handout

All translations from Levett and Burnyeat’s Theaetetus.

1. (some of ) Socrates' instructions to Theaetetus:

a. 151b8 (Soc.) προσφέρου οὖν πρός με ὡς πρὸς μαίας ὑὸν καὶ αὐτὸν μαιευτικόν, καὶ ἃ ἂν ἐρωτῶ προθυμοῦ ὅπως οἷός τ’ εἶ οὕτως ἀποκρίνασθαι

Soc. I want you to come to me as one who is both the son of a midwife and himself skilled in the art; and try to answer the questions I shall ask you as best you can.

b. 157d3 (Soc.) ... ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν καὶ καρτερῶν εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως ἀποκρίνου ἃ ἂν φαίνηταί σοι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐρωτῶ. (5)

Soc. .... You must have courage and patience; answer like a man whatever appears to you to be true about the things I ask you.

Isn't that what we readers are asked to do as well?

2. This is not Theaetetus' first rodeo, in spite of appearances:

a. 148d4 (Soc) πειρῶ μιμούμενος τὴν περὶ τῶν δυνάμεων ἀπόκρισιν, ὥσπερ ταύτας πολλὰς οὔσας ἑνὶ εἴδει περιέλαβες, οὕτω καὶ τὰς πολλὰς ἐπιστήμας ἑνὶ λόγῳ προσειπεῖν. {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἀλλ’ εὖ ἴσθι, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλάκις δὴ αὐτὸ ἐπεχείρησα σκέψασθαι, ἀκούων τὰς παρὰ σοῦ ἀποφερομένας ἐρωτήσεις. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτ’ αὐτὸς δύναμαι πεῖσαι ἐμαυτὸν ὡς ἱκανῶς τι λέγω οὔτ’ ἄλλου ἀκοῦσαι λέγοντος οὕτως ὡς σὺ διακελεύῃ, οὐ μὲν δὴ αὖ οὐδ’ ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ μέλειν. (5)

Soc. Try to imitate your answer about the powers. There you brought together the many powers within a single form; now I want you in the same way to give one single account of the many branches of knowledge.
Tht. But I assure you Socrates, I have often tried to think this out, when I heard reports of the questions you ask. But I can never persuade myself that anything I say will really do; and I never hear anyone else state the matter in the way that you require. And yet, again, you know, I can't even stop worrying about it.

b. 155c8 {ΘΕΑΙ.} Καὶ νὴ τοὺς θεούς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπερφυῶς ὡς θαυμάζω τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ ταῦτα, καὶ ἐνίοτε ὡς ἀληθῶς βλέπων εἰς αὐτὰ σκοτοδινιῶ. (10)

Tht. Oh yes, indeed, Socrates, I often wonder like mad what these things can mean; sometimes when I'm looking at them I begin to feel quite giddy.

Again, isn't this similar to the boat we readers are in?

3. These matters were controversial at the time

180d7 (Soc.) ὀλίγου δὲ ἐπελαθόμην, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι ἄλλοι αὖ τἀναντία τούτοις ἀπεφήναντο, †οἷον ἀκίνητον τελέθει τῷ παντὶ ὄνομ’ εἶναι† καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα Μέλισσοί τε καὶ Παρμενίδαι ἐναντιούμενοι (1) πᾶσι τούτοις διισχυρίζονται, ὡς ἕν τε πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἕστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὑτῷ οὐκ ἔχον χώραν ἐν ᾗ κινεῖται.

Soc. But I was almost forgetting, Theodorus, that there are other thinkers who have announced the opposite view; who tell us that 'Unmoved is the Universe,' and other similar statements which we hear from Melissus or a Parmenides as against the whole party of Heracleiteans. These philosophers insist that all things are One, and that this One stands still, itself within itself, having no place in which to move.

They are still controversial today.

4. Possibly ambiguous agreement using δοκέω

a. all these here are my own translations
145a2 ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ μοι. Seems right to me.
145a9 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Seems right to me at least.
145c6 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ χρὴ ταῦτα ποιεῖν, εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ. Well, that’s what we must do, if it seems right to you.
152e7 ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ τοῦτο λέγειν; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔμοιγε. …or does it not seem right to say that? Theaet: To me at least it does.
155b3 ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ γε δή. It seems to me at least.
155d8 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔπω μοι δοκῶ. It does not yet seem clear.
158e4 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔ μοι δοκῶ. I do not think I do.
159a5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. It seems to me at least.
171d8 ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ. It seems to me at least.
171e9 ΘΕΟ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως. It seems so to me at least.
184b3 ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλὰ χρή, εἰ δοκεῖ, οὕτω ποιεῖν. Well, we must do so, if it seems right.
202d4 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλῶς λέγεσθαι τὸ νῦν ῥηθέν. What was just now said seems well said to me at least, Socrates.
203c7 ΘΕΑΙ. Τὰ ἅπαντα ἔμοιγε δοκοῦμεν. It seems to me at least we should say all of them.
205a7 ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ μοι νῦν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν πᾶν τε καὶ ὅλον. Whole and all seem to me at this point not to be different at all.
But arguably not all are conceivably ambiguous:
153d6 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ’ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα δηλοῦν ἅπερ λέγεις.
154a9 ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦτο μᾶλλόν μοι δοκεῖ ἢ ἐκεῖνο.
194d7 ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν
b. 147c7 Tht. Ῥᾴδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν γε οὕτω φαίνεται

