• Repeated from last class:
• Diogenes Laertius 7.35
  This text describes a cataleptic impression
• "Perception, again, is an impression produced on the mind, its name being appropriately borrowed from impressions on wax made by a seal; and perception they (i.e. Stoics) divide into comprehensible and incomprehensible: Comprehensible, which they call the criterion of facts, and which is produced by a real object, and is, therefore, at the same time conformable to that object; Incomprehensible, which has no relation to any real object, or else, if it has any such relation, does not correspond to it, being but a vague and indistinct representation."
• Diogenes Laertius 7.36
• "Diocles, of Magnesia, in his Excursion of Philosophers, where he speaks as follows, and we will give his account word for word.
  The Stoics have chosen to treat, in the first place, of perception and sensation, because the criterion by which the truth of facts is ascertained is a kind of perception, and because the judgment which expresses the belief, and the comprehension, and the understanding of a thing, a judgment which precedes all others, cannot exist without perception. For perception leads the way; and then thought, finding vent in expressions, explains in words the feelings which it derives from perception. But there is a difference between phantasia and phantasma. For phantasma is a conception of the intellect, such as takes place in sleep; but phantasia is an impression, tupôsis, produced on the mind, that is to say, an alteration, alloiôsis, as Chrysippus states in the twelfth book of his treatise on the Soul. For we must not take this impression to resemble that made by a seal, since it is impossible to conceive that there should be many impressions made at the same time on the same thing. But phantasia is understood to be that which is impressed, and formed, and imprinted by a real object, according to a real object, in such a way as it could not be by any other than a real object; and, according to their ideas of the phantasiai, some are sensible, and some are not.  ...
  For all our thoughts are formed either by indirect perception, or by similarity, or analogy, or transposition, or combination, or opposition. By a direct perception, we perceive those things which are the objects of sense; by similarity, those which start from some point present to our senses; as, for instance, we form an idea of Socrates from his likeness. We draw our conclusions by analogy, adopting either an increased idea of the thing, as of Tityus, or the Cyclops; or a diminished idea, as of a pigmy. So, too, the idea of the centre of the world was one derived by analogy from what we perceived to be the case of the smaller spheres. We use transposition when we fancy eyes in a man‘s breast; combination, when we take in the idea of a Centaur; opposition, when we turn our thoughts to death. Some ideas we also derive from comparison, for instance, from a comparison of words and places.
• Aetius 4.12.2-4 (in SVF 2.54)
• An impression is an affection occurring in the soul, which reveals itself and its cause. Thus, when through sight we observe something white, the affection is what is engendered in the soul through vision; and it is this affection which enables us to say that there is a white object which activates us. Likewise when we perceive through touch and smell. ... just as light reveals itself and whatever else it includes in its range, so impression reveals itself and its cause. The cause of an impression is an impressor: e.g. , something white or cold or everything capable of activating the soul. Imagination is an empty attraction, an affection in the soul which arises from no impressor ... (LS 39B)

• Kataleptic impressions and catalepsis
• a kataleptic impression has the following traits
• It comes from what is
• i.e. it in fact comes from what it appears to be an impression of
  
• It is produced according to what is
• i.e. it corresponds to the object which imprinted it
• and also that object's features caused it to have the features it has
  
• It could not come from something which is not
• it is so clear and obvious that it just could not come from anything else (?)
  
• Isn't it always possible to create a replica?
• well, if the replica really is indiscernible from the object, then the replica is simply the same as the object
• still, there could be problems: now we have two objects: what if it is somehow important to determine which is the original?
• This worry is legitimate, but it may well postdate the Stoic theory
• on the other hand, Plato, at the end of the Cratylus does talk about things relevant to that worry
  
• in fact, ancient scepticism is chiefly aimed at the Stoic kataleptic impression
• There are other obvious legitimate worries: what are the distinguishing marks that identify an impression that has each of those wonderful traits described above, and what mechanism makes it the case that some impressions have those traits?
• Doubts about that sort of thing should, perhaps, lead the Stoics to become sceptics (more on that below).
  

• How does a kataleptic impression lead to knowledge?
• "Strong assent" is necessary
• Strong is opposed to weak assent
• we non-Sages only ever give weak assent
• Strong assent is immune to attack by any series of questions
• Strong assent is also immune to emotional or physical pressure
• Think of the fact that 1=1
• If you are tortured, you might say "One does not equal one. There, I've said it. Now stop the torture."
• But have you changed your belief?
• We now know that various means can make a person abandon even such a belief: arguably they are extra-ordinary, but what is ordinary...
  
