- §11. Living Beings
- The soul is the form of a living form-matter composite.
- The "soul" in Aristotle is not a religious thing, a
moral thing, or a 'spiritual' thing (whatever that means),
or a thing that can survive death (I detect no concern
about an afterlife or anything like that in Aristotle): it
is that thing which makes you or me different from a
corpse: whatever it is that makes us a functioning
organism: the thing that is absent from the dead body of a
former organism.
- ALL living things have a soul ((DA 431a20–22; cf. DA
412a13, 423a20–6; De Part. An. 687a24–690a10; Met.
1075a16–25)
- The soul, then, is the cause of an organism:
- The Formal cause
- It just is the structure of the body (the body is the
matter): how it all fits together and works
- The Efficient cause
- From the soul originate the motions which move the
body
- The Final cause
- I do not think that the Stanf. Enc. of Phil. fully
explains how the soul is a final cause of the organism:
we will be exploring this later as well. We are here to
be rational beings: the fully developed human has
developed and uses their rational capacities. Just as a
fully developed acorn has become an oak tree, and fully
fulfills whatever the essence of oakiness is.
- The soul is also the substance of ensouled bodies.
- soul : body :: form : matter :: actuality : potentiality
- Thus Aristotle rejects a simplistic materialism, like that
of the Presocratics as well as that of many moderns.
- Aristotle also rejects Plato's kind of dualism, which
believes souls can exist without a material base.
- The faculties of the soul are hylomorphically analyzed as
well:
- perception is reception of sensible forms without
matter
- thinking is the mind being formed by intelligible
forms.
- lots of questions and details here: we'll read de
Anima.
- § 12. Happiness and Political Association
- For Aristotle, Ethics is about individuals while politics is
about groups of individuals and individuals within groups.
- He takes it as given that most people wish to lead good
lives: his ethics and politics is about "most people"
- It is not about why we should be good.
- It is also not concerned with whether this or that act is
good or bad (e.g. lying, stealing, charity, abortion, athletic
achievement, murder, being kind, etc.)
- But he believes that the best life for a human being is not
a matter of subjective preference
- people can (and, sadly, often do) choose to lead
sub-optimal lives.
- He proposes a life lived in accordance with reason as
meeting the criteria for a good human life uniquely and
therefore promotes it as the superior form of human life.
- Determining what the criteria are for a good human life is
the prior task to deciding what life is good for humans.
- Aristotle thinks that the final good for human beings must
meet the following criteria:
- it must be pursued for its own sake (EN 1094a1)
- it must also be such that we wish for other things for
its sake (EN 1094a19)
- it must also be such that we do not wish for it on
account of other things (EN 1094a21)
- it must be complete (teleion), by which is meant more
precisely that it is always choiceworthy and always
chosen for itself (EN 1097a26–33)
- no matter the circumstances
- it must be self-sufficient (autarkês), in the sense
that its presence suffices to make a life lacking in
nothing (EN 1097b6–16).
- neither the life of pleasure nor the life of honour
satisfies them all.
- this is not immediately apparent to everyone:
Aristotle will need to argue for that if he is to
satisfy anyone in this class
- what satisfies them all is eudaimonia, which is "well-being" or
"living well" and sometimes translated, unfortunately, as
'happiness.'
- eudaimonia is
the fulll realization of our natures, the optimum
actualization of our human capacities
- another way to put it is becoming fully human:
realizing the uniquely human potentiality of our nature
- neither nature nor endowments are matters of choice
for people
- even within Aristotle's schema, it seems, different
people have different versions of what constitutes
well-being.
- think of it this way: every one of us has a bucket,
call it the "well-being" bucket, and our task is to
figure out the capacity and qualities of the bucket
and fill it: the bucket itself determines what it can
hold to some extent, and each person fills it with
different things, but there are more and less optimal
ways to fill it, and many bad (mistaken) ways to fill
it.
But perhaps saying that the
highest good is well-being (eudaimonia) will appear to be a
platitude and what is wanted is a much clearer expression of what
this is. Perhaps this would come about if the function (ergon) of
a human being were identified. For just as the good, and doing
well, for a flute player, a sculptor, and every sort of
craftsman—and in general, for whatever has a function and a
characteristic action—seems to depend upon function, so the same
seems true for a human being, if indeed a human being has a
function. Or do the carpenter and cobbler have their functions,
while a human being has none and is rather naturally without a
function (argon)? Or rather, just as there seems to be some
particular function for the eye and the hand and in general for
each of the parts of a human being, should one in the same way
posit a particular function for the human being in addition to all
these? Whatever might this be? For living is common even to
plants, whereas something characteristic (idion) is wanted; so,
one should set aside the life of nutrition and growth. Following
that would be some sort of life of perception, yet this is also
common, to the horse and the bull and to every animal. What
remains, therefore, is a life of action belonging to the kind of
soul that has reason. (EN 1097b22–1098a4)
- In determining what eudaimonia consists in, Aristotle
makes a crucial appeal to the human function (ergon), and
thus to his overarching teleological framework, the idea
that things are goal-oriented.
