Cicero's De Legibus I, selected quotations

• The oak at the start and the status of the past and the role of literature in that status
• 4. "the kind of truthfulness expected of a witness in court rather than of a poet
• "in history the standard by which everything is judged is the truth, while in poetry it is generally the pleasure one gives"
• "our national literature is deficient in history, as I realize myself and as I frequently hear you say. But you can certainly fill this gap satisfactorily, since, as you at least have always believed,¹ this branch of literature is closer than any other to oratory"
• 9 think about the nature of our authors and what they write:
• "if a few days are free for a vacation in the country, the length of the composition I undertake is adapted to the time at my disposal. But an historical work cannot be commenced unless a period of leisure is arranged for in advance, nor can it be completed in a short time"
• 14 distance between principles and theory and the actual practice of law:
• "What subject indeed is so vast as the law of the State? But what is so trivial as the task of those who give legal advice?"
• 16 a sort of 'preview' of the discussion to follow
• "in no other kind of discussion can one bring out so clearly what Nature’s gifts to man are, what a wealth of most excellent possessions the human mind enjoys, what the purpose is, to strive after and accomplish which we have been born and placed in this world, what it is that unites men, and what natural fellowship there is among them. For it is only after all these things have been made clear that the origin of Law and Justice can be discovered."
• we must consider "the nature of Justice, and this must be sought for in the nature of man; we must also consider the laws by which States ought to be governed; then we must deal with the enactments and decrees of nations which are already formulated and put in writing"
• "Law is the highest reason, implanted in Nature, which commands what ought to be done and forbids the opposite. This reason, when firmly fixed and fully developed in the human mind, is Law. And so they believe that Law is intelligence, whose natural function it is to command right conduct and forbid wrongdoing. "
• "Law is a natural force" = "the mind and reason of the intelligent man, the standard by which Justice and Injustice are measured"
• "that which in written form decrees whatever it wishes, either by command or prohibition. For such is the crowd’s definition of law. "
• 21 divine origin of highest law: "Do you grant us, then, Pomponius (for I am aware of what Quintus thinks), that it is by the might of the immortal gods, or by their nature, reason, power, mind, will, or any other term which may make my meaning clearer, that all Nature is governed" Atticus stipulates to that.
• 22 Human exceptionalism in the earthly realm: "Your admission leads us to this: that animal which we call man, endowed with foresight and quick intelligence, complex, keen, possessing memory, full of reason and prudence, has been given a certain distinguished status by the supreme God who created him; for he is the only one among so many different kinds and varieties of living beings who has a share in reason and thought, while all the rest are deprived of it. "
• 23 "since there is nothing better than reason, and since it exists both in man and God, the first common possession of man and God is reason.
  
• "virtue exists in man and God alike, but in no other creature besides; virtue, however, is nothing else than Nature perfected and developed to its highest point
• divine providence and plan: the world is for humans to use: "Nature has lavishly yielded such a wealth of things adapted to man’s convenience and use that what she produces seems intended as a gift to us, and not brought forth by chance
• qua human all humans are equal: "we are born for Justice, and that right is based, not upon men’s opinions, but upon Nature. This fact will immediately be plain if you once get a clear conception of man’s fellowship and union with his fellow-men. For no single thing is so like another, so exactly its counterpart, as all of us are to one another. Nay, if bad habits and false beliefs did not twist the weaker minds and turn them in whatever direction they are inclined, no one would be so like his own self as all men would be like all others. And so, however we may define man, a single definition will apply to all. This is a sufficient proof that there is no difference in kind between man and man
• 31 BUT not just for good: "The similarity of the human race is clearly marked in its evil tendencies as well as in its goodness.
• and, as a consequence of the above, he thinks there are human moral universals: "what nation does not love courtesy, kindliness, gratitude, and remembrance of favours bestowed? What people does not hate and despise the haughty, the wicked, the cruel, and the ungrateful? Inasmuch as these considerations prove to us that the whole human race is bound together in unity, it follows, finally, that knowledge of the principles of right living is what makes men better.
• so we know where good comes from: "if the judgments of men were in agreement with Nature, so that, as the poet says, they considered “nothing alien to them which concerns mankind,”¹ then Justice would be equally observed by all." But what about evil? Why do humans fall away/go astray?
  
• 33 "For those creatures who have received the gift of reason from Nature have also received right reason, and therefore they have also received the gift of Law, which is right reason applied to command and prohibition. And if they have received Law, they have received Justice also. Now all men have received reason; therefore all men have received Justice. Consequently Socrates was right when he cursed, as he often did, the man who first separated utility from Justice; for this separation, he complained, is the source of all mischief.
• But something like altruism also arises: "when a wise man shows toward another endowed with equal virtue the kind of benevolence which is so widely diffused among men, that will then have come to pass which, unbelievable as it seems to some, is after all the inevitable result—namely, that he loves himself no whit more than he loves another.
• and the goal of all this discussion: "our whole discourse is intended to promote the firm foundation of States, the strengthening of cities, and the curing of the ills of peoples.
• anti-utility: "I do look for the approval of all who believe that everything which is right and honourable is to be desired for its own sake, and that nothing whatever is to be accounted a good unless it is praiseworthy in itself" (note that logically such things can also be useful, so it's not full on anti-utility)
• 40 what keeps people from injustice (which IS perceived as 'useful'): "But if it were a penalty and not Nature that ought to keep men from injustice, what anxiety would there be to trouble the wicked when the danger of punishment was removed? But in fact there has never been a villain so brazen as not to deny that he had committed a crime, or else invent some story of just anger to excuse its commission, and seek justification for his crime in some natural principle of right. Now if even the wicked dare to appeal to such principles, how jealously should they be guarded by the good! But if it is a penalty, the fear of punishment, and not the wickedness itself, that is to keep men from a life of wrongdoing and crime, then no one can be called unjust, and wicked men ought rather to be regarded as imprudent; furthermore, those of us who are not influenced by virtue itself to be good men, but by some consideration of utility and profit, are merely shrewd, not good. For to what lengths will that man go in the dark who fears nothing but a witness and a judge? What will he do if, in some desolate spot, he meets a helpless man, unattended, whom he can rob of a fortune? Our virtuous man, who is just and good by nature, will talk with such a person, help him, and guide him on his way; but the other, who does nothing for another’s sake, and measures every act by the standard of his own advantage—it is clear enough, I think, what he will do! If, however, the latter does deny that he would kill the man and rob him of his money, he will not deny it because he regards it as a naturally wicked thing to do, but because he is afraid that his crime may become known—that is, that he may get into trouble. Oh, what a motive, that might well bring a blush of shame to the cheek, not merely of the philosopher, but even of the simple rustic!
• 42 actual human laws are not all just: " the most foolish notion of all is the belief that everything is just which is found in the customs or laws of nations.
• why utility and human laws are insufficient: "But if Justice is conformity to written laws and national customs, and if, as the same persons claim, everything is to be tested by the standard of utility, then anyone who thinks it will be profitable to him will, if he is able, disregard and violate the laws. It follows that Justice does not exist at all, if it does not exist in Nature, and if that form of it which is based on utility can be overthrown by that very utility itself." (problem here might be "Whose utility?")
• 43 virtue requires nature: "where then will there be a place for generosity, or love of country, or loyalty, or the inclination to be of service to others or to show gratitude for favours received? For these virtues originate in our natural inclination to love our fellow-men" (could it be that virtue is actually more advantageous in the long run than the short term gain of vice?)
• 58 a bit more practical: "Law ought to be a reformer of vice and an incentive to virtue