• Epictetus 1.6
• Argument for God's existence from design:
• And, indeed, from the very structure of things which have attained their completion, we are accustomed to show that the work is certainly the act of some artificer, and that it has not been constructed without a purpose. And the existence of male and female, and the desire of each for conjunction, and the power of using the parts which are constructed, do not even these declare the workman? If they do not, let us consider the constitution of our understanding according to which, when we meet with sensible objects, we simply receive impressions from them, but we also select something from them, and subtract something, and add, and compound by means of them these things or those, and, in fact, pass from some to other things which, in a manner, resemble them: is not even this sufficient to move some men, and to induce them not to forget the workman? If not so, let them explain to us what it is that makes each several thing, or how it is possible that things so wonderful and like the contrivances of art should exist by chance and from their own proper motion?
  
• Human Nature was created to contemplate God and creation:
• But God has introduced man to be a spectator of God and of His works; and not only a spectator of them, but an interpreter. For this reason it is shameful for man to begin and to end where irrational animals do, but rather he ought to begin where they begin, and to end where nature ends in us; and nature ends in contemplation and understanding, in a way of life conformable to nature. Take care then not to die without having been spectators of these things.
• Our soul (i.e. our nature) was meant to be used to endure indifferents
• have you not received faculties by which you will be able to bear all that happens? Have you not received greatness of soul? Have you not received manliness? Have you not received endurance? And why do I trouble myself about anything that can happen if I possess greatness of soul? What shall distract my mind or disturb me, or appear painful? Shall I not use the power for the purposes for which I received it, and shall I grieve and lament over what happens?
• Hercules as metaphor for life: indifferents are the material out of which we may show our virtue
• What do you think that Hercules would have been if there had not been such a lion, and hydra, and stag, and boar, and certain unjust and bestial men, whom Hercules used to drive away and clear out? And what would he have been doing if there had been nothing of the kind? Is it not plain that he would have wrapped himself up and have slept? In the first place, then he would not have been a Hercules, when he was dreaming away all his life in such luxury and case; and even if he had been one what would have been the use of him? and what the use of his arms, and of the strength of the other parts of his body, and his endurance and noble spirit, if such circumstances and occasions had not roused and exercised him?
• Say "bring it on": relish the challenge: don't whine: it is up to you.
  
• say: “Bring now, O Zeus, any difficulty that Thou pleasest, for I have means given to me by Thee and powers for honoring myself through the things which happen.” You do not so; but you sit still, trembling for fear that some things will happen, and weeping, and lamenting and groaning for what does happen: and then you blame the gods. For what is the consequence of such meanness of spirit but impiety? And yet God has not only given us these faculties; by which we shall be able to bear everything that happens without being depressed or broken by it; but, like a good king and a true father, He has given us these faculties free from hindrance, subject to no compulsion unimpeded, and has put them entirely in our own power, without even having reserved to Himself any power of hindering or impeding.
  
• That last looks like free will! How can it be in a deterministic world?
• Epictetus 1.12
• For he is free to whom everything happens according to his will and whom no man can hinder.
• For how do we proceed in the matter of writing? Do I wish to write the name of Dion as I choose? No, but I am taught to choose to write it as it ought to be written. And how with respect to music? In the same manner. And what universally in every art or science? Just the same. If it were not so, it would be of no value to know anything, if knowledge were adapted to every man’s whim. Is it, then, in this alone, in thish which is the greatest and chief thing, I mean freedon, that I am permitted to will inconsiderately? By no means: but to be instructed is this, to learn to wish that everything may happen as it does. And how do things happen? As the disposer has disposed them. And he has appointed summer and winter, and abundance and scarcity, and virtue and vice, and all such opposites for the harmony of the whole; and to each of us he has given a body, and parts of the body, and possessions, and companions. ... we ought to go to be instructed, not that we may change the constitution of things—for we have not the power to do it, nor is it better that we should have the power-but in order that, as the things around us are what they are and by nature exist, we may maintain our minds in harmony with the things which happen.
• as to intelligence you are not inferior to the gods nor less; for the magnitude of intelligence is not measured by length nor yet by height, but by thoughts. Will you not, then, choose to place your good in that in which you are equal to the gods?
• For what, then, have they made you responsible? For that which alone is in your power, the proper use of appearances. Why then do you draw on yourself the things for which you are not responsible? It is, indeed, a giving of trouble to yourself.
• Epictetus 2.19
• [Speaking of the situation of humans who want to be Stoics: they have the wherewithal and the material] This is by nature free from restraint, this alone is free from impediment. Why then do you not finish the work? Tell me the reason. For it is either through my fault that you do not finish it, or through your own fault, or through the nature of the thing. The thing itself is possible, and the only thing in our power. It remains then that the fault is either in me or in you, or, what is nearer the truth, in both.
  

