the Tagus an attack was made upon Hannibal as he was returning
from his
expedition against the Vaccaei, and his army, laden as it was with
plunder,
was thrown into some confusion. Hannibal declined battle and fixed
his camp
by the side of the river; as soon as there was quiet and silence amongst
the
enemy, he forded the stream. His entrenchments had been carried just
far
enough to allow room for the enemy to cross over, and he decided to
attack
them during their passage of the river. He instructed his cavalry to
wait
until they had actually entered the water and then to attack them;
his forty
elephants he stationed on the bank. The Carpetani together with the
contingents of the Olcades and Vaccaei numbered altogether 100,000
men, an
irresistible force had they been fighting on level ground. Their innate
fearlessness, the confidence inspired by their numbers, their belief
that
the enemy's retreat was due to fear, all made them look on victory
as
certain, and the river as the only obstacle to it. Without any word
of
command having been given, they raised a universal shout and plunged,
each
man straight in front of him, into the river. A huge force of cavalry
descended from the opposite bank, and the two bodies met in mid stream.
The
struggle was anything but an equal one. The infantry, feeling their
footing
insecure, even where the river was fordable, could have been ridden
down
even by unarmed horsemen, whereas the cavalry, with their bodies and
weapons
free and their horses steady even in the midst of the current, could
fight
at close quarters or not, as they chose. A large proportion were swept
down
the river, some were carried by cross currents to the other side where
the
enemy were, and were trampled to death by the elephants. Those in the
rear
thought it safest to return to their own side, and began to collect
together
as well as their fears allowed them, but before they had time to recover
themselves Hannibal entered the river with his infantry in battle order
and
drove them in flight from the bank. He followed up his victory by laying
waste their fields, and in a few days was able to receive the submission
of
the Carpetani There was no part of the country beyond the Ebro which
did not
now belong to the Carthaginians, with the exception of Saguntum.
1)
Hannibal’s Difficult March from the Spain & the Alps into Etruria
2)
Rome’s Consul C. Flaminius’ Poor Generalship at Lake Trasimene (N. of Rome,
W. of Tiber River)
3)
ROME: Report of the Battle Hits Home
4)
Romans Appoint a Dictator, Q. Fabius Maximus, to halt their losses
5)
Fabius’ Conservative Policy toward Hannibal
Hannibal’s
Difficult March from the Spain & the Alps into Etruria (22.2)
While the consul was occupied in these propitiatory ceremonies and
also in
the enrolment of troops, information reached Hannibal that Flaminius
had
arrived at Arretium, and he at once broke up his winter quarters. There
were
two routes into Etruria, both of which were pointed out to Hannibal;
one was
considerably longer than the other but a much better road, the shorter
route, which he decided to take, passed through the marshes of the
Arno,
which was at the time in higher flood than usual. He ordered the Spaniards
and Africans, the main strength of his veteran army, to lead, and they
were
to take their own baggage with them, so that, in case of a halt, they
might
have the necessary supplies; the Gauls were to follow so as to form
the
centre of the column; the cavalry were to march last, and Mago and
his
Numidian light horse were to close up the column, mainly to keep the
Gauls
up to the mark in case they fell out or came to a halt through the
fatigue
and exertion of so long a march, for as a nation they were unable to
stand
that kind of thing. Those in front followed wherever the guides led
the way,
through the deep and almost bottomless pools of water, and though almost
sucked in by the mud through which they were half wading, half swimming,
still kept their ranks. The Gauls could neither recover themselves
when they
slipped nor when once down had they the strength to struggle out of
the
pools; depressed and hopeless they had no spirits left to keep up their
bodily powers. Some dragged their worn out limbs painfully along, others
gave up the struggle and lay dying amongst the baggage animals which
were
lying about in all directions. What distressed them most of all was
want of
sleep, from which they had been suffering for four days and three nights.
As
everything was covered with water and they had not a dry spot on which
to
lay their wearied bodies, they piled up the baggage in the water and
lay on
the top, whilst some snatched a few minutes' needful rest by making
couches
of the heaps of baggage animals which were everywhere standing out
of the
water. Hannibal himself, whose eyes were affected by the changeable
and
inclement spring weather, rode upon the only surviving elephant so
that he
might be a little higher above the water. Owing, however, to want of
sleep
and the night mists and the malaria from the marshes, his head became
affected, and as neither place nor time admitted of any proper treatment,
he
completely lost the sight of one eye.