It seems easy now in that way at any rate, Socrates. But you are asking a question like the one that recently occurred to us in our discussion. … (it turns out it is NOT an easy thing)

c. 147e3 Tht. Ἔμοιγε δοκοῦμεν· σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ

To me at least we seem to (have done so), but look for yourself.
Which throws the onus back on Socrates, showing that γε is limitative "at least" or "at any rate"

5. ἴσως used as a one-word answer that the context tells us is taken as affirmative

145a4 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως οὔ.
147a6 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως.
185b6 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως.
197a9 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως· οὐ μέντοι ἔν γε τῷ παρόντι μνημονεύω.

Presumably. But at the present moment at least I do not recall.

203a5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως.

6. assentient γάρ:

145d10 {ΘΕΑΙ.} Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; (10) 'For how could it not?'
Indeed: if this question and others like it were to be taken seriously, instead of rhetorically, it would lead to a very different dialogue.

7. An expanded 'yes':

157d9 {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἀλλ’ ἔμοιγε, ἐπειδὴ σοῦ ἀκούω οὕτω διεξιόντος, θαυμασίως φαίνεται ὡς ἔχειν λόγον καὶ ὑποληπτέον ᾗπερ (10) διελήλυθας.

Tht. Well, as far as I'm concerned, while I'm listening to your exposition of it, it seems to me an extraordinarily reasonable view; and I feel that the way you have set out the matter has got to be accepted.

NOTE: Characters in other dialogues voice similar thoughts, but rather than in agreement, in exasperated confused disagreement. (Euthyphro and Meno, for instance, in the dialogues Euthyphro and Meno)

8. The fiction: Socrates does not express or have his own views and is not expressing them in the dialogue:

a. 150c4 (Soc.) ἄγονός εἰμι σοφίας, καὶ ὅπερ ἤδη πολλοί μοι ὠνείδισαν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδὲν (5) ἀποφαίνομαι περὶ οὐδενὸς διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σοφόν, ἀληθὲς ὀνειδίζουσιν.

Soc. The common reproach against me is that I am aways asking questions of other people but never express my own views about anything, because there is no wisdom in me; and that is true enough.

b. 157c4 {ΘΕΑΙ.} Οὐκ οἶδα ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ περὶ σοῦ δύναμαι κατανοῆσαι πότερα δοκοῦντά σοι λέγεις αὐτὰ ἢ (5) ἐμοῦ ἀποπειρᾷ. {ΣΩ.} Οὐ μνημονεύεις, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ἐγὼ μὲν οὔτ’ οἶδα οὔτε ποιοῦμαι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἐμόν, ἀλλ’ εἰμὶ αὐτῶν ἄγονος, σὲ δὲ μαιεύομαι ... .

Tht. I really don't know, Socrates. I can't even quite see what you're getting at--whether the things you are saying are what you think yourself, or whether you are just trying me out.
Soc. You are forgetting, my friend. I don't know anything about this kind of thing myself, and I don't claim any of it as my own. I am barren of theories; my business is to attend you in your labour, .... .

c. 161b1 (Soc.) τὸ δὲ γιγνόμενον οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν λόγων ἐξέρχεται παρ’ ἐμοῦ ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐμοὶ προσδιαλεγομένου, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι πλέον πλὴν βραχέος, ὅσον λόγον παρ’ ἑτέρου σοφοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι μετρίως. καὶ νῦν τοῦτο παρὰ τοῦδε πειράσομαι, οὔ τι αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν.

Soc. But you don't realise what is happening. The arguments never come from me; they always come from the person I am talking to. All that I know, such as it is, is how to take an argument from someone else--someone who is wise--and give it a fair reception. So, now, I propose to try to get our answer out of Theaetetus, not to make any contribution of my own.

Most first time readers find this laughably transparently problematic even perverse: many expert readers take it seriously. And yet, cf. supplementary point 11 below: often both Soc. and Tht. speak of a shared investigative enterprise and shared ideas (not only in Theaetetus, but in every Platonic dialogue that has interlocutors).

