physics196b10-33

Physics Book II, Chapter 5 196b10-33:

First then we observe that some things always come to pass in the same way, and others for the most part. It is clearly of neither of these that chance, or the result of chance, is said to be the cause--neither of that which is by necessity and always, nor of that which is for the most part. But as there is a third class of events besides these two-- events which all say are by chance-- it is plain that there is such a thing as chance and spontaneity; for we know that things of this kind are due to chance and that things due to chance are of this kind. Of things that come to be, some come to be for the sake of something, others not. Again some of the former class are in accordance with intention, some not, but both are in the class of things which are for the sake of something. Hence it is clear that even among the things which are outside what is necessary and what is for the most part, there are some in connexion with which the phrase 'for the sake of something' is applicable. (Things that are for the sake of something include whatever may be done as a result of thought or of nature) Things of this kind, then, when they come to pass accidentally are said to be by chance. For just as a thing is something either in virtue of itself or accidentally, so may it be a cause. For instance, the housebuilding faculty is in virtue of itself a cause of a house, whereas the pale or the musical is an accidental cause. That which is per se cause is determinate, but the acccidental cause is indeterminable; for the possible attributes of an individual are innumerable. As we said, then, when a thing of this kind comes to pass among events which are for the sake of something, it is said to be spontaneous or by chance. (The distincition between the two must be made later--for the present it is sufficient if it is plain that both are in the sphere of things done for the sake of something).

some things always come to pass in the same way,	1. Some things always happen: In the next sentence he says they happen by necessity.
and others come to pass for the most part.	2.Other things that happen most of the time.
It is clearly of neither of these that chance, or the result of chance, is said to be the cause	3. "chance" does not cause either the things in 1 or the things in 2
But as there is a third class of events besides these two-- events which all say are by chance-- it is plain that there is such a thing as chance and spontaneity; for we know that things of this kind are due to chance and that things due to chance are of this kind.	4. There are other things that happen by chance/spontaneity.
	Why? I think it's because that is what it means to happen by chance: not to happen always or for the most part. There are things that do not happen always or for the most part, and he is giving their cause a label, 'chance.' What he has not claimed is that 1,2 and 4 are exhaustive, that there are not still other categories of things that are not in 1,2 or 4 (things that happen sometimes but are caused by necessity?)
Of things that come to be, some come to be for the sake of something,	5. There are things that happen for an end.
others not.	6. There are things to which 5 does not apply.
Again some of the former class are in accordance with intention,	7. Some of the things in 5 happen 'in accordance with intention' (which is probably the same as happening intentionally, but perhaps it is not the same as happening 'intentionally')
some not,	8. Other things in 5 do not happen 'in accordance with intention' (does this mean that they happen for an end but could not happen intentionally? like the sun rising: no on can intend for the sun to rise, but it can happen for an end such as growing plants)
but both are in the class of things which are for the sake of something.	9. Both the things in 7 and the things in 8 are for the sake of something.
Hence it is clear that even among the things which are outside what is necessary and what is for the most part, there are some in connexion with which the phrase 'for the sake of something' is applicable.	'HENCE': He thinks he has provided an argument for the claim that follows, namely 10. that there are things that are both by chance (i.e. they are not in 1 or 2) and are for the sake of something'
(Things that are for the sake of something include whatever may be done as a result of thought or of nature)	11. Whatever happens resulting from thought or the nature of a thing is among the things that are for the sake of something. But he does not say that this is a definition of being 'for the sake of something' or that things that are for the sake of something include ONLY things that result from thought or nature.
Things of this kind, then, when they come to pass accidentally are said to be by chance.	12. The things in 10 can come to pass accidentally. What does this mean? For that, see 14.
Things of this kind, then, when they come to pass accidentally are said to be by chance.	13. When the things in 10 do come to pass accidentally, they are said to be by chance. Is this a definition of 'by chance'? or a quality that all things that are 'by chance' have?
For just as a thing is something either in virtue of itself or accidentally, so may it be a cause.	14. A thing, such as a cause, it something either in virtue of itself or accidentally. So there are accidental and natural causes.
For instance, the housebuilding faculty is in virtue of itself a cause of a house,	15. For example, ability to build a house naturally causes a house to be built.
whereas the pale or the musical is an accidental cause.	16. But if a musical person or a pale person causes a house to be built, that is an accidental cause. This is because of 14: the musical person did not cause the house to be built in virtue of being musical: that was accidental to their housebuilding.
That which is per se cause is determinate,	17. A thing has only one nature (aka essence) and that nature, in virtue of itself, if it causes something, can only cause a thing that its nature pre-determines.
but the accidental cause is indeterminable; for the possible attributes of an individual are innumerable.	18. But things have an indeterminate number of accidents (aka things that are not part of their nature). 19. By 18, for any given thing that is caused, there are an indeterminate number of accidental causes of it.
As we said, then, when a thing of this kind comes to pass among events which are for the sake of something, it is said to be spontaneous or by chance.	20. When an accidental cause causes a thing (see 19), that thing is said to be (caused) by chance or to be spontaneous.
(The distinction between the two must be made later--for the present it is sufficient if it is plain that both are in the sphere of things done for the sake of something).	21. And things by chance or spontaneity are both included among things done for the sake of something. Does this mean that ALL things by chance or spontaneity are for the sake of something? or just that some of the things by chance or spontaneity are for the sake of something?

