Aristotle Politics Book III
an eclectic tour
Chapter 1: what is a citizen?
"It is evident, therefore, that we must
begin by asking, Who is the citizen,
and what is the meaning of the term? For here again there may be a
difference of opinion, He who is a citizen in a democracy will often
not be a citizen in an oligarchy.. . . we may say, first, that a
citizen is not a citizen because he lives in a certain place, for
resident aliens and slaves share in the place; nor is he a citizen who
has legal rights to the extent of suing and being sued; for this right
may be enjoyed under the provisions of a treaty. . .. . . . resident
aliens . . . are called citizens only in a qualified sense, as we might
apply the term to children.((1275a1ff.)
"But the citizen whom we are seeking to
define is a citizen in the strictest
sense,
against whom no such exception can be taken, and his special
characteristic is that he shares in
the administration of justice, and
in offices. Now of offices, some are discontinuous, and the same
persons are not allowed to hold them twice, or can only hold them after
a fixed interval; other have no limit of time-for example, the office
of juryman or member of the assembly. It may, indeed, be argued that
these are not magistrates at all, and that their functions give them no
share in the government. But surely it is ridiculous to say that those
who have the supreme power do not govern. .. .. let us not dwell on
this . ... let us assume that those who share in such office are
citizens. This is the most comprehensive definition of citizen and best
suits all those who are generally so called. (1275a19ff.)
"He
who has the power to take part in
the deliberative or judicial administration of any state is said by us
to be a citizen of that state; and, speaking generally, a state is a
body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life."
(1275b18ff)
Chapter 2: What is a state?
See the last quotation above: a state is a body of citizens sufficing
for the purposes of life.
A state is not a place or certain inhabitants.
"For, since the state is a partnership,
and is a partnership of citizens in a constitution, when the form of
government changes, and becomes different, then it may be supposed that
the state is no longer the same. . . . and in this manner we speak of
every union or composition of elements as different when their
composition differs . . . it is evident that the sameness of a state
depends chiefly on the sameness of the constitution.
The state is made up of not only the citizens, who are supposed to be
the rational elements, but also of irrational elements, citizens'
wives, children and slaves.
Chapter 3: Is a good citizen a good person?
The good citizen is good qua citizen
insofar as he has as his aim the preservation of the constitution (of
the state he lives in).
He need not possess the goodness which makes one a good person.
The only way to have a perfect state
is to have only good citizens:
unless we assume that in the perfect state all citizens will be good humans,
they need not be good humans (cf. the current phenomenon of examining
the character of candidates vs. their record of deeds qua elected
officials).
"But will there then be no case in
which the excellence of the good citizen and the excellence of the good
man coincide? To this we answer that the good ruler is a good and wise
man, but the citizen need not be wise." (1277a14-6)
The excellence of a citizen
includes being able to rule and be ruled like a free man (1277b13).
So ruling and being a citizen are the same thing (being a citizen
just means partaking in ruling), and the excellence of both is the
same?
What of 1277a14-6, quoted above, where it was said that the ruler
must be wise, but the citizen need not?
"Practical wisdom is the only
excellence peculiar to a ruler: it would seem that all other
excellences must equally belong to ruler and subject. The excellence of
the subject is certainly not wisdom, but only true opinion."
(1277b37ff.)
Chapter 5:
Employees would not be citizens in the best state:
"There still remains one more question
about the citizen; is he only a true citizen who has a share of office,
or is the mechanic to be included?
If they who hold no office are to be
deemed citizens, not every citizen can have this excellence [i.e. the
virtues that can only be exhibited when ruling]; for this man is a
citizen. And if none of the lower class are citizens, in which part of
the state are they to be placed? For they are not resident aliens, and
they are not foreigners. . . . it must
be admitted that we cannot
consider all those to be citizens who are necessary to the existence of
the state. . . The best form of state will not admit them to
citizenship; but if they are admitted, then our definition of the
excellence of a citizen will not apply to every citizen, not to every
free man as such, but only to those
who are freed from necessary
services." (1278a3ff.)
"As to the question whether the
excellence of the good man is the same as that of the good citizen, the
considerations already adduced prove that in some states the good man
and the good citizen are the same, and in others different. When they
are the same it is not every citizen who is a good man, but only the
statesman and those who have or may have, along or in conjunction with
others, the conduct of public affairs." (1278baff.)
Chapter 6: cui bono
"First, let us consider the purpose of
a state, and how many forms of rule there are by which human society is
regulated. We have already said . . . that man is a political animal.
