a preliminary observation: this page has a great deal about
'citizens': it would be good to note right from the start that
Aristotle is not always concerned with the same thing when he says
'citizen' as any of us might be: we each have our own individual
ideas, and perhaps also some collective agreement about what
'citizens' are, but keep your antennae up for how Aristotle does not
square with those ideas and yet is still talking about something
interesting and citizen-y.
Aristotle Politics Book
III
an eclectic tour
Chapter 1: what is a citizen?
"It is evident, therefore, that we
must
begin by asking, Who is the
citizen,
and what is the meaning of the term? For here again there may be a
difference of opinion, He who is a citizen in a democracy will
often
not be a citizen in an oligarchy.. . . we may say, first, that a
citizen is not a citizen because he lives in a certain place, for
resident aliens and slaves share in the place; nor is he a citizen
who
has legal rights to the extent of suing and being sued; for this
right
may be enjoyed under the provisions of a treaty. . .. . . .
resident
aliens (metics) . . . are called citizens only in a qualified
sense, as we might
apply the term to children.((1275a1ff.)
"But the citizen whom we are seeking
to
define is a citizen in the
strictest
sense,
against whom no such exception can be taken, and his special
characteristic is that he shares in the administration of justice,
and
in offices. Now of offices, some are discontinuous, and the same
persons are not allowed to hold them twice, or can only hold them
after
a fixed interval; others have no limit of time--for example, the
office
of juryman or member of the assembly. It may, indeed, be argued
that
these are not magistrates at all, and that their functions give
them no
share in the government. But surely it is ridiculous to say that
those
who have the supreme power do not govern. .. .. let us not dwell
on
this . ... let us assume that those who share in such office are
citizens. This is the most comprehensive definition of citizen and
best
suits all those who are generally so called. (1275a19ff.)
"He who has the power to take part
in
the deliberative or judicial administration of any state is said
by us
to be a citizen of that state; and, speaking generally, a state is
a
body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life." (1275b18ff)
Chapter 2: What is a state?
See the last quotation above: a state is a body of citizens
sufficing
for the purposes of life.
A state is not a place or certain inhabitants.
"For, since the state is a
partnership,
and is a partnership of citizens in a constitution, when the form
of
government changes, and becomes different, then it may be supposed
that
the state is no longer the same. . . . and in this manner we speak
of
every union or composition of elements as different when their
composition differs . . . it is evident that the sameness of a
state
depends chiefly on the sameness of the constitution.
On the noxious side: The state is made up of rational and irrational
elements, citizens and
their wives, children and slaves.
Chapter 3: Is a good citizen a good person?
The good citizen is good qua
citizen
insofar as he has as his aim the preservation of the constitution
(of
the state he lives in).
He need not possess the goodness which makes one a good person.
The only way to have a perfect
state
is to have only good citizens:
unless we assume that in the perfect state all citizens will be good
humans,
they need not be good humans (cf. the modern phenomenon of examining
the character of candidates vs. their record of deeds qua elected
officials).
"But will there then be no case in
which the excellence of the good citizen and the excellence of the
good
man coincide? To this we answer that the good ruler is a good and
wise
man, but the citizen need not be wise." (1277a14-6)
So this makes it look as if there are rulers and citizens, and being
a
citizen (i.e. at some time being in public administrative office) is
different from being a ruler? I dont' fully get this. Perhaps jury
members and assembly members, who are citizens, will never hold
higher
office, and so need not be wise. Aristotle certainly believe it
would
be better if they were wise.
The excellence of a citizen
includes being able to rule and be ruled like a free man! (1277b13)
So ruling and being a citizen are the same thing after all?
(being a citizen
just means partaking in ruling), and the excellence of both is the
same? What of 1277a14-6, quoted above, where it was said that the
ruler
must be wise, but the citizen need not?
"Practical wisdom is the only
excellence peculiar to a ruler: it would seem that all other
excellences must equally belong to ruler and subject. The
excellence of
the subject is certainly not wisdom, but only true opinion."
(1277b37ff.)
Chapter 5:
Employees would not be citizens in the best state:
"There still remains one more
question
about the citizen; is he only a true citizen who has a share of
office,
or is the mechanic to be included? If they who hold no office are
to be
deemed citizens, not every citizen can have this excellence [i.e.
the
virtues that can only be exhibited when ruling]; for this man is a
citizen. And if none of the lower class are citizens, in which
part of
the state are they to be placed? For they are not resident aliens,
and
they are not foreigners. . . . it must be admitted that we cannot
consider all those to be citizens who are necessary to the
existence of
the state. . . The best form of state will not admit them to
citizenship; but if they are admitted, then our definition of the
excellence of a citizen will not apply to every citizen, not to
every
free man as such, but only to those who are freed from necessary
services." (1278a3ff.)
"As to the question whether the
excellence of the good man is the same as that of the good
citizen, the
considerations already adduced prove that in some states the good
man
and the good citizen are the same, and in others different. When
they
are the same it is not every citizen who is a good man, but only
the
statesman and those who have or may have, along or in conjunction
with
others, the conduct of public affairs." (1278baff.)
At this point, let's stop and note that our modern ideas of
'citizen' are not what Aristotle is talking about, unless you think
that having the right to vote and serve on a jury constitute having
a share in office or ruling. I would resist doing that. Aristotle is
basically saying that many of our government employees and the few
of us who hold some public office are the only people who are
'citizens.' If we take all that into account, do we disagree or
agree with Aristotle? How does that change our assessment?