- He thinks that he can identify the human function in
terms of reason
- Happiness turns out to be an activity of the rational
soul, conducted in accordance with virtue or excellence,
or, in what comes to the same thing, in rational
activity executed excellently (EN 1098a161–17).
- The suggestion that only excellently executed or
virtuously performed rational activity constitutes human
happiness provides the impetus for Aristotle's virtue ethics.
- first, he insists that the good life is a life of
activity; no mere state suffices
- a brilliant and good person couch-surfing thru life
won't do
- it falls to the ethical theorist to determine what
virtue or excellence consists in with respect to the
individual human virtues, including, for instance, courage
and practical intelligence.
- This is why so much of Aristotle's ethical writing is
given over to an investigation of virtue, both in general
and in particular, and extending to both practical and
theoretical forms.
- By "virtue," Aristotle simply means "excellence of its
kind" or "fully actualizing natural potential" (not just
any potential, such as my potential to fertilize daisies)
- Aristotle concludes his discussion of human happiness in his
Nicomachean Ethics by introducing political theory as
a continuation and completion of ethical theory.
- Ethical theory formulates and characterizes thoughts about
the best form of human life; political theory does that too,
but for the forms of social organization best suited to the
realization of the best form of human life (EN 1181b12–23).
- So what social organization are we talking about? the
basic political unit for Aristotle is the polis,
which is both a state and a civil society
- he does not think that the polis requires justification as
a body threatening to infringe on antecedently existing
human rights: the polis is basic: not more basic than the
individual, but a facet of the fact that we are political
animals:
- perhaps rationality is inherently social, in need of
exchange of ideas, even within one's own soul
- he advances a form of political naturalism which treats
human beings as by nature political animals
- that is encapsulated in a justifiably famous
Aristotelian saying: "Humans are political animals"
- not only in the weak sense of being gregariously
disposed,
- nor even in the sense of merely benefiting from mutual
commercial exchange,
- but in the strong sense of their flourishing as human
beings at all only within the framework of an organized
social framework, a polis. The polis ‘comes into being for
the sake of living, but it remains in existence for the
sake of living well’ (Pol. 1252b29–30; cf. 1253a31–37).
- The polis is thus to be judged against the goal of
promoting human happiness.
- A superior form of political organization enhances human
life;
- an inferior form hampers and hinders it
- he rejects contractarianism b/c it treats as merely
instrumental the political activities which are in fact
partially constitutive of human flourishing (Pol. iii 9).
- but is it human happiness as a whole or individuals'
human happiness: how does it add up? does it add up?
- kinds of political organization
- rulers may be
- their forms of rule may be
- legitimate
- illegitimate, as measured against the goal of
promoting human flourishing (Pol. 1279a26–31).
- six possible forms of government result, three correct
and three deviant:
|
Correct |
Deviant |
| One Ruler |
Kingship |
Tyranny |
| Few Rulers |
Aristocracy |
Oligarchy |
| Many Rulers |
Polity |
Democracy |
- Aristotle thinks that a suitable level of distributive
justice is necessary to enhance human well being.
- a just state is preferable to an unjust state
- justice requires treatment of equal claims similarly,
unequal claims dissimilarly.
- but Aristotle does not think all people are equal
- justice's goal is to enhance human flourishing, an end
toward which liberty is instrumental and not something to
be pursued for its own sake.
- given human beings' acquisitive nature (hmmm...),
democracy, the best among deviant forms of government, may
be the best we can realistically hope for.
- in terms of administering this justice, there is a mixed
constitution, which seems to be the realistic idea
- and an ideal one, a monarchy ruled by the best ruler
- Aristotle is often realistic
- he does not encourage revolution: he thinks we should
incrementally improve the system we find ourselves in
- 13. Rhetoric and the Arts
- the two famous treatises we have on the productive arts by
Aristotle are Rhetoric
and Poetics.
- neither is a polished treatise that was clearly conceived
as a unity by Aristotle himself: they seem a bit like
chapters on similar topics that were put together, although
they do have a bit more unity than that.
- rhetoric and the arts are productive sciences.
- these differ from the practical sciences of ethics and
politics, which concern human conduct, and from the
theoretical sciences, which aim at truth for its own sake.
- rhetoric aims at the production of persuasive speech
(Rhet. 1355b26; cf. Top. 149b5)
- tragedy aims at the production of edifying drama (Poet.
