- Nicomachean Ethics
1098b29ff
- With those who identify happiness with excellence or some
one
excellence our account is in harmony; for to excellence
belongs
activity in accordance with excellence. But it makes, perhaps,
no small
difference whether we place the chief good in possession or in
use, in
state or in activity. For the state may exist without
producing any
good result, as in a man who is asleep or in some other way
quite
inactive, but the activity cannot; for one who has the
activity will of
necessity be acting, and acting well....so those who act
rightly win
the noble and good things in life.
- Their life is also in itself pleasant. For pleasure is a
state
of soul, and to each man that which he is said to be a lover
of is
pleasant; e.g. not only is a horse pleasant to the lover of
horses, and
a spectacle to the lover of sights, but also in the same way
just acts
are pleasant to the lover of justice and in general excellent
acts to
the lover of excellence. Now for most men their pleasures are
in
conflict with one another because these are not by
nature
pleasant, but the lovers of what is noble find pleasant the
things that
are by nature pleasant; and excellent actions are such, so
that these
are pleasant for such men as well as in their own nature.
Their life,
therefore, has no further need of pleasure as a sort of
adventitious
charm, but has its pleasure in itself. For, besides what we
have said,
the man who does not rejoice in noble actions is not even
good; since
no one would call a man just who did not enjoy acting justly,
nor any
man liberal who did not enjoy liberal actions; and similarly
in all
other caes. If this is so, excellent actions must be in
themselves
pleasant. But they are also good and noble, and have each of
these
attributes in the highest degree, since the good man judges
well about
these attributes and he judges in the way we have described.
Happiness
then is the best, noblest, and most pleasant thing.