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What is this passage doing, formally (i.e. let's ignore the content and look at the form of it)

First then we observe that some things always come to pass in the same way, and others for the most part.

This is an observation about the world that consists of endoxa, widely held opinions, or perhaps Aristotle's own opinions.

Aristotle does not attempt to prove this.

It is clearly of neither of these that chance, or the result of chance, is said to be the cause--neither of that which is by necessity and always, nor of that which is for the most part.

another endoxic element
adds in an element "by necessity" to the category above of things that happen always.

But as there is a third class of events besides these two-- events which all say are by chance-- it is plain that there is such a thing as chance and spontaneity;

this is a conclusion from previous claims
"as ..., it is plain"

for we know that things of this kind are due to chance and that things due to chance are of this kind.

an explanation ("for") which perhaps gives a reason, a premise for what preceded.
seems repetitive: we know that x's are y's and that y's are x's: it is NOT repetitive, however: that serves an argumentative purpose.
it implies the following: all x's are y's and all y's are x's: that is important logically, because it defines whether x's are a genus of y's or vice versa: they are not: they are the same thing.

Of things that come to be, some come to be for the sake of something, others not.

an endoxic claim, or perhaps Aristotle's own claim.
establishes a classification

Again some of the former class are in accordance with intention, some not, but both are in the class of things which are for the sake of something.

further classifies
classification principle is specified
intention: seems to be a 'for the sake of something' that also has an agent: going to the store is to buy bread, and it also identifies my intention: on the other hand, an acorn is for the sake of a tree, but has no intention

is this an important thing? Not sure.

Hence it is clear that even among the things which are outside what is necessary and what is for the most part, there are some in connexion with which the phrase 'for the sake of something' is applicable.

a conclusion
seems to be analytical of the above: it doesn't deduce something new and surprising, but rather confirms that if you accept the endoxa above, you must accept this.

(Things that are for the sake of something include whatever may be done as a result of thought or of nature)

definitional? or maybe just identifies SOME of the things for the sake of something

Things of this kind, then, when they come to pass accidentally are said to be by chance.

giving a label to such things: he calls them "chance"
often, once A does that, the word henceforth has a technical meaning.
But he can and does revert to everyday meanings: one has to be on one's toes and ask "is there a technical meaning to any of the terms here that could save the argument or change how I interpret it?"

For just as a thing is something either in virtue of itself or accidentally, so may it be a cause.

an explanation: a reason: a claim that warrants what came before

For instance, the housebuilding faculty is in virtue of itself a cause of a house, whereas the pale or the musical is an accidental cause.

example: illustration
be careful, this is mean to illustrate the theory, not to dictate what it means
sometimes one cannot help but use the example to understand the theory, but that is dangerous, because we have all sorts of ideas about any given example that may not be A's ideas.

