An idea from book 5 that stood out was Aristotle’s point that revolutions don’t just happen because of inequality, but because people feel like they’re being treated unfairly. It made me wonder if instability comes more from actual conditions, or from how people perceive those conditions. From my understanding Aristotle seems to think perception really matters, since even a system that looks stable can fall apart if people feel disrespected or left out.-Symaira Elliott 04.6

• I agree, this also stood out to me - it reminded me of that quote about some poor/working class Americans viewing themselves as temporarily embarrassed millionaires rather than focusing on the economic reality of the country, and because of this they don’t necessarily act in their own favor politically. Perception of the existing situation definitely has a huge impact on revolutionary ideas. - Anna Calcaterra 4/6/26

• I definitely agree with this I think that how people perceive things carries a lot more weight. Actual conditions can mean nothing if a group perceives it in a certain way. I wonder if though by perceiving something to be a certain way it makes it an actual condition for whoever is perceiving it. - Charlotte Stone 04.07.2026

• Considering western traditions of law and democracy are heavily inspired by texts like this one, I find Aristotle’s warning against accumulating ‘minor illegalities’—to prevent a general contempt of the law—striking, because that’s exactly what’s happening in modern america, especially surrounding drug use. It may be because America is just too big to function like the ideal polis, but making a system with one set of laws that prevents people doing anything slightly illegal in a place with such a differentiated population seems impossible. -Jackson Dircks 4.6

• I completely agree, that struck me too. You cannot just contain drugs or illegalities in a country this big, due to how big the population is. I bet Aristotle would say the deeper problem is the lack of homonia because he thought humans were meant t have a shared conception of being good. Within this modern america though, the law becomes coercive which is what aristotle claims makes politics unstable. -Veda Renzulli 04.06

• I also completely agree and going further into not only the illegality of something like drugs, but the various other aspects of human existence that have been criminalized, say for example, transgender rights in many states across this country (I believe over 26 states have some form of anti-trans laws on the books now, ranging from “minor” to incredibly debelitiating), you can view this collection of minor illegalities as the power grab that it is. There's a great Aaron Sorkin quote that's something like “no one ever lost an election by running as tough on crime.” As the system becomes more corrupt and more broken, politicians hoping to maintain or gain power can campaign on the criminalization of behavior and therefore capitalize off of the populus’s fear. – Ashley 04/06/26

• I really like this example. I think what’s interesting is that once you have enough of these on the books, enforcement becomes selective almost by default, and in the context of the U.S., that selectivity tends to fall along existing lines of -- for instance -- race, class, and gender identity; in this light, it also seems like a lot of these minor illegalities depend on visibility and whether certain behaviors or identities are more noticed/made legible to the state. - Noor Nabi

• I found his comment on equality being of two kinds numerical and proportional a little puzzling. He throws out a few different number ratios but doesnt explain how this or that ratio or proportion leads to either democratic or oligarchical rule. And I would also argue that in any society you will find very similar ratios of people who believe in equality to those who dont, so I dont understand where hes getting these proportions from. Also how is this something you even quantify? - Aidan Hull 04.06

• Aristotle seems to love to try to quantify things that don’t make a lot of sense to me either. I wonder what the appeal of quanityfying things was for him, and why does that make sense to him. - Charlotte Stone 04.07.2026

• I think it’s more about ‘to each according to desert or need’ v. ‘everyone gets the same’: so, for instance, we are taxed according to different ratios (the actual application can be questioned, but the idea seems fine) rather than all the same (that is why people criticize, say, a sales tax: it hits the poor harder than the rich). I’m not sure I’m understanding your objections or puzzling. JAB

• I wanted to expand on what exactly about Aristotelianism bothers me from a relativist perspective because I am far better at writing than speaking. Essentially, my train of logic is this: axioms follow; 1) there exists a reality, and 2) distinct objects in that reality, and 3) some objects are better intended by man (that’s man in the unmarked sense) for some purposes than others, ie. a calculator is great at keeping score and terrible and cooking food. Aristotelianism further states that objects have natures imagined as ideal versions of themselves generalized into impossibility, and that those ideal versions align with man’s purpose for them, and thus that all things are best used by pursuing their purpose, and because good is excellence, than an object pursues its greatest use by pursuing its greatest good, and thus is properly used. Man then must also have a purpose as a human is a distinct object, assuming this to be the case also 4) axiomatically, and that purpose must be their ideal nature and that nature must be the good. I find two issues arise from this logic: firstly, man’s distinctness as an object is a deterministic axiom. In order to assume that, one must also assume an enormity of other axioms implicitly; that man is a man, that man exists, that man perceives truly, etc. While many of these can be refuted by simple practicality, a true solipsist can’t even eat breakfast after all, I find the first enormously problematic. To have a purpose to work towards, man must remain one man, and experience continuity between different states. I find that difficult to accept, as I am inclined towards the contradictory belief that an individual is composed of many fractal lesser individuals and they so forth, and that assuming continuity of acceptance and leadership between them is false. Therefore what may be thought to be one’s nature is the nature only of a part, or perhaps not the nature of any part but the nature of one particular whole which may change or reform at any time, assuming of course that Axiom 4 is true and there is a nature to begin with. Even assuming continuity of the perceiver, what of the circumstance? Do I have the same good in one place and another? I believe in Aristotle’s locality and period it was neither wrong nor particularly noteworthy to sleep with young boys. Clearly that is no longer acceptable. If I travel from one of these places and times somehow to another, does my good change or does it come with me? The second problem is, thankfully, shorter. I find that the logic between “an object has a purpose” and “man has a purpose” to be very troublesome. Living creatures are by definition made of organic compounds, and they into cells and then organs. Where does the object start and end? Is a cell an object, with its own purpose? Then is the purpose of the human the confluence of the cells? In that case, how can man be said to have a purpose beyond what seems to be the purpose of his cells? Or is the man a phenomenon which arises from those cells but independent of them? Biologically and chemically speaking I would be inclined toward the latter, but that would mean a non material object is put in place of man, and has undefinable limits and practicalities. -Liv Buckser, 4/6/26

• There is no longer any such thing as ‘man in the unmarked sense’ or ‘mankind’ or even ‘humans’: someone will take exception to those usages (less plausible to ‘humans,’ but people do). I just use ‘people’ or ‘humans’ as consistently as I can. JAB

• Another thing I would take into account is that A believes people can be mistaken or defective: the ideal human is a unified individual, says A. 

• Yes, good changes from place to place and time to time: just as kilometers are miles: around the edges things change but the core does not (the need for a consistent measure, or an enforceable rule, or a (roughly) fair distribution, or a (largely acceptable) sexual norm. That does not make it any less a thing with parameters and a need to be (somewhat) defined and codified and accepted. JAB

• Humans are emergent from the pile of cells that make them up, and in particular the neurons in the brains: they are not reducible to that (we are not our corpses). Whatever the purpose of the emergent thing is is the purpose of a human. Not that I think that all that is right: it’s just what I think A would say. JAB.

• I noticed how Aristotle seemed to treat democracy as something that can be shaped depending on who the citizens are and how power is distributed rather than as a single fixed system. I couldn’t help but wonder: is he actually defending democracy here?-Symaira Elliott 04.8

• I noticed that too, and another question came to my mind too, is Aristotle being pragmatic or is he genuinely open as a legitimate form of government? -Veda Renzulli 04.08

• I also felt that it seemed almost like he would rather have an oligarchy if his opinions on the efficiency/goodness of democracy depend so heavily on who is included with the democracy. - Anna Calcaterra 4/8/26

• I always assumed he thought democracy was not the best option because it can be unstable, prone to tyranny, etc., but still a legitimate form of government. - Charlotte Stone 04.08.2026 

• He is multi-faced: sometimes he is simply pragmatic and sees the plus sides of a system and wants to work with that. Other times he decides to just muse about the ideal, independently of reality. other times he muses about the ideal but requires that whatever he comes up with must be something he things actually could come to be in the real world. Etc. In other words, it’s a hot mess, but there are discernible ingredients and discernible threads (to badly mix metaphors) that can be followed. JAB

• I find Aristotle’s take on law enforcement—that it’s unrewarding because it deals with people that naturally resent it, and as such doesn’t seem worth it to self-respecting individuals, and only attracts the least fit people for the job—very prescient. I’m not sure drafting the military into law enforcement is the best way to address that, but the idea of suitable people being chosen for the job—rather than choosing it—might have something to it. -Jackson Dircks

• One thing I find interesting when looking at Aristotle is how firm he is in his assumptions about human nature, yet he still desires flexibility in different forms of government. He seems to believe that people are driven by self interest and vices. He views this as a feature of society, because of this he evaluates governments based on how well they function given the character and composition of the citizens. For Aristotle, monarchy, aristocracy, and what he calls polity are legitimate when they aim at the common good, while tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy become corrupt and deviant when they serve only the interests of those in power. His criticism of democracy is not just that it gives power to the many, but that it can turn into rule by the poor for their own benefit rather than for the whole state. At the same time, he clearly sees oligarchy as even more dangerous in many cases, because it concentrates power in the hands of a wealthy few who are even more likely to govern selfishly and therefore destabilize the state. This is why Aristotle ultimately leans toward a mixed system, especially grounded in a strong middle class. He seems less concerned with labeling a government as democratic or oligarchic and more focused on whether it can balance competing interests and maintain stability. In that sense, his position is not ideological but deeply pragmatic. I wonder if this mixed polos is his ideal government or just the one he can envision with the most stability. - Brian Fahey April 8

• I think this is a really strong reading! In response to your last question, I’d lean toward seeing the mixed regime not as Aristotle’s ideal, but as a constrained compromise shaped by his relatively pessimistic view of human nature. - Noor Nabi

• Maybe this is a complete far stretch, but I don’t think that just because I am not involved in politics doesn’t mean I don’t know how to live my life. Aristotle say the life of an alien is detached from political society. I exercise my right to vote, but does that qualify as a choice worthy life? Maybe I interpreted this section wrong. -Veda Renzulli 04.10