1448b16–17)
- it is controversial whether Aristotle is descriptive or
prescriptive about rhetoric and tragedy
- If prescriptive, he seems to prescribe things to
Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides, whom he deems the best
tragedians, how to write tragedy.
- seems a bit arrogant and objectionable
- Still, he does not arrive at these recommendations
purely a priori.
- Aristotle analyzes the products of rhetoric and poetry a
posteriori: he has collected the best works of
forensic speech and tragedy available to him, and has
studied them to discern their more and less successful
features. In proceeding in this way, he aims to capture
and codify what is best in both rhetorical practice and
tragedy, in each case relative to its appropriate
productive goal (i.e. its telos).
- Rhetoric
- goal is persuasion
- Aristotle lived in a democracy of sorts
- Bailly digression about Aristotle's society:
- not representative
- highly participatory
- but only males born to citizen fathers were citizens
- it was also a slave-owning society
- obviously not up to our standards at all
- arguably superior, by our standards, to the
alternatives that surrounded it
- a stepping stone in the gradual history of extension
of rights and privileges to more and more people?
- or maybe we still live in a slave society, without
direct ownership?
- I have my views, but this is so highly controversial
that it would be unproductive to get into it
- suffice to say that I still think Aristotle is worth
studying, even though he lived in and shared many of
the values of a society whose practices were not
ethical
- it's an open question what to do with such figures
from the past
- end Bailly digression
- context can determine the type of rhetoric:
- deliberative: trying (with others) to decide what to
do: a speech in the assembly or on a committee
- epideictic: trying to persuade a group about something
that had no further consequences: a public speech
- judicial: lawcourts, etc.: trying to persuade a group
of fellow citizens
- methods, ways to persuade:
- personal character
- emotions of the audience
- argument of the speech
- puts the theory of his psychological, logical, and
ethical treatises to work
- thus Rhetoric
is a good place to look for how he interprets various
theoretical positions, where the theory starts to meet
practice .
- emotions are discussed very extensively
- dialectic, the art of intelligent productive
discussion that falls short of science, is very
important for rhetoric, and so things like credible
opinions (endoxa), proofs, and patterns of human
reasoning generally are discussed.
- Tragedy (i.e. the Poetics)
- most commonly, catharsis is said to be the goal of
tragedy according to Aristotle, but the text does not
support that fully.
- there were several other forms of poetry in Aristotle's
world: his treatise does not discuss every form of poetry
in detail
Tragedy, then, is an imitation of
an action that is serious and complete, and which has some
greatness about it. It imitates in words with pleasant
accompaniments, each type belonging separately to the different
parts of the work. It imitates people performing actions and does
not rely on narration. It achieves, through pity and fear, the
catharsis of these sorts of feelings. (Poet. 1449b21–29)
- so the big question is "what is the goal of tragedy"
and here, Aristotle is not clear, unfortunately.
The poet and the historian differ
not in that one writes in meter and the other not; for one could
put the writings of Herodotus into verse and they would be none
the less history, with or without meter. The difference resides in
this: the one speaks of what has happened, and the other of what
might be. Accordingly, poetry is more philosophical and more
momentous than history. The
poet speaks more of the universal, while the historian speaks of
particulars. It is universal that when certain things turn out a
certain way someone will in all likelihood or of necessity act
or speak in a certain way—which is what the poet, though
attaching particular names to the situation, strives for.
(Poet. 1451a38–1451b10)
- thus one good candidate for what the goal and function
of tragedy is is ‘learning, that is, figuring out what
each thing is’ (Poet. 1448b16–17). In Aristotle's view,
tragedy teaches us about ourselves.
- Two important elements of drama are catharsis and mimesis
- Catharsis
- catharsis is a purgation of emotions: a sort of
purifying and drawing out of emotions.
- Aristotle does claim that tragedy will accomplish
catharsis, but he does not state that it is the goal of
tragedy.
- so what is the subject, the matter, and the nature
of catharsis?
- two possibilities
- the audience (the subject) has its emotions (the
matter) of pity and fear purged (the nature)
- it's not purgation, but rather purification
(cognitive or structural: our emotions are changed
by watching)
- purging would be getting rid of emotions
- purifying would be improving our emotions
- Mimesis (Imitation)
- Mimesis is a natural human activity: it is part of our
nature to engage in it
- we learn and grow via mimesis: delight in learning is
natural: it is part of our nature to love learning
(Poet. 1148b4–24).
- These natural tendencies lead us to drama: imitation
becomes representation and depiction
- it's not merely copying or re-presenting
- it engages universal themes in a philosophical
manner (at least in its mores fully developed forms)