• Diogenes Laertius 7.23
• They say that he was once scourging a slave whom he had detected in theft; and when he [the slave] said to him, "It was fated that I should steal," he [Zeno] rejoined, "Yes, and that you should be beaten."
  
• If we think that Zeno is supposed to be acting correctly and not just making a joke/witty reply, then this passage suggests that the fact that everything is fated is irrelevant when it comes to punishment (and hence blameworthiness)
  
• Perhaps the idea is that sure, fate caused him to do it, but 1) he did it, and 2) he did it knowingly. 1 and 2 seem plausibly sufficient for the action to be blameworthy.
  
• Neither 1 nor 2 pay any attention to the causal chain, do they?
• Enough said. Compatibilism!
  

• Nonetheless, there is a great worry about blaming or praising people for things that they "had" to do
• If it is necessary that they do it, then it's like the man who, because the train lurches, falls onto a woman, who in turn falls entirely as a result of the push.
• Neither he nor she are plausibly blameworthy for the fall, nor is the train, nor the track (they do not "choose" anything): the train and track may be causes in that causal chain, but blame requires more than that.
  
• In Ancient Ethics in general, some things are generally agreed upon:
1. Blame/praise for an action can only be attached to the agent who did it.
2. For blame/praise to reasonably apply, the agent must have chosen to do it, knowingly
3. If it was necessary that the agent do it, then the agent cannot be reasonably blamed/praised for the action
• This is the flipside of #2: choice between two (or more) apparent options is not really choice if one of them is necessary.
  
4. There are at least some blameworthy/praiseworthy human actions
• Stoics, moreover, hold the following two positions:
1. every event has a cause
2. every event happens by fate
• (see quotations from last lecture notes for evidence for this as Stoic position)
• this clearly seems to add up to the conclusion that "choice" is an illusion.
  
• Attackers of Stoics say that causes work like this:
1. if something is caused to happen, then it happens by necessity
2. if something happens by fate, then it happens by necessity
• Brennan looks at 2 arguments:
• the 'Fabius' argument, named after "Fabius," who is sort of like "John Doe" or "Joe Public" (just a placeholder for any human).
  
• the argument that because everything is caused, nothing is 'up to us'

1. Fabius

• Cicero de Fato 12
• Well, if there is a science of divination, then what sorts of theorems does it employ? In every science the scientists make use of theorems in their work, and I can't believe things are different for the people who use divination to predict the future. So there are theorems of divination and they go like this: 'If anyone is born at the rising of the star Sirius (to make up an example), then he will not die at sea.' But you'd better watch out, Chrysippus, or you'll be giving up the struggle you have with Diodorus the great logician. For if that is a true conditional sentence--i.e., 'if anyone is born at the rising of the star Sirius, then he will not die at sea,'--then so is this one: 'if Fabius is born at the rising of Sirius, then Fabius will not die at sea.' So there is a conflict between 'Fabius was born at the rising of Sirius,' and 'Fabius will die at sea.' But since it is stipulated as certain that Fabius was born at the rising of Sirius, then there is a conflict between 'Fabius exists' and 'Fabius will die at sea.' So the following will also be a conjunction of incompatibilities: 'both: Fabius exists, and Fabius will not die at sea' which can thus never happen as it is stated. So it turns out that the statement: 'Fabius will die at sea' belongs to the class of things that cannot possibly happen. So, any false statement about the future describes something that cannot possibly happen.
• Brennan explains the "Fabius" argument as follows:
1. if divination is a science, then there are true conditionals of the form, 'if p, then q', where p mentions past events (for example, the birth of Fabius), and q mentions a future event (for example, his death).
2. in a true conditional of that sort, the denial of the proposition about the future, that is, the prediction, conflicts with the proposition about the past
3. true propositions about the past are necessary
4. whatever conflicts with the necessary is impossible
5. so, any negation of a true prediction is impossible
• Chrysippus' response:
• Cicero de Fato 13
• But this is what you [Chrysippus] want least of all ... you say that even in the case of things that will not be in the future, it is still possible for them to happen. For instance, this gem will never be broken, but it is still possible for it to break ... and here Chrysippus breaks into a sweat, and hopes that the Chaldaeans and other oracles are wrong, and they will not use that kind of connection to express their theorems, i.e. 'if someone is born at the rising of Sirius, then he will not die at sea.' Instead, he wants them to say 'not both: someone is born at the rising of Sirius, and that person will die at sea.' What hilarious liberties he is taking, teaching the Chaldaean oracles how to express their theorems.
• Chrysippus is claiming that conditionals are too strong a formulation for such predictions.
• He wants the oracle to formulate their predictions differently. They should say things like:
• People do not both have a birthday at the rising of sirius AND a death at sea.
• There is no conflict between the two: it is possible to be born then and die at sea: it just does not happen
• this is weaker than necessity
  
• The oracle may simply observe a universal regularity without claiming any necessary connection.
  