22.3
After losing many men and beasts under these frightful .circumstances,
he at
last got clear of the marshes, and as soon as he could find some dry
ground
he pitched his camp. The scouting parties he had sent out reported
that the
Roman army was lying in the neighbourhood of Arretium. His next step
was to
investigate as carefully as he possibly could all that it was material
for
him to know what mood the consul was in, what designs he was forming,
what
the character of the country and the kind of roads it possessed, and
what
resources it offered for the obtaining of supplies. The district was
amongst
the most fertile in Italy; the plains of Etruria, which extend from
Faesulae
to Arretium, are rich in corn and live stock and every kind of produce.
(22.7)
This was the famous battle at Trasumennus, and a disaster for Rome
memorable
as few others have been. Fifteen thousand Romans were killed in action;
1000
fugitives were scattered all over Etruria and reached the City by divers
routes; 2500 of the enemy perished on the field, many in both armies
afterwards of their wounds. Other authors give the loss on each side
as many
times greater, but I refuse to indulge in the idle exaggerations to
which
writers are far too much given, and what is more, I am supported by
the
authority of Fabius, who was living during the war. Hannibal dismissed
without ransom those prisoners who belonged to the allies and threw
the
Romans into chains. He then gave orders for the bodies of his own men
to be
picked out from the heaps of slain and buried; careful search was also
made
for the body of Flaminius that it might receive honourable interment
but it
was not found. As soon as the news of this disaster reached Rome the
people
flocked into the Forum in a great state of panic and confusion. Matrons
were
wandering about the streets and asking those they met what recent disaster
had been reported or what news was there of the army. The throng in
the
Forum, as numerous as a crowded Assembly, flocked towards the Comitium
and
the Senate house and called for the magistrates. At last, shortly before
sunset, M. Pomponius, the praetor, announced, "We have been defeated
in a
great battle." Though nothing more definite was heard from him, the
people,
full of the reports which they had heard from one another, carried
back to
their homes the information that the consul had been killed with the
greater
part of his army; only a few survived, and these were either dispersed
in
flight throughout Etruria or had been made prisoners by the enemy.
The misfortunes which had befallen the defeated army were not more
numerous
than the anxieties of those whose relatives had served under C. Flaminius,
ignorant as they were of the fate of each of their friends, and not
in the least knowing what to hope
for or what to fear.
ROME: Report of the Battle Hits Home
The
next day and several days afterwards, a large crowd, containing more women
than men, stood at the
gates waiting for some one of their friends or for news about them,
and they
crowded round those they met with eager and anxious inquiries, nor
was it
possible to get them away, especially from those they knew, until they
had
got all the details from first to last. Then as they came away from
their
informants you might see the different expressions on their faces,
according
as each had received good or bad news, and friends congratulating or
consoling them as they wended their way homewards. The women were especially
demonstrative in their joy and in their grief. They say that one who
suddenly met her son at the gate safe and sound expired in his arms,
whilst
another who had received false tidings of her son's death and was sitting
as
a sorrowful mourner in her house, no sooner saw him returning than
she died
from too great happiness. For several days the praetors kept the senate
in
session from sunrise to sunset, deliberating under what general or
with what
forces they could offer effectual resistance to the victorious Carthaginian.
22.8
Before they had formed any definite plans, a fresh disaster was announced;
4000 cavalry under the command of C. Centenius, the propraetor, had
been
sent by the consul Servilius to the assistance of his colleague. When
they
heard of the battle at Trasumennus they marched into Umbria, and here
they
were surrounded and captured by Hannibal. The news of this occurrence
affected men in very different ways. Some, whose thoughts were preoccupied
with more serious troubles, looked upon this loss of cavalry as a light
matter in comparison with the previous losses; others estimated the
importance of the incident not by the magnitude of the loss but by
its moral
effect. Just as where the constitution is impaired, any malady however
slight is felt more than it would be in a strong robust person, so
any
misfortune which befell the State in its present sick and disordered
condition must be measured not by its actual importance but by its
effect on
a State already exhausted and unable to bear anything which would aggravate
its condition.
Q.