That which is per se cause is determinate, but the acccidental cause is indeterminable;

an observation, a claim

for the possible attributes of an individual are innumerable.

premise for the claim

As we said, then, when a thing of this kind comes to pass among events which are for the sake of something, it is said to be spontaneous or by chance.

repeat of what came before
always look carefully: does it add something? reformulate? remove something? is it the same as what came before?

(The distincition between the two must be made later--for the present it is sufficient if it is plain that both are in the sphere of things done for the sake of something).

cross-reference to later discussion

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OVERVIEW OF PASSAGE: This passage is Aristotle's answer to the question he has raised via endoxa and phainomena in the previous pages. That question is whether chance exists. In this passage, he identifies a phenomenon which does exist and he says it is chance. Then he analyzes what it is.
Right after this passage, he will define chance, as you no doubt noticed, as "an accident cause in the sphere of those actions for the sake of something which involve choice."

First then we observe that some things always come to pass in the same way, and others for the most part.	Some things happen always Some things happen for the most part Seems acceptable: but are there things that really do happen always? Offspring of humans are always human? If an acorn germinates and turns into a tree, it is always an oak?Fire is always hot? hotter than its surroundings? For the most part? Oaks are, for the most part, tall trees. Humans are, for the most part, bipedal, octopusses eight-tentacled, tables legged, ...
It is clearly of neither of these that chance, or the result of chance, is said to be the cause--neither of that which is by necessity and always, nor of that which is for the most part.	Chance, or the result of chance, does not cause things to happen always or for the most part. Seems somewhat analytic of what chance is, at least on an everyday understanding of chance. Think about it: if a supposed chance happening always happened that way, would it be chance?
But as there is a third class of events besides these two-- events which all say are by chance-- it is plain that there is such a thing as chance and spontaneity; for we know that things of this kind are due to chance and that things due to chance are of this kind.	There are things that happen neither always nor for the most part. Everyone says these things happen by chance. Thus there is a third way for things to happen, called 'chance.' This is one of Aristotle's standard statements about chance: if X is by chance, it does not happen always or for the most part. See APo 87b19-27. He is at least entitled to conclude that "everyone" is committed to his conclusion, if we assume that the claims he is making are things that "everyone" believes.
Of things that come to be, some come to be for the sake of something, others not.	Things come into being. A does not say what sort of things: seems very general. Could be substances, could be qualities, could be quantities, etc. Possible formulation: If something comes into being, it either does so for the sake of something or not. The law of the excluded middle pretty much guarantees this. Alternative formulation: 2 claims Some things come into being for the sake of something. Some things come into being not for the sake of something. Which formulation works with the argument in context?Are the formulations really different?
Again some of the former class are in accordance with intention, some not, but both are in the class of things which are for the sake of something.	Two sorts of things that are for the sake of something: intentional ones non-intentional ones Something intentional for the sake of something? I go to the store in order to buy groceries. That is the only reason I go to the store. I wouldn't go there if I couldn't buy groceries. Something non-intentional for sake of something? Well, those who believe in modern theories of evolution might provide examples: no one decided that some particular adaptation works for survival of the species, but Aristotle might claim that it does work for that and that is what it is for the sake of. Aristotle's examples are teeth for rending meat or grinding grass, or a chance meeting that serves an unintentional purpose (paying a bill).
Hence it is clear that even among the things which are outside what is necessary and what is for the most part, there are some in connexion with which the phrase 'for the sake of something' is applicable.	THEREFORE, there are things that happen by chance which happen for the sake of something. How in the world is Aristotle entitled to this as a conclusion?
(Things that are for the sake of something include whatever may be done as a result of thought or of nature)	Things for the sake of something include: things done as a result of thought (e.g. I chop down the oak tree) things done as a result of nature (e.g. the oak tree grows)
