General Notes on Cicero's
Political Thought
Having realized that it would be impossible to get through
all of the de Re Publica
in a timely manner if I continued to lecture in much detail, I
decided a more compendious approach was in order.
This page is largely inspired by and is a presentation of
E.M. Atkins chapter on Cicero from The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political
Thought. Indication of every place that is endebted to
Atkins would be tedious, but the reader should know that Atkins'
chapter is the source of the structure of this page. Much of the
wording has been changed to my own idiom.
Cicero's background is relevant to his political thought:
he was a novus homo, a
man whose family had never before had one of its members achieve
the consulship.
He was from Arpinum. In his life, he governed Rome, Sicily, and
Cilicia. He studied at Rome and in Greece. He was widely read in
his own lifetime.
Cicero knew that no political regime lasts forever. Conscious of
that, he nonetheless argued that the Roman republic was the most
stable regime available. As a novus
homo and an intellectual, he had the fervor of a
convert combined with the scholarly urge, and so he put in
writing the aristocratic ideals of the Roman republic of his
time.
He set the scene of the de Re Publica in Rome's past,
possibly because he was convinced that the tradition,
and the fact that it was a tradition, not a pie-in-the-sky
intellectual endeavor, gave what he wrote gravitas and
credibility. But he was deeply familiar with the more
theoretical discussions of politics that Greek philosophy
offered, and he reacts to, reshapes, and uses that tradition
extensively in his writings.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The Republic was governed by a few aristocratic families known as patricians.
They were the governing
class. They were wealthy too, but considered such things
beneath them. But it was not a completely
closed club. New blood could enter. Cicero was one of the
newcomers.
But there was a parallel wealthy class called the equites ("knights") who ruled the
world of property and
finance in Rome. They did not have political duties or
privileges. But they could stand for office and thereby switch
over to the patricians.
Voting was weighted in Rome towards the wealthy and aristocrats.
What is more, although anyone could stand for office, in
practice, only the aristocrats did most of the time.
The people had significant opportunities to exercise their
political power particularly when there was disagreement and
conflict in the aristocratic class (remember Thersites).
"OPEN-AIR SOCIETY"
victorious generals => triumphs => election
lavish funerals =>publicity => election
important court cases => renown => election
Reputation => election
POPULARES
Those who favored reforms that would give more to the people
were known as 'populares.' It was not a party in our sense, but
rather a tendency which some politicians followed some of the
time. The paradigmatic populares were the Gracchi brothers,
Gaius and Tiberius, both of whom were killed in the early to mid
2nd c. BCE. They favored shifting power to the people somehow
(land redistribution, for example). Measures passed or taken by
populares were one force that caused tension in the system.
GROWTH
The empire grew and grew.
Eventually, individual military commanders accrued immense power
and could hold it for a long time (as opposed to consuls who
were consul for one year only).
ALLIES
The ties which individuals had to the provinces and allies were
of great import.
MILITARY LEADERS
From the time when Marius encouraged the propertyless to enroll
in the Roman army in 107BCE, individual military commanders came
to wield so much power that there were not effective checks and
balances on their power.
ARISTOCRATIC CODE
Everything was cast in moral terms: virtue and vice, justice and
injustice, etc.
The code was an inherited one: mos maiorum, and was to a large extent
responsible for keeping things on track in Rome.
Education via historical heroes: actual historical personages
held up for emulation.
Education via apprenticeship to powerful individuals who knew
the code.
Respect for precedent was deeply engrained.
The family, not the individual was the locus of pride and
reputation.
"In theory, individual and familial ambitions were channeled to
benefit the greater whole. There was thus an inherent tension in
the system between competitive and socially directed values."
LIBERTY
For the powerful, it consisted in preventing one person from
becoming supreme.
For the people, it meant equality before the law, right of
appeal, voting.
CICERO'S CAREER
Cicero's initial education with Lucius Licinius Crassus
the orator, Quintus Mucius Scaevola the Augur and the Augur's
cousin Quintus Mucius Scaevola the Pontifex, both of whom were
lawyers. He got from them a passion for moderated
conservatism.
Philosophically, he was influenced by and learned from the Stoic
Diodotus and the head of the Academy Philo of Larissa, a
sceptic. Then he went to Greece from 77-79 and studied under the
Stoic Posidonius and the Academic Antiochus of Ascalon, an Old
Academy man.
