- Professor
- Associate Professor
- Arel, Barbara Ph.D.
- Bonifield, Carolyn M Ph.D.
- Cats-Baril, William L. Ph.D.
- Dempsey, Stephen J. Ph.D.
- Hughes, Susan B. Ph.D.
- Jones, David A. Ph.D.
- Lucas, Marilyn T. Ph.D.
- Novak, David Ph.D.
- Parke, E. Lauck Ph.D.
- Tomas III, Michael J. Ph.D.
- Vanden Bergh, Richard G. Ph.D.
- Zhang, Chun Ph.D.
- Assistant Professor
- Lecturer/Sr Lecturer
- Lecturer (Part Time)
- Faculty Emeritus
- Averyt, William F. Ph.D.
- Battelle, Peter E. M.B.A.
- Brandenburg, Richard G. Ph.D.
- Gatti, James F. Ph.D.
- Gurdon, Michael A. Ph.D.
- Jesse, Richard R. Ph.D.
- Kraushaar, James M. Ph.D.
- Laber, Gene Ph.D.
- Savitt, Ronald Ph.D.
- Severance, Malcolm Ph.D.
- Shirland, Larry E. Ph.D.
- Tashman, Len J. Ph.D.
Hugh Marble III, Ph.D., CFA Assistant Professor
Contact Information
Office: 308 Kalkin
Phone: 802 656-8273
E-Mail: Hugh.Marble@uvm.edu
Office Hours: T R 2:45pm-3:45pm on regular class days or by appointment
Hugh Marble III joined the faculty of UVM in 2007 after completing his PhD at the University of Florida. Before pursuing the PhD, he worked as a consultant for Public Financial Management, a firm specializing in providing capital market, financial and strategic advice to public debt issuers. He is a CFA charterholder and has an MBA from Rollins College and a Bachelor of Science from the University of Rhode Island. Dr. Marble's research looks at changes in credit ratings and also at the impact of debt contracts on firm incentives.
Courses Currently Taught by Hugh Marble III:
Publication History
Journal Article, Academic Journal
- Street, V. L.; Marble III, H.; Street, M. D. - "An Empirical Investigation of the Influence of Organizational Capacity and Environmental Dynamism on First Moves" (Refereed)
- Journal of Managerial Issues
- 2011 - v. XXIII, no. 3, pp. 269-300
[Show/Hide Abstract]
Abstract: Even though firms that are first to market often maintain a performance advantage over later entrants, this is not always the case. There are important contingencies that affect whether a first move will be successful or not. Here, two such contingencies, organizational capacity and environmental dynamism, are examined. Hypotheses focused on how these contingencies affect the first move-performance relationship are tested. These hypotheses are derived from the resource-based model of first-mover advantages by Authors (2010). Consistent with this model grounded in the resource-based view, the findings of these tests indicate that technology and knowledge integration enable the success of first moves. Additionally, and largely in contrast to predictions based in the resource-based view, there is evidence that there may be constraining factors that could inhibit the creation of appropriate resources from the first move. Application of the job demands model provides insight into these constraining factors. Finally, the findings presented here help explain how first moves can create value for firms by leading to increased performance.
- Marble III, H. - "Anatomy of a Ratings Change" (Refereed)
- Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
- 2011 - v. 51, no. 1, pp. 105-112
[View publication]
[Show/Hide Abstract]
Abstract: I document the frequency with which credit rating changes result from changes in the firm's operating environment versus changes in capital structure controlled by management. I find that management action plays a significant role in credit rating changes. Twenty-eight percent of downgrades and 44% of upgrades have a substantial management influence. The frequency of management impact on credit ratings shows the limitations of credit risk modeling using structural models that assume constant capital structure. Even the cases in which firms are downgraded across the investment/speculative grade threshold can be driven by management actions rather than operating or economic conditions. Twenty-two percent of the observations of firms newly downgraded to speculative grade are entirely attributable to management action. The frequency of management-driven changes exhibits yearly and industry variation.
Book, Chapter in Scholarly Book-New
- Marble III, H. - "Secured Financing"
- Wiley
- 2010
,
[Show/Hide Abstract]
Abstract: Secured debt is often part of a firm???s capital structure. While private loans are far more likely than public debt to be secured, the majority of firms use some secured debt. The explanations for the choice of security provisions are generally focused on (1) mitigating agency conflicts between bondholders and stockholders, (2) signaling or mitigating information asymmetry, (3) improving incentives to monitor and efficiently liquidate, and (4) transferring wealth from other claimants to stockholders and secured lenders. This chapter addresses the theoretical arguments and empirical support for these explanations. There is at least some evidence consistent with each of the first three arguments. The use of security provisions to improve monitoring and liquidation choices has the strongest empirical support.
Working Paper
- Marble III, H.; Brown, D. T. - "Investment Incentives and the Recourse Structure of Debt: Theory and Evidence"
- 2009
[Show/Hide Abstract]
Abstract: We model the choice between non-recourse secured debt and recourse debt (unsecured debt or secured debt with recourse) by firms that are sequentially acquiring assets and then making investment choices once those assets have been acquired. Non-recourse secured debt is shown to be optimal for firms engaged in the acquisition of assets that have little need for non-contractible ongoing investment. Unsecured debt provides superior post-acquisition incentives for owners of assets that require ongoing investment or that can be easily modified. The mix of recourse versus non-recourse debt of Real Estate Investment Trusts, which typically use significant amounts of non-recourse debt, is shown to be consistent with this model and with the predictions of Stulz and Johnson (1985).
- Marble III, H.; Brown, D. T. - "Secured Debt Financing and Leverage: Theory and Evidence"
- Social Science Research network
- 2006
[View publication]
[Show/Hide Abstract]
Abstract: This paper provides a model of how secured debt financing impacts both the asset substitution and underinvestment problems and empirical evidence in support of the model. The model considers a firm with a mix of secured and unsecured risky debt claims against an asset in place and the opportunity to acquire another asset. It is shown that (1) the underinvestment problem does not depend on the proportion of the original debt that is secured and (2) the asset substitution problem decreases in the proportion of the original debt that is secured. Debt capacity increases with the proportion of debt that is secured as the asset substitution problem is lower for a given level of debt. An analysis of a large sample of firms with data available on COMPUSTAT supports the model predictions. First, leverage is positively and significantly related to the fraction of the debt that is secured controlling for other variables known to affect leverage. Second, attaching collateral to the debt, unlike shortening maturity (Johnson (2003)) or including protective covenants (Billett, King and Mauer (2006)) does not increase debt capacity by mitigating the underinvestment problem.
