Aristotle Politics Book III
an eclectic tour

Chapter 1: what is a citizen?

"It is evident, therefore, that we must begin by asking, Who is the citizen, and what is the meaning of the term? For here again there may be a difference of opinion, He who is a citizen in a democracy will often not be a citizen in an oligarchy.. . . we may say, first, that a citizen is not a citizen because he lives in a certain place, for resident aliens and slaves share in the place; nor is he a citizen who has legal rights to the extent of suing and being sued; for this right may be enjoyed under the provisions of a treaty. . .. . . . resident aliens . . . are called citizens only in a qualified sense, as we might apply the term to children.((1275a1ff.)

"But the citizen whom we are seeking to define is a citizen in the strictest sense, against whom no such exception can be taken, and his special characteristic is that he shares in the administration of justice, and in offices. Now of offices, some are discontinuous, and the same persons are not allowed to hold them twice, or can only hold them after a fixed interval; other have no limit of time-for example, the office of juryman or member of the assembly. It may, indeed, be argued that these are not magistrates at all, and that their functions give them no share in the government. But surely it is ridiculous to say that those who have the supreme power do not govern. .. .. let us not dwell on this . ... let us assume that those who share in such office are citizens. This is the most comprehensive definition of citizen and best suits all those who are generally so called. (1275a19ff.)

"He who has the power to take part in the deliberative or judicial administration of any state is said by us to be a citizen of that state; and, speaking generally, a state is a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life." (1275b18ff)

Chapter 2: What is a state?

See the last quotation above: a state is a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life.

A state is not a place or certain inhabitants.

"For, since the state is a partnership, and is a partnership of citizens in a constitution, when the form of government changes, and becomes different, then it may be supposed that the state is no longer the same. . . . and in this manner we speak of every union or composition of elements as different when their composition differs . . . it is evident that the sameness of a state depends chiefly on the sameness of the constitution.

The state is made up of not only the citizens, who are supposed to be the rational elements, but also of irrational elements, citizens' wives, children and slaves.

Chapter 3: Is a good citizen a good person?

The good citizen is good qua citizen insofar as he has as his aim the preservation of the constitution (of the state he lives in).
He need not possess the goodness which makes one a good person.

The only way to have a perfect state is to have only good citizens: unless we assume that in the perfect state all citizens will be good humans, they need not be good humans (cf. the current phenomenon of examining the character of candidates vs. their record of deeds qua elected officials).

"But will there then be no case in which the excellence of the good citizen and the excellence of the good man coincide? To this we answer that the good ruler is a good and wise man, but the citizen need not be wise." (1277a14-6)

The excellence of a citizen includes being able to rule and be ruled like a free man (1277b13).
So ruling and being a citizen are the same thing (being a citizen just means partaking in ruling), and the excellence of both is the same?

What of 1277a14-6, quoted above, where it was said that the ruler must be wise, but the citizen need not?

"Practical wisdom is the only excellence peculiar to a ruler: it would seem that all other excellences must equally belong to ruler and subject. The excellence of the subject is certainly not wisdom, but only true opinion." (1277b37ff.)

Chapter 5:

Employees would not be citizens in the best state:

"There still remains one more question about the citizen; is he only a true citizen who has a share of office, or is the mechanic to be included? If they who hold no office are to be deemed citizens, not every citizen can have this excellence [i.e. the virtues that can only be exhibited when ruling]; for this man is a citizen. And if none of the lower class are citizens, in which part of the state are they to be placed? For they are not resident aliens, and they are not foreigners. . . . it must be admitted that we cannot consider all those to be citizens who are necessary to the existence of the state. . . The best form of state will not admit them to citizenship; but if they are admitted, then our definition of the excellence of a citizen will not apply to every citizen, not to every free man as such, but only to those who are freed from necessary services." (1278a3ff.)

"As to the question whether the excellence of the good man is the same as that of the good citizen, the considerations already adduced prove that in some states the good man and the good citizen are the same, and in others different. When they are the same it is not every citizen who is a good man, but only the statesman and those who have or may have, along or in conjunction with others, the conduct of public affairs." (1278baff.)

Chapter 6: cui bono

"First, let us consider the purpose of a state, and how many forms of rule there are by which human society is regulated. We have already said . . . that man is a political animal. And therefore men, even when they do not require one another's help, desire to live together; not but that they are also brought together by their common interests insofar as they each attain to any measure of well-being. This is certainly the chief end, both of individuals and of states. And mankind meet together and maintain the political community also for the sake of mere life (in which there is possibly some noble element so long as the evils of existence do not greatly overbalance the good)." 1278b15ff.

