Popper Chapter 5

In this chapter, Popper explains some ideas of his own and explores their non-Platonic precursors in Greek thought.

Popper claims that there is a fundamental difference between normative laws and natural laws. Natural laws identify strict unvarying regularities (except perhaps in biology, where things happen regularly but not invariably). Natural laws cannot be broken or enforced, because that is not how they work. What is more, they are either true or false. Normative laws, however, forbid or demand certain conduct (e.g. the Ten Commandments or a legal law). As such, they can be broken and enforced. It would be inappropriate to call a normative law true or false.

In order to understand Plato, Popper suggests that it is important to understand the history of the distinction between natural and normative laws. Popper is not engaging in a historicist argumen, but using history to understand Plato's argument. The distinction between history and historicism is important: Popper thinks history is respectable and worth investigating, but historicism (the idea that there are inevitable laws or patterns to history) is not.

The distinction between normative and natural laws might have arisen as follows, says Popper. First, people held a view called "naive monism." In naive monism, people have not yet made any distinction between normative and natural laws. It is a stage that might be found in 'primitive' tribes, suggests Popper. In naive monism, there are two varieties: 1) naive naturalism, which Popper thinks never actually occurred. In it, people think that all things that happen, whether naturally or by human agency, are unalterable, and that's that. The second variety of naive monism, 2) is called naive conventionalism. In this view, all things that happen are the result of the decisions of demons and gods. These demons and gods are essentially like humans, but have the power to decide how things happen both in nature and in human environments. Both 1 and 2 are called "monism" because they assume that there is one type of explanation for all occurrences. Namely, naive naturalism assumes that every occurrence occurs because of some unalterable natural law. Naive naturalism, however, probably never was actually believed by any one, primitive or modern. Naive conventionalism assumes that every occurrence occurs because of the decision of some agent, i.e. everything is convention.

The breakdown of naive conventionalism occurs when a primitive society starts to realize that different societies have different conventions. Thus some things are different depending on what society you belong to. Other things, however, stay the same: gravity works everywhere as a law, but a law against public nudity does not. Popper calls the stage that is reached when one realizes that taboos and such are human conventions "critical dualism." It is dualism because at this stage, one thinks there are two sorts of explanations of occurrences: one is convention, the other is natural law. It is critical because one has used critical powers to discover it.

It must be understood that critical dualism does not assume anything about the historical origin of norms: it need not, for instance, assume that every human norm has a clear origin in a decision by some human(s). It does, however, assume that all norms CAN be changed by humans.

Popper wants to be absolutely clear that just because any norm CAN be changed, that does not make norms arbitrary. There are better and worse norms, according to Popper. It is crucial that he explain how we decide which ones are better and which ones are worse, and that that criterion for decision not be a norm itself. If it is a norm, then norms are all arbitrary, I think. If it is rooted in some natural law, then he has a different problem. Namely, he will face the possibility that all norms can ultimately be derived from some natural law, which he desperately wants to avoid.

If all norms are either derived from norms or are somehow underived norms, then there is no way to decide "better" and " worse." Popper is certainly right, however, that norms are UP TO US and so we are responsible for the norms we adopt.

III
No norm can ever be derived from a fact: in other words, a statement like "it is a fact that ..." can never cause a statement like "therefore we should ..." to be true. It is not at all clear to me that the ancient authors we are studying believed this. A simplistic chain of logic as follows does not seem to misrepresent Plato drastically: humans have three parts in their soul; if the rational part is in control, humans are more likely to maximize their pleasure in life; humans desire to maximize their pleasure in life; therefore humans should work to put their rational part in control.

Decisions are what produce norms: any decision I or you make establishes a norm. If we make a decision that is contrary to a natural law (I decide to float upwards with no means of propulsion, for instance), then that is still a decision, but can never be carried out. There are many such decisions occurring every day.

"Critical dualism" is dualism because of this distinction between facts and decisions (which is actually derived from or the same as the distinction between norms and natural laws).

Now, you may say that "it is a fact that I decided this should be done" and so decisions can be facts. That is only true in that it is a fact "that you decided this should be done" but the content of the decision (i.e. "this should be done") is NOT a fact. It is a norm. In other words, that most societies forbid stealing is a fact. That stealing should be forbidden, however, is not a fact.