Fabius Maximus was now Dictator for the second time. On the very day of
his entrance upon office he summoned a meeting of the senate, and commenced
by discussing matters of religion. He made it quite clear to the senators
that C. Flaminius' fault lay much more in his neglect of the auspices
and of
his religious duties than in bad generalship and foolhardiness. The
gods
themselves, he maintained, must be consulted as to the necessary measures
to
avert their displeasure, and he succeeded in getting a decree passed
that
the decemvirs should be ordered to consult the Sibylline Books, a course
which is only adopted when the most alarming portents have been reported.
After inspecting the Books of Fate they informed the senate that the
vow
which had been made to Mars in view of that war had not been duly
discharged, and that it must be discharged afresh and on a much greater
scale. The Great Games must be vowed to Jupiter, a temple to Venus
Erycina
and one to Mens; a lectisternium must be held and solemn intercessions
made;
a Sacred Spring must also be vowed. All these things must be done if
the war
was to be a successful one and the republic remain in the same position
in
which it was at the beginning of the war. As Fabius would be wholly
occupied
with the necessary arrangements for the war, the senate with the full
approval of the pontifical college ordered the praetor, M. Aemilius,
to take
care that all these orders were carried out in good time.
He
then marched along the Flaminian road to meet the consul. As soon as he
caught sight of the army in the
neighbourhood of Ocriculum near the Tiber, and the consul riding forward
with some cavalry to meet him, he sent an officer to tell him that
he was to
come to the Dictator without his lictors. He did so, and the way they
met
produced a profound sense of the majesty of the dictatorship amongst
both
citizens and allies, who had almost by this time forgotten that greatest
of
all offices. Shortly afterwards a despatch was handed in from the City
stating that some transports which were carrying supplies for the army
in
Spain had been captured by the Carthaginian fleet near the port of
Cosa. The
consul was thereupon ordered to man the ships which were lying off
Rome or
at Ostia with full complements of seamen and soldiers, and sail in
pursuit
of the hostile fleet and protect the coast of Italy. A large force
was
raised in Rome, even freedmen who had children and were of the military
age
had been sworn in. Out of these city troops, all under thirty five
years of
age were placed on board the ships, the rest were left to garrison
the City.
Fabius’
Strategy (22.12)
The Dictator took over the consul's army from Fulvius Flaccus, the
second in
command, and marched through Sabine territory to Tibur, where he had
ordered
the newly raised force to assemble by the appointed day. From there
he
advanced to Praeneste, and taking a cross country route, came out on
the
Latin road. From this point he proceeded towards the enemy, showing
the
utmost care in reconnoitring all the various routes, and determined
not to
take any risks anywhere, except so far as necessity should compel him.
The
first day he pitched his camp in view of the enemy not far from Arpi;
the
Carthaginian lost no time in marching out his men in battle order to
give
him the chance of fighting. But when he saw that the enemy kept perfectly
quiet and that there were no signs of excitement in their camp, he
tauntingly remarked that the spirits of the Romans, those sons of Mars,
were
broken at last, the war was at an end, and they had openly foregone
all
claim to valour and renown. He then returned into camp. But he was
really in
a very anxious state of mind, for he saw that he would have to do with
a
very different type of commander from Flaminius or Sempronius; the
Romans
had been taught by their defeats and had at last found a general who
was a
match for him. It was the wariness not the impetuosity of the Dictator
that
was the immediate cause of his alarm; he had not yet tested his inflexible
resolution. He began to harass and provoke him by frequently shifting
his
camp and ravaging the fields of the allies of Rome before his very
eyes.
Sometimes he would march rapidly out of sight and then in some turn
of the
road take up a concealed position in the hope of entrapping him, should
he
come down to level ground. Fabius kept on high ground, at a moderate
distance from the enemy, so that he never lost sight of him and never
closed
with him. Unless they were employed on necessary duty, the soldiers
were
confined to camp. When they went in quest of wood or forage they went
in
large bodies and only within prescribed limits. A force of cavalry
and light
infantry told off in readiness against sudden alarms, made everything
safe
for his own soldiers and dangerous for the scattered foragers of the
enemy.
He refused to stake everything on a general engagement, whilst slight
encounters, fought on safe ground with a retreat close at hand, encouraged
his men, who had been demoralised by their previous defeats, and made
them
less dissatisfied with their own courage and fortunes. But his sound
and
common sense tactics were not more distasteful to Hannibal than they
were to
his own Master of the Horse. Headstrong and impetuous in counsel and
with an
ungovernable tongue, the only thing that prevented Minucius from making
shipwreck of the State was the fact that he was in a subordinate command.