• This works, as far as it goes...
• Problems:
• Is there a reason why not both? If there is, it might involve necessity via a causal connection. So there is probably no reasonwhy not both.
  
• If divination depends on a network of causes, then it looks as if divination does indeed identify necessary connections, and it is indeed impossible that they be broken.
• Unless causes do not necessitate...
• In other words, the 'solution' appears to rest on a technicality that will not stand up against objections like those just raised.
• Chrysippus has more work to do: he must find a way to split necessity from causation
  

2. Stoic Opponents: Fate destroys what is 'up to us'
• Brennan's nutshell version
  
• If everything happens by fate, then nothing is 'up to us'
• but something is 'up to us'
• so, not everything happens by fate.
• Cicero de Fato 40
• They [i.e. the opponents] argued as follows:
1. If all things happen by fate, then all things happen by antecedent causes;
2. and, if this applies to impulse, then it applies to whatever is entailed by impulse, and thus it applies to assents as well.
3. But if the cause of impulse is not 'up to us,' then neither is impulse itself 'up to us', and
   
4. If this is so, then the things brought about by impulse are not 'up to us' either.
5. Therefore, neither our assents nor our actions are 'up to us.'
6. From this, it results that neither praise nor blame nor rewards nor punishments are justified.
• Chrysippus responds:
• Cicero de Fato 40
• Chrysippus has recourse to his cylinder and his cone: they cannot begin to move until given a push, but once that has happened, it is due to their own nature that the cylinder proceeds to roll and the cone proceeds to veer off. 'Whoever shoved the cylinder,' he says, 'gave it a start on moving, but did not give it its capacity to roll.' In the same way, the thing that produces the impression makes a sort of imprint and stamp of its image in our mind, but the assent is 'up to us.' It's just like with the cylinder: there is an external shove, but after that its continued movement is due to its own power and nature.
• Somehow this is supposed to help the Stoics out of the problem.
• Chrysippus is clearly not denying that assenting was determined.
• He is saying that my assent is a reflection of my mind.
• The impression part of the impulse itself was not sufficient for my action: it did not make me assent.
• No impression can compel assent
• My disposition towards the proposition within the impression is a more important cause of assent.
  
• Together, the incoming external impression and the internal state of my mind causes the assent.
• Thus he is rejecting # 3 above (if the cause of impulse is not 'up to us,' then neither is impulse itself 'up to us')
• The cause of the impulse is the assent, and the most important part of it is 'up to us'
• Note that Chrysippus must be saying that we can be held responsible for our character, even if what formed it is a big causal network which eventually has causes wholly external to us. We are responsible for our character NOW.
• This amounts to a compatibilist position.
• Incompatibilists are different: they think one of two things:
• that full determinism mandates rejection of anything like personal responsibility.
• that responsibility is obviously right, and so we have to reject full determinism
• For Stoics, we are reasonably held responsible for things that happen because of our internal psychology.
• Stoics and compatibilists like them claim that just as we make physical or cognitive assessments of people based on how they are NOW, so we can make moral assessments of people based on their moral condition NOW.
• Saying how people got to be the way they are now is a further, separate assessment.
• Saying how people got to be the way they are now involves tracking causal chains that are determined and cannot be changed.
  
• Think of it this way:
• I buy a car
• The car is a lemon
• Even if that's because the factory manager was a nincompoop, my car is still  right now a lemon.
• That the manager was a nincompoop does not make my car any better.
  
• It's still a lemon.
• Both the car and the manager can be assessed by some criteria, but those are independent assessments.
  
• Someone deals drugs:
• "Society" (i.e. her causal environment/situation) made her do it
• POPPYCOCK!
  
• She did it.
  
• She is to blame for dealing the drugs.
• Society didn't deal drugs. It is, however, a causal nexus contributing to a person's wickedness.
• "Society" is not a thing that chooses knowingly.
  
• The principle seems to be that we can isolate rational bodies in the causal chain and blame them for what they cause.
• Bailly Aside: Now, you may ask, what follows from that? Can we punish criminals, beatify the virtuous? Personally, I think that a lot more work needs to be done here. This theory may only "push back" the discussion and not really solve whether or not responsibility is a reasonable basis for the many things that result if one is held responsible for something.
  

