Summary of Richard Kraut's Aristotle Chapters 12 and 13

Note: this document does not always follow Kraut, but most of it does: it is designed to give our class a sort of 'guided tour,' a 'through line' of what one person who has devoted years to these topics and whose work has undergone review sees as the most consistent positions on offer in Politics. It is a sort of 'overall conclusions' picture.

The four branches of politics

For Aristotle, there are 4 sorts of regimes that a politician should study, in order of degrees of desirability:
  1. The ideal regime in books VII and VIII: rule by a virtuous educated citizenry)
  2. The constitution that is suitable for most cities (rule of the middle class)
  3. Mixed regimes (i.e. mixtures of democracy and oligarchy)
  4. The "assumed constitution" (i.e. where a statesman has either an oligarchy or a democracy to deal with)
  5. (Bailly note: interestingly, rule by one super-superior individual, which is mentioned as ideal as well, does not figure on this list, perhaps because it is not something one can aim at: you can't plan for there to be one super-superior person available)
Obviously, the ideal regime is best, but it is not practical in most cases: Aristotle describes it to show what could be, not to suggest that every city should strive to become ideal ASAP. It would take at the very least a tremendous educational system/culture being in operation for a at least a generation to produce enough citizens for the ideal state, and you can't just set such a thing up at once. Number 2, the rule of the middle class, is the best practical solution. But most politicians are faced with #3 or #4. Aristotle thinks that mixing democracy and oligarchy can temper the vices of each, so he thinks a mixed regime is better than a "purely" democratic or oligarchic regime.

So, most people have a bad constitution: why preserve bad constitutions? That is a question worthy of serious study in Aristotle. Kraut suggests two reasons: 1) is it unrealistic to think that much of the time the best practicable alternative is to improve the existing constitution? 2) Being long-lasting is not a goal in itself for Aristotle: rather, being long lasting results from what Aristotle is striving for, namely moderation.

12.2 Character and constitutions
Aristotle thinks that employees should not be citizens. He thinks they are too concerned with their own good, their financial situation, and have too little justice.
Some modern political theorists would reply that a city can have institutions that promote order, peace, and stability, but making people good is just too much for a state to do. Aristotle would reply that a state just is its citizens, and a city cannot be healthy if its citizens are not. Aristotle thinks that democracies and oligarchies can be governed for at least partial improvement of citizens (and what else is our public education for, if not partial improvement/formation of citizens?).

There is another position about virtue, namely that it is an all or nothing thing. Doing right is not just an action, it is also a state of mind that produces an action. Thus if one does right for the wrong reasons, one is not really doing right. This attitude is extremely demanding and pessimistic about the possibility that large numbers or people can be virtuous. Aristotle does espouse it, however.

Aristotle thinks that true virtue is an internal state manifested by activity, and that neither the internal state of a person nor any given activity is sufficient for virtue: the virtuous does the right thing for the right reasons. But Aristotle thinks that nonetheless there are valuable stages between vice and full virtue: having good habits is one: we can lead people to have good habits, and improve their existing habits, even if they do not have the right state of mind. Educating people to HABITUALLY do actions that are right is a good thing, and the state should attempt it. Taxes and other laws often have a component of this. In defective regimes, there are few if any really virtuous people, but a politician can nonetheless try to lead people to have good habits.

Even a tyrant has two choices: rule strictly in what the tyrant sees as their interest, which will involve repression and tyranny, but will keep the tyrant in power, OR stay in power by ruling in a more enlightened way that takes into account others' interests. In other words, move closer to a kingship (rule by a singular virtuous person). The enlightened tyrant is evil, but not utterly. The repressive tyrant is utterly evil.

Thus the character of the tyrant is seen not just in their ultimate goal (keeping all power), but also in the means used (repression or benevolence).

Rule by the middle class
IV.11 describes the rule of the middle class. It is generally speaking the most suitable constitution for all cities: in other words, if you had to choose one real feasible constitution, this would be it. He assumes that middle class folks will rule for the common good. Their character is formed by their background: being of moderate means, they will be accustomed to being ruled, but also to ruling, and they will have moderate desires. They have some land, and do not need to fight hard for a living, but they do not wallow in luxury: so they are not arrogant because of luxury, nor are they servile because of need. They have none of the vices that often accompany too much or too little material goods. On the other hand, they do not study philosophy and goodness. Their habits are good, but not backed up by reason and theory: if circumstances change, they may no longer be good.

