A few words about subjectivism.

Subjectivism is the theory that things are good for humans because of some attitude humans have towards them. In other words, thinking makes it so.

In the following, I am by and large following PP20-50 of Richard Kraut's Aristotle: Political Philosophy, Oxford, 2002 (which is, BTW, a page-turner).

Aristotle rejects subjectivism quite thoroughly: this summary/commentary/analysis does not map its ideas out via Aristotle: it is concerned with the argument that seems to be found mostly in Aristotle, but one would have to put a lot more work into these notes to tie them down thoroughly to Aristotle.

Some problems for subjectivists:

• When someone changes her mind about what is good for her, there is no criterion for saying which is right, the earlier idea or the later idea.
• Thus the subjectivist may have to tolerate contradictory statements if the earlier idea and the later idea contradict each other.
  
• And yet, people may change, and so it seems reasonable that both ideas are right, but at different times.
  
• That is not, however, how the subjectivist would describe the situation, for the idea that different things are right at different times presupposes that there is an answer to the question "what is right" that is determined by something other than one's attitude, doesn't it?
  
• Wouldn't the subjectivist have to say that people do indeed change, but that does not cause the change of what is right for that person. Rather, people simply have the arbitrary ability to change what is right for them. Sometimes they do that in reaction to changes, sometimes they do not. But it is not the case that the changes cause the conception of what is right to change (for then there might be some other determinant of what is right than attitude).
  
• And yet, at any given moment, any given person frequently has conflicting ideas of what is good for them (I don't mean that they are unsure or waffling: I mean that the person has actual opinions and beliefs which commit them to valuing X and rejecting X at the same time, whether they are aware of the conflict or not).
• It cannot be the case that the "true" valuation of X is somehow the arithmetic sum of all of a person's attitudes toward X, because some attitudes involve a very strong commitment to X that is not compatible with a "true valuation" of X that is weakly committed to X or rejects X.
  
• Which attitudes would determine the "real" valuation?
• And if there is a "real" valuation, then is subjectivism true?
  
• Take an example: I am unsure whether I should get married at all.
  
• It is not the case that I think marriage is good for me.
• It is not the case that I think it is bad for me.
  
• It is not the case that I think it is neither good nor bad.
• I think it would be good for me financially, which would lead to other good things.
• I think it would be a good way to have children, but I have conflicting ideas about having children, all of which seem to me to add up to a qualified desire to have children.
  
• I think it would cramp my style in many ways.
• I know that marriage is a huge risk and requires unwavering commitment, and I am not sure I am up to that.
  
• Rather, I think that it IS either good or bad for me, but I am unsure which.
  
• Subjectivism holds that my attitudes establish the value of getting married.
• Given the first of the above three facts, if subjectivism is true, then marriage is not good, not bad, and not neither good nor bad for me.
• That is ridiculous, because I also believe that it is the case that it is either good or bad for me.
  
• Thus subjectivism is ridiculous (in this instance? or more generally?), if it cannot deal with such uncertainty.
  
• What about the fact that most people hold that it is possible to make a poor/mistaken choice?
• How can a subjectivist make a poor/mistaken choice?
• The very act of choosing confers the value on the choice.
• So whatever I choose is by the fact that it is chosen valuable.
• There are no poor choices or good choices, only choices, because the act of choosing is what determines the value.
  
• Thus poor choice is incoherent as a notion.
• What about the fact that most people occasionally change their minds about various things.
• if the mere fact of believing, intending, choosing, etc. a thing is what makes it valuable, then changing one's mind is incoherent.
• what basis is there for a change of mind?
• a different valuation of the thing?
• but the act of choosing or valuing the thing is what made it valuable in the first place.
• how can choosing, valuing, etc. make it really valuable if it is always subject to reappraisal?
  