That seems like a good argument, and seems to work.
Chrysippus clearly made that argument.
But he clearly was not satisfied.

• The "agent-shifting" case: Chrysippus tries another way to justify compatibilism.
  
• Chrysippus admits that the external impression plus my internal state are sufficient to cause the action.
• BUT he still wants to say I was not forced, because:
• ANOTHER AGENT, in my shoes, might not have done the same action.
• Thus the assent is a fact about me and no one else, and I am responsible for the assent.

• The Life-boat analogy


• the life-boat can hold 250 pounds
• I am already in the life-boat
  
• my weight  is 180 lbs.
• your weight  is 100 lbs.
• you jump in the life-boat
  
• the life-boat sinks.
• I blame you.
• You say "but I only weigh 100 lbs: the boat can hold 250: how can I be the cause?"
• I say, "Given that I am who I am, and weigh what I weigh, it is just impossible that a 100lb addition would not sink the boat."
• REPEATED WITH ANALOGY SPELLED OUT:
  
• the life-boat can hold 250 pounds
• I am already in the life-boat (i.e. I am in me)
  
• my weight (i.e. my internal disposition) is 180 lbs.
• your weight (i.e. the external impression) is 100 lbs.
• you jump in the life-boat (i.e. you are an impression that comes to me)
• the life-boat sinks.
• Jump out of the analogy and back into what it is meant to illustrate: given who I am, a given external impression can FORCE me to do something: there was no way for me not to do it, given who I am.
• Sure, another person might not be affected that way by the "same" impression, but why is that relevant? I am who I am, she is who she is.
  
• Chrysippus' "Another agent wouldn't do it" argument seems not to really argue that it was possible for ME not to do it.
  
• Chrysippus still has to do better: how was it POSSIBLE for me not to assent.

• The Stoic definition of "possible" according to Brennan (the sources for this are in Long and Sedley's collection):

• P is possible just in case:
1. P is receptive of being true
2. P is not hindered from being true by externals

• #1 seems to be saying that, e.g., "I am drawing a round square" is impossible because it is "not receptive of being true," because no square can be round.
  
• #2 seems to be talking about situations like, e.g., being paralyzed (or having nothing to draw with) which make it impossible to draw anything, whether or not the thing drawn is "receptive of being true."
  
• Taking the cake
• Imagine I am put in a position where I can take a cake or not.
  
• It looks to me as if, on the Stoic picture, I was fated to steal the cake: causal chains ineluctably led to an impression hitting me: the cake was there: we "met each other half way": because of who I am and what the cake is, an impression formed "taking the cake is a good idea": because of who I am, I assented. Causal chains ineluctably led to me being who I am: given who I am and given that impression, there is no way I could not take the cake: in other words, it is impossible.
• Chrysippus responds:
• "I do not steal the cake" is perfectly possible!
  
1. "I do not steal the cake" is receptive to being true: it is not similar to "I draw a square circle"
2. "I do not steal the cake" is not hindered by externals: nothing outside of me is preventing me from not stealing the cake (that is, nothing outside of me is forcing me to steal it)
• Thus it is indeed possible for me not to steal the cake EVEN if I steal it.
• Brennan responds:
• Slow down: there's some sleight of argument there
• The possibility criteria listed above need to consider "I do not steal the cake" consistently
• either "I" includes all my dispositions, or it does not.
• If "I" includes my dispositions, then running back through A and B, we will find that "I do not steal the cake" is indeed an impossible object in A
• Given my dispositions, it is just not possible that "I do not steal the cake"
• If "I" does not include my dispositions, then they are external to "I do not steal the cake", and by once again running through A and B, we will find that "I do not steal the cake" is hindered by my dispositions.
• Thus once again, it is just not possible that "I do not steal the cake"
• Thus Chrysippus should concede that fate makes all events, including assents, necessary
• Fate destroys what is up to us.
• Conclusion:
  
• Stoics say that there is nothing wrong with saying that my actions are determined, but they seem to be unwilling to say that they are necessary.
• That unwillingness arises from a perception that what is necessary is not amenable to blame and praise.
  
• They want blame and praise to be compatible with determinism.
• Stoics should have bitten the bullet and said that my actions are determined, and that means that they are necessitated and caused.
• Then they should have said that that is compatible with praise and blame.
• Praise and blame could be held to be legitimate because they are assessments of what I am NOW, not judgements of how I got to be what I am or whether those causes were good or bad.
• Even though my actions are necessitated, the Stoics might well have been better off saying that determinism is nonetheless compatible with blame and praise.