• I agree that aristotle seems to believe in assigning rights to those with certain areas of competency. For example he says that he believes that land should be owned by those with arms and stake in government, and that it should be lent to the public in a form of friendly consent. While I understand that those with arms will often take land because they have the ability to, I also find most cases when that happens extremely abhorrent and unjust. And what exactly entitles a man with arms to land over others who benefit society in more useful ways other than combat? Should a doctor not be entitled or more entitled to land? I often disagree with his assignment of rights to people based on the skills and traits he often assigns. -Aidan Hull 4/10

• Kinda what Veda was talking about but it also stood out to be how he sees politics not as separate from personal life, but essential to it. I think he was saying that being a part of politics allows people to practice virtue on a larger scale while contributing to the common good. However at the same time, again more directly about what Veda touched on but if political involvement is necessary for achieving the “best life”, but only for certain groups are included as full citizens, then his vision of a fulfilled life seems limited to a select few rather than something that is really universal.-Symaira Elliott 04.10

• In book seven, I was confused about a part that said judicial and electoral functions require they know everyone to be able to properly judge one's character. I was wondering whether he has anything to say about potential bias? Maybe I read it wrong. - Charlotte Stone 04.10.2026

• I was also wondering about why, in a lot of the texts we have read, musicians are discredited. Like in book eight, he says that music should be taught, but not beyond appreciation and harmony. He also says that skilled performers only exist to please others, and that is bad. He doesn’t say it doesn’t take great skill, because he warns against learning the harp, or flute, or any other difficult instrument. I don’t know, I’m just wondering why a lot of these guys hated music. - Charlotte Stone 04.10.2026       

• Kind of like Charlotte's point, but I thought the idea and the confusion of Aristotle's discussion of music was worth discussing. Aristotle basically gives three thoughts on why music is important, but ultimately says students shouldn’t learn a musical skill. I think it all comes down to the idea that, as a free citizen, wasting time on a skill that requires such effort is a poor way to spend your time as a rich person. At least that’s how I interpreted it. -Veda Renzulli 04.13

• Yeah I thought that this was an incredibly interesting section especially when looked at in conjunction with the other aspects of being a good citizen as Aristotle describes them to be. I’m definitely biased in this regard because I’m an artist so, at bare minimum I would be subconsciously inclined to defined the validity of my work, but tons and tons of scientific research has shown the massive importance art has on our health whether that be mental or physical. Both the creation and consumption of art, perhaps music above all, playa a critical role not only in our well being, but in my opinion the core aspects of our humanity. Often, at least through my eyes, Aristotle seems to be looking not for the ideal citizen, the ideal human, but the ideal machine. Not a living being, but a perfect creation who happens to be flesh and bone. – Ashley 04/13/26

• I disagree with Aristotle on his point that extensive study of music is only to the benefit of others -- while other people certainly do benefit from skilled performers, there is personal fulfillment that comes from practicing music as well. I guess he maybe views the personal fulfillment of music specifically as frivolous, since he makes the point that reading/writing are useful for practical reasons, so perhaps the fulfillment one gets out of these is justified in his eyes because of that. - Anna Calcaterra 4/13

• The discussion around education in book 8 was interesting. It stood out to me how he treats musical education as not something that is trivial but as something deeply political. He argued that the kinds of music young people are exposed to shape their character, and by extension, the character of the state. That idea felt surprisingly strict, almost like he’s suggesting that aesthetic experience should be regulated for the sake of political stability. If music and art are meant to train citizens to feel pleasure and pain “correctly,” then education isn’t just about knowledge, it’s about conditioning emotional responses to align with the values of the polis. This makes me wonder how much room Aristotle actually leaves for individuality.-Symaira Elliott 04/13

• Aristotle’s opinion on education and music is interesting and revealing about how he views the polis. He has no respect for those who play the music, and he thinks the field of art and music is important but needs to be heavily curated and moderated to fit the correct emotional response. I think he views the state as the father, i.e., a moderator or controller of the state. I wonder if he would support such a system of rigidity if he wasn’t envisioning himself being a principal part of the system. This harkens back to the discussion today about how short-sighted Aristotle was for his time. He interpreted a lot of his privileged circumstances as deserved and part of the natural order. - Brian Fahey 4/13

• I also don’t really understand his argument that music is bad because musicians only exist to please others. I don’t understand what is wrong with doing something for other people. Don’t all the people in the polis have to provide one another with certain goods or skills and work together to achieve the good life? It kind of reminds me of an older generation saying they don’t like the newer generation's music because it's too loud and a bad influence on them. - Charlotte Stone 04.13.2026 

• I was wondering the same thing: how do you know if someone is “naturally a slave”? Does he ever explain himself at all? -Charlotte Stone 03.28.2026

• In Pericles’ funeral oration, he spends a lot of time illustrating the virtues and strengths of Athens as a society, generally describing their superior political system, their military unrivaled capability, their honorable men, and so on. At some points, especially when he’s telling the audience that, as proper Athenians, they should be willing to face adversity on behalf of their city like the warriors whose funeral it was did, this speech can be reminiscent of much later nationalism, where people swear loyalty to the state rather than to any individual or set of values. Is that a running theme in imperial Athenian history? -Jackson Dircks 3/27

• Thucydides (Pericles') oration feels less like a eulogy and more like a piece of civic propaganda, shaping how citizens should understand their identity and their obligations to the state. What is compelling is how the speech blends praise of the dead with a broader political message: their sacrifice is meaningful because Athens itself is uniquely worth defending. The Athens is then portrayed as a city defined by freedom, equality before the law and civic participation, depicting democracy as the source of both military strength and cultural excellence. All things that a citizen should be more than willing to lay down their life for. -Symaira Elliott 03.27

• The individual is a part of the polis in the same way that a hand is part of a body: it exists for the body, and the body exists for the soul. The hand (or the body) cannot exist separately from the body (or soul), and the good of the hand (or the body) is limited to making the proper contribution to the body (or soul). This part of the passage confused me because I think it is a definitive part of human nature to make short-sighted, self-destructive choices that are not necessarily for the betterment of the soul. When you expand the analogy to people being like hands for the common collective “soul” of the government, it becomes even more complicated, because governments often act in their own selfish interests rather than for the common good, especially depending on the status quo. I like the idea that governments are the stewards and implementers of the people’s collective will, but as we can see, the government is tied to special interests, and public engagement in our democracy is constantly declining. The driving factors of control and corruption seem to prevent any meaningful change. - Brian Fahey Mar 27, 2026

• I think you may be using ‘human nature’ as a statistical concept, wherein whatever many people do is part of ‘human nature.’ Aristotle does not use it that way: he is looking for what the best human would be, as a human, and he calls that ‘human nature.’

• One thought that stood out to me is how much the book was criticizing other thinkers, especially Plato, rather than presenting Aristotle’s own system. Aristotle seemed convinced that before building a political theory, one must first dismantle existing ideal models and real constitutions to show their weaknesses. It made me wonder whether he believes that flawed systems are more useful to study than perfect ones, since they reveal what actually works in human communities.-Symaira Elliott 03.30 

• I agree, I don't think the most reasonable approach within this book was to tear apart other intellects because it seems as if it is just to make yourself sound smarter, which doesn’t even prove the worthiness. I do find it interesting, though, that he discusses the governments of Sparta and Crete, but doesn't just discuss the Constitution of the Lacadaemonians; he tears them apart again like Symairas point. -Veda Renzulli 03.30

• He is building up to his own ideas: he treats others mostly as his precursors: they either saw some of what he saw, almost saw things, or were mistaken in ways that he wants to correct.

• I found how Aristotle discusses the relationship between men and women(like most ancient sources) to be both wildly insulting and wildly interesting. I mention this though because much of Aristotle's language surrounding warlike men is incredibly reminiscent of dialogue I hear today. Aristotle says “For the one who first told the myth seems not to have been unreasonable in coupling together Ares and Aphrodite. For all warlike men seem prone to being possessed by sexual relations either with men or women…And yet what difference is there between women rulers and rulers ruled by women?” While a TikTok video I saw on my page this very morning had a women saying “Look i don’t like fuck with the marrnies and all, but let me tell you those boys can fuck!! They’re all just so submissive.” (this quote was made slightly less explicit than it actually was). I just find it interesting, especially as a psychology student, that thousands of years ago scholars were discussing the apparent connection between militaristic, violent, “manly men” and submissive tendencies or desires in their relationships with women. – Ashley 3/30/26

• And there is also the way that incels and white supremacists etc. try to claim antiquity as theirs. 

• I found the discussion of my previous comment today really interesting. I understand now that he most likely meant the highest good as something grounded in human nature, not necessarily what we would understand it to be in the modern day. My interpretation is anachronistic. But I think the discussion points to a bigger issue in Aristotle’s thinking, especially in how he talks about things like slavery and the distinction between those who are “natural” slaves and those who are slaves by circumstance. There is a real sense of dissonance here. I find reading Aristotle frustrating at times because he does not always make a clear distinction between how things are and how they should be, between describing reality and prescribing ideals. I grew up watching shows like The West Wing nonstop, so I am a political idealist at heart. I believe in the ideas and that this is what government should be. That is why it is so to read someone as influential and so clearly intelligent as Aristotle and see him be so perceptive in some areas, yet so limited in others. It feels like he is capable of thinking at a very high level about ethics and human purpose, but then accepts institutions like slavery in a way that seems inconsistent. You would think he would be smart enough to see the difference but then again he also correlates reason and intelligence and we can see that's not true. - Brian Fahey Mar 30, 2026

• I’m a little confused about Aristotle’s idea of the object of an action. I just don’t get why an action can’t have two objects? He says for example that the object of governing should be the collective happiness of the people, not the moneymaking of the tyrant. But I don’t understand why it can’t be both. Why can’t someone be interested in both their own welfare and the welfare of the state? I don’t see a particular reason those two things need to be mutually exclusive. Why must the excellence of an object be its good? Can’t someone be a fantastic runner but at the same time be dishonorable, and thus banned from competition? Then is the object of his running towards the commonality or towards himself? Why can’t it be both? -Liv Buckser, 3/30/26

• I think A would say that actions typically have a ‘proper’ object and ‘incidental’ objects: that is not the same as my own instinct which is to say that actions have a hierarchy of objectives: some are more important than others and take precedence in cases of conflict. I wonder if I and Aristotle wind up at the same place eventually?