And therefore men, even when they do not require one another's help,
desire to live together; not but that they
are also brought together by their common interests insofar as they
each attain to any measure of well-being. This is certainly the chief
end, both of individuals and of states. And mankind meet
together and maintain the political community also for the sake of mere
life (in which there is possibly some noble element so long as the
evils of existence do not greatly overbalance the good)." 1278b15ff.
"The
rule of a master . . . is
exercised primarily with a view to the interest of the master, but
accidentally considers the slave, since, if the slave perish, the rule
of the master perishes with him. On the other hand, the government of a
wife and children and of a household . . . is exercised in the first
instance for the good of the governed or for the common good of both
parties, but essentially for the good of the governed. . . And so in
politics: when the state is framed upon the principle of equality and
likeness, the citizens think that they ought to hold office by turns. .
. nowadays, for the sake of the advantage which is to be gained from
the public revenues and from office, men want to be always in office. .
. The conclusion is evident: that governments which have a regard to
the common interest are constituted in accordance with strict
principles of justice, and are therefore true forms; but those which
regard only the interest of the rulers are all defective and perverted
forms, for they are despotic, whereas a state is a community of
freemen." (1278b32ff.)
SO, the rulers rule for the sake of the governed, all of them, in good
states.
Chapter 9
quid est illud bonum?
"But a state exists for the sake of the
good life, and not for the sake of life only . . . nor does a state
exist for the sake of alliance and security from injustice, nor yet for
the sake of exchange and mutual intercourse."(1280a30ff.)
Not a minimalist about states.
"Whereas, those who care for good
government take into consideration political excellence and defect. Whence
it may be further inferred that excellence must also be the care of a
state which is truly so called." (1280b4ff.)
"It is clear then that a state is not a
mere society, having a common place, established for the prevention of
mutual crime and for the sake of exchange. These are conditions without
which a state cannot exist; but all of them do not constitute a state,
which is a community of families and aggregations of families in
well-being, for the sake of perfect and self-sufficing life.
. . Hence there arise in cities family connexions, brotherhoods, common
sacrifices, amusements which draw men together. But these are created
by friendship, for to choose to live together is friendship. The
end of the state is the good life, and these are the means towards it.
. .
Our conclusion then is that political
society exists for the sake of noble actions, and not of living
together." (1280b29ff)
Chapter 13
"All these considerations appear to
show that none of the principles on
which men claim to rule and to hold
all other men in subjection to them are right. To those who
claim to be
masters of the government on the ground of their excellence or their
wealth, the many might fairly answer that they themselves are often
better and richer than the few-I do not say individually, but
collectively. And another problem which is sometimes put forward may be
met in a similar manner. Some persons doubt whether the legislator who
desires to make the justest laws ought to legislate with a view to the
good of the better or the many, when the case which I have mentioned
occurs. Now what is right must be construed as equally right, and what
is equally right is to be considered with reference to the advantage of
the state, and the common good of the citizens. And a citizen is one
who shares in governing and being governed. He differs under different
forms of government, but in the best state he is one who is able and
chooses to be governed and to govern with a view to the life of
excellence." (1282b27ff.)
For men of preeminent excellence who arise in a democracy, there is
no law. They are gods among men. They are not part of the state!
(1284a5ff)
"anyone would be ridiculous who attempted to make laws for them" That
is why democratic states institute ostracism.
From Reason and Emotion by John
M. Cooper. This
selection is from page 356, 'Political Animals and Civic Friendship.'
Aristotle's criterion for a "correct"
constitution is
deceptively simple. A "correct" constitution is one in which the
government aims at the common advantage. In the deviation-forms the
government aims instead at the advantage of the office-holders
themselves (and their families) as a group. But 1) to whom is the
advantage sought in correct constitutions common, and 2) in what sense
is it common?
To the first question the natural answer
would seem to be:
common to all the citizens, i.e., all the free, native-born residents.
In fact, I think this is what Aristotle does intend: it is at least
suggested by III 13, 1283b40-41, where Aristotle speaks of 'correct'
rule as being 'for the advantage of the whole city and for the common
advantage of the citizens.' But if we put Aristotle's view this way, we
must recognize that we are using the word citizen in a way that departs
from his own explicit theory in III 1-2 of who the citizens of a city
are.
See book III section 1-2. One suggested
definition is "those who
have
access to courts of law, who may sue or be sued". But this is too wide;
this access is open to any person who has entered into a commercial
contract, or at any rate partially open, for a resident foreigner may
be obliged to appoint someone to act for him, so that his participation
in
the state is incomplete.
It is clear that Aristotle uses the word 'citizen' in different ways
at different times. He has a stricter and a looser sense of the word:
the strict sense is one who partakes in governance, but there is a
looser sense in which any freeborn male is a citizen. Note that
citizens are to rule for the advantage of the whole city, which
includes everyone.