This seminar will focus on price determination in markets characterized by imperfect competition. In imperfectly competitive markets, firms set price or quantity strategically, taking into account the actions of other firms, including potential entrants. In particular, we will study game-theoretic models of competition, entry deterrence and collusive behavior. We will also study the special features of competition in network industries, such as telecommunications, software and electricity. We will apply these models to specific case studies, several taken from antitrust law. There will be a required textbook, as well as outside journal articles and book chapters. Goals include: 1. Students will understand how to apply economic theory to understand how prices are determined in imperfectly competitive markets. 2. Students will understand how to apply economic theory to understand the welfare consequences of mergers, price discrimination, collusion, and other practices in imperfectly competitive markets. 3. Students will understand when and how different models and conclusions follow when markets are characterized by network effects.

The course is a seminar. The reading and class discussion are key. It is essential to read assign material before class, and come to class prepared to discuss the material. Students should expect to spend at least eight hours outside of class each week reading, solving homework problems and studying for exams.

There are multiple homework assignments. There is one midterm examination. There is a final exam and it is cumulative. There is a writing assignment that involves review of a journal article or articles.