• Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1.1 1094a1ff)
• Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. But a certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others are products apart from the activities that produce them. Where there are ends apart from the actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities. Now, as there are many actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are many; the end of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall under a single capacity--as bridle-making  and the other arts concerned with the equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this and every military action under strategy, in the same way other arts fall under yet others--in all of these the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to all the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former that the latter are pursued. It makes no difference whether the activities themselves are the ends of the actions, or something else apart from the activitities , as in the case of the sciences just mentioned.
• What is the good?
• It is the aim of arts, inquiries, actions, and choices.
• As such, it is a goal
• Thus our actions, inquiries, arts, and choices are teleologically arranged
• Which is better, the action/thing or the goal?
  
• Sometimes actions and their goals are separate
• a house is different from housebuilding
• the house is better than the action.
• Some arts, sciences, and actions are subordinate to others
• carpentry is subordinate to building, as is plumbing, etc.
• in such cases, the "master" art is better than its subordinate arts or their ends
• because we pursue the subordinate things for the sake of the master things.
• There are some arts where the action and the product are not separate things: dancing, singing, and virtue are examples.
• But we can still separate them conceptually?
  
• If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what we should? If so, we must try, in outline at least, to determine what it is, and of which of the sciences or capacities it is the object. It would seem to belong to the most authoritatitve art and that which is most truly the master art. And politics appears to be of this nature; for it is this that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class of citizens should learn and up to what point they should learn them; and we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities to fall under this, e.g. strategy, economics, rhetoric; now, since politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include those of the others, so that this end must be the good for man. For even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems at all events something greater and more complete both to attain and to preserve; for though it is worth while to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or for city-states. These, then, are the ends at which our inquiry, being concerned with politics, aims.
• Is there a master goal of a human life?
• If there is no thing that we desire purely for its own sake, we could be stuck in an infinite process:
  
• we will choose X for the sake of Y, which will be choosen for the sake of Z, which will be chosen for the sake of A, which will be chosen for the sake of B, etc.
• either it will go on forever or loop back on itself.
• in either case, it will be infinite, which would make our desires "empty and vain."
• Aristotle seems to think that that is enough to reject the idea
• why? perhaps our desires simply are empty and vain.
• or perhaps it's like shampoo: lather, rinse, repeat
• and why is that empty and vain?
• presumably because it does not reach a goal: can't he value process? maybe it does have a goal...
  
• But IF there is some thing we do for its own sake, it would be of practical use to know what it is.
• We can aim at it.
• Politics is the art that is the master art:
  
• it uses all the other sciences and arts and says what we are to do and not do
• thus it includes the ends of all the subordinate arts
• and its end must be good
• politics is superior to ethics because it aims at the goal of a nation, not just an individual
• We'll have to see more about what A has to say about this in the Politics and elsewhere, because this seems like a dangerous principle.
• In any case, we can see that A calls his inquiry here politics, EVEN THOUGH the Nicomachean Ethics  concerns it self with individuals.
• We also see him making a very controversial perhaps nefarious claim that the good of the nation is finer and more godlike than that of an individual.
• why possibly nefarious? because privileging the state over individuals is problematic and a key component of authoritarianism, totalitarianism, fascism and other things that usually have a bad rap in the US.
  
• Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject matter admits of; for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts. Now fine and just actions, which political science investigates, exhibit much variety and fluctuation so that they may be thought to exist only by convention, and not by nature. And goods also exhibit similar fluctuation because they bring harm to many people; for before now men have been undone by reason of their wealth and others by reason of their courage. We must be content, then in speaking of such subjects and with such premisses to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true and with premisses of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better. In the same spirit, therefore, should each of our statements be received; for it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reckoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician demonstrative proofs.
• An important principle: conclusions can be no more precise than the subject matter allows
• How to apply it here, however, is a good question.
• Is this meant to mean that we need to round off our calculations as we do in mathematics? If we have vague input, we cannot get output more precise than the input?
• Is this something like proto-statistics: what we say here applies to the generic human, but there is no actual generic human, only particular humans, and so what we say here is theoretical and has questionable practical application to any given individual? or is limited by not dealing with the particulars of a particular person (and, after all, we are all particular people)?
  
• ...
• Let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that all knowledge and choice aims at some good, what it is that we say political science aims at and what is the highest of all goods achievable by actions. Verbally there is very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness, and identify living well and faring well with being happy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and the many do not give the same account as the wise. For the former think it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or honor; they differ, however, from one another--and often even the same man identifies it with different things, with health when he is ill, with wealth when he is poor; but, conscious of their ignorance, they admire those who proclaim some great thing that is above their comprehension. Now some thought that apart from these many goods there is another which is good in itself and causes the goodness of all these as well. To examine all the opinions that have been held would no doubt be somewhat fruitless; it is enough to examine those that are most prevalent or that seem to have some reason in their favor.
• First, we can agree on a name: we'll call the goal happiness.
• But we all know that English "happiness" won't work, so we can't really even agree on a name...
• "Flourishing," "Well-being," "Human flourishing, " ...
• eudaimonia?
  
• Endoxa:
• various people think the goal is:
• pleasure
• wealth
• honor
• health
• many think it varies over time:
• health when I am sick
• wealth when I am poor
• others proclaim some grand thing beyond comprehension
  
• sort of like Aristotle is doing?
• perhaps like Plato's 'form of the good' which can seem mystifying, but see next item
• others say that "good" is some thing separate from all good things: these are the Platonists.
  
• Let us not fail to notice, however, that there is a difference between arguments from and to first principles....while we must begin with what is familiar, things are so in two ways--some to us, some without qualification. Presumably, then, we must begin with things familiar to us. Hence any one who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is noble and just and, generally, about the subjects of political science must have been brought up in good habits. For the facts are the starting-point, and if they are sufficiently plain to him, he will not need the reason as well. and the man who has been well brought up has or can easily get starting points...
• We have to start with what we think we know (whether it is really knowable or not will, it is hoped, emerge)
• But if the inquiry is to reach what is knowable simpliciter, we have to start out with "good habits"
• in other words, A's ethics will only work for people who already have good upbringing!
• it won't work so well for nazis, serial murderers, homophobes, sexists, racists, etc.?
• or does this mean it won't work so well for slaves, the poor, non-Greeks, deviants, etc.?
  
• What are we to make of this?
• Does it mean that the Ethics is simply dialectical: that it works from what we think we know forward, but cannot work from what is really knowable as a demonstrative science does?
• Aristotle does not seem to think that that is the case.
• Surely here he is simply saying that for his intended audience, the proper starting point is dialectical. It will help them to see the first principles when they come into view. The right starting points are helpful, because Aristotle does not need to argue for them. He does seem to say that there is a reason for them.