categories1A20-1B9

Aristotle's Categories.
This page consists of notes based on the Categories as well as S Marc Cohen's lecture notes on them and Gareth Matthews Chapter in ACTA 'Aristotelian Categories': it would be tedious and disruptive to give credit everywhere it is due to those two scholars, so this blanket credit is given here. Also, they are writing introductions to these materials, so what they say is, in some sense, 'common knowledge' ('common' to scholars who know about such things, not everyday schlubs like you and me).

Quick Facts:

Usually considered to be an early Aristotle text.
Part of the Organon, which is a name for the first 6 works of Aristotle in your books. They are his works on logic and were, for centuries, the first works a philosophy student in Europe would learn.

Traditionally, the Categories is seen as having at least two different sections:

Often divided into 1-4 (prepraedicamenta) and 5-9 (praedicamenta)

10-15 (the postpraedicamenta)
We'll discuss 1-9 here mostly.
What is important is that 1-4 offer a classification of things in the world (substance v. non-substance, primary v. secondary), and so do 5-9 (categories), and 10-15 offers a grab-bag of topics (opposition, priority, motion, having).

Thus Categories is not tightly unified.

What is the Categories?

An ontology
Each "category" is a category of beings. There are 10 categories.
Alongside of this 10-fold classification, there is a 4-fold classification (see the table below).

The fourfold Classification:

Aristotle Categories 1a20-1b9:

Of things there are: (a) some are said of a subject but are not in any subject. For example, human is said of a subject, the individual, human, but is not in any subject. (b) Some are in a subject but are not said of any subject. (By 'in a subject,' I mean what is in something, not as a part, and cannot exist separately from what it is in.) For example, the individual knowledge-of-grammar is in a subject, the soul, but is not said of any subject; and the individual white is in a subject, the body (for all color is in a body), but is not said of any subject. (c) Some are both said of a subject and in a subject. For example, knowledge is in a subject, the soul, and is also said of a subject, knowledge-of-grammar. (d) Some are neither in a subject nor said of a subject, for example, the individual man or the individual horse- for nothing of this sort is either in a subject or said of a subject. Things that are individual and numerically one are, without exception, not said of any subject, but there is nothing to prevent some of them from being in a subject--the individual knowledge-of-grammar is one of the things in a subject.

neither in a subject nor said of a subject example: Jacques is not said of any subject and Jacques is not in any subject Things in this box are called 'primary substances'	in a subject but not said of a subject example: the particular individual knowledge-of-grammar that Jacques has is in Jacques, but is not said of Jacques or of any subject Things in this box are called 'non-substance particulars' (i.e. individual non-universal things that are not substances but fit into one of the other categories)
said of a subject but not in that subject example: human is said of Jacques, but is not in Jacques Things in this box are called 'secondary substances' (i.e. universals that apply to substances)	said of one subject and in another subject example: knowledge is in Jacques soul and knowledge is said of this particular individual knowledge-of-grammar in Jacques. Things in this box are called 'secondary non-substances' (i.e. universals that apply to non-substances)

Apparently, Aristotle is categorizing the things that exist in the world outside of our minds by analyzing how we talk about them.

This (seems to) assumes that how we talk about the world mirrors the actual structure of the world.

His whole theory, we hope, does not rest simply on linguistic analysis: rather, linguistic analysis makes his theory plausible to beginners, or perhaps there is a solid reason why language tends to take apart the world in this way.

Note also that Aristotle is selecting which linguistic things to pay attention to, so not just any aspect of language matters here..

In simple sentences, we have a subject (hypokeimenon) and a predicate (kategoroumenon: origin of "category"):

Jacques (subject) is a human (predicate).

human is said of Jacques in this sentence.

Jacques (subject) runs (predicate).

runs is "in" Jacques in this sentence.

Running (subject) is an activity (predicate).

activity is said of running in this sentence.

The white of the classroom wall is a color.

"Said of" Versus "In":

Consider:

Jacques is human.

Aristotelian version: Human is said of Jacques.

Jacques is of average build.

Aristotelian version: Average build is in Jacques.

The first sentence says something essential about Jacques.

Jacques could not be what he is if he ceased being human. That would change him into a different kind of thing (corpse? monster? animal? food?).

The second says something accidental about Jacques.

Jacques could get thinner or fatter, more or less muscly, etc. and still be Jacques. None of those changes would change what kind of thing Jacques is.