"The rule of a master . . . is exercised primarily with a view to the interest of the master, but accidentally considers the slave, since, if the slave perish, the rule of the master perishes with him. On the other hand, the government of a wife and children and of a household . . . is exercised in the first instance for the good of the governed or for the common good of both parties, but essentially for the good of the governed. . . And so in politics: when the state is framed upon the principle of equality and likeness, the citizens think that they ought to hold office by turns. . . nowadays, for the sake of the advantage which is to be gained from the public revenues and from office, men want to be always in office. . . The conclusion is evident: that governments which have a regard to the common interest are constituted in accordance with strict principles of justice, and are therefore true forms; but those which regard only the interest of the rulers are all defective and perverted forms, for they are despotic, whereas a state is a community of freemen." (1278b32ff.)

SO, the rulers rule for the sake of the governed, all of them, in good states.

Chapter 9 quid est illud bonum?

"But a state exists for the sake of the good life, and not for the sake of life only . . . nor does a state exist for the sake of alliance and security from injustice, nor yet for the sake of exchange and mutual intercourse."(1280a30ff.) Not a minimalist about states.

"Whereas, those who care for good government take into consideration political excellence and defect. Whence it may be further inferred that excellence must also be the care of a state which is truly so called." (1280b4ff.)

"It is clear then that a state is not a mere society, having a common place, established for the prevention of mutual crime and for the sake of exchange. These are conditions without which a state cannot exist; but all of them do not constitute a state, which is a community of families and aggregations of families in well-being, for the sake of perfect and self-sufficing life. . . Hence there arise in cities family connexions, brotherhoods, common sacrifices, amusements which draw men together. But these are created by friendship, for to choose to live together is friendship. The end of the state is the good life, and these are the means towards it. . .
Our conclusion then is that political society exists for the sake of noble actions, and not of living together." (1280b29ff)

Chapter 13

"All these considerations appear to show that none of the principles on which men claim to rule and to hold all other men in subjection to them are right. To those who claim to be masters of the government on the ground of their excellence or their wealth, the many might fairly answer that they themselves are often better and richer than the few-I do not say individually, but collectively. And another problem which is sometimes put forward may be met in a similar manner. Some persons doubt whether the legislator who desires to make the justest laws ought to legislate with a view to the good of the better or the many, when the case which I have mentioned occurs. Now what is right must be construed as equally right, and what is equally right is to be considered with reference to the advantage of the state, and the common good of the citizens. And a citizen is one who shares in governing and being governed. He differs under different forms of government, but in the best state he is one who is able and chooses to be governed and to govern with a view to the life of excellence." (1282b27ff.)

For men of preeminent excellence who arise in a democracy, there is no law. They are gods among men. They are not part of the state! (1284a5ff) "anyone would be ridiculous who attempted to make laws for them" That is why democratic states institute ostracism.

From Reason and Emotion by John M. Cooper. This selection is from page 356, 'Political Animals and Civic Friendship.'

Aristotle's criterion for a "correct" constitution is deceptively simple. A "correct" constitution is one in which the government aims at the common advantage. In the deviation-forms the government aims instead at the advantage of the office-holders themselves (and their families) as a group. But 1) to whom is the advantage sought in correct constitutions common, and 2) in what sense is it common?

To the first question the natural answer would seem to be: common to all the citizens, i.e., all the free, native-born residents. In fact, I think this is what Aristotle does intend: it is at least suggested by III 13, 1283b40-41, where Aristotle speaks of 'correct' rule as being 'for the advantage of the whole city and for the common advantage of the citizens.' But if we put Aristotle's view this way, we must recognize that we are using the word citizen in a way that departs from his own explicit theory in III 1-2 of who the citizens of a city are.

See book III section 1-2. One suggested definition is "those who have access to courts of law, who may sue or be sued". But this is too wide; this access is open to any person who has entered into a commercial contract, or at any rate partially open, for a resident foreigner may be obliged to appoint someone to act for him, so that his participation in the state is incomplete.

It is clear that Aristotle uses the word 'citizen' in different ways at different times. He has a stricter and a looser sense of the word: the strict sense is one who partakes in governance, but there is a looser sense in which any freeborn male is a citizen. Note that citizens are to rule for the advantage of the whole city, which includes everyone.