• An idea that struck me while reading book 3 was the idea of what makes a true citizen. Aristotle says that it is unclear who categorizes as a real citizen and in that, the idea with many different governments also relays information that there are different types of citizens in each government. But then it makes me think, ancient greeks and romans hated the idea of foreigners so much so why is there such a broad spectrum on who is a citizen? -Veda Renzulli 04.01 

• I was also especially struck by this idea(even more so after Penny’s class today with the discussion of slavery in the roman republic). I wonder how much the notion of Autochthony has to do with this need for such a broad spectrum of the concept of being a citizen. In societies like ancient Athens this would make more sense as it would be of somewhat vital importance to preserve that Autochthonic heritage but when you get to rome a society always under the belief that they were immigrants it gets more murky. It feels like the desperate human need for the us vs them narrative honestly. – Ashley 04/01/2026 

• I also keep coming back to how much Aristotle cares about whether you can participate in power as opposed to who you are (e.g., defining a citizen as someone who “has the power to take part in the deliberative or judicial administration of any state is said by us to be a citizen of that state; and, speaking generally, a state is a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life." (1275b18ff)). It makes claims of autochthony feel almost secondary, somewhat like a self-justifying, exclusionary narrative (imo, autochthony overtly functions that way; asserting that people are “of the soil” to naturalize political boundaries that are constructed), and I feel like A deviates from that. At the risk of sounding tangential, I think a lot about autochthony, inclusion/exclusion, and citizenship in the context of the U.S. right now. Perhaps I’m biased, but BIPOC communities -- including citizens -- often get treated as if we don’t belong, and this feels structural; the category of citizenship is somewhat broad on paper but still relies on older logics of exclusion to determine who is actually recognized as part of the political community. - Noor Nabi

• I’m curious about how Athens being a democracy factors into Aristotle’s view of both. Did Athens’ imperial endeavors and political instability inform the use of ‘democracy’ as being the corrupted form of a government run by the people, or did people use that term to describe Athens afterwards? -Jackson Dircks 4.1

• I also wonder about ‘levels’ of government: could someone in the Athenian imperial possessions play some role in ‘local’ government? 

• Aristotle argues that a citizen is someone who participates in ruling, and that this definition can vary across the Greek world. What I find interesting is how far this idea can really be expanded. In Sparta, for example, the kings were not political leaders but held primary military and religious authority. Their position was also financially demanding, often relying on loans from wealthy Spartan women. These women holding real economic influence over those in power, it raises the question of whether that influence counts as a form of political participation. In a way, their control over resources shapes decisions and outcomes, even if they were excluded from formal citizenship. This influence essentially makes them like citizens under Aristotle's definition. I wonder what he would have thought about that. - Brian Fahey Apr 1, 2026

• According to the ideals that Aristotle gives in Book 4. Are we really living in a true democracy, or is it more of an oligarchy or aristocracy? Perhaps there is a little bit of all of them? -Veda Renzulli 04.03

• I find it interesting that Aristotle calls monarchy the “most divine” of the forms of government, and then reasons that because of this the perversion of it (tyranny) is necessarily the worst of the bad forms of government. Based on his definitions of these bad forms, it seems to me that a monarchy is more likely to become a tyranny than the other forms are likely to become corrupted -- and I feel like this should be a point against it being the “most divine”. Is it maybe made more special, in his opinion, that it is rare to achieve it successfully? Or does he just genuinely believe it is a better form of rule no matter the possible and likely complications? - Anna Calcaterra 4/3/26

• I think it’s more that he considers monarchy and tyranny to be fundamentally different objects. A monarchic system can become a tyrannical one, but a particular monarchy is defined by having a good king, who would not allow it to be a tyranny. Therefore a monarchy cannot become a tyranny without the replacement of it’s ruler via regime change, and as a good monarch would ensure good succession, a true monarchy by Aristotle’s definition is resistant to tyrannical change. That is of course presuming an ideal king without avarice and with enormous good sense and luck in sons.-Liv Buckser, 4/4/26

• Whereabouts does he say that? What he means always depends on the context. I could imagine him saying that the state of being able to see and having intelligence are not pleasant UNLESS they are active, but I think he believes that the activity of seeing and the activity of using intelligence is pleasant: it supervenes on the activity. I need a passage to look at.

• I think it is an interesting take to enjoy and hate things that bring you pleasure. Along with the idea that pleasure is the utmost peak of happiness, but does it surpass absolute moral virtue? -Veda Renzulli 03.25

• Its interesting to read book 10 knowing what we know now about how pleasure works in the brain and how it applies to so many things in people despite in many  cases effectively stemming from the same brain function. He seems to notice this or at least separate pleasure from any particular moral and rather notices it as a general function that manifest in different conflicting instances. - Aidan Hull 3.25

• I found it interesting how Aristotle elevates contemplation above every other kind of activity, even though he spent so much time developing the importance of moral virtue in everyday life. It felt almost like a shift in tone: after emphasizing social responsibility, friendship, and political life, he suddenly presented the quiet intellectual life as the most complete form of happiness. It made me question whether Aristotle truly believes that most people can achieve the highest happiness, or if he is ultimately describing an ideal that only a small group of philosophers could realistically attain.-Symaira Elliott 03.25

• I think the idea that goods like intelligence or good eyesight are desirable without being pleasant is rather interesting because of the analogy that no one would go back to their childhood intellect even if being a child is enjoyable. I think this is a generally fair statement but I don't understand how the ability to see better is not pleasant as I didn't get glasses since 2nd grade and I have terrible vision I can still remember how incredible the first day was. I wonder if he thinks this ignorance or lack of clear sight is fine because the observer doesn't know the difference. - Brian Fahey March 25, 2026

• Good question: can you see how Aristotle would answer it? I’m not able to right now, but I only have 5 minutes. An awful lot of scholarship is just conversation with dead authors: coming up with some question and then figuring out what answer they would be committed to if they really believed what they write. Bailly

• I think the idea of maganaminity is so interesting because isnt that essentially the same as having a huge ego? I believe it to be having a big ego, but perhaps being deserving of it? But maybe it's the idea that they know that they are themselves worthy of an honor, but do not take the extreme pleasure that they are the best of the best? -Veda Renzulli 03/02

• I also found this concept to be especially interesting not just because of like, well it just being an interesting concept but much more so because of who were reading. I also found myself questioning the timeline of when this was written. Before or After Alexander The Great’s conquest? As I think that can make a large difference on the interpretation of this concept in the broader cultural/historical sense of things as Aristotle was his teacher. – Ashley Golden 03/02

• I think of magnanimity as a cousin of generosity: the generous person is generous because they give a sizable portion of their wealth away to good causes, but the magnanimous person adds something to that. What they add is partially scale: they give a more sizable portion, I think. But also, they add something like ‘vision’ or ‘strategic goodness’ to their gift: they give it in a way that makes the results not just simply good, but good in a way that is better than mere goodness. It’s like when someone gives money to the library versus someone giving money to set up this here library in this here way, and that library is just such a visionary idea. Both are generous, but the one adds some goodness. Perhaps I need to reread the chapter in Aristotle, but that’s what I remember. Bailly

• This chapter/book presents the great-souled person as someone who believes they deserve great honors and actually does deserve them. And on one hand this sounds like arrogance; yet on the other, Aristotle treats it as a virtue because it reflects an accurate understanding of one’s own worth. This made me question whether true virtue can really coexist with this kind of self-conscious awareness of superiority. If someone knows they are morally and socially excellent, doesn’t that awareness risk undermining humility? I ruminated on what Aristotle himself would say and came to the conclusion that he would probably say that humility isn’t the goal, accuracy is. From my understanding the virtuous person isn’t pretending to be small; they simply refuse honors that are beneath them and accept those that fit their merit. Still, I found myself wondering whether this ideal depends on a very hierarchical society where honor is a public and limited good.-Symaira Elliott 03.2

• I agree with this, I think it is especially hard to understand as most people are used to being probably too humble or self-effacing in Aristotle’s opinion. I also kind of see people claiming they are morally or socially excellent as undermining humility, but I think that is just my own opinion. - Charlotte Stone 03.03.2026

• I wonder: try this situation out: one person says they deserve the biggest prize there is for doing something that clearly doesn’t qualify, whereas another person refuses a prize because their collaborator, who they feel, accurately, did most of the work, is not included in the prize, but that person does claim to have been instrumental in the achievement and to deserve honor for it, just not more than their share. I could name examples, but I hope you see that that is applicable and that that also does happen both on a grand national and international scale and on the small scale of class or company group projects? The one is arrogant, the other is accurate, and, according to Aristotle’s requiremments, proud. Maybe I’m not thinking it through. Bailly

• The idea of objective value to actions and virtues hangs over the entirety of this book, and in the section on anger/gentleness Aristotle addresses it in an interesting way, referencing how people who lean towards anger or the other extreme may be praised for being ‘manly’ or forgiving, respectively, and saying that figuring out the exact limits of praiseworthiness on the gentle-anger-axis would be very difficult. In a way, this implies that there is an objective answer, but that it might as well never be measured because what really matters is the circumstance in which an angry or gentle action is taken and how it’s perceived by others. I found this line of thought (and others like it) interesting because the idea that there may be absolute truths, but they don’t matter much because the general human experience is more immediately relevant, is refreshingly familiar and applicable considering most of what we’re reading is abstract theory. WHO SAID THIS? WANT CREDIT? I’LL LEAVE IT HERE FOR YOU TO CLAIM. Seems very intelligent to me.