Philosophically: Cicero followed scepticism in that he held that
one should examine all sides, then choose one, but not be
dogmatic about it. He was 'eclectic': he admired and took
material from stoics, peripatetics, and Platonists. The only
ones he rejected explicitly were Epicureans (although he
sometimes seems to take something from them too). Cicero's
closest friend Atticus was an Epicurean.
When he was unable to be politically active, Cicero wrote
philosophical works. It was clearly a substitute, not his most
preferred activity.
Cicero rose to power through being an orator. He took on
important cases and acquitted himself well. First, he defended
Sextus Roscius Ameria against a supporter of Sulla the dictator.
Then he delivered the Verrine orations in 69 BCE against an
exploitative governor of Sicily.
As consul in 63, his first action was defeating land reform. But
his main claim to fame as consul was putting down the rebellion
of Catiline, who was following the populares tendency.
After his consulship, the triumvirate of Pompey, Caesar and
Crassus made Cicero's brand of politics, moderate conservatism,
out of favor. What is more, Cicero had a powerful aristocratic
enemy, Publius Clodius, who drove Cicero into exile in 58 (he
was recalled the next year, but it had a significant effect on
his career and person).
Under Caesar and Pompey, Cicero was not happy. His "concord of
the orders" could not come to be without free senatorial debate,
free law courts, and a free republic. He was compelled to defend
personal enemies and forced to renounce some of his ideas.
- His "concord of the orders" pictured a republic in
which all the classes, rich, poor, aristocrat, knight,
plebeian, financial, governing, etc. would unite in
supporting the republic and reject revolution. He saw it as
a sort of harmony of different elements.
- During this time (the 50's), Cicero wrote de Oratore, about
rhetoric. The orator, it turns out, is also the statesman.
The primary question of the work was whether an orator need
be broadly learned. It is in part a reaction to the Gorgias. The Roman
ideal, for Cicero, was an orator who combined rhetorical
ability with broad learning: theory and experience come
together in one person.
- The de
Republica
- follows Plato's Republic in many of its concerns
- justice
- origin of the best city
- criteria for best city
- long-term stability
- education of leaders
- philosophical principles
- education
- the afterlife
- differs as well
- concrete versus purely theoretical
- historical/empirical versus purely theoretical
- trust of experience and the actual as opposed to the
purely theoretical
- Structure
- 6 books, comprised of three days of discussion
- first day: books I and II
- What is the best state?
- Rome as visual aid to theory
- follows Polybius:
- Rome as sampling of the best of the three pure
options
- consul as best of monarchy: imperium
- senate as best of aristocracy: consilium
- elections, plebeian assembly, and tribunes as best
of democracy: libertas
- liberty includes access to office and a judicial
role
- government as a trust: something given by the
people to the magistrates in trust
- of the three, the authority of the senate is the most
important for Cicero: the leadership of the best
citizens must be there for the best republic
- each generation improves the inherited tradition
- illustrated by kings in book II
- second day: books III and IV
- justice and human nature
- justice as sine
qua non for best state
- distributive justice
- justice vis-a-vis external states
- justification of empire
- the Athenian Embassy to Rome of 155 BCE
- three philosophers went to Rome
- the occasion was a Roman fine imposed on
Athens for trying to seize Oropus
- argument was made that justice is single,
unchanging, universal, and innate in humans (a
Stoic view)
- civil (Epicurean) versus natural justice
(Stoic)
- justice as culture-specific
- justice as self-interest (not to be harmed)
- the main challenge for the speaker Laelius is to
show that Roman Rule really is just even though it
is a thing of the senses.
- St. Augustine's summary of this part seems to
indicate that his argument was a form of
paternalism: Roman rule saved subjects from
themselves.
- Roman imperialism also defended as defense of
allies
- the historic Scipio was at the time of de Re Publica's
setting attacking Tiberius Gracchus for land
reform because
it deprived Italian allies of their rights.