Chapter 6: cui bono
"First, let us consider the purpose
of
a state, and how many forms of rule there are by which human
society is
regulated. We have already said . . . that man is a political
animal.
And therefore men, even when they do not require one another's
help,
desire to live together; but they
are
also brought together by their common interests insofar as they
each attain to any measure of well-being. This is certainly the
chief
end, both of individuals and of states. And mankind meet
together and maintain the political community also for the sake of
mere
life (in which there is possibly some noble element so long as the
evils of existence do not greatly overbalance the good)."
1278b15ff.
"The rule of a master . . . is
exercised primarily with a view to the interest of the master, but
accidentally considers the slave, since, if the slave perish, the
rule
of the master perishes with him. On the other hand, the government
of a
wife and children and of a household . . . is exercised in the
first
instance for the good of the governed or for the common good of
both
parties, but essentially for the good of the governed. . . And so
in
politics: when the state is framed upon the principle of equality
and
likeness, the citizens think that they ought to hold office by
turns. .
. nowadays, for the sake of the advantage which is to be gained
from
the public revenues and from office, men want to be always in
office. .
. The conclusion is evident: that governments which have a
regard to
the common interest are constituted in accordance with strict
principles of justice, and are therefore true forms; but
those which
regard only the interest of the rulers are all defective and
perverted
forms, for they are despotic, whereas a state is a community of
freemen." (1278b32ff.)
SO, the rulers rule for the sake of the governed, all of them, in
good
states.
Chapter 9
"But a state exists for the sake of
the
good life, and not for the sake of life only . . . nor does a
state
exist for the sake of alliance and security from injustice, nor
yet for
the sake of exchange and mutual intercourse."(1280a30ff.)
"Whereas, those who care for good
government take into consideration political excellence and
defect. Whence
it may be further inferred that excellence must also be the care
of a
state which is truly so called." (1280b4ff.)
"It is clear then that a state is
not a
mere society, having a common place, established for the
prevention of
mutual crime and for the sake of exchange. These are conditions
without
which a state cannot exist; but all of them do not constitute a
state,
which is a community of families and aggregations of families in
well-being,
for the sake of perfect and self-sufficing life.
. . Hence there arise in cities family connexions, brotherhoods,
common
sacrifices, amusements which draw men together. But these are
created
by friendship, for to choose to live together is friendship. The
end
of the state is the good life, and these are the means towards
it.
. .
Our conclusion then is that
political
society exists for the sake of noble actions, and not of living
together." (1280b29ff)
Chapter 13
"All these considerations appear to
show that none of the principles on which men claim to rule and to
hold
all other men in subjection to them are right. To those who claim
to be
masters of the government on the ground of their excellence or
their
wealth, the many might fairly answer that they themselves are
often
better and richer than the few-I do not say individually, but
collectively. And another problem which is sometimes put forward
may be
met in a similar manner. Some persons doubt whether the legislator
who
desires to make the justest laws ought to legislate with a view to
the
good of the better or the many, when the case which I have
mentioned
occurs. Now what is right must be construed as equally right, and
what
is equally right is to be considered with reference to the
advantage of
the state, and the common good of the citizens. And a citizen is
one
who shares in governing and being governed. He differs under
different
forms of government, but in the best state he is one who is able
and
chooses to be governed and to govern with a view to the life of
excellence." (1282b27ff.)
Good Lord: For men of preeminent excellence who arise in a
democracy, there is
no law. They are gods among men. They are not part of the state!
(1284a5ff)
"anyone would be ridiculous who attempted to make laws for them"
That
is why democratic states institute ostracism.
Further item of interest:
Word for word from Reason and Emotion by John M. Cooper. This
selection is from page 356, 'Political Animals and Civic
Friendship.'
Aristotle's criterion for a "correct" constitution is
deceptively simple. A "correct" constitution is one in which the
government aims at the common advantage. In the deviation-forms
the
government aims instead at the advantage of the office-holders
themselves (and their families) as a group. But 1) to whom is the
advantage sought in correct constitutions common, and 2) in what
sense
is it common?
To the first question the natural answer would seem to be:
common to all the citizens, i.e., all the free, native-born
residents.
In fact, I think this is what Aristotle does intend: it is at
least
suggested by III 13, 1283b40-41, where Aristotle speaks of
'correct'
rule as being 'for the advantage of the whole city and for the
common
advantage of the citizens.' But if we put Aristotle's view this
way, we
must recognize that we are using the word citizen in a way that
departs
from his own explicit theory in III 1-2 of who the citizens of a
city
are.
See book III section 1-2. One suggested definition is "those who
have
access to courts of law, who may sue or be sued". But this is too
wide;
this access is open to any person who has entered into a
commercial
contract, or at any rate partially open, for a resident foreigner
may
be obliged to appoint some to act for him, so that his
participation in
the state is incomplete.
I suggest that what effectively distinguishes the citizen
from all others is his participation in Judgment and Authority,
that
is, holding office, legal, political, administrative. Others, such
as
membership of a panel of judges or of a citizen-assembly, have no
such
limitation. It might be objected that such persons are not really
'ruling' and therefore not participating in authority. But they
have
the power and it would be ridiculous to deny their participation
in
authority.