9. An answer that goes beyond yes and thinks synchronically:

154c10 {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ἐὰν μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ δοκοῦν πρὸς τὴν νῦν (10) ἐρώτησιν ἀποκρίνωμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν· ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς τὴν προτέραν, φυλάττων μὴ ἐναντία εἴπω, ὅτι ἔστιν.

Tht. Well, Socrates, if I answer what seems true in relation to the proposed question, I shall say 'no, it is not possible'; but if I consider it in relation to the question that went before, then in order to avoid contradicting myself, I say, 'Yes, it is.'

It is clean and convenient ( for Plato) and minimizes confusion (for readers) to reserve the conversational lead for Socrates (with signal exceptions [Thrasymachus, Callicles], Socrates is the only character who gets to say that δὲ γε that marks the conversational lead).

10. Socrates (Plato?) acknowledged for a moment that he does not need Tht.: he could answer his own questions

{ΣΩ.} Τοῦδέ τοι ἕνεκα αὐτά σοι διακριβοῦμαι, εἴ τινι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τῷ αὐτῷ διὰ μὲν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐφικνούμεθα λευκῶν τε (e.) καὶ μελάνων, διὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἑτέρων αὖ τινῶν· καὶ ἕξεις ἐρωτώμενος πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἀναφέρειν; ἴσως δὲ βέλτιον σὲ λέγειν αὐτὰ ἀποκρινόμενον μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμὲ ὑπὲρ σοῦ πολυπραγμονεῖν. καί μοι λέγε·

Soc. Now the reason why I am being so precise with you is this. I want to know if it is with one and the same part of ourselves that we reach, through our eyes to black and white, and though the other means to yet further things; and whether, if asked, you will be able to refer all these to the body--but perhaps it would be better if you stated the answers yourself, rather than that I should busy myself on your behalf.

Why would it be 'better'? For whom? or for what purpose? To pull us in and get us to engage?

11. Who really owns the ideas: the play of pronouns: both Soc. and Tht. switch from 'we' to 'you' regularly: although the midwife metaphor says insistently that Soc. has no ideas and the ideas all belong to the interlocutor, the investigation is at times explicitly a shared one, and the ideas are as well, more so as the dialogue goes on (this is a shamelessly random and incomplete sampling of these things)

a. 187e8 {ΘΕΑΙ.} Φαμὲν γὰρ δή.

Tht. That is what we claim.

b. 188e1 ἢ πῶς ἐροῦμεν; {ΘΕΑΙ.} Οὕτως.

Soc. ... Or how shall we answer?
Tht. That's our answer.

c. 189c5 {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ὀρθότατά μοι νῦν δοκεῖς εἰρηκέναι.

Tht. Now you seem to me to have got it quite right.

AND, at the end of the dialogue, they are said to have both been pregnant and both together to have delivered their non-viable offspring.
{ΣΩ.} Ἦ οὖν ἔτι κυοῦμέν τι καὶ ὠδίνομεν, ὦ φίλε, περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἢ πάντα ἐκτετόκαμεν; (5) {ΘΕΑΙ.} Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί’ ἔγωγε πλείω ἢ ὅσα εἶχον ἐν ἐμαυτῷ διὰ σὲ εἴρηκα.

d. Soc. Well, now, dear lad, are we still pregnant, still in labour with any thoughts about knowledge? Or have we been delivered of all of them?
Tht. As far as I'm concerned, Socrates, you've made me say far more than ever was in me, Heaven knows.

A schematic of how I see readers and interlocutors.

The interlocutor ...	You (on first read) ...	You (the experienced Platonic reader) ...
... consists of only words on a page.	...are/have a mind.	... are/have a mind crammed full of all that is in the other dialogues.
... is constructed into a fictive person, with a mind, by you.	... are a witness and the mind that constructs the interlocutor.	... are an expert witness and a constructor of interlocutors, busy observing meta-patterns, seeing connections to other dialogues.
... exists in a linear fictional stream and experiences the dialogue inherently diachronically.	... are reading linearly, but free to scroll around: your thoughts may be mostly diachronic at this point.	... know the full linear flow of the dialogue backwards and forwards, but are also fully synchronically equipped with all of Plato readily available.
... is mostly spoken of as a person in scholarship.	...are mostly ignored in scholarship.	... are the assumed consumer of scholarship.

Two figures stand out in terms of taking interlocutors seriously and working on things relevant to what I am presenting here:
John Beversluis, Cross-Examining Socrates: A Defense of the Interlocutors in Plato's Early Dialogues, CUP, 2000.
Ruby Blondell, The Play of Character in Plato's Dialogues, CUP, 2002.