The characters in the middle class do not have a strong ideology. The poor and the rich do, however. The middle class is willing to do its part, but does not demand for itself power, nor is it servile. The poor would happily crush the rich and the rich would crush the poor: the rich would exploit and the poor would confiscate and redistribute. Neither is a good thing.

This middle class rule is similar to that of the ideal city in Books VII and VIII, but it is not founded on education: the middle class are not truly virtuous. They just happen to act virtuously, by and large, because of their circumstances.

IV.11 shows Aristotle's contempt for both extremes, rich and poor. He would like to deal with cities that did not have either of these powerful groups. The poor think they are as good as anyone else just because they are free, and the rich always want more.

Democracy and its varieties
The very rich and very poor are locked in a cycle of distrust, envy, and contempt.

Democracy is inherently corrupt because the deprivation suffered by the poor makes it impossible for them to be fair to the wealthy.

In IV.11 he says that those who are extremely poor are utterly passive: they know nothing of how to rule, only how to obey (1295b18-22).

But he insists that in the worst kind of democracy the poor play a very active role indeed. In its most extreme form, poverty produces a servile passivity, but poverty that is not so severe can produce a very different kind of personality.

Democracy, as bad as it is, is not so bad as oligarchy.
First, democracies have larger populations than do oligarchies, and therefore tend to have a larger middle class, which has a moderating effect (1296a9-21).
The many are less given to faction than the few: they form a cohesive political unit. Their ruling idea is that all free men are equal. In contrast, oligarchs think themselves superior to all others; however much power each has, he yearns for more, and that pleonexia (greed) is more destructive to the constitution than is the acquisitiveness of the poor (1297a12-13)

When Aristotle describes democracies, he is giving us a normative taxonomy, in IV-VI. His goal is to guide practice by proposing an ordered series of decreasingly desirable regimes. His readers are expected not merely to understand the world but to change it. He accepts the existence of distrust and puts it to good use.  Making the factions nearly equal in strength can protect the constitution against the worst excesses of the other. The worst kind of democracy strongly resembles Athenian democracy.

He awards the most honored positions to the elite. Having grown up with abundant resources, they are better equipped to manage the public resources. He would rather give more power to the middle class, however.
When each faction employs its distrust to moderate the other faction, democracy and oligarchy are at their best.

In the best democracy, rich and poor are equals. All have some property, most are farmers, and meetings of the assembly are infrequent. Offices are filled by election, not lot, and the well qualified are elected. They are subject to legal scrutiny on leaving office.
In the worst democracy, the elite have no offices, the assembly meets often, citizenship standards are lax, employees are citizens, laws lose importance and decrees are the normal order of the day. The masses enjoy power for its own sake, and thus mirror the evils of an unchecked oligarchy. The democrat thinks justice is whatever the demos decides it is.

Freedom and the law
Democracy has as a chief goal freedom, but Aristotle says that freedom is usually badly defined as the ability to do whatever you want (V.9 and VI.2). Being restricted, however, is beneficial (VI.5).

For Aristotle freedom involves a middle ground where one is both ruled and rules. If one is a normal human being, it is dangerous to be unrestricted (VI.5). Democrats fail to see that each individual benefits from being restricted. A law is not burdensome that commands fairness (X.9 EN). We react more favorably to being restricted by a law than a non-law command, even if both are equitable. Laws are generally easier to bear. Aristotle does think decrees have their place (IV.4), but he thinks that an assembly that cannot adhere to laws will eventually give vent to passion. Even the best are vulnerable to passion, but the law is not. (Book III). If someone is not subject to passion, they are a law unto themselves and should be king or leave (III.13). Legal codes are unneeded for real kings (II.11), but most regimes need them, but law is imperfect and needs equitable judgement to apply it and interpret it.

Weighted Voting
At VI.3, he says that one person one vote is wrong: voting should be weighted. Wealth should give one more voting power. The effect is supposed to be that the rich need some poor to get a majority and vice versa. Thus the two are held in tension and are required to consult the others' interest.
Such a regime is either a democracy or an oligarchy depending on the weight of the poor versus the rich.
In an oligarchy, you give the rich less voting power and pay the poor to go to assembly. In a democracy, you give the rich more voting power. The aim is to even out their powers.