- third day: books V and VI (quite fragmentary)
- the best citizen
- education
- conduct in crisis
- Cicero cast the discussion in terms of wisdom, virtue,
and morality
- Roman virtue is held up not as military prowess, but
as wise decisions
- failures blamed on corruption of the aristocrats
- Most famous part of de
Re
Publica: Scipio's dream
- Scipio meets his dead grandfather Scipio Africanus
- Grandpa foretells Scipio's greatness
- Grandpa says that politics is a small stage compared
to the divine scale of the cosmos; Pales to
insignificance
- True statesman rewarded by going to heaven.
- The de Re Publica
was published in 51 BCE and a letter from Caelius to Cicero (ad Fam. VIII.1.4) says
it was popular.
- The de Legibus
- Apparently never published!
- Clearly intended as a companion to the de Re Publica
- Concrete example of Rome combined with Greek emphasis on
reason and theory
- Structure
- Book I: origin of justice
- Natural law is discovered by reason, independently
- But generations of Roman legislators have created a
legal system that is largely in harmony with or identical
to natural law
- Facets of and possibly an argument for the existence of
natural law?
- gods give certain things to humans as gifts and duties
- there is one shared ratio
vivendi (1.35) and coniunctio hominum (1.16): a principle
of living together
- humans share a natural affection for justice and and societas is bound
together by justice
- true law =
right reason
- right reason is what belongs to all humans qua humans
and is fully developed in some
- right reason is shared by gods and humans
- thus, normal human development leads to just humans
- 1.33 says that one wise human loves other (wise?)
humans as much as him or her self
- justice
- true justice arises from natural human inclinations,
not the contractual threat of punishment
- true justice not equal to written law (written law
could enforce robbery)
- true justice not a matter of what is useful: it is
good for its own sake
- true justice is an objective matter
- Cicero describes his opponents as claiming that justice
is defined differently by different communities
- It's not clear whether Cicero thinks there is an actual
code of laws that can be discovered or rather that there
is a divine/human reason that can serve to identify what
is naturally just
- It seems that Cicero is actually arguing that there is
one single system of law and justice which is largely the
same as the actual traditional Roman constitution, one
that every community would be best off implementing.
- The assumption is that reason and human experience
should lead to the same answer to the question what is
justice.
- A further assumption is that human law (at least that of
Rome) comes closer and closer over time to natural law
(rather than simply changing as circumstances change).
- And yet, in emergencies, law can and should be suspended
(e.g. Cicero's actions against Catiline's conspiracy and
later against Antony)
- Perhaps the thorny impossibility of reconciling all of
these claims led Cicero to postpone publication and to
plan a revision of de
Legibus (which he apparently never accomplished)
- Book II: religious law
- Book III: magistracies
- at least two more books, perhaps about education and the
courts
- THE CIVIL WAR BETWEEN POMPEY AND CAESAR
- Caesar crossed the Rubicon with his army in 49: he refused
to lay aside his military command and return to Rome,
because once he did so, he was vulnerable to prosecution.
- Cicero chose Pompey's side, those who were going to be
losers.
- We can see Cicero debating what he should do:
- the watchwords and principles of the debate
- friendship: amicitia
- glory: gloria
- the republic: res
publica
- duty/obligation/appropriate action: officium.
- Letter to his friend Atticus 9.4.2: should tyranny be
overthrown at the cost of the safety of the state? may a
statesman retire in bad times, or must he act for freedom?
- Letter to his friend Atticus 7.14.3: peace is better
even than a just civil war
- he was wrestling with duty to family, friends, and state
- Pompey was his 'friend'
- Pompey offered some hope
- those citizens whom Cicero considered good supported
Pompey
- Pompey offered a better hope of a restored republic
- Cicero's prior actions made him lean toward Pompey
as a matter of constancy
- loyalty to family demanded neutrality
- what did the state demand?
- Caesar won and pardoned Cicero.
- But there was no longer a role for free debate and a
contribution for Cicero to make on Cicero's terms
- Hence Cicero withdrew and wrote philosophy
- Philosophy as a service to the state when the actions
befitting a statesman were not an option
- Cicero wrote extensively between Caesar's victory and
the Ides of March of 44 BCE when Caesar was assassinated.
- After the Ides: more politically oriented philosophy
- de Amicitia
about friendship: a political virtue
- friendship should not lead one against the republic
(an attack on Antony?)