The first essentially predicates human of Jacques.
The second accidentally predicates average build of Jacques.
Essential predicates are said of the subject.
Accidental predicates are in the subject.
In a "said of" relationship, both the subject and the predicate have to be in the same category.

In an "in" relationship, the subject and the predicate cannot be in the same category.

Universals versus Particulars

Aristotle does not use this terminology in the Categories, but he does elsewhere, so it is worth relating it to what he does say in the Categories
Elsewhere:

Now of actual things some are universal, others particular (I call universal that which is by its nature predicated of a number of things, and particular that which is not; man, for instance, is a universal, Callias a particular) de Interpretatione17a38
For this is just what we mean by the individual—the numerically one, and by universal we mean that which is predicable of the individuals. Metaphysics Β, 1000a1
Of all the things which exist some are such that they cannot be predicated of anything else truly and universally, e.g. Cleon and Callias, i.e. the individual and sensible, but other things may be predicated of them (for each of these is both man and animal); and some things are themselves predicated of others, but nothing prior is predicated of them; and some are predicated of others, and yet others of them, e.g. man of Callias and animal of man. It is clear then that some things are naturally not said of anything; for as a rule each sensible thing is such that it cannot be predicated of anything Prior Analytics 43a26f.

He is clearly speaking of universals and particulars with "said of" and "in."

Universals are "said of" subjects: particulars are not said of subjects.

Universals are secondary:

if they are in the category of substance, they are secondary substances
if they are in another category, they are secondary non-substances

Particulars are primary:

primary substances
primary non-substances (Aristotle does not actually talk about "primary non-substances," as far as I know) are called "particular qualities," "particular quantities," etc.

"Said of" and classification

When you say x of y, you are classifying y.
Classification can only occur within a category: you cannot classify a quality in a category other than quality such as substance or relatives, or a substance in a category other than substance such as quantity.
Classification can be illustrated by "trees" (chalkboard illustration)

the highest level will be a universal
the lowest level will be a universal called an infima species that comes immediately before particulars.
genus-species
differentiae

Why are primary substances the bedrock of existence?

Although they are specified negatively (they are NOT said of and NOT in a subject), the examples given by Arisotle are all individual instances of natural kinds (which just re-labels them, but at least relates to modern terminology better)

Given that they are so very basic, it is perhaps not surprising that characterizing them carefully and fully with positive terms turns out to be difficult or impossible.

Aristotle offers an argument at 2a34-2b7:

All non-substances are in some primary substance.
All secondary substances are said of some primary substance.
There is nothing other than primary substances, non-substances, and secondary substances.
Therefore, if primary substances did not exist, nothing else could be said of or in anything and so nothing else could exist.

In terms of non-substances, it seems to make sense: how could color exist if there were no body for it to be in? How could 2 exist if it were not 2 of something?

well, honestly, a lot of people think 2 does exist separately from any 2 things.
but apparently Aristotle does not (and he's not obviously wrong).

In terms of substances, it seems that the universal "human" would not exist if there were no individuals for it to be said of (what about dinosaurs: do they exist in any sense?)

Plato, however, thought that universals are primary, the bedrock of existence.

Primary non-substances: what are they and how should we think about them?

First, note that Aristotle himself does not speak of such things! At least not directly. The following sentence seems to imply that there are such things.

Things that are individual and numerically one are, without exception, not said of any subject, but there is nothing to prevent some of them from being in a subject--the individual knowledge of grammar is one of the things in a subject. (1b6-9)

What is this "individual knowledge of grammar"?

The key to figuring this out lies in interpreting what "in a subject" means, and there is one widely-agreed upon key text: By "in a subject" I mean what is in something, not as a part, and cannot exist separately from that which it is in. (1a24-5)

note that "in" is used in the "definition" of "in a subject"!
that seems to violate a prime directive in definitions: they should not be circular.
perhaps there is a definition of "in" in the definition that is not the same as "in a subject," but Aristotle does not explicitly give that definition
so we have to look at Aristotle's examples, and examples are always dangerous: they are meant to illustrate the point, not to make the point. Using them to make the point can distort or mistake the point. But for lack of a better procedure, we forge on.

there are at least 3 possible ways to interpret that passage:

A possible translation of the passage:
By "in a subject" I mean what is in something, not as a part, and cannot exist separately from that which it is in. (1a24-5) (a fine translation of the greek)

1) I.e. for any given non-substance particular, there is some one particular substance it is in and that it could not exist apart from.