• Strong assent is that sort of thing
• If you really know it, you would never change your mind or bow to someone casting doubt upon the impression that 1=1.
• Imagine that kind of assent to ethical propositions as well as others.
• That is the kind of assent the sage has
• it just makes no sense to think that torture or argument will make the sage renege on the sage's strong assent
• Weak assent is the norm for humans
• we assent to things, but our conviction could be swayed, and it is usually not backed up by dispositional knowledge, and we could not answer all questions about it
• So Knowledge is defined as "Strong assent to a kataleptic impression"
• Note that it is an event! not a state
• it only ever exists when it happens: it is occurrent
  
• They still use knowledge as we do
• A Stoic might say "I know algebra" even though right now the Stoic is not knowing algebra actively
• That is loose speaking by the Stoics, not technical precision.
• Beware of this phenomenon: the Stoics have lots of precise terminology, but then the authors we have don't use it! Darn it all.
• This explains why non-sages cannot know anything according to Stoics
• non-sages have only opinions
• But the sage has no opinions, only knowledge
• starts to look superhuman indeed
• Aren't we in a better position?
• We can "take a chance" and go with impressions
  
• In a world of imperfect information, we need to do that, don't we?
• We don't know that the cafeteria food is not poisoned: but we need to eat
• We don't know that our best friend has not decided to kill us: but we need our friend
• The sage simply can't/doesn't need to take those chances
• to do so would introduce the thin edge of a wedge
• one false belief would corrupt/could corrupt the sage
• also, the sage realizes that those impressions are not kataleptic

SIDE NOTE: It may seem that the Stoic ideas are an easy target, perhaps even "non-starters," but if you are an empiricist of any stripe, you have to address something like these challenges: what is our warrant or justification for accepting any sense impressions? Generally speaking, empiricism is the belief that we gain knowledge of the world via the senses. Strong empiricism says that is the only way we gain knowledge of the world. Rationalism is often opposed to empiricism and holds that we gain knowledge of the world via intuition or via innate abilities or contents of our minds. There are stronger and weaker versions of this too. Below, there is a quote from Aetius that shows that the Stoics entered this debate and thought that there were "preconceptions," which seem to be innate: were they abilities?propensities?concepts?knowledge? Diogenes Laertius is quoted below too, as saying that Chrysippus held that "sensation and preconception are the only criteria. And preconception is, according to him, a comprehensive physical notion of general principles. But others of the earlier Stoics admit right reason as one criterion of the truth."

• Shouldn't the Stoics' logic push them over into scepticism?
  
• Given that the sage never has opinions, and only has knowledge, it seems pretty easy to push the sage over into scepticism
• HOW does the sage KNOW that any particular impression is kataleptic?
• Couldn't it be otherwise?
• Once the sage admits there is a doubt, she either has to abandon her claims or become an epistemological sceptic and doubt the very possibility of knowing
• that is because the sage would not reject impressions outright, but rather withhold assent, conclude that there is not enough information to assent.
• and that is precisely what being an ancient sceptic involved: refusing to assent or dissent: sceptics "withheld" their assent
  
• For other philosophies, such as Aristotelianism or Platonism, knowledge seems more like a dispositional thing: it is a matter of having a web of interconnected facts and principles that add up to knowledge.
• For the Stoic, the sceptic has a much more specific easier target:
• Cast doubt on the existence of the kataleptic impression, and Stoicism seems to fall apart
  
• Furthermore, it seems hard to explain how the sage can possibly do anything
• don't all actions require constant assent to impressions?
• Aristotle formulated it as follows, in the "PRACTICAL SYLLOGISM" a version of which is:
  
1. First, we have a desire: want food
2. Then we see some food: that's food
3. Then we conclude with the action: eating food
• Step 3 is not propositional: rather, it's an action
• From two propositions, action results, according to the syllogism
• Stoics tell a slightly different story:
1. First, we have an impression: "I want food"
   
2. We (do/do not) assent to it: we agree that we want food
   
3. Impression: "That is food."
4. Assent to 3
5. Practical Impression: "Eating that food that I want is what I should do."
6. Action
• Step 5 is a PRACTICAL IMPRESSION
• Note that it is definitely non-sensible
  
• (where 1 and 3 are sensible: we feel/experience them/sense them)
  
• there is a lively debate in the literature about whether the Stoics held that there were non-sensible kataleptic (or other) impressions
• Note that the sage must have such an impression and have it be a kataleptic one in order to do anything at all
• so the sage can't do anything if the sage is faced with only vague/uncertain/subpar impressions
  

• The "reasonable," aka the "probable"
  
• Diogenes Laertius 7.177 (Life of Sphaerus II in our online text)
• "And when he made a considerable advance in philosophy he went to Alexandria, to the court of Ptolemy Philopater. And once, when there was a discussion concerning the question whether a wise man would allow himself to be guided by opinion, and when Sphaerus affirmed that he would not, the king, wishing to refute him, ordered some pomegranates of wax to be set before him; and when Sphaerus was deceived by them, the king shouted that he had given his assent to a false perception. But Sphaerus answered very neatly, that he had not given his assent to the fact that they were pomegranates, but to the fact that it was probable that they might be pomegranates. And that a perception which could be comprehended differed from one that was only probable." (=LS 40F)
• Cicero Academica 2.99-100
• [Speaker: Cicero, in defence of the New Academy] Indeed, even the wise man whom your school [the stoicizing school of Antiochus] brings onto the scene follows many things which are convincing--not unknown, perceived or assented to, but likely. Were he not to accept them, all life should surely be abolished. After all, when the wise man boards a ship he surely doesn't know and perceive in his mind that the voyage will be successful--how can he? But if he were now setting out from here for Puteoli, a journey of thirty stades, with an honest crew and a good steersman in the present calm weather, it would seem convincing to him that he would get there safely." (from L&S: 42I)
  
