- 1justice as a state:
- that makes people act justly
- that makes people wish for just things
- it is unlike a science:
- a science deals with contraries (medicine deals with health
and sickness, for example)
- justice does not produce its contrary, injustice
- 'justice' is homonymous: the word refers to (at least) 2
different things:
- lawfulness
- all lawful acts are 'just' in this sense
- why? because laws are typically designed to benefit the
polis: to produce and preserve wellbeing/happiness (of
all, of some, or of the leaders)
- this is highly dependent on how you define a 'polis'
and what sort of polis the laws are enacted in
- also, because laws are designed 1) to produce/encourage
virtuous actions: bravery, temperance, and other
excellences and 2) to avert/discourage vicious actions.
- and so lawfulness justice is not just an excellence, but
complete excellence:
- it involves actual exercise of complete excellence
(bravery, temperance, etc. toward others)
- it is complete in that it involves all the virtues
- while it is complete actual virtue, the very essence of
justice is not that: it is complete actual virtue toward
others, but that cannot happen without complete actual
virtue itself!
- 2 'equality'
(think of this as one's due, the fair, the appropriate
distribution of things/money: it is a mathematical idea of
either distribution that is literally equal for all OR
proportionately equal to each)
- this is different from the justice identified above:
- it is a particular virtue separate from the others rather
than all of virtue as it relates to others
- an illustration: a greedy person takes more than their
share: that is not vicious in any other way (it is not
intemperate or cowardly or ...): it is contrary to the
'justice' that is 'equality'
- ordinarily, general types of acts are called vicious
according to one vice
- adultery is vicious bc it is self-indulgent
- desertion in battle bc it is cowardly
- unfair gain bc it is unjust
- but sometimes the particulars or a particular act can be
different than the typical
- Chris pays Pat to commit adultery with someone, and
Pat does it for no other reason than the money: Pat is
greedy (and so unjust) but not self-indulgent
- Chris deserts a comrade in battle bc Chris wants to
get the dopamine from a video game, and for not other
reason: that is self-indulgent, but not cowardly
- etc.
- the equal that is called justice is a part of the
'lawfulness' justice that is described in section 1 above
- the task of deciding whether these things are a subject
associated with politics is put off 'til later (it seems
some of it might be more purely individual)
- this 'equal' justice has various divisions (at least I
think he's talking about 'equal' justice here: perhaps I am
going too fast)
- part concerns distribution of honors or money or other
things that are common to everyone who has a share in the
constitutions
- part concerns rectifying transactions (sales, contract,
etc.)
- some concerns the involuntary (theft, fraud,
enticement of slaves, adultery, etc.)
- some concerns the voluntary (sales, contracts)
- some are violent (assault, murder, etc.)
- 3 the equal is an
intermediate and equal and relative
- for every equal just act, there are at least 4 things: 2
agents and 2 distributions (each person gets some)
- as an intermediate, it must be between things
- as an equal, it must be the right point for division
(either strictly equal or proportionately equal)
- it is relative to the agents, the people who are receiving
the 'equal'
- it is done according to 'merit' of some sort
- not all agree as to what constitutes merit in each case
- it can vary from constitution to constitution, for
instance
- aristocrats think it is excellence
- democrats think it is free status
- oligarchs think it is noble birth or wealth
- the 'equal' can be proportionate: someone whose merit is
10X that of another person gets 10X as much, for instance
- we can call this proportionate 'equal' 'geometric'
- 4 in 'transactions,' there is
an 'equal,' an 'intermediate' that is the virtuous: all other
arrangements are unjust bc not the equal or the geometric
- in many such transactions, people seek out a judge who is
the intermediate: the judge decides what arrangement will be
best so that there is no deficiency and no extra on either
side
- the judge is the restorer of equality
- in transactions, the just involves having no more and no
less before or after the transaction
- 5
- a wrong idea: reciprocity as justice
- it is neither distributively just nor rectificatorily
just (one way of dividing the 'equal' justice above)
- instances: if you wound me, I should not wound you in
return
- but reciprocity does hold humans together: either harm
for harm or benefit for benefit
- he calls it a 'sort of justice'
- reciprocity requires that things that are exchanged be
commensurable
- THAT is why we have money
- just action is intermediate between acting justly and
being acted upon justly
- the just person acts: they determine and willingly give
the equal
- it is not said, but the just person is also a taker:
they take willingly what is equal from the other person
- 6
- a distinction: acting justly versus being just
- someone might in the heat of the moment do something
unjust (A's example is adultery), but not out of choice:
they do it out of a momentary passion, not a deliberated
choice.