At
first to a few listeners, afterwards openly amongst the rank and file,
he
abused Fabius, calling his deliberation indolence and his caution cowardice,
attributing to him faults akin to his real virtues, and by disparaging
his
superior a vile practice which, through its often proving successful,
is
steadily on the increase he tried to exalt himself.
1) 24 Year-old Scipio Takes Command to Avenge Family
Losses in Spain – 211 b.c.
26.18
The Spanish tribes who had revolted after the defeat of the two Scipios
showed no signs of returning to their allegiance; there were not, however,
any fresh instances. After the recovery of Capua the public interest
both in
senate and people centered in Spain quite as much as in Italy; and
it was
decided that the army serving there should be increased and a
commander in chief appointed. There was, however, much uncertainty
felt as
to whom they ought to appoint. Two consummate generals had fallen within
thirty days of each other, and the selection of a man to take their
place
demanded exceptional care. Various names were proposed, and at last
it was
arranged that the matter should be left to the people, and a proconsul
for
Spain formally elected. The consuls fixed a day for the election. They
were
in hopes that those who felt themselves qualified for such an important
command would become candidates. They were, however, disappointed,
and the
disappointment renewed the grief of the people, as they thought of
the
defeats they had sustained and the generals they had lost. The citizens
were
depressed, almost in despair, nevertheless they went out to the Campus
Martius on the day fixed for the election. All turned their eyes to
the
magistrates and watched the expression of the leaders of the republic
as
they looked enquiringly at one another. Everywhere men were saying
that the
State was in such a hopeless condition that no one dared to accept
the
command in Spain. Suddenly, Publius Cornelius Scipio, the son of the
Scipio
who had fallen in Spain, a young man barely twenty four years old,
took his
stand upon a slight eminence where he could be seen and heard, and
announced
himself as a candidate. All eyes were turned towards him, and the delighted
cheers with which his announcement was received were at once interpreted
as
an omen of his future good fortune and success. On proceeding to vote,
not
only the centuries but even the individual voters were unanimous to
a man in
favour of entrusting P. Scipio with the supreme command in Spain. When,
however, the election was decided and their enthusiasm had had time
to cool
down, there was a sudden silence as the people began to reflect on
what they
had done, and ask themselves whether their personal affection for him
might
not have got the better of their judgment. What gave them the greatest
concern was his youth. Some, too, recalled with dread the fortune that
had
attended his house, and regarded as ominous of evil even the name of
the man
who was quitting two bereaved families in order to carry on a campaign
round
the tombs of his uncle and his father.
26.19
Seeing how the step which they had taken so impetuously now filled
them with
anxiety, Scipio called the voters together and spoke to them about
his age
and the command which they had entrusted to him, and the war which
he had to
conduct. He spoke in such lofty and glowing words that he evoked their
enthusiasm once more, and inspired them with more hopeful confidence
than is
usually called out by faith in men's promises or by reasonable anticipations
of success. Scipio won people's admiration not only by the sterling
qualities which he possessed, but also by his cleverness in displaying
them,
a cleverness which he had developed from early youth. In his public
life he
generally spoke and acted as though he were guided either by visions
of the
night or by some divine inspiration, whether it was that he was really
open
to superstitious influences or that he claimed oracular sanction for
his
commands and counsels in order to secure prompt adoption. He sought
to
create this impression on men's minds from the beginning, from the
day when
he assumed the toga virilis, for he never undertook any important business,
either public or private, without first going to the Capitol, where
he sat
for some time in the temple in privacy and alone. This custom, which
he kept
up all through his life, gave rise to a widespread belief, whether
designedly upon his part or not, that he was of divine origin, and
the story
was told of him which was commonly related of Alexander a story as
silly as
it was fabulous that he was begotten by an enormous serpent which had
been
often seen in his mother's bedroom, but on any one's approach, suddenly
uncoiled itself and disappeared. The belief in these marvels was never
scoffed at by him; on the contrary, it was strengthened by deliberate
policy
on his part in refusing to deny or to admit that anything of the kind
ever
occurred. There were many other traits in this young man's character,
some
of which were genuine, others the result of studied acting, which created
a
greater admiration for him than usually falls to the lot of man.
It was the confidence with which he had in this way inspired his
fellow citizens that led them to entrust to him, young as he was, a
task of
enormous difficulty, and a command which involved the gravest
responsibilities.