The pink of this rose may be qualitatively no different from the pink of that rose, and yet this pink is the pink of this rose in a strong way: there is no other pink that is the pink of this rose.

what makes it distinct from the pink in that rose? What is the principle of individuation here when there are no qualitative differences? Just the fact that this one is in this rose and that one is in that cheek, and that other one is in that rose.

in other words, the primary substance it is in distinguishes it from others like it.

two primary substances that are absolutely identical in every respect are still two-in number, and every single property that one of them has is distinct from every single quality that the other has according to this option.
Aristotle does not, unfortunately, sufficiently discuss the fact that they may be qualitatively identical and puzzle over it, but it does raise some nice puzzles.

this interpretation takes "that which" to refer to a particular substance, a primary substance.

called a "trope" in modern philosophy, I hear
also called an "abstract particular"
but be careful if you know modern theories about such things: Aristotle may not be thinking in quite the same ways.

the problem with this theory, for Aristotle, is that it makes it the case that although a "trope" such as this particular white can be in Socrates, the more general non-substances of which the trope is a particular, namely white or color, cannot be in Socrates, because they don't fulfill the requirement "and cannot exist separately from that which it is in," because surely white and color can exist separately from Socrates.
it would be nice to have a theory that treated things like that

SO, another interpretation arises:
By "in a subject" I mean what is in something, not as a part, and cannot exist separately from being in something or other. (less likely from the Greek, but not impossible)

2. I.e. for any given non-substance particular, it is necessarily in some particular substance or other, but there is no particular substance it is necessarily in.

This particular pink is in this rose, and that rose, and that rose, and that paint, and this ball: it is a shade of pink that cannot be further subdivided into distinct shades of pink.

this interpretation requires the Greek to specify not "that which," a primary substance, but rather "some thing or other" which is rather unspecific
G.E.L. Owen started up this line of interpreation.

OR
By "in a subject" I mean what is in something, not as a part, and there is something it cannot exist apart from. (works OK as a translation of the Greek)

This translation does not explicitly favor the following interpretation, but it allows for it:
3. the interpretation is that Aristotle means to say that for each sort of thing that is "in a subject" there is some particular sort of subject it is in. Think of it as follows: it is like a parasite that has a primary host, but it can be in any number of different individual mammals.

thus color's primary host is body, but it can be in any number of different sorts of body and any number of particular bodies.

"part" means "conceptual part": i.e. part of the definition, part of the essence.
this interpretation says Aristotle is only defining what it means to be an accident
this interpretation takes "something" ("that which" in interpretation #1) to be a specific sort of thing, but that specific sort of thing is not fully specifiable in terms of primary or secondary or substance or non-substance (just as "body" is not)
Michael Frede started up this line of interpretation

This is a thorny problem: I think it reaches the outer envelop of what Aristotle thought about and what he is logically committed to: unless we find really good evidence in Aristotle for only one solution, we have exceeded our evidence at this point.

But nothing stops you from continuing in an Aristotelian manner. I'll stop here, however, b/c I'm trying to figure out what Aristotle's text commits him to and where its edges are.

One-over-many

There is a problem for Plato, called the "one over many problem"
One-over-many: For any plurality of F things, there is a form of F-ness by virtue of partaking in which each member of that plurality is F.

In other words, for all us humans, there is a form of human-ness which makes us human.

The problem is that the word "partaking" is awfully vague and hard to cash out in specific and clear terms. HOW does that form "make" us human?
Matthews suggests that the problem does not exist for Aristotle, because he thinks that Aristotle thinks of primary non-substances as "tropes" (the first option above).

To be an individual color, for instance, simply is to be in some particular non-substance and also to have some hue and shade and to be a color: there is no separate thing such as color or hue or shade. There are just individual colors and they all have hues and shades and are colors.
Everything that exists is a something or other.
Every individual that exists is an individual something or other.
There is no such thing as a thing that exists without being a something or other.
This is a very different ontology from Plato's ontology.
Questions:

SO if every thing is an individual, not a one-over-many, there is no thing that is a universal? Aristotle cannot be saying that, because he talks of universals often and relies on their existence for oh-so-many claims. So what is the status of universals?
What he is saying is that the universal does not and cannot exist apart from its particular instances, and that it does not cause its particular instances to be what they are in an external way, but as an essential internal part of them. That leads us to differentiae.