• -Jackson dircks, 3/2/26

• The idea that nobody would deliberately injure oneself, and therefore a man cannot be guilty of doing injustice twords a child and a slave confused me. There is just no explaination of why someone would never do injustice to oneself deliberately. I was thinking about this because Aristotle does address his opinions on lazy people or people with addictions, is that not deliberately injuring oneself? Maybe I’m looking at the question wrong. - Charlotte Stone 03.03.2026

• I agree with his confusion. We get so many definitions of justice or injustice and it just further confuses me when we receive an example on what this injustice is it just seems to confuse me further. The idea that people aren’t hurting themselves if they are addicted to something is so interesting to me too especially because addictions of all sorts are relatively bad  with some worse than others. I think my comment may have been more confusing than the book. -Veda Renzulli 03.04

• I don’t think I agree with the total equating of justice to the law, or that “whatever is lawful is in some way just”. I think these ideas are closely related and have great influence over each other, but there are certainly instances in which the law fails to create a just society. Aristotle does seem to recognize this when he discusses a “correctly established law”. - Anna Calcaterra 3/4/26

• I also found the idea of justice aligning with the law a bit weird, but, assuming this only truly applies to the correctly established law (potentially established on a foundation of absolute justice, which may be circular reasoning but whatever), this seems reminiscent of the platonic idea of pure individual justice naturally resulting in/reinforcing societal justice. There are many differences between the two though, namely the specifics Aristotle gets into being a lot more applicable to the real world rather than an idealized hardly-attainable society, but that’s a whole other discussion. -Jackson Dircks, 3/4/26

• I agree that law is only just insofar as it reflects an independent standard of justice. If we need a standard outside the law to judge whether laws are “correctly established,” then is Aristotle really equating justice with law or subordinating law to something else? - Noor Nabi

• I find the idea of comparing justice to its opposite injustice to find its meaning fascinating because it immediately made me think about our modern day justice system and whether he would find it to be any form of justice. He acknowledges that the law cannot always equal justice and that the law only protects the “best” people as we said in class; this is just a code for the people who in his mind should count. So I don't know if any inequity in the current modern day justice system would bother him. But tyranny definitely bothers him. In my opinion the law is very important in our society today but it can be used as a weapon against the people for tyranny and this recent lawsuit made by the President against the IRS is a great modern day example of this. - Brian Fahey Mar 4 2026

• I asked this question in class before break, but I want to expand on it- I’m trying to understand what exactly Aristotle thinks “good” entails. From book one, it seems obvious that virtue is the pursuit of happiness for each person, and that the virtue of a collective society is the pursuit of that happiness (fulfillment? Actualization?) But later in book five he mentions two things which make this difficult for me to understand. Firstly, the good must come from both within and without, in other words wisdom can be held by someone who doesn’t do anything, but virtue cannot, and secondly that a good person is a good person because they take good actions. These three definitions seem to conflict to me, first the good coming from outside a person through their actions, secondly from inside a person and manifesting as actions, and thirdly as a state of mind which induces actions towards happiness. These seem mutually exclusive to me. -Liv Buckser, 3/16/2026

• Can practical wisdom truly be taught? That was a question I wondered while reading, or can it be developed through lived experience. It’s discussed that practical wisdom is different from scientific knowledge because it deals with making good decisions about action in particular situations rather than universal truths. It further made me wonder how someone becomes practically wise in the first place and has me thinking of the elders' rule and role in the republic(tangent). If it requires experience and moral character, it seems like it cannot simply be learned from instruction or theory. Instead, it may only develop over time through habit, reflection, and participation in political and social life.-Symaira Elliott 03.16

• I like the idea that there are three things within the soul that were action, truth, reason, and desire, its just so interesting to me because that makes credible sense to me. A question that arose was what is the difference between the golden mean and right reasoning? -Veda Renzulli 03.16

• I’m confused about what Aristotle means when he references things that admit of being themselves versus things that admit of being otherwise. It may be a translation thing, but the terminology here doesn’t gel with me. I generally understand that things that admit of themselves are more straightforward and true, and maybe have more to do with foundational principles or something, and that things that admit of being otherwise are more subjective, derivative, or deductive in nature, but it feels like the meaning there goes deeper and I’m just not really getting the nuance. -Jackson Dircks 3/16

• I found Aristotle's definition of intelligence(6.43) to be incredibly interesting, especially so when looked at in the context of modern American society. Many in our country view intelligence not as a concern for what is good or bad for their fellow man, but rather intelligence is equal to how much money one can earn. And in a capitalist society the oppression and exploitation of people is required. I just think it's interesting that many today view the antithesis of Aristotle's beliefs to be true. – Ashley 3/16

• I agree, I also found it interesting. Although I almost think that intelligence is viewed more as a means to make money, not as much as being equal to how much money one can earn. I think that the value placed on having intelligence started to decrease as soon as money became more popular. - Charlotte Stone 03/16

• I wonder also if some of the difference is caused by language? Dr. Bailly feel free to correct me as the translation I’m using does not have the original greek and I’m relying on the loeb, but I think the word he generally uses for intelligence in the modern sense would be “nous” which is different from intelligence. Nous is the capacity of an individual to grasp truth, which means it can’t really be equated to anything in a capitalist society. I would also gently push back on the post modernist extremism- I certainly think that monetary value can be drawn from intelligence, but capitalist systems actually tend to divide the intelligentsia and the brokera classes, which suggests to me that while intelligence is exploitable, it is neither equated with nor directly related to monetary value in modern philosophy. I think Rand might certainly argue with me, but I really dislike that book. -Liv Buckser, 3/17

• I wonder whether, if/once that standard is widely internalized, it becomes possible to even recognize forms of intelligence that don’t produce measurable output. With rising student debt, the defunding of the humanities, and tech dominance, I often worry that we are losing the ability to value intelligence that isn’t legible in economic terms. - Noor Nabi 3/18

• The discussion of lack of self control felt like it clashed with the idea that knowledge alone is sufficient for virtuous action especially when Akrasia shifts how moral weakness should be thought of. What stood out to me was that failure in action was not simply a lack of knowledge, but a failure to properly use knowledge. The akractic person still holds the correct understanding of what is good yet in moments of desire the understanding becomes inactive or overridden. It reminded me of our discussion last class about how a just person can still be just while making unjust decisions. They still retain that in them, it just was dependent on intention and follow-through action. Because virtue is reframed as something embodied and practiced and not merely understood to what extent can we really say that someone who consistently fails to act on what they know is good actually possesses that knowledge in a meaningful sense? My thoughts tbh were all over the place i hope this makes some sort of sense.-Symaira Elliott 03.18

• Incontinence in Book 7 see19ms to lead back to morality and whether a person lacks the self-control to not give in to desires. And in this sense, I think the desire he is talking about refers to eating a chocolate cake when you are trying to not have sugar, but rather having the knowledge that they know something is right to do, but completely fails to make the right decision and ultimately takes pleasure in eating the cake, among other ways of desire. Then as a result, these people tend to feel guilt, but are the guilty because they really did the wrong thing in terms of morals, or is it because the thing they did was truly wrong. Veda Renzulli 03.18 

• I don’t know how much I agree with the way Aristotle differentiates between people’s reasons for the various vices and ranks them against each other. While the intent or reasoning may be different, the outcome is still the same regardless, so I don’t think we can necessarily say it is better or worse. - Anna Calcaterra 3/18

• I think how Aristotle seems to view pleasure is interesting, especially in reference to how Plato seemed to view it. If I remember correctly, in the Republic, pleasure—in the sense that citizens would be happy in the kalipolis—was generally a sort of end-all be-all, and the way to it was founded on the knowledge of the good, whereas Aristotle asserts that a temperate/virtuous person would avoid pleasures and instead just work to avoid pain. This difference in viewpoints seems like it’s due to a difference in the definition of pleasure, and the presumed impacts it has on the human psyche, which is interesting. Is there somewhere where either of them outright define pleasure? -Jackson Dircks 3/18

• In book eight, and maybe I interpreted this incorrectly, I think he was saying that it is worse to abuse a friend or family member than a stranger. I just felt that this goes against all the discussions on justice earlier, and I was wondering what he meant by it. - Charlotte Stone 03/19

• Where was that, Charlotte? Do you remember?

• If I understood chapter 9 properly I really enjoyed the idea that loving a friend is in some sense, an extension of loving oneself. It was argued that true friendship is rooted in virtue and not personal gain. This suggested to me that friendship was not separate from moral development but actually a reflection of one’s own character. It made me think that 1. You are the company you keep around, 2. how friendships can act as a mirror and 3. If friendships mirror the self, then to what extent can someone truly be virtuous if they fail to cultivate or sustain deep, selfless friendships? .-Symaira Elliott 03.23

• That is how I understood chapter 9 as well and it kind of thought it was really sweet. Something that people have in common within friendships is the idea that they like each other and most people, again in friendships, like similar things which could be somewhat like a mirror as you mentioned before, but then again how could a friendship mirror oneself if the friendship is toxic to an extent, where two people aren't benefitting from it? -Veda Renzulli 03.23

• I completely agree with this comment, I found this book to be truly really sweet(and by far my favorite book in the text so far)! But to add to the two above comments I thought it to be really interesting to look at this concept/ideology of friendship within a political context. With politics I think this applies more so to political alliances than true friendships. Both within antiquity and modern day context, you can see the remarkable differences between alliances based upon true loyalty and care for one another versus alliances based upon immediate utility and advantageous circumstances. For instance both of the triumvirate's, alliances based purely upon them being politically advantageous to each individual and each individual having at most, neutral feeling for the others and at worst bordering on utter disdain these alliances in the short term worked but in the long term collapsed and led to civil war. Compare this to the close friendship between Octavian and Agrippa which was vital for the former's success in the aforementioned war. You see this today within the Trump administration, just look at all of his various press secretaries and lawyers who now make their living going on podcasts and making fun of the man. Friendship or alliance based upon utility not care is in my opinion always doomed to collapse. — Ashley 03/23