• so changing one's mind actually involves denying that choosing, intending, believing, etc. does really confer value on a thing.
• What about children and parents?
• If subjectivism is true, then children are right in all of their subjective valuations.
• That is preposterous.
• Because we need other people to help us learn what is good for us.
• To generalize this point fully: Subjectivism entails that we have nothing to learn from others about what is good for us.
• What of "holding a grudge" and "blood feuds"
  
• A person might blindly pursue vengeance even though that person admits that it is not good for her.
• So the person values destruction of enemies over all else.
• And the person realizes that destruction of enemies is not, all things considered, good for her.
• So who is it good for? Subjectivism tells us that that person holds contradictory beliefs.
• What of the person who says that vengeance is right and good and is not, all things considered, bad for him? They exist, such people.
  
• Subjectivism tells us that that person's belief that vengeance is good is true.
• Carry it further: serial murderers are all right. So are mass-murderes, torturers, child abusers.
• Sorry guys, that position, whether it is coherent or not, is repulsive and I simply reject any world in which that is true.
  
• I.e. if subjectivism is true, then I'd rather live my little life in the ignorant mistaken illusion that there is good and there is bad and that something can be bad for me regardless of what I think about it. And you know what, my life works quite well with that "illusion."
• Perhaps it's a matter of faith: there is no way to demonstrate which is the right answer by argument. Nonetheless, some of the above arguments are quite strong, and I think subjectivism is incoherent AND repulsive, and so I reject it in favor of a system that I can't say I have fully figured out and may be incoherent but at least is not repulsive.
• What of people who think that what is pleasurable is therefore good?
• They are not quite subjectivists
• pleasure differs from person to person, and so the good would differ from person to person if pleasure is good. In that way hedonists are like subjectivists.
  
• But there are people who think pleasure is not good: a subjectivist would have to say that for those people pleasure is not good. Thus the subjectivist cannot say that what is pleasurable is good.
• But subjectivism is a powerful tool for those who are in favor of a diverse society that values autonomy.
• I am in favor of a diverse society, and I value autonomy. But I do not like subjectivism.
  
• "Toleration does not presuppose that the behavior tolerated is good. On the contrary, it is precisely when one thinks that others are mistaken about their well-being that one needs to call upon oneself to be tolerant of them." (Kraut, P. 41)
• For a diverse society to exist as a harmonious society, there MUST be some agreement about what constitutes well-being.
  
• In other words, in a society that consists of different groups that think that the other groups are simply and very importantly wrong about the most important things, there would be little incentive for cooperation.
  
• Could we have an "ideal subjectivism"
• "Ideal subjectivism, as we might call it, holds that the self that is the creator of one's good is the person who would emerge when everything that impedes one's ability to think clearly about one's well-being has been stripped away, and everything that enhances that ability is added." (Kraut P. 46)
• Kraut points out that this "ideal subjectivism" is no longer subjectivist, for that ideal self would not say that thinking makes value. Rather she would say that thinking reveals value. For the process of perfecting one's self is a process of refining one's ends as well as one's means, and if one refines one's ends, that means one thinks that refining one's ends is possible. That is, one thinks that there are better and worse ends. And that is not subjectivist.
• My further thoughts:
• what of what we call 'constructs': things that are not due to 'nature' or 'facts about reality,' but are constructed by humans?
• are they all subjective?
• is that a problem for the reasons identified above?
• example: laws: surely they are, to some large degree, 'subjective': they are what the legislative body thinks is right and they become law because the legislative body thought they were right.
• Aristotle clearly calls them 'just'
  
• they are also 'constructed': how to negotiate that?
• For Aristotle, it's easy: he thinks they are bound by a prior justice, which is the fair, the equal, and that, he thinks, is natural, by which it seems he means that there are facts of the matter and that this prior justice is part of the fabric of reality and not negotiable or subjective.
  
• other examples abound: gender? human nature? good/right? all are held to be constructs and seem subjective in some sense.
• can it be that subjectivism is not wrong but also not right? What I mean is the following: to bring it right down to our class level, all the grades you earn are a combination of your work and a teacher's assessment, and that assessment is just about always somehow subjective. If that subjective element is so problematic, why do we stick with it? It seems inevitable that we need to put humans in positions of judging and that that judging will always be to some large degree subjective, so how do we negotiate that.
• These thoughts go well beyond what Aristotle or this class can cover, but they are related and interesting and important.