Popper admits that the fact that norms are conventional/artificial carries with it some arbitrariness, but he thinks that norms about society and government are not fully arbitrary. His "reason" is that they involve people's lives and other such "important matters," but there are many views that claim that "life" is not important, or at least that there are many things more important than life. Many people die for things that are more important than their life! Many people send other people to their deaths because of things that are more important than the lives of those people who die.

Popper does not want moral decisions to be a matter of taste (and neither do I), but he does not provide a good argument for that position in this chapter. We should look for such an argument elsewhere in Popper. If we do not find one, then Popper's position is threatened.

Protagoras, Popper says, thought that there are no norms of nature, nature is bound by natural laws. But we impose norms upon the natural state of affairs with the help of Zeus (Zeus gave us the ability to do so when he gave us understanding of justice and honor). We still cannot defy natural laws, however.

IV

Even within our human environment, Popper says, there are "natural laws." For instance, there are "natural laws" of institutions and machines. Institutions are made by establishing certain norms, but that does not mean they are exempt from natural laws. Thus within sociology, Popper speaks of laws that are like natural laws, i.e. unbreakable.

V.
In between critical dualism and naive monism, there are intermediate positions. The most important are three:
  1. biological naturalism
  2. ethical or juridical positivism
  3. psychological or spiritual naturalism
  1. Biological naturalism says that there are norms and natural laws, but the basis of norms is natural laws. For instance, we CAN decide to eat only once every ten days, but we will die. It turns out that behind the various conventions that say we should eat a certain number of times each day is a natural law: we have to eat every certain period (let's not debate what it is here).

    Antiphon was the first to put forward a form of biological naturalism (see 'Sophists'). He held that most norms are arbitrary and contrary to nature. He says that norms are imposed from outside, but natural laws are inevitable. It may be disadvantageous to break a norm if someone sees you, but it is advantageous to break it if no one sees you. Nonetheless, he taught the need for self-control. He was an equalitarian who held that in natural gifts, humans are equal. Hippias the Athenian also held such equalitarian views.

    These equalitarian views were used to oppose slavery by Hippias and Antiphon! Lycophron, Alcidamas, and others express the sentiment that no one is a slave by nature. Thus biological naturalism has some potentially attractive features.
    If you go try to find writings by Hippias, Antiphon, Lycophron, and Alcidamas, you may not find much that seems helpful. Popper's book lists sources of their thought. Also, you can come talk to me about it. We don't have much of their writings, and what we have is not always easy to find and sort through.

    Plato and Aristotle, however, advanced the theory that some people are morally and biologically unequal and are by nature slaves. Thus biological naturalism can have unattractive features.

    Popper points out that "living in accord with nature" sounds good, but if we strip away all sort of technology and human-made things, we are left eating raw food, naked, and generally in a bad way. So it is unlikely that the biological naturalist wants to live strictly according to nature in that sense of nature. But there are more subtle problems with biological naturalism. For the biological naturalist must DECIDE what is according to nature. Some humans, for instance, may not place their health higher than something else (whether that be something like a sacrifice of health for the sake of medical research [presumably a lofty goal] or a sacrifice of health for the sake of smoking, drinking and other self-destructive but apparently attractive activities [presumably not lofty goals]). So it is clear that this so-called biological naturalism must ESTABLISH NORMS, and that means that the biological naturalist has after all made decisions, established norms.

  2. Ethical positivism.
    Ethical positivism says that there are/should be no other norms than those that actually exist. Thus the ethical positivist thinks that the facts which exist and affect society are the actual norms of society. Any other supposed norms are merely unreal imaginations. An individual cannot/should not judge the norms of her society. Historically, ethical positivism has usually been conservatism and has often invoked the authority of God: the norms are established by god and are facts not to be changed.

    Popper thinks that ethical positivism is based on the assumption that norms are arbitrary.

