Interesting Questions for Jan 29

• Rachel Sargent:
  1) Can you ever be certain what something really IS? And is it necessary to be certain to know something?
  Bailly observation: Deep epistemological questions: no quick answer is possible.
  
  2) Can the scientific method, as a part of the internal nature of an observer desigend to observe an outer, objective world, effectively be used to examine the observer's internal nature?
  Bailly observation: Why should it not? Can't I use a microscope to look at a microscope (as long as I have a mirror)? Can't I use my eyes to look at my eyes (again, with a mirror). What's the mirror here?
  
  3) Can you feel an emotion without realizing it? That is, if you have no words or system to fit an emotion into, can you feel an emotion the same as emotions you are aware of and not notice because you don't have the mental tools to hold on to it? Or is emotion inextricably linked with its perception?
  Bailly observation: Personally, I say yes, and yes, and not really. I might feel something, not know what it is, and have someone else clearly recognize it as shame, guilt, love, etc. That happens all the time. I do feel something, however.
  
  
• Nilima Abrams:
  1)What is a fair way to test whether various cultures have the same emotions? Is it possible? The experiments with facial expressions study the output side, thus can they actually tell us whether we share underlying emotions, or do they just display outer reactions? To avoid difficulties in translation would it be good to show a scenario that would elicit a certain reaction in one culture and see if there is the same reaction in another?
  Bailly observation: Address the particular studies Griffiths mentions: studies of preliterate cultures, etc.-he explains how they try to negotiate the fact that the studies are cross-cultural. Also, what is "fair." Is it not fair for me to say that you have a particular emotion? Why is identification between people in the same culture that much less problematic than identification between people of different cultures. I think that we are all too impressed with these sceptical theories.
  
  2)What is the relationship between emotions and actions? In the section discussing emotions as disclaimed actions, the two are blurred. Griffiths gives examples of MPS, "being a wild pig" and amok. Does the theory say that emotions cause actions? Or simply that they are percieved to cause actions and thus those actions are more societally accepted? Do you think that emotions cause actions?
  Bailly observation: Good question. Isn't action part of some emotions? Griffiths calls emotions irruptive motivational states: that means that they interrupt our normal motivations and suddenly motivate action. So he thinks they are motivators in relation to action.
  
  Examine Griffiths use of the word "rational" on p. 70. Is his use clear? Is it congruent with your idea of rationality? If a behavior seems weird, but is ultimately benefficial, shouldn't it be called a rational behavior?
  Bailly observation: Good question.
  
  
• Katie Cook:
  1)What are we to make of so-called mixed emotions, such as when a person says, I love it and I hate it? How do we interpret this when it seems that under the propositional attitude scholl this might not be considered an emotion at all?
  Bailly observation: Why should mixed emotions not be simply that: two emotions at once? What does it mean that they might be "opposite" and yet you can still have them both about the same thing at the same time? This is an interesting question Katie has asked.
  
  2)If social constructionism is true; how can there be such widespread cross cultural agreement about so many emotions as chapter three suggests in the emotion recognition studies?
  Bailly observation: Why can't societies and cultures really be more similar than they are different? Why is it that I can go to just about any culture in the world and figure out a way to live in it with some success?
  
  3)How can social constructionism handle the way that infants, born deaf and blind, display the same facial expressions in response to stimuli, although they completely lack enculturation?
  Bailly observation: Griffiths would claim it can't-that's his point. Good question.
  
  
• Lauren Barnett
  1.) William Lyons states, ³In general a cognitivist theory of emotion is one that makes some aspect of thought, usually a belief, central to the concept of emotion and, at least in some cognitive theories, essential to distinguishing different emotions from one another.² If, in fact, Lyons¹ definition of cognitivist theory is true, how would one explain pan cultural emotional representation? And, if one could explain this would it be rational to use this data as a means to identify the origin of emotion in the human body or even the human race?
  Bailly observation: Griffiths gives good reasons to be critical of Lyons' claims: use them if you answer this question.
  
  2) According to the ³social role theory,² emotions are caused by societal influences, wherein persons within a given society may adapt a certain emotion by either pressure or repetition, not necessarily forced. In this strain of thought then, is it possible for the human race to manifest our own emotions from the very start? And in this way, is it possible that through evolution we may create new emotions or even emotions on a higher plain than those we experience now?
  Bailly observation: Lauren's question is one reason why Griffiths thinks that the social role theory is at best partially right.
  
  3) In tests done with the Japanese on emotions linked with facial expression it was found that, ³slow motion video tape analysis showed the micromomentary occurrence of characteristic negative emotional expressions, and then showed them being replaced with a polite smile.² In your opinion, does this occurrence reflect a mechanism of emotion in and of itself? Is it possible that this reaction as a whole represents an emotion not known to our culture or is it simply an example of the ³social role theory²?
  Bailly observation: can't people mask their emotions? Don't we often try to hide what we are feeling, with some success?
  