• I think that what is happening here is that there are two propositions
1. 'Those are real pomegranates'
2. 'It is reasonable that those are real pomegranates'
• I think that the sage can assent to 2 strongly, but not to 1
• There can be a non-kataleptic impression nested within a kataleptic impression
• 1 is clearly not kataleptic
• 2 is kataleptic
  
• 2 is sufficient for action
  
• So sages and we too can assent safely to impressions such as the one that has within it the proposition "I will be alive tomorrow" or "the sun will come out tomorrow" etc.
• As long as we are only assenting to their reasonability: i.e. we assent to "It is reasonable that I will be alive tomorrow."
  
• BUT Brennan seems to be saying something different, and I am not sure I understand him, so I won't try to present it: you can go read him.
  
• This bears further investigation
• It is the key to how the Stoics think that the sage can continue to act in the world without having opinions
• Unfortunately, I am not sure we have the evidence (probably I just haven't seen it while thinking about this problem) in our primary sources to figure what the Stoic theory to this level of detail.

• Non-sensible/non-perceptual kataleptic impressions?
• Why doubt that they exist for Stoics?
• Because a Kataleptic Impression, as defined above, has a causal notion in it
• the object not only corresponds to the impression, but it also causes the impression to have the form it does
• Only bodies can play a direct causal role
• nothing incorporeal, such as a proposition, time, empty space, can cause anything real
• How did the Stoics dodge this objection?
• Sextus Empiricus Against the Professors 8.409
• "For they {the Stoics] say, just as the trainer or drill-sergeant sometimes takes hold of the boy's hand to drill him and to teach him to make certain motions, but sometimes stands at a distance and moves to a certain drill to provide himself as a model for the boy-- so too some impressors touch, as it were, and make contact with the commanding faculty to make their printing in it, as do white and black, and body in general; whereas others have a nature like that of the incorporeal  sayables (lekta), and the commanding faculty is impressed in relation to them, not by them." (LS 27e)
• That's clearly an attempt to dodge the bullet
  
• How does the incorporeal stand in relation to the commanding faculty and how can the commanding faculty take on the features of that incorporeal?
• The idea may be that the mind forms part of itself into the form of the incorporeal sayable and that forms the imprint.
  
• It's not altogether whacky: how do we explain that our mind can form pictures of a wombat's head attached to the top of a tree trunk covered in pepperoni pizzas with beautiful wavy earthworms sticking out below?
• The mind just is plastic: it can create things in itself
  
• And the problem is not really any different from the basic problem of where the propositions that always accompany impressions come from! How and why are certain features of an object included while others are excluded? It's a huge problem, but not just for Stoics, no?
• In any case, it is clear that the Stoics thought there could be kataleptic impressions of incorporeals.
  

• Aetius 4.11.1-4
• "When a man is born, the stoics say, he has the commanding part of his soul like a sheet of paper ready for writing upon. On this he inscribes each one of his conceptions. The first method of inscription is through the senses. For by perceiving something, e.g. white, they have a memory of it when it has departed. And when many memories of a similar kind have occurred, we then say we have experience. For the plurality of similar impressions is experience.  Some conceptions arise naturally in the aforesaid ways and undesignedly, others through our own instruction and attention. The latter are called 'conceptions' only, the former are called 'preconceptions' as well. Reason, for which we are called rational, is said to be completed from our preconceptions during our first seven years." (LS 39E)
• Diogenes Laertius 7.54
• "They say that the proper criterion of truth is the comprehension, phantasia; that is to say, one which is derived from a real object, as Chrysippus asserts in the twelfth book of his Physics; and he is followed by Antipater and Apollodorus. For Boethius leaves a great many criteria, such as intellect, sensation, appetite, and knowledge; but Chrysippus dissents from his view, and in the first book of his treatise on Reason, says, that sensation and preconception are the only criteria. And preconception is, according to him, a comprehensive physical notion of general principles. But others of the earlier Stoics admit right reason as one criterion of the truth; for instance, this is the opinion of Posidonius, and is advanced by him in his essay on Criteria." (LS 40A)
• Epictetus Discourses 1.22
• "Precognitions are common to all men, and precognition is not contradictory to precognition. For who of us does not assume that Good is useful and eligible, and in all circumstances that we ought to follow and pursue it? And who of us does not assume that justice is beautiful and becoming? When, then, does the contradiction arise? It arises in the adaptation of the precognitions to the particular cases. When one man says, “He has done well: he is a brave man,” and another says, “Not so; but he has acted foolishly”; then the disputes arise among men."
  
• "What then is education? Education is the learning how to adapt the natural precognitions to the particular things conformably to nature; and then to distinguish that of things some are in our power, but others are not; in our power are will and all acts which depend on the will; things not in our power are the body, the parts of the body, possessions, parents, brothers, children, country, and, generally, all with whom we live in society."