• Something I found confusing, and maybe contradictory, is Aristotle’s opinion that friendship with slaves is possible because they are also human beings, and therefore there is also justice within these relationships. Earlier he claimed that it is impossible to be unjust to a slave, so I’m wondering where that sort of cognitive dissonance comes from. I suppose it ties in with his ideas about friendship between two unequal parties like father and son. Overall, however, I really enjoyed book 9. - Anna Calcaterra 3/23/26

• I agree, this was confusing. Maybe it's just the fact that this book is more like Aristotle’s notes, and he was developing ideas as he went. Or maybe he’s just saying that it's only a friendship of utility, and if the slave were ever freed, the friendship would fade because it was never a true friendship. - Charlotte Stone 03.23.2026 

• I’m a little confused about Aristotle’s description of how the self-loving person will share their distresses with others. He says they would share their troubles with others more frequently because “it is always the same thing that is painful or pleasant, not different things at different times. This is because he practically never regrets what he has done.” What exactly is the consistent thing that is painful or pleasant? Also, on a not very related note, I really like how he describes the virtuous self-loving person as seeing their friends as other themselves. It’s a very humanizing view of the people one knows. -Jackson Dircks 3/23

• Aristotle saying you can become friends with a slave confuses me because he says that friendship is based on similar natures and reciprocity are slaves considered true friends or just that of convenience or circumstance. And does he really consider slaves to be extensions of their masters in this case because a good man could be friends with a good slave to a bad master. - Brian Fahey March 23, 2026

Book I of Nichomachean Ethics by Aristotle has been my first exposure to ethics and so far, I am really enjoying it. I really like thinking deeply about what happiness is because I feel like it is something that is expected out of most people but what does it truly mean to be happy? All of your dreams come true, and you receive good news? I think there are so many ways to feel happy, but Aristotle suggests that happiness is the end of the things achievable by action, and I would tend to agree. Earlier in Book I, chapter 7, Aristotle mentions that we choose things to be happy, but that makes me curious. When we feel this sensation, do we choose to do it, or is it something that naturally occurs when something good happens? -Veda Renzulli 02/20

• Just like Veda I think this is my first real exposure to ethics. One thing that stood out to me in book 1 was the tension between happiness as something stable and self-sufficient, and Aristotle’s admission that external goods (ex. noble birth, wealth, friends) are necessary to fully achieve it. If happiness is the highest good and rooted in rational activity in accordance with virtue, then why does it still depend so heavily on luck? I know later on in the book he argues that someone who is virtuous but utterly destitute or plagued by terrible misfortunes cannot really be happy so does the activity of the soul (eudaimonia) have to be in accordance with virtue and not just be a feeling or passing state?-Symaira Elliott 02.20

• I also noted the distinction Aristotle makes between “ordinary” and “sophisticated” people’s definitions of happiness -- that ordinary people think of it as pleasure and that the more sophisticated think of it as honor/virtue -- but that he also makes the point that it is entirely possible to be virtuous and unhappy due to outside circumstances. I was a little surprised by this because I haven’t read Aristotle before and don’t know much about him, so I didn’t know he would acknowledge that. I liked your question about the soul being in accordance with virtue, and I do think that is what he was getting at, because to me the earlier passages in the book seem to go against the idea of true happiness as a feeling or passing state, as you said. - Anna Calcaterra 2/20

• Plato makes the distinction between the ordinary and sophisticated forms of happiness ruling your life. This idea makes me think of an argument I saw between two of my friends recently. One friend of mine was leaving class early to go to the Ice walkout protest and the other friend was on the phone playing video games with someone he knows from childhood who he had already committed to he said he won't participate in the protest today because of that and this someone when ubered all the way to the the ice facility in Winooski to protest weeks previously and is of the most politically engaged people I've met so far at school. The idea that the forces of virtues and vices that rule our lives and the idea of committing to a friend is something most would consider virtuous but allowing this virtue to dominate your will can change how you would approach a circumstance anytime. I think this way of thinking about life can result in great selfishness and show the selfishness in your life depending on the person. Brian Fahey 2.20

• ‘Selfishness’ is an interesting thing. Is it useful to differentiate between ‘selfishness’ that has internal consequences and that which has external consequences? I’ve run into people who say everything is selfish. But someone who tells me that I merely give to charity because it makes me feel good, and so it is selfish, is talking about internal consequences. Someone who gives to charity because it helps others is talking about external consequences. If I hurt you because it makes me feel good, that is surely selfish and is about internal consequences. Just musing here, probably unrelated entirely to what you were saying. Also not sure where to take it. Someone in class once suggested that perhaps humans just are altruistic: I believe that. But I also believe that humans are not consistent: the same human can be altruistic and selfish in contradictory ways: they don’t like it when we point out the contradiction, but that does not make them less contradictory: if they agree with us, they become less contradictory, because humans have a very low tolerance for explicit exposed contradiction.  Bailly

• Oh, BTW, I said in class I was not sure how Plato would respond to someone who wanted to talk about the lust for power: actually, I do think Plato has much to say about it. In Rep. 1, if I remember rightly, his questions lead Thrasymachus to the belief that someone who has ‘power’ but is mistaken about what the good is is actually harmful to themself, does not really want that power, and that that ‘power’ is bad for them. So I think he sees the appetite for power, and he judges it like other appetites: is it controlled and in service to an overall conception of the good? He might say that it has to be in service to the apparent good. But is it in service to a correct conception of the good? If not, it is bad and harmful to the ‘powerful’ agent themself, and so should not be called ‘power.’ I think that makes him non-neutral about power (power is not power unless it is for good), a perhaps interesting idea. I wonder what Foucault says about that, he who is so obsessed with power. Bailly

• It seems to me that Aristotle is a major evolution on Plato’s concept of personal action. Aristotle says that there are just actions which make the man performing them just, exactly as the harper becomes a harper by harping. (There’s that craft analogy again.) That’s pretty different from Plato’s idea that the just man creates justice by when he performs any action, and that a just man’s actions are automatically just. It externalizes morality in a way that I don’t think was seen very heavily in the republic; even though the form of the good is external, its use is still the perfection of self. -Liv Buckser 2/22/26

• I am irritated by Aristotle’s division of good into the soulful and the habitual, moral and intellectual, because it seems to me to be the very type of thing he would not accept from someone else. While it is not necessarily the core of his argument about the virtues and the practices of virtue that result from the division, this kind of logicless categorization, sorting things based on what is perceived as obvious, is what discounts Plato’s unique form of the good.-Liv Buckser, 2/25/26

• I have to agree when the idea is proposed that virtue is a disposition, I feel like this directly relates to the idea that people do things because it is morally right. It is the disposition to behave in the right way, which makes me think of the Latin word for virtue, which is vitrus, but this also is a translation of the word “manliness,” which I think is so interesting because in order to be virtuous, you have to be manly in antiquity, which is quite interesting. -Veda Renzulli 02.25

• I also especially liked the idea of virtue as a disposition because I personally found it very relevant to our generation. I know it’s a cliche to say that young people(even when you yourself are a young person) are more selfish then their older counterparts(and when it comes to the macro sense I don’t believe this to be true), but something I’ve personally noticed is that many people our age who would or do claim to be a virtuous or a good person, when the time comes where doing the right thing would involve uncomfortable consequences or inconvenience, they tend to pick themselves. Conversely I feel people from older generations are significantly more likely to help out their neighbors even at the cost of personal inconvenience. The idea of putting your money where your mouth is and all that.                   – Ashley  02/25

• I agree when push comes to shove we really see how people respond even when they claim to be virtuous or living life with the intent of being virtuous. I think it def has to do with being uncomfortable and people not being willing to sit in that discomfort and still choose someone or something over themselves and that discomfort. Does that make sense? -Symaira Elliott 02.25

• I feel like I’m still slowly getting into what this book is about and at times it can still be pretty confusing. Having said that, something I was struck by was the idea that we become just by doing just acts and temperate by doing temperate acts. My question is: if virtue is formed entirely by habit, how do we begin to act virtuously before we already possess virtue? Aristotle talked about how legislators train citizens through habituation, but this makes me wonder how much moral responsibility belongs to the individual versus the society shaping them.-Symaira Elliott 02.25

• I was also wondering about this. He mentions that virtue is a conscious choice, and we deliberate about the means to an end, not just the end itself. Are there perfectly virtuous people already who can teach how to be virtuous? And how did they become perfectly virtuous? - Charlotte Stone 02.25.2025

• I think this problem between doing good deeds and being a good person is really interesting, because it’s reminiscent of a more recent argument of whether “true altruism” even exists. The argument basically states that everything we do is in some way for personal gain, and even the most charitable acts could be seen as being for the sake of our own peace of mind. The natural conclusion here is that no matter how good or temperate the deeds we do are, it can’t make us good or temperate outside of just giving us these habits and making other people consider us well. Given Aristotle' s assertion that the end goal of life is some form of personal happiness anyways, I wonder how this would fit into his framework, or if he would think that having good habits is the very thing that defines whether someone is good, which it seems like he does on some level. -Jackson Dircks 2/25

• Aristotle treats the necessity of wage labor as a misfortune external to virtue, which we explored a bit in class, but does this not make his claim that success is living a life of entirely virtuous activity throughout an entire lifetime (p 202) structurally class-bound than universally human? When survival driven labor consumes our time and energy, the development of rational and civic capabilities becomes statistically concentrated among the materially secure. This reminds me of the modern correlation between academia and socioeconomic security (one of my professors, Dr. Caroline Beer, briefly spoke about this in one of her lectures too: she mentioned she likely would not be a professor had her parents, who are teachers, not instilled in her a love of reading) -- is the contemplative life institutionally gated? As Dr. Bailly mentioned, even Stoic detachment from material goods (exemplified by the incredibly wealthy Seneca) appears less compelling (to me, at least) when preached from insulation. Another thing I was thinking about is the didactic purpose Aristotle’s work here is serving: when Aristotle elevates contemplation of the universe as the “highest human good,” it reads almost aspirationally, almost functioning to redirect potentially elite ambition. - Noor Nabi 2/25