  
• Ashley Orenberg:
  1.) Griffiths uses the term ³emotional disorders² on page 24. What does he mean when referring to emotional disorders? I immediately thought of the phrase ³mood disorders,² a phrase that holds a great deal of meaning in psychology concerning someone who is experiencing a specific emotion (or mood) in a way which impairs his/her ability to function. For example, bipolar is a type of mood disorder. The person is experiencing extreme highs and extreme lows. But how would Griffiths describe his meaning behind the term ³emotional disorders² if the word emotion is so difficult to define in and of itself? Would he even agree with defining someone as having an emotional (or mood) disorder? I understand I¹m using the words mood and emotion interchangeably which is certainly not all together accurate, but I did this to make an example! I hope it got my point across!
  Bailly observation: check out the last section of the book: it's about moods.
  
  2.) Just as Griffiths questions the word ³emotion² and what makes certain attitudes constitute an emotion and many others do not, I question what makes someone be labeled as ³emotional?² Usually a person is labeled emotional when he/she displays many extreme physiological features on a fairly regular basis. Because Griffiths states that someone could be experiencing an emotion without exhibiting any physiological responses, could it be possible for someone to be emotional without physically acting ³emotional?²
  Bailly observation: Ever seen "Sense and Sensibility" or read the book? The older sister is a great example of someone who experiences intense emotion but does not show it. Griffiths will claim that the affect programs cannot be suppressed (they are automatic and independent of higher cognitive activity), but they can certainly be masked, excused, etc.
  
  3.) ³In a trivial sense all concepts are socially constructed² (pg. 146). Therefore, wouldn¹t the only accurate way of comparing ³emotions² across cultures be with physical actions such as crying, smiling, frowning, and screaming? Instead of trying to compare the term emotions across cultures, wouldn¹t it be more appropriate to ask them what word they place with the action crying and then investigate what object or event led them to act that particular way? I am wondering how you think Griffiths may respond to this suggestion.
  Bailly observation: That's why he calls it "trivial"-it does not matter for such things as cross-cultural comparison, or so he claims. Even actions have to be talked about via concepts: so if you are impressed with this sort of social construction, then absolutely no cross-cultural communication is really possible, and probably no cross-individual communication either. In fact, I cannot even really understand what I wrote just a little while ago, because my social constructions are different now...no, I'd rather not have us take this too seriously right now: it's a brand of scepticism and we will talk about it later. I hope that does not sound brusque.
• Graham Budd:
  It strikes me that while the evolutionary theory of emotions does a reasonable job explaining why we act the way we do when we experience an emotion it does little to address what the emotions really are. Evaluate how well the evolutionary theory of emotions actually explain what emotions are? or: How well does the evolutionary theory fit in with the title of the book?
  Bailly observation: Well, doesn't it at least say that emotions are phenomena that are the product of evolution and so should be investigated in a phylogenetic and historical way?
  
  What are the similarities and differences between the social concept model and the model of social construction?
  Bailly observation: I think that the social concept model is a social construction model, but not all social construction models are the social concept model. I suppose what the question really wants is a discussion of the difference between the social concept model and other models of social construction.
  
  Which of the various theories discussed thus far concerning the true nature of emotions do you find most persuasive?
  Bailly observation: Is persuasiveness to be determined by which one is most attractive or which one is most rigorous...or by some other criterion?
  
  
• Rachel Sargent:
  1. Is emotion tied to personality? To what degree? How are they different or related?
  Bailly observation: A huge question that is way beyond the scope of the book, but an interesting one.
  
  2. What is the function for emotion, beyond the individual functions of discrete emotions, that would connect them all together? or perhaps there isn't one?
  Bailly observation: "Function" is a good question to ask. But maybe the function emotions fulfil is not what would tie them together?
  
  3. How important is physical expression to what emotion is? For example, will the experimental machine at MIT designed to mimic human expression ever feel human emotion? What would it mean if it could? or if it couldn't?
  Bailly observation: These are really separate questions, not one question followed by an example. Perhaps the second is a specific aspect of the first, but I think it gets into separate areas.
  
  
• Nathan Mahany:
  1) Assuming that emotions are purely neurological responses to specific chemical and environmental stimuli, and that each person is subjected to different environments and situations, it is improbable that any two people should experiences the exact same results to an identical emotional stimulus. Does the social role model conform to this information?
  
  2) Griffiths states that Eskimoís are do not have an emotion for jealousy because extramarital relationships are considered acceptable. Is this a good argument? Why or why not?
  Bailly observation: Good question.
  
  3) What is the significance of Darwinís research on the human facial expressions? Is there a direct correlation between certain emotions and facial expressions?
  Bailly observation: This seems to be a question unlike others above: it asks for a summary of what Griffiths wrote, not further thought. That's fine. Just noting it.