  3. Psychological or spiritual positivism.
    The psychological positivist says that biological naturalism is right that there are natural laws which lead to normative laws, but the psychological positivist says these natural laws are not "biological" but rather psychological. Humans do not live only as biological beings with certain natural and inevitable needs: they live as psychological beings with loftier goals. Human nature is not about eating, propagating, finding shelter, etc. It is spiritual.

    Popper thinks Plato was the first psychological positivist. He held that the soul is more important than the body, and the true nature of humans was their soul. Thus his society is built around supposed facts about the soul.

    Psychological positivism can be used to defend ANY existing norm. Nothing that has ever been a norm for humans cannot be defended by it.
Popper says that the resistance to critical dualism (he obviously thinks critical dualism is the best option) comes from two sources: the first is our reluctance to admit that norms are ultimately our responsibility. The second is that we tend to like monism: we want to attribute norms to facts. But we cannot attribute them to nature or some other unalterable thing like natural laws, god, etc., Popper says.

VI Plato's psychological positivism
Plato thinks that "nature" or "essence" is the Forms. All sensible things are copies of Forms. All human-made things are copies of those copies of Forms.

The soul, however, is prior to all sensible things. "Prior" is not defined by Popper, but it might mean something like that it is closer to the Forms.

According to Plato, the "nature" of a thing is its origin, and the Forms are the ultimate origins of all things. Popper takes this in a temporal way. Taken temporally, the fact that Forms are prior to everything else means that in order to find the nature of anything, one must go back in time to its origin in the Forms. Thus THE method of any science is historicist. (we might want to ask whether there are not other ways to take the "priority" of Forms: perhaps they are simply prior logically in the same way that one is prior to two, but that does not mean that IN TIME one came to exist before two...there are other ways to take prior).

Even perfect humans, i.e. true philosophers, rely on other humans, and so are not self-sufficient, and so are imperfect (anything that needs something else is not perfect, because need implies imperfection).

The state, however, does not need another thing, and so can be more perfect. What is more, any given human can only reach maximum perfection in a state. Thus the individual needs the state. But the state is prior to or more important than the individual. The seed of social decay is in individuals, not the state itself.

Popper says that according to Plato the origin of human society is a social contract based on the social nature of man. Plato holds that the state is a super-individual, an organic being. The individuals gather to form it in order to further their own interests. Behind that decision lies the FACT that the individuals are not self-sufficient. A further FACT is that each individual has particular abilities and is suited to some tasks more than others. That FACT underlies the economic principle/norm of the division of labor.

Plato thinks the soul is prior in nature to the body, and that its products, such as law, are also natural (although artefacts, i.e. humanly made sensible things, are not natural, but are copies of copies). Since laws and institutions are born of reason, they exist by nature: a clear statement of a variety of psychological naturalism. So far, the theory cannot say which laws are better, for all laws are products of the soul's reason, and so are equally natural.

VII
The individual is an imperfect version of the state: the state, being more autarkic, is more perfect.

The organic view of the state is, however, initially offered in order to explain things about individuals. The organic theory emphasizes unity (how can something be an "organism" if it is not "one" thing?), and so, for instance, the state is to be small. As Grote says (sexist language changed) "though a human is apparently One, he or she is in reality Many ... though the perfect Commonwealth is apparently Many, it is in reality One." Popper calls this theory that the state is or ought to be One "holism." He thinks that Plato's holism is closely related to tribal collectivism. It is "natural" for the individual to be subservient to the whole, which is not just a collection of individuals, but a higher unity.

VIII
Popper thinks there is a problem with Plato's historically perfect state: if it did exist at some time, why did it degenerate? Plato's answer that everything that is generated must decay is not sufficient (particularly if we are to take seriously the claim made above that the state is actually natural, i.e. in accordance with the forms, as a product of the soul).

Plato explains it by saying that individuals are the cause of decay of the state. Even if they are bred according to eugenic principles, those eugenic principles must be formulated by humans, and as such must be based on perceptions, not true knowledge. The rulers cannot know their fellow humans as they know the Forms, i.e. purely by reason: they must use perception. Perception, however, is fallible, and so the breeding program will inevitably fall short of perfection, and so there will be individuals born among the rulers who will cause it to degenerate.

Thus Plato offers a racial biological basis for his historical analysis.