• Is there any part of the soul that can exist apart from the body?
    • If there is any way of acting or being acted upon proper to soul, soul will be capable of separate existence; if there is none, its separate existence is impossible. In the latter case, it will be like what is straight, which has many properties arising form the straightness in it, e.g. that of touching a bronze sphere at a point, though straightness divorced from the other consituents of the straight thing cannot touch it in this way; it cannot be so divorced at all since it is always found in a body. De Anima 403a10-16
  • Hylomorphic analysis applied to living beings:
    • Since the expression, 'that whereby we live and perceive' has two meaning, just like the expression ' that whereby we know'--that may mean either knowledge or the soul, for we can speak of knowing by either, and similarly that whereby we are in health may be either health or the body or some part of the body; and since of these knowledge or health is a form, essence, or account or if we so express it an activity of a recipient matter--knowledge of what is capable of knowing, health of what is capable of being made healthy (for activity of that which is capable of originating hence seems to take place in what is changed or altered); further, since it is the soul by which primarily we live, perceive, and think:--it follows that the soul must be an account and essence, not matter or a subject. For, as we said, the word substance has three meanings--form, matter, and the complex of both--and of these matter is potentiality, form actuality. Since then the complex here is the living thing, the body cannot be the actuality of the soul; it is the soul which is the actuality of a certain kind of body. Hence the rightness of the view that the soul cannot be without a body, while it cannot be a body; it is not a body but something relative to a body That is why it is in a body, and a body of a definite kind. It was a mistake, therefore, to do as former thinkers did, merely to fit it into a body without adding a definite specification of the kind or character of that body, although evidently one chance thing will not receive another it comes about as reason requires; the actuality of any given thing can only be realized in what is already potentially that thing, i.e. in a matter of its own appropriate to it. From all this it is plain that soul is an actuality or account of something that possesses a potentiality of being such. De Anima 414a4-29