• Interesting, Noor! I think that Aristotle thinks wage-earning is actually a hindrance to virtue: no leisure to figure things out, or something like that? The counterpart to Seneca is Epictetus, a stoic who was born a slave and worked his way out of it into being a philosopher. As for the other stuff you say, without disagreeing at all, is it fair to suggest that there are ways to ‘spread the wealth’ and ‘spread some privilege’? Some privilege is unfairly gotten and needs to be abolished, but some of it is, I hope, spreadable. Wealth, and privilege, are not always zero-sum games, and there are some areas where the ‘limits to growth’ are lesser. My mother always told me that she thought it was somehow ‘too early’ for our family to be in academia: what she meant, I believe, is that we were not at that socio-economic or cultural level. It struck me as a strange thought, but I believe it comes from something like a faith in social mobility combined with a thought that only the upper class should be giving themselves over to things like being professors. I do notice that people gravitate to what they know, and the careers we know best growing up are those of our parents/family, so many people gravitate toward what they know in that way. It’s hard, but not impossible, to spread that privilege, but others seem more spreadable. Bailly

• I think there are absolutely tangible ways to create opportunities for upward mobility outside of, say, formal charity, like volunteering (for ex., there is a program called Paper Airplanes where you help students and professionals in Syria learn English to support their professional development and navigate things like citizenship paperwork), creating access to knowledge in other ways, etc. That said, I also feel like these kinds of opportunities are often contingent on the goodwill of someone else -- a teacher, mentor, or organization willing to invest time and resources. This reminds me of Aristotle’s point that success requires some luck, and I wonder how much of our own paths hinge on encountering particular people at the right time. TLDR: I definitely think that privilege can be spread, but I also think there’s still a strong element of chance in who benefits - Noor Nabi 2/27

• One of the definitions of success is that it is what makes life worth living, which makes sense because if you find happiness in life, I would say that is a successful life. But I was wondering, Aristotle said that death may be preferable to life if you live like a child, live to do the daily grind, or live to eat, sleep, etc. Does he think that no one considers those things to be what makes their life worth living? Is it not up to the individual what makes their life worth living? - Charlotte Stone 02.26.2025  

• For book 3, Aristotle makes moral responsibility feel almost uncomfortable in how far it reaches. If actions done in anger or desire are still voluntary because they come from within us, then we can’t easily excuse ourselves by blaming emotion. That idea/concept really stuck with me as I read. It makes me wonder whether we underestimate how much ownership we have over our reactions. At the same time, if our character is formed by habits we’ve practiced for years, then at any given moment are we freely choosing or just acting out who we’ve trained ourselves to be? It seems like Aristotle is hinting or I guess really plainly pushing the reader to see that they’re responsible not only for what we do, but for the kind of self we slowly construct over time. -Symaira Elliott 02.27

• I think it is interesting that Aristotle thinks we shouldn’t base our decisions on wishes and beliefs because they can become inaccurate or biased, but I am not sure what else I would base a decision on. I feel like I make decisions solely on my belief in whether it is good or bad. But Aristotle claims that humans will make a decision, and that decision will be the greater good. Along with that idea, the idea that humans may not be responsible for the actions that happen because of ignorance, but that they are responsible for the ignorance itself, is something that really stuck in my brain whilst reading. -Veda Renzulli 02.27

• I’m interested in the cutoff between involuntary and voluntary (and maybe nonvoluntary) actions. Aristotle labels spirited/emotional decisions voluntary and decisions made in ignorance involuntary. He does address the argument, though, that emotional/spirited decisions may be involuntary because they’re based on things a human “ought” to be driven towards, which begs the question of how voluntary any decision really is. A natural argument that he kind of uses in response is that a person is responsible for consciously keeping spirits and desires in check so they can act voluntarily, but if they ought to do that to be successful (in the aristotelian sense), then one could argue that that decision, and any decision made in order to achieve some greater goal—which is pretty much all of them—isn’t entirely voluntary. In other words, determinism. Aristotle makes a clean-ish cutoff here and in doing so maintains human autonomy, but were there thinkers of the time that didn’t? If there were, what was the response to their ideas? -Jackson Dircks 2/27

• This just got addressed in class, and Aristotle seems to disagree on account of maintaining personal responsibility, which is a fittingly practical response to determinism. -Jackson Dircks again, 2/27

• I think the idea that humans are responsible for the ignorance behind actions that have caused harm is a logical continuation of the idea that the rational part of humanity is the best -- acting impulsively, not doing research before making decisions, etc. is irrational, and taking responsibility of one’s ignorance is done through rationality. - Anna Calcaterra 2/27

• I wonder what Plato actually thought about Honor as a concept. He doesn’t explore it as deeply as I wish he would have, and in a lot of cases seems to take it for granted that we the reader understand it. I don’t know if that’s a fair assessment, but I feel almost as if he’s describing gravity or solar flares, just a thing we all acknowledge as an extent. I wonder what exactly the tenants of honor are? Do they change? He says honor often aligns with Justice, but they are not the same thing. -Liv Buckser 2/4/2026

• I agree, it seems as though honor isn't important, or important enough to talk about unless it pertains to justice. I wonder though if he will continue on and maybe expand on this. - Charlotte Stone 02.05.2026 

• I find book two politically fascinating as essentially a full scale defense of state enforced censorship. It does make sense to a certain degree, I certainly wouldn’t like snuff films broadcast on children’s network. However, I find that Socretes, in my opinion, fails to interrogate the long term consequences of censorship to this scale, particularly as he applies it to the gymnastic and physic, which would naturally result in stagnation of the arts. I guess to him perhaps stagnation isn’t a problem, and medicine is an art not a science. It’s just interesting to see a world where progress isn’t the main goal, and where preserving life is a minor benefit instead of the entire purpose of the medical system. -Liv Buckser, 2/5/2026

• I was interested in the suggestion of censoring myths and stories. Socrates wants to have an education that includes mathematics, gymnastics, and music, and wants to censure arts that do not promote virtue. Does he not think that if a person who has never known anyone to be unvirtuous would be able to pick out when they themselves are acting unvirtuously? Or if the person left the Kallipolis, how would they be able to handle the rest of the world? Is the idea that the Kallipolid has everything anyone would ever want, and there is no reason to leave, and no new people come to this place ever? - Charlotte Stone 02.06.2026   

• When I first read The Republic this was my favorite book, but something that has always struck me about the dialogue surrounding the just and the unjust man towards the beginning of book II is just how similar it sounds to the modern ear as the dialogue surrounding the stanford prison experiment. What I mean by this is that many often use the results of the Stanford prison experiment as evidence to suggest that all humans given power over other humans will naturally abuse that power and their subjects. But the test subjects in the Stanford prison experiment were almost entirely, rich to middle class, white, 20-22, male college students. The test at best doesn’t show the nature of all humans but the nature of that specific group(if we choose to ignore everything wrong with the test's methodology). The reason I say this reminds me of the beginning dialogue in book 2 is how quickly generalizations are being made to all of human nature, by a well to do powerful white man(obviously this is being looked up under the modern lens) based likely off of what he himself would do. WHO IS THIS COMMENT BY?

• This is, to me, an unfair characterization of plato here. I understand the desire to establish duality, that is of affect and the affected, and to position one as superior by that knowledge, but I disagree that your positioning applies here at all. Anthropologically, Plato was not a “powerful white man.” Plato was not powerful, and certainly socrates was not, by their own admissions they are thinkers who do not apply to statecraft. I suppose what you mean is they are privileged, but I would say that our standards of have and have nots simply do not apply to societies where the concept of property law was a novel invention. Plato was certainly not white, the categorization did not exist and would not for thousands of years.. Perhaps you mean that he was of a dominant ethnicity, but I personally disagree with the idea that antiquity even had that idea. I think perhaps a more charitable way of discussing the ideas within would be by saying that Plato was concerned primarily with the procreation of the Athenian citizen’s way of life, that what he thought was right and wrong strongly aligned with the interests of the Athenian democracy at the time he was writing. I think there is enormous value in analyzing it that way. -Liv Buckser 2/8/2026

• Book II of the Republic was really interesting to me in terms of defining what justice is and what the origins are. In most of my university courses, we discuss justice and what makes someone justified in their actions, so I find it very helpful to thoroughly examine its roots. Throughout both books, I was thinking of the line “...those who practice injustice do it unwillingly and because they lack injustice, if in our thoughts we grant to a just an an unjust person the freedom to do whatever they like” (Plato Republic Book II, 359 c.) The result of this would be that people want to be better than everyone else, which is then classified as good. -Veda Renzulli 02.06.2026

• I found that interesting too. Plato explains injustice as ignorance/inner disorder, but hasn’t fully theorized responsibility yet, so I found it interesting that Plato still seems to assume some obligation to participate in one’s own moral formation. - Noor Nabi, 2/9/26

• I find it interesting the way Plato’s Socrates is going about designing this city. Of course, it’s all just for the sake of proving a point, so it’s hard to tell how much of it he would actually implement if he were one of his described philosopher-kings, but it’s vaguely reminiscent of more modern ideas of utopias with alternative political systems, proposing drastic changes to peoples’ way of life with little consideration for how they would respond because it’s all for the “greater good.” This is in line with the theory of justice that assumes justice is objective and peoples’ beliefs have no bearing on it—which socrates seems to be using here—but makes me skeptical of how just this city and its establishment would actually be. -Jackson Dircks, 2/9/26

• I agree 100%. I think some of the main points of these books are the idea that things can be done for the greater good in terms of morality, but in all fairness who does it really benefit? I think this rings true throughout the previous books as well. -Veda Renzulli 02.09.2026

• I was also thinking about modern utopias when reading Books IV and V and the opinion that a true utopia is impossible - something I think Socrates and Glaucon are also aware of, as they seemingly try to convince themselves that the just city is actually possible and then try to reach a consensus of how it could be so. - Anna Calcaterra 2/9/26