Democracy Ancient and Modern
Aristotle seems both democratic and anti-democratic.
If we call democracy "rule by the people," then Aristotle is anti-democratic in that he thinks employees should not be citizens. But he is just as opposed to giving exclusive power to the elites (in wealth, scientific knowledge, etc.: Modern democracies incorporate in one way or another the idea that elites must be checked, but they nonetheless give and/or allow a great deal of power to different sorts of elites. So Aristotle is in line with modern thinking here). He thinks elites should be eliminated as much as possible, and that the poor should be enabled to become landed middle class (this seems unrealistic, maybe even to Aristotle, who requires that certain citizens be able to do extra-ordinary financial things for the city).
In all, Aristotle certainly thinks democracy has merits.

The invasion of the banausoi
"banausoi" refers to what we would call "employees" and "tradespeople." Aristotle thinks that democracies should not include them as citizens. His thought is that they will not make significant contributions to the polis because they don't have time and they are too concerned with other things. Modern democracies use taxation as an avenue for them to make significant contributions.
We cannot easily reject his contention that people should play a significant role in their polis: note how institutions like the national guard and jury duty can interfere with holding a job. There are few ways that we can really participate, except through trying to get someone else elected, although there are local boards, etc., that do not require full time participation.

What is more, in our modern world, there are very large actors that Aristotle seems not to know about who can 'wag the dog': multi-nationals and the super rich. Not sure how to fit this into Kraut's analysis.

Political Friendship
Aristotle thinks that everyone who lives in a polis thereby participates in some minimal thing that can be called friendship, but he thinks there is a more advanced kind, which he calls homonoia, which translates into "like-mindedness." EN IX.6 talks about it. Homonoia is consensus about the fundamentals, and can allow for great disagreement about details. In the best regimes, the elements have accustomed themselves to the way things are run and agree broadly speaking about the way things are run. Hostility is subdued but not necessarily eliminated. A statesperson should make homonoia one goal of political efforts.

Chapter 13: Final Thoughts


Idealism and Realism
The ideal city of books VII and VIII is just that, an ideal. It is not to be realized in the actual world, although nothing makes it impossible, strictly speaking.

Likewise, the kingship and aristocracy run by one or more truly virtuous souls is not something that it is reasonable to expect to create (also there is the problem of continuity: even if we manage to find the one perfect person as ruler, what happens when they pass?).

But in IV.11, "it is no mere dream to imagine a city comprising primarily men of middling wealth and fortune who trust each other to promote the common good and to share offices on an equal and rotating basis."

But cities torn by faction are the norm, and so even the second best is usually only a distant possibility.

The statesperson should try to work forward from whatever circumstance and situation the city they are in find itself.

"Politics is typically a bad business and is likely to remain so. He [Aristotle] arrives at this sorry conclusion both because of assumptions he makes about human nature and because he is guided by a normative thesis about the way cities should be governed. The normative thesis is simple and incontrovertible: political power ought to be used impartially for the good of all members of the community. But his assessment of human nature tells him that people have difficulty inhabiting the impartial perspective that service to the community requires (III.9). Human beings .. . allow pecuniary interests to play too large a role in their political decisions, or will use power as a tool to assert their dominance. . . Human nature throws up other obstacles . . . we do not like to be constrained. . .. it is difficult to resist the temptation to do what we think everyone else does with such opportunities."

What is a decent person to do? Withdraw? Aristotle is sympathetic: he thinks philosophy is the best life.

Politics as a matter of ultimate goals of human life

Aristotle assumes that politics is a matter of ultimate ends. Many would be inclined to disagree with aristotle today about his view on that. Kraut identifies three sorts of opponent:
  1. the one who is sceptical about the possibility of finding ultimate ends,
  2. the one who thinks Aristotle is mistaken about the ultimate end, and
  3. the one who thinks that final ends have nothing to do with politics; they are matters for individuals.
The third one says that even if there are some ends that are more reasonable than others, we should not let that enter into politics. But that seems ridiculous: if it is true that some ends are more defensible than others, why should we not allow the state and its resources to be used to further it? Why not vote for candidates who propose to do this? One answer might be that we value individual autonomy: everyone should be free to formulate their own ultimate ends and the state should not interfere. That sounds good, but practically speaking, it is hard to conceive of a public institution that does not somehow interfere with someone's ideas about the ultimate end.

The first one, the sceptic, says that there is no rational way to decide between ultimate ends and so it is a waste of our time as citizens to bring them into politics. The sceptic, however, must convince those who feel differently. The sceptic cannot simply banish from politics those who appeal to ultimate ends. In other words, the sceptic must convince others. In particular, the sceptic would have to convince Aristotle that the ultimate end is not "a lifetime of excellence in thought, feeling, and social behavior, adequately supplied with external resources." (Kraut P 480).