Differentiae

So non-substances are in substances, right?
And secondary substances are said of primary substances, right?
And secondary substances have definitions,
And a definition consists of a genus plus a differentia:

the genus identifies what group of other things a thing belongs to.
the differentia differentiates it from the other things in that group. But it does so in an essential way, not just accidentally.

And if a secondary substance is said of a primary substance, then the definition of the secondary substance is also said of that primary substance, right?

for example:

Human is said of Jacques.
The definition of human is "rational animal" (according to Aristotle).
Thus, Rational animal is said of Jacques.

So far so good, right?
It looks like we are dealing with natural kinds (species, genera, and their definition) of particular individuals.
But what about all those differentiae? e.g. "rational" and "rationality" in the definition of "human"? It looks like a quality. Isn't that a non-substance (it's a quality after all)? and isn't it said of every individual human?

That can't be, because we just said that non-substances are in substances, not said of them.

At 3a21, Aristotle says that no diffentiae are in a subject, so Aristotle is not confused about this. He is clear: he thinks that differentiae and secondary substances are said of primary substances.
Aristotle also thinks that the only thing that can be in a substance is a non-substance.
Let's look back at what "in a subject" means:

By "in a subject" I mean what is in something, not as a part, and cannot exist separately from that which it is in. (1a24-5)

Michael Frede suggests that "not as a part" is important there: differentiae are "conceptual parts" of substances, whereas other properties are not.

Recall that the "said of" relation essentially predicates something of a subject, whereas the "in" relation accidentally predicates something of a subject.
A "conceptual part" is something that is essential.

Thus a slow, careful reading reveals consistency where there was apparent inconsistency.
But what does 'conceptual part' mean? I think we've reached the edge of Aristotle again, if Frede is right.

Substance and hylomorphism

In the Categories, a criterion for substances is given: substances are said to be uniquely able to receive contraries (4a10-22)

In the Metaphysics, however, this criterion for substance is not maintained.

In the Categories, there is no hint of hylomorphism (the idea that primary substances are matter-form composites, and the form is the best candidate for substance).

People think that Aristotle's analysis of substantial change led him to hylomorphism: in every substantial change, there is a material substrate that remains the same while a form changes.

In the Categories, things change, but there is no mention of substantial change.

Some people think that the philosophical system of the Categories and the rest of the Organon is incompatible with and yet is also the precursor to the philosophical system of the Physics and Metaphysics.
Others think that the two are compatible.
One bone of contention between the compatibilitists and the incompatibilists is that Aristotle calls Socrates a primary substance in the Categories, whereas he calls Socrates' form primary in the Metaphysics. Compatibilists like Michael Wedin say the following: Socrates is primary in the Categories because that is ontological primacy, where his form is primary in the Metaphysics because that is explanatory or structural primacy.

Aristotle does not directly discuss the differences between Categories and Metaphysics, so, once again, scholars have pushed out to the perimeter of Aristotle's thought: he did not think of or discuss everything, even though we can often figure out his likely answers to questions he did not ask by asking what he is logically committed to.

The 10 Categories:

Aristotle does not think that these 10 categories are species of "being," because, he argues ( Metaphysics 998b23, 1059b31) that "being" is not a genus.

Every genus must have a differentia that is outside of it.

a differentia that would specify how it differs from other things in its group: in this case the other things would, by definition, be non-being(s), whatever non-being(s) is (or are).

"being" can have no such differentia
therefore being is not a genus of the 10 categories
the upshot is that there is no single highest kind
there are 10

and each of the ten can be divided

"quantity" is divided at 4b20-23 as follows

QUantity

Continuous

line
surface
body
time
place

Discrete quantities

number
speech

A problem arises: "body" seems to signify a thing which is quantified, not a quantity itself (a tetrahedral body of 30 cubic meters, for instance)
perhaps he is confused
elsewhere, he talks of "body" as substance ( Top. 130b2, DC 2681–3, DA 434b12, Meta. 1079a31, 1069b38)
"body" cannot be both a substance AND a quantity (unless "body" is homonymous and so needs to be disambiguated)
Other problems: what does "speech" mean here? What about passages where he specifies other divisions of quantity in other works? etc.

