Kripke on Analyticity, Designators, and Possible Worlds

1. **Kripke on analyticity**:

> [L]et's just make it a matter of stipulation that an analytic statement is, in some sense, true by virtue of its meaning and [necessarily true] in virtue of its meaning. Then something which is analytically true will be both necessary and *a priori*. (That's sort of stipulative.) (p. 39)

   Example:
   (1)   No bachelor is married.
   This sentence is supposed to be true "in virtue of its meaning."

   Remarks:

   (a) **No falsehoods**: Only true sentences are "true in virtue of their meanings."

   (b) **"True in virtue of meaning"**: What does this mean? Here's a stab (call this **access analyticity**):

   (ACCESS ANALYTICITY) S is "true in virtue of its meaning" iff knowing the syntax of S, its meaning, and some logic will enable you to discern its truth.

   (c) **No contingent truths**: Analytic truths are **stipulated** by Kripke to be necessary. THIS IS NOT STANDARD. And it raises the question:

   Are there any sentences which are true in virtue of meaning, but also only contingently true?

   [BTW: I have no idea what motivates this stipulation.]

   (d) **Analyticity is defined in modal terms**.

   (e) **Do analytic sentences state *a priori* facts?** According to the philosophical tradition, they do. But on the gloss of "true in virtue of meaning" that I have offered above, it is not obvious that they always do. It depends on whether knowledge of S's syntax and meaning is *a priori*. Kripke assumes throughout that analytic sentences state *a priori* facts.

   (f) ***A Priority* without analyticity**: If someone tells me that (1) is false, they must misunderstand either "bachelor" or "married." But failing to know, *e.g.*

(2) $87^2 = 7569$.

does not indicate that you have misunderstood one expression or another. Thus, (2) seems to be *a priori* without being analytic.

2. **Kripke on designators**:
   Designators include:

Names The proper names of natural language; and

Def. Descriptions expressions of natural language which refer to a unique individual by describing that individual.

Remarks:

(a) **Paradigm cases of definite descriptions**: Expressions of the form "the so-and-so", *e.g.* "the shortest spy," "the man who corrupted Hadleyburg."

(b) **There are other cases**: *e.g.* "Aristotle's mother."

(c) **Names that look like Definite Descriptions**: Some expressions seem to have the "right form," but don't refer by describing. Kripke's examples: "The Holy Roman Empire," "The United Nations." Other cases: "The Coalition of the Willing," "The Evening Star."

(d) **Referring by Describing**: What is it to refer to something by describing it? It is to express a condition which that individual, and only that individual, satisfies.
[**TERMINOLOGY**]: I will say that a condition C *singles out* an individual x iff x satisfies C, and nothing else does.
[**FOR EXAMPLE**]:

Expression	Condition	Individual
"The shortest spy"	*being a spy shorter than any other*	
"der kürzeste Spion"	*being a spy shorter than any other*	

"The shortest spy" expresses a condition, *being a spy shorter*

than any other, which singles out a certain individual. [**DRAW THE TRIANGULAR CARTOON**]

(e) **NOTICE**: The **semantic bond** between definite descriptions and their referents is easily explained. Something is the referent of a definite description in virtue of being singled out by the condition the definite description expresses.

3. **Possible Worlds**
There are only three things you need to know about possible worlds.

   (a) **Possible worlds are "opinionated"**: every possible world decides every question. [**BLACKBOARD**]: For every world w, and every sentence P, either P or its negation $\neg P$ is true at w.

   (b) **Possible Worlds are not <u>IM</u>possible**: whatever is the case at some possible world might have been the case. [**BLACKBOARD**]: If there is a possible world at which P is true, then P is possible.

   (c) **Possible worlds "cover all the possibilities"**: There's at least one possible world witnessing every possibility; whatever might have been the case is the case at some possible world. [**BLACKBOARD**]: If P is possible, then there is a possible world at which P is true.

Putting all of this together yields a *systematic correspondence* between what possible and what sorts of worlds there are:

(**SC**) It is possible that P iff P is true at some possible world.

Kripke on Analyticity, Designators, and Possible Worlds

1. **Kripke on analyticity**:

> [L]et's just make it a matter of stipulation that an analytic statement is, in some sense, true by virtue of its meaning and [necessarily true] in virtue of its meaning. Then something which is analytically true will be both necessary and *a priori*. (That's sort of stipulative.) (p. 39)

   (1)   No bachelor is married.

   Remarks:

   (a) **No falsehoods**

   (b) **"True in virtue of meaning"**:

   (**ACCESS ANALYTICITY**) S is "true in virtue of its meaning" iff knowing the syntax of S, its meaning, and some logic will enable you to discern its truth.

   (c) **No contingent truths**

   (d) **Analyticity is defined in modal terms**.

   (e) **Do analytic sentences state *a priori* facts?**

   (f) ***A Priority* without analyticity**
   (2) $87^2 = 7569$.

2. **Kripke on designators**:

Names The proper names of natural language; and

Def. Descriptions expressions of natural language which refer to a unique individual by describing that individual.

   Remarks:

   (a) **Paradigm cases of definite descriptions**: Expressions of the form "the so-and-so", *e.g.* "the shortest spy," "the man who corrupted Hadleyburg."

   (b) **There are other cases**: *e.g.* "Aristotle's mother."

   (c) **Names that look like Definite Descriptions**: Kripke's examples: "The Holy Roman Empire," "The United Nations." Other cases: "The Coalition of the Willing", "The Evening Star", "The Mississippi River".

   (d) **Referring by Describing**
   [**TERMINOLOGY**]: A condition C *singles out* an individual x iff x satisfies C, and nothing else does.

Expression	Condition	Individual
"The shortest spy"	*being a spy shorter than any other*	
"der kürzeste Spion"	*being a spy shorter than any other*	

(e) **Definite Descriptions and the Semantic Bond**: Something is the referent of a definite description in virtue of being singled out by the condition the definite description expresses.

3. **Possible Worlds**

(a) **Possible worlds are "opinionated"**: every possible world decides every question.

(b) **Possible Worlds are not <u>IM</u>possible**: whatever is the case at some possible world might have been the case.

(c) **Possible worlds "cover all the possibilities"**: There's at least one possible world witnessing every possibility; whatever might have been the case is the case at some possible world.

(SC) It is possible that P iff P is true at some possible world.