- so their act is unjust but they themselves are not yet
unjust unless they do it by choice (Aristotelian technical
choice, that is)
- political justice in its true sense occurs between equals,
people who share their lives for self-sufficiency, who are
free and equal (either geometrically or literally)
- these are the people who are equal under the law
- between people who do not fulfill those conditions,
there is no true justice
- but there is justice by analogy
- for justice, it is not the case that a human or humans
rule: the law rules: the officeholder gets honor and
privilege, but not more than their due share
- an officeholder assigning too much to themself is
tyrannical
- back to the justice by analogy
- A says there is no true justice between unequals: thus
between a master and a slave and a parent and a child
there is no true justice (but there is justice by analogy)
- but none of that is 'political justice'
- 7 justice can also be divided
as followed
- 'natural' justice is that which is the same for all lands
and peoples
- an instance of the 'natural': the right hand is
naturally stronger (but we can work to make the left hand
stronger)
- it seems he is saying that for god(s) there is probably
only natural justice and it does not change, but for
humans, there is 'natural' justice, but we can change the
situation such that it becomes a mix of 'legal' and
'natural'
- he thinks there are better and worse political
constitutions, and there is a best one by nature: it's
simply not the case that it exists everywhere, and so the
'natural' justice does not apply everywhere in actuality,
although it remains the best and the 'natural' justice
- hmmm: an idea of perfection? or a provincialism in A's
thought (like the temporal provincialism of thinking
women are inferior)
- 'legal' justice
- involves originally indifferent things: what standard we
use for weights, what sacrifice to make for what to whom,
etc.
- 8
- for an act to be just, it must be voluntary
- if you do the same act in the same circumstances but
involuntarily, it is only incidentally just
- so, paying back money owed, but doing it
involuntarily, is definitely the just thing to do, but
it does not make the act just except as an accident: the
act just happens to be just
- same applies to injustice
- ignorance of the circumstances can make an act only
incidentally unjust
- three kinds of injury in transactions
- mistakes: give the wrong thing to the wrong person for
the wrong reason : done out of ignorance
- misadventure: when something happens contrary to
reasonable expectations (normally, brakes work, for
instance, or there was no way to know a tornado would
occur)
- a (kind of) injustice: acting with knowledge (not
making a mistake) and according to reasonable
expectations, but acting without deliberation and hence
without choice: examples are chiefly acting out of
passion
- an unjust person: doing an injustice by choice.
- in such cases, it is impossible to be ignorance that
one has wronged another
- even involuntary acts can be divided
- some are forgivable: mistakes made in ignorance or
from ignorance are forgivable
- some are unforgivable: things done in ignorance 'out
of a passion which is neither natural nor such as a man
is liable to'
- what kind of things could he mean?
- likely things like the example we saw earlier of
effeminacy
- we might list various sorts of perps under this
heading
- 9 the first part is unclear:
it seems he is 'stirring the pot' to get our ideas of the
issues flowing
- one cannot voluntarily be treated unjustly seems to be the
conclusion
- next questions: is the person who makes the division
unjust or is the person who gets more than their fair share
unjust
- and can one treat oneself unjustly
- the example given to connect the questions is the person
who knowingly assigns to themself less than their fair share
and to someone else more than their share
- in that case, the divider acts unjustly: they act
knowingly and voluntarily
- but the divider is also the one whom the injustice harms
- Aristotle solves it by saying that the divider suffers
no harm contrary to their own wish and so is not treated
unjustly (but still does suffer the harm of the injustice)
- 1136b30 it seems he is saying that the one who obeys an
order to do an injustice is not to blame for the unjust
act, although they do the injustice: it is not their
choice, and it is not voluntary.
- one may do injustice but not be unjust, and the just
person, who is just, could do injustices (it is in
their power); likewise the unjust person may do just things:
but it is not easy to be just and do just things nor is it
easy to be unjust and do unjust things, for the acts must be
done from a particular state with particular knowledge to be
just or unjust
- 10 laws necessarily talk about
universals, not particulars, and so they inevitably
occasionally miss the mark of justice: they need to be
corrected. The 'equitable' : I think that means 'equal'
justice which Aristotle is saying is superior to 'legal'
justice
- this is a hugely important point: it is why there is
inevitably need for a just judge, a person to consider the
particulars
- this is part of why Aristotle said at the very beginning
that ethics cannot be analyzed more precisely than the
degree of precision which the subject matter allows
- "And this is the nature of the equitable, a correction of
law where it is defective owing to its universality. In fact
this is the reason why all things are not determined by
law... so that a decree is needed." (1137b26)
- 11 suicide: the person who
commits suicide does an injustice, but not to themself,
because it is iimpossible to voluntarily be treated unjustly:
rather they do the injustice to the state (could we use the
concept of a 'victimless' crime here? just theoretically?)
- it is unlawful to murder, and so it is unlawful to murder
oneself, and so it is unjust in the 'legal' sense