Relatives is even harder and more confusing

the text of Categories that treats of "relatives" is short and not enough
Aristotle seemed to think that every thing in all the non-substance categories belonged to one single primary substance
thus relatives are difficult: you can't say "This is greater" or "He is the son" because those are incomplete: one can only be greater than something else and one can only be son of a parent. Did Aristotle think that one could be "greater" or "son" without that essentially being a relation between at least two primary substances? How? From the Greek used to discuss this category, he seems to be primarily concerned with the things that are related, not the relations themselves: he may not even consider those relations entities. Maybe they are just words, linguistic things, not real extra-mental entities?

Quality seems a bit easier

but here there is no systematic rationale for why he specifies the species of quality he does, and no argument for why each of the species he specifies are qualities and not something else.
One of the species of quality he suggests is "shape": but what is the differentia of "shape"? the same applies to his other suggested species (habits, dispositions, natural capabilities, etc.)

In other words, once we get into the 10 categories beyond substance, Aristotle's text seems brain-stormish, incomplete, not systematic, not careful, etc.

So what should we do?
Well, perhaps the best answer is that we should try to do better than Aristotle: can we, following Aristotle's better, more careful discussions, construct an "Aristotelian" defense and discussion of the 10 categories?
We should also acknowledge that, in spite of these problems, the notion of categories has had tremendous influence and is worth studying for that reason.

Categories in general

We can start out with external questions: what access do we have to whatever sort of things categories might be (i.e. epistemically, can we possibly succeed?)? Are these "categories" necessarily conceptual or mind-dependent rather than extra-mental?

Realist? anti-realist? we have to make assumptions.

OR we can approach the categories internally: assuming there is such a thing as extra-mental most general kinds of things (i.e. categories), what is the principle one should use to find them or generate them? What did Aristotle use?
Studtmann identifies 4 possible ways that Aristotle could have generated the categories

The Question Approach
The Grammatical Approach
The Modal Approach
The Medieval Derivational Approach

Question approach

ask of each thing "what is it"

what is Socrates?

human

what is that?

animal

what is that?

etc.

... a substance

what is that (pointing to a color)

what is red?

a color

what is a color?

etc.

... a quality

ask of one primary substance all kinds of question

height
color
shape
etc.
group the answers by kinds
...
they will fall into 10 categories

seems plausible, but there is a variety of questions which won't lead to categories, and it depends on our asking the right questions without knowing what the right questions are
some textual evidence, but not conclusive

Grammatical approach

examine features of language
sentences frequently have primary substances as subjects
we have active and passive verbs

hence the categories action and passion

but elsewhere Aristotle, probably quite sensibly, notes that in many cases, what is active and what passive is a matter of perspective, not fact

in the end, objections to this mode of generating categories are that language is arbitrary. It is also just a special case of the sceptical person's objection "how do we know that any way we think we are accessing reality actually accesses reality" (btw, that objection applies to the question approach as well)

The Modal Approach

According to this interpretation the constitutive principle of the list of categories is that they constitute those classes of items to each of which any sensible particular — substantial or otherwise — must be related. Any sensible particular, substance, event, sound, etc. must be related to some substance; it must have some quality and quantity; it must have relational properties, it must be related to times and places; and it is placed within a network of causal chains and laws, thus being related to the categories of affecting and being affected.

Julius Moravcsik as quoted by Studtmann

will that yield Aristotle's categories, or some other set?

Medieval Derivational

named for the long tradition of explainers of Aristotle
the idea is that one can find an a priori proof that will yield Aristotle's categories
e.g.

A predicate is referred to a subject in a second way when the predicate is taken as being in the subject, and this predicate is in the subject either essentially and absolutely and as something flowing from its matter, and then it is quantity; or as something flowing from its form, and then it is quality; or it is not present in the subject absolutely but with reference to something else, and then it is relation. (Aquinas, Commentaries on Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book V, Lesson 9, Section 890)

a risk here is that Aristotle just doesn't provide the raw material to undergird this approach: he does not sufficiently specify the principles that would allow these things to flow from other things or what flow from means.
but it is promising in theory
it just risks pushing the Aristotelian envelope far beyond what Aristotle himself did

for those interested, see bibliography in Studtmann, Paul, "Aristotle's Categories", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/aristotle-categories/>.