- de Officiis
- December of 44: written while he was becoming more
active again in politics
- the title refers to the Stoic concept of to kathekon, the
"appropriate"
- Cicero transformed that into officium, a Latin term for
"obligation" or 'duty'
- has different connotation than to kathekon: it
involves others, a relational word
- also has greater linkage to one's particular role:
different roles => different obligations
- It was written as advice to his son Marcus, who was
off in Athens for his education
- It is clearly somehow modeled on Panaetius the Stoic's
work on to kathekon.
- Some claim it is slavishly derivative
- That seems unlikely
- Characteristic melding of the theoretical Greek
with the more empirically-grounded Roman
- Cicero declares that he is criticizing and
modifying, not just expounding what Panaetius said
- Structure:
- Book I
- What is the honorable (honestas)?
- The four cardinal virtues: justice, fortitude,
temperance, prudence
- Stoic versus Academic versus Peripatetic
- Stoic view is uncompromising: virtue is the only
good
- Academic and Peripatetic: virtue is the supreme
good, but other things can be good too
- Book II
- What is the useful (utilitas)?
- is it different from the honorable?
- Book III
- case studies where the useful and the honorable
seem to conflict
- Cicero's conclusion: combination: nothing can be
good unless honorable and nothing is honorable unless
good
- Note: "good" means "beneficial": thus by
substitution, nothing can be beneficial unless
honorable, and nothing honorable unless beneficial
- Note 2: "beneficial" things are useful...
- In appearance the honorable and the useful can
conflict
- In actuality, they cannot
- rule for cases of apparent conflict:
- "for one man to
take something from another and to increase his
own advantage at the cost of another's
disadvantage is more contrary to nature than
death, than poverty, than pain, and than anything
else that may happen to his body or external
possessions." III.21
- "Nature prescribes that
one human should want to consider the interests of
another, whoever he may be, for the very reason that
he is a human" III.27
- "Parents are dear, and
children, relations and acquaintances are dear, but
our country alone has embraced all the affections of
us all." I.57
- Altruism as a natural property of humans?
- Robbing and doing violence actually hurt the
perpetrator
- They also destroy the bonds of society, which are
what preserves the republic
- Thus the duty of justice is to preserve societal
bonds and thereby the republic
- Was Caesar's assassination justified
- Yes, because it actually preserved
societal bonds
- tyrants are like lifeless limbs: they need
amputation because they harm the body
- Nature prescribes obligations of justice to us even
more than obligations of wisdom: Cicero is
reversing the order of the Greeks, who held that the
life of science is superior to the life of the
politician
- For Cicero, justice has two aspects
- justice itself
- injustice is harming others or failing to
prevent harm
- justice is preventing harm/not harming others
- Justice is also serving the common good
- A prerequisite for justice is fides,
loyalty/trust
- society is held together by trust
- citizens require fides of their elected
officials
- Justice is also concerned with maintenance of
private property
- major concern here was populares
measures such as agrarian measures and debt
relief
- the state has as one of its purposes the
maintenance of private property
- Why fail to be just
- absorption in philosophy/science, etc
- reluctance to make enemies
- justice as liberality
- one should give to others
- but only in accordance with their worth
- and only in accordance with one's means
- liberality such as agrarian legislation or
debt relief is not appropriate: it is both
unjust and not useful
- courage or greatness of spirit
- great spirits could derail the common good, but
greatness of spirit was nonetheless a virtue
- politicians could display as much greatness of
spirit as soldiers
- without justice, greatmenss of spirit was a vice
- Cicero also championed gloria and dignitas
- Greek philosophers reject reputation as a good: it
is fickle, treacherous, and has no intrinsic value
- Cicero acknowledges that glory can lead the
ambitious astray, but holds that it is a positive
good for people who pursue only the honorable.
- Once again, without justice, glory-seeking is a
vice.
- Shame too is a virtue
- one should not cause outrage to other humans
- each person has four personae
- as a human
- as this particular human with this character
- as this particular human in these circumstances
of fortune
- as an individual with a particular career
- different aspects of a person demand different
virtues
- Cato's character required his suicide
- Other people were not required to commit suicide
Atkins' conclusion:
"It may have been naive, but it was not, surely, valueless, to
suggest an alternative strategy [to tyranny] for restoring and
maintaining peace. The ethos of the Roman Republic, to which Cicero
gave personal philosophical expression, was to possess a lasting
appeal." P516