Things of this kind, then, when they come to pass accidentally are said to be by chance.	A thing which comes to be for the sake of something and happens by accident is said to be by chance. What sort of thing is he talking about? Why should we believe there are such things? Perhaps he is talking about things which could have been done for the sake of something but were not: for instance, I could have gone to the Davis Center to see you, but I did not, and yet I nonetheless accidentally saw you there. That is the sort of thing most people think Aristotle is talking about here, but it's hard to see that clearly in the text. We need to go ahead to 197a6 and read it back into the text here in order to make sense of the text here. If that is so, then he is limiting chance to the sort of thing that could have been done for the sake of something BUT WAS NOT. That is a very narrow definition. He might have another label for things that happen not by nature and not for the most part AND not for the sake of something. It seems he thinks such things happen. see Physics II.6, the next chapter
For just as a thing is something either in virtue of itself or accidentally, so may it be a cause.	X is Y either in virtue of itself or accidentally just so, X can be a cause either in virtue of itself or accidentally. Again, what is he talking about? Are there such things?
For instance, the housebuilding faculty is in virtue of itself a cause of a house, whereas the pale or the musical is an accidental cause.	EXAMPLE: note that this example is widely agreed to be problematic: see remark at end of page. my housebuilding ability can cause a house my housebuilding ability is for the sake of building a house: that's its function, what it does qua itself. a house too is for the sake of something: it has a purpose, not because it thinks, but because what it is to be a house simply is to fulfill a certain function (shelter, etc.) it does so qua housebuilding ability A pale person can build a house. A musical person can build a house. Neither the pale person nor the musical person builds a house qua pale or musical person. Thus the pale person and the musical person are accidental causes of their houses. In other words, the pale person did build a house, but qua pale person, she was only accidentally the cause of the house. Qua builder, she was a non-accidental cause of the house: a per se cause: specifically a per se efficient cause.
That which is per se cause is determinate, but the acccidental cause is indeterminable; for the possible attributes of an individual are innumerable.	Only the things which are the causes qua themselves are per se causes. But because every thing has an indefinite number of accidental traits, an indeterminable number of accidental causes exist for every per se cause. If I build a house, we can say of every one of my accidental traits that it was an accidental cause of the house being built, just as we can say that the pale woman built a house.
As we said, then, when a thing of this kind comes to pass among events which are for the sake of something, it is said to be spontaneous or by chance.(The distincition between the two must be made later--for the present it is sufficient if it is plain that both are in the sphere of things done for the sake of something).	Thus when something which is for the sake of something causes X, it can be spontaneous or by chance. The difference between spontaneity and chance is treated elsewhere. (he does this in Physics II.6, the next chapter)

Remarks: As what follows this passage makes clear, Aristotle thinks that the following sort of thing is a case of chance: I go to the Davis Center to get a book. I do not go there to meet you. But you are there and I do meet you. Thus the cause of the meeting, my going to the Davis Center, is chance. It is important that I could have gone there to meet you, for otherwise Aristotle does not consider it chance. Only things that could have been done for the sake of something are chance. The label we can use for things that we might call "chance" that don't fit that narrow definition of chance is "coincidence" or "spontaneity." The important thing is that A makes a distinction between things that happen by sheer coincidence and things that happen by coincidence but could have happened for the sake of something.
Also important: Aristotle's housebuilder example does not fit that description of chance well. We should rather call what he illustrates there accidental cause, of which chance is a subspecies. The reason is that there is nothing in the pale or the musical person's housebuilding that fits the description of something that could have been done for the sake of something but was not.
This is important: the basic lesson is that you need to pay attention to the nitty-gritty detail of every word and every sentence, but you also need to keep in mind the context and the ultimate result of the section you are reading. Aristotle is not always doing what you think he is doing. Re-reading can help to figure that out. Also, examples are often treacherous in Aristotle: if you try to argue from them, you often wind up with un-Aristotelian conclusions. That is frustrating.