• I wonder how much they believed this city was possible. I know that they referred to it as a “city in words”, implying it is not possible to have a community that functions under these strict rules. But then why go to these lengths to convince one another that the city could be? - Charlotte Stone 02.09.2026

• Something that I always really appreciate when reading the classics is having the opportunity to see how despite practically every single facet of human life having gone through such unfathomable changes in the last 2500 years, humans themselves have changed very little. I mention this because book III of the republic, one of the most important philosophical works by one of the most important philosophers ever starts with what, at least to me, reads as the ancient greek equivalent of “TV is rotting the children's minds and those violent video games are going to turn them into impious heathens” and I find that to be incredibly funny. We can literally change the way the planet itself functions, but adults are always going to be annoyed by what children do for entertainment, and there's so beauty in that. – Ashley Golden 02/09/26

• One thing that struck me in books 4-5 was how Plato defines justice as each part of the city “doing its own work “ and not interfering with others. On one level, this definition feels orderly and elegant as justice becomes a kind of harmony, both in the soul and in the state. However it equally feels restrictive; if justice means staying in your assigned role, then social mobility and individual ambition seem almost like threats to stability. That makes me wonder whether Plato values order more than personal freedom. In book 5 the tension intensifies with the proposal of women and children being held in common among the guardian class. Plato frames this as a way to eliminate private loyalties that could undermine unity, but also requires a huge radical restructuring of family life. I thought a lot about whether achieving perfect unity justifies such extreme measures. Symaria Elliott 2.9

• I am not sure I agree with Book IV's idea that Socrates promotes: that philosophers are fit to rule the city. I do not think there is a perfect description of what a king fits under, because it depends on what is occurring in the city, the history of what has happened within it, and how to improve it. Not to overgeneralize a philosopher, but my idea of a philosopher is thinking “what could be…” as opposed to facts, and I feel like a ruler must know what is realistically happens.  -Veda Renzulli 02.11

• I agree! I feel like a ruler should be pretty well rounded while also being grounded in reality to properly govern people. I also think specifics on the city itself also plays a large role into what a ruler looks like.-Symaira e 2.11

• I agree, and I think it also relates to the increasingly unobtainable qualifications for “philosopher” that Socrates gives. He seems to give a narrower and narrower definition of what counts as a real philosopher, saying there is “only a very small group who associate with philosophy in a way that is worthy of her”. - Anna Calcaterra 2/11/26

• Something that stood out to me in the readings for today was how unsettling Plato’s idea of the philosopher-king actually is. The allegory of the cave makes it seem clear that the person who has seen the form of the good, the truth beyond appearances, would be the most qualified to rule. But Plato also says the philosopher must be compelled to return to the cave and govern, even though ruling is not what they want. That tension feels important, if the best rulers don’t desire power and must be forced into it, how stable really is that system? Plato’s idea that political authority should belong only to those with access to absolute truth feels both powerful but potentially very dangerous.-Symaira Elliott 2.11 

• I am wondering what he means when he says that the philosopher must want to return to the cave and govern, but not want to rule. What does he see the difference is there? - Charlotte Stone 02.11.2026

• In book 6, Socrates addresses uneducated opinions as being “shameful and ugly things” before being pushed to give his opinion on the nature of good. This is interesting for a few reasons. To start, given his enlightening perspective on said nature of good, it becomes hard to tell the difference between Socrates’/Plato’s analysis of things he’s educated on versus things he’s guessing at, which probably owes itself to his skill as a philosopher. It does also bring up the issue of people making uneducated assertions in general. If a philosopher can create such profound and lasting arguments (the sun, line, and cave allegories) from little knowledge, what does that say about the proposed philosopher-kings, and how easily they can influence the knowledge and beliefs of the people? -Jackson Dircks 2/11

• I found the metaphor of a ship with a blind and deaf captain to be particularly interesting to today's politics. The crew uses force or tricks to gain control, but the only one who knows how to steer a ship is the weak captain. Similarly, leaders seize control without any knowledge of how to lead. I believe the current President cannot run a country but he can win elections i.e. steer the ship and his crew or staff can only use tricks to change the course of the administration and country. The classics are so interesting because no matter how much the world changes people's natures don't. So many inferences and metaphors about us still ring true. - Brian Fahey 2/11

• With complete honesty, while trying to read the Gorgias thoroughly, I was just met with confusion. I enjoyed the frequent shifts in dialogue, from debating the idea of rhetoric to a power debate, then to a philosophical battle near the end. I am curious about why this was written and what the purpose of having so many questions is. -Veda Renzulli, January 29

• I also struggled to read Gorgias, and I feel as though I need to read it a few times to get a good grasp on the debate. I am wondering if that was what Plato was going for, to really have people think when reading the piece, or if that was just the popular style of the time. - Charlotte Stone, 01.30

• I also found it pretty confusing but incredibly engrossed in the power debate-Symaira 

• The dialogue was pretty confusing to me for a bit but I really am chalking it up to not being used to Plato’s writing style. The constant back and forth between Socrates and the other speakers made it difficult to pin down clear conclusions, especially when answers to questions were met with more questions. Something I did notice was the insistence that rhetoric, when detached from knowledge of the good, becomes a form of moral danger rather than a neutral skill. There were quite a few comparisons between rhetoric and flattery, which helped pose the question I think Plato was getting at being: if a speaker can move an audience without educating them does that power itself become unethical? Does that make sense? - Symaira E 1/28

• I agree, I am not used to Plato’s writing style, so that could’ve played a part in my confusion. -Veda Renzulli 1/29

• I found the debate format interesting because, when asked or prompted to think about something philosophical like the nature and function of rhetoric, my inner monologue tends to become something like a dialogue or debate, where when an alternative or rebuttal comes up it’s as if another voice is interjecting. Looking it up, this seems to be how a lot of people think through complex issues, so, assuming the same of Plato, this may be something of a refined stream of consciousness surrounding some central idea. -Jackson Dircks 1/30

• This is a prominent perspective on Plato’s dialogues. I find that characterized, he seems to form his philosophies in direct response to the beliefs expressed to him, and is almost exclusively a generalist and contrarian, if only in his expression. -Zoe Axelrod 

• I like your point about dialogue reflecting how people actually think through complex issues. That seems especially relevant to Socrates’ insistence that philosophy is an ongoing examination of one’s desires. This back and forth matters because Socrates thinks we’re often wrong about what we want, and dialogue is the only way to uncover that. Open Socrates by Agnes Callard is a really great read if you’re interested in that idea! She develops this point in a very clear and engaging way. - Noor Nabi 1/30

• I think one easy way to understand his philosophy is as the perfection of self. Socrates insists in multiple dialogues that he seeks only to understand, even at the irritation of others. He does not seek to form conclusions, only to perfect the conclusions he already has by removing as many contradictions as possible. - Liv Buckser 2/2/2026

• Good point, and I also appreciated hearing your thoughts on this in class! - Noor Nabi 2/4/2026

• One question that stayed with me in book 1 is whether Plato wants us to take the early definitions of justice seriously or mainly as examples of how persuasive but unstable such definitions can be. Socrates moves quickly through the views of Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus, which made the discussion feel confusing at times, especially because no single definition is allowed to settle. Rather than clarifying justice, Book 1 made me aware of how fragile moral ideas are when grounded in habit, force, or loyalty which seemed intentional for a deeper dive in the rest of the book. Symaira 2/4

•  Throughout book 1, I kept wondering how Socrates had to prove that justice is good and connected to morality. The question that also stuck with me was the idea that is injustice more profitable than justice? Injustice is seen as a virtue, while justice is seen as weak, but my question is, why is it viewed that way? -Veda Renzulli 02/04

• I also had the same question when I first read Republic 1. Injustice seems profitable because the standard being used is power/visible advantage while justice is framed as obedience and restraint. This reminded me of a book I recently read, In Defense of Anarchism, that argues authority and autonomy are fundamentally incompatible and that obedience itself can’t be a moral virtue since it suspends individual moral responsibility, and I suppose from that angle, justice seems weak not because morality is weak, but because it’s being reduced to compliance (exactly the assumption Socrates is trying to unsettle). - Noor Nabi 2/4

• As a few people have already pointed out, I found the dialogue format engaging and representative of the way people (or myself at least) think through issues. That being said, I was a bit lost during the interactions between Polemarchus and Socrates for a large chunk of their conversation - although I ultimately understood the point Socrates makes at the end about doing any bad to any person, even benign an enemy, contributing to injustice in the world. - Anna Calcaterra 2/4

• There seem to be a few interesting parallels between the just man in Republic and the rhetorician from Gorgias. Both are argued on one end to be less useful in any transaction or interaction than a person specialized in the subject of the interaction, but are also described as having an injustice almost inherent to them. The rhetorician is most able to use their skills to put others down to better themselves, and a man acting purely in justice is a sort of thief. I’m curious as to what this says about the place of non-specialized citizens (thinkers, lawyers, rhetoricians,  politicians, etc.) in athenian society and how they were viewed by the public. –Jackson Dircks 2/4

• I found Antigones quite… honestly odd? Thematically confused I suppose. On the one hand, glory comes to those who follow the gods and those who spite the gods will be punished. On the other hand, is Creon not a king? In this society I was under the impression that the office brought some religious authority as well. I suppose it’s Antigone’s execution that angers the gods, not the non-burial, but for the law at the time, isn’t that judgement kind of just? I mean, I wouldn’t consider it so now, but he made a proclamation on pain of death and he is the king. Doesn’t he have the authority to do stuff like that? Why are people mad? - Liv Buckser, Jan. 25th

• I think that even though Creon is king, I don’t think that he has religious authority in the sense that he can think himself above the gods. He claimed his “rule above all,” which we seen happen in many other stories of mythology, like Sisyphus and Tantalus. All were punished harshly, and I don't think it was because of the crime itself, but rather that they claimed they were better than the gods. - Charlotte Stone, Jan26th  

• Near the end of Antigone while the chorus is recounting the turn of events that destroyed Creon’s family, they assert that “we must not be impious towards the gods,” and “the great words of boasters are always punished with great blows.” This seems to imply that the thing Creon did to upset the gods wasn’t entirely the lack of burial rites, but the crude remarks, or “boasts” he made about them and their prophets in his argument with Tiresias. One could argue that the gods care more about these kinds of remarks than the actual transgressions against their divine law. This story could have served as an excuse or justification for the greeks at the time of writing this play to make and enforce non-divine laws, implying that as long as nobody claimed their laws were better than the gods’, they would go largely unpunished. -Jackson Dircks, Jan 26th

• My first impression of Antigone came in my sophomore year of high school, and I found it very confusing because it was my first real exposure to Ancient literature. One of the most critical issues is that Creon 100% believes in law rather than divine ruling, whereas Antigone thinks the opposite. The hubris that occurs within Creon is often exhibited in other characters of ancient Greek literature, such as Achilles, who ultimately succumbed to his own pride and was about to attack the Trojans when he was shot down by one of the Trojan prince Paris’ arrows. Hubris, or pride, is one of the most common flaws in Greek tragedy, and in each story, the person with this arrogance faces the consequences of their actions. - Veda Renzulli, January 26th

• Read alongside Euthyphro, Antigone’s appeal to divine law appears less morally authoritative than rhetorically convenient. Antigone treats the gods’ will as obvious and unquestionable, but never explains what that will consists in beyond her own certainty. This is precisely the confusion tackled in Euthyphro -- invoking the gods does not resolve a moral question unless piety can be coherently defined. From that lens, I noticed that Antigone resembles Euthyphro more than she does Socrates. Both claim moral clarity while refusing the scrutiny that might justify it. - Noor Nabi, January 26th

• I really appreciated reading Antigone in conjunction/after the Eumenides as (at least in how I interpreted it, the play read as a continuation on the argument between the old guard vs new guard/ old laws(laws of the ancient gods) vs new laws(the laws of man). Though in Antigone, rather than the laws of man symbolizing the complexity of murder and being used to question what it means to be just, in this play they symbolize the unjust nature of tyrannical control and the danger in defying the gods and the rites they demand. I know(think?) that these two plays are not often read in conjunction with one another but when they are they provide an incredibly interesting compare and contrast. – Ashley Golden 1/26/26

• I find it interesting how Antigone references committing “a crime that is holy”. When she relates to Ismenes the reasoning behind her decision to go out and bury Polynices, the divisions between the Theban law and her moral obligations/sentiments are clear to see. This separation between legal validity and morality, worldly law and divine law,  under Antigone’s conception has many interesting implications reminiscent of many far later jurisprudential philosophies. - Finn Carothers

• I agree with this -- I found it particularly interesting the distinction the play makes between legality and religion, or worldly law and divine law as you put it. In the play, it ultimately seems that this divine law takes precedent, and that this distinction is something that shouldn’t exist, with the gods punishing Creon for his defiance of them in his policies. This line of thinking is obviously quite different to modern leanings, but the fact that law and religion are contrasted at all is significant. - Anna Calcaterra 1/26/26

It is not clear whether the ‘constitutional debate’ in Herodotus actually occurred: in fact, it seems highly unlikely, because Persia was an empire and there was no history there of different forms of government, no tradition of deciding government by a means like this: it looks so very Greek, because in the Greek city states, these three forms of government did exist and had enough of a history that they were broadly understood by educated men. Also, Greeks did occasionally have to decide on what form of government to use: when they sent out a new colony, especially if it was a colony sponsored by >1 Greek polis. So it seems to be inserted into Herodotus for Greek reasons rather than to be a real historical happening. But what does that mean about the accuracy and ‘historicity’ of Herodotus’ so-called ‘history’? Jacques Bailly Jan. 12

In Herodotus’ Constitutional Debate, Otanes favors democracy, or the rule of the many. Do you think that Otanes was truly for democracy, or was he forced into this decision because he wanted to dominate Darius and his idea of a monarchy? Veda Renzulli January 14

It is clear to me at least that Agamemnon and Achilles’ argument is about more than who has possession of Briseis. She is representative of the glory of the conquest which is being split unevenly between the participant warriors, especially because the oath binds Agamemnon through kin but Achilles only through friendship. When Agamemnon takes Briseis he is also taking possession of Achilles share of the glory, symbolized pointedly as a woman. Liv Buckser January 14

The switch in P.O.V from within the Greek camp to Mount Olympus seems unnecessary at first, until you realize the deeper connection Thetis and Zeus’s conversation has within the total story of the Trojan War. The Greeks are bonded together by an oath—to fight for the return of Helen—even though some are unwilling, especially Achilles. When Agammemnon steals Achilles’s prize, not only is he belittling Achilles in front of an entire army, but he’s pushing the boundaries of Achilles’s oath. I’m sure if Achilles had it his way, he would return home after this tussle. However, his loyalty to his word, even if it means sticking with nasty Agammemnon, is shown through Thetis’s supplication to Zeus, and their shared understanding of the importance of spoken promises. It’s crazy to think how a promise as serious as pledging ur life for a cause could be merely spoken, instead of written down. Katie-May Newman January 15

The importance of honor/glory for the aristocratic/ruling classes is a core theme in the iliad but it is incredibly apparent throughout the first book both in the argument between Agammemnon and Achilies as well as in the later conversation between Zeus and Thetis. The argument between Agamemnon and Achilles is centered around the concepts of honor and glory, as Agamemnon, leader of the most men from the Greek troops and who is often looked at throughout the epic as the defacto, say, commander in chief (for lack of a better term), believes he is entitled to Briesis as a “trophy” over Achilles the strongest of the greek fighters due to his superior position, while Achilies believes he is entitled to her due to how necessary he is to the war effort – and how idle Agamemnon is comparatively. Honor and respect for titles/position vs Glory for acts of bravery/warrior skill. Though what’s arguably most important is how these two aristocratic men view their need for glory/respect/honor compared to the lives of the common Greek soldiers. Both Achilles and Agamemnon view the deaths of countless Greek soldiers(due to Achilles choosing to sit out of the war after this affront to his dignity and position) as a fair price to pay for the sake of their egos and glory they are owed for fighting in the war. — Ashley Golden Jan. 16

I’m super interested in Hesiod's description of Justice. She’s a physical woman who sits by Zeus and complains when her honor is spurned. The concept of retribution is personified not as some kind of divine force in of itself but as an honorable woman. Does that suggest that honor supersedes justice? Hesiod also uses both capital J Justice and lowercase justice, and I’m not entirely sure what the distinction is. Is justice false and Justice true, or is justice just the force and Justice the woman? Is one stronger than the other? -Liv Buckser Jan. 16 

I was looking at the quote from Hesiod about not wanting to be a just man among human beings, and I was wondering if he is just commenting on the fact that you can get more through unjust actions, and unjust people can get what they want more easily. Maybe he is saying it can feel almost not worth it to be just if the unjust will get more justice. January 19th Charlotte Stone  

I find the Athenian constitution fascinating as an honest argument for oligarchy. Modern political theorists (in my experience) tend to fall strongly on the side of centralized democracy or constitutional autocracy, and it’s interesting to read someone advocating for what many people consider the worst of both worlds. There is of course some bias to his analysis, obviously he would consider himself among the class of higher men, but the argument has some weight. Why should the governed people get to have a say in decisions they have no knowledge of? Obviously the modern response is that there is something inherently valuable about each opinion and each person, but if you live in a society in which not all humans are people then it’s not a given that everyone does deserve to speak. There is the idea throughout that the Athenian democracy is efficient and effective, but the speaker is clearly still a proponent of a different system. - Liv Buckser 1/22/26

The Athenians' decision to draft a constitution was vital to keeping their city-state afloat after being ruled as an oligarchy, which created inequality in economic matters, and abuse of power was being used. By using reforms such as Solon’s, which erased debt slavery, and Kleisthenes’, which created 10 new tribes along with the Council of 500, where 50 members were chosen from each of the new tribes to take care of business for the assembly. Ultimately, I believe the Athenians needed to experience democracy, but it didn’t run smoothly without flaws. For as important as it was for people to have a say, there was still the idea that the Council of 500 was a group of inexperienced politicians who only voiced their opinions and were most likely not thetes. -Veda Renzulli Jan 23

In this constitution, Xenophon(?) describes how, pertaining to the Athenian political system, “A city would not be the best on the basis of such away of life, but the democracy would be best preserved that way.” This implies that a government can be motivated by self-preservation rather than the interests of the people or the rulers, which is somewhat reminiscent of much later ideas of nation-states as single entities separate from, but composed of, their people. -Jackson Dircks Jan 23.

Athenian government holds above all else individual enfranchisement and autonomous rights, to the extent of essentially choosing peace over societal betterment. With the acknowledged sacrifice of the bourgeois is ubiquitously accepted as better equipped to empower the people, " For among the best people there is minimal wantonness and injustice but a maximum of scrupulous care for what is good, whereas among the people there is a maximum of ignorance, disorder, and wickedness; for poverty draws them rather to disgraceful actions, and because of a lack of money some men are uneducated and ignorant;" yet nonetheless, each individual, even the "worst men", those irrevocably reduced to wickedness and ignorance, are valued and deserving. As we previously discussed the emphasis of accountability upon and within the Athenian people, each man is respected beyond the confines of their sociopolitical status, poverty not attributable to one’s character; this, I believe, is more venerable than even today's societal values. - Zoe Axelrod Jan 23.

The drafting of the constitution felt almost defensive in structure. There’s this sense of anticipated criticism of democracy and this builds the document around explaining why the system works for the demos even when it appears unjust or inefficient to elites. The moving from political institutions to social behavior was not only interesting, but also suggests to me that there’s a deliberate attempt to guide the reader toward an uncomfortable conclusion. That democracy’s success does not depend on merit or virtue, but on alignment with popular interest. This made me wonder whether the text was drafted not to persuade democrats, but to force oligarchic readers to confront the internal logic of a system they hated but could not be easily dismantled  Symaira Elliott Jan. 23