•  When we were discussing the idea that you can’t do both the fine and shameful thing at any time I had thought, what if you know the fine thing to do and just don't act either way. Is that still doing the shameful thing or is indifference a whole other idea?- Winberry
    • Great, interesting question. Not sure whether Plato addresses it: if he does, not directly. Often, you can figure out what he is probably committed to about such things by reading widely and finding scattered treatments of relevant phenomena: it’s not perfect, but that’s what one has to do if one really needs to or wants to know what Plato might say about this or that thing that he doesn’t address directly. I have no answer to offer off hand, in this case. But it does illustrate that Plato is great to think with, and that’s perhaps as good a reason to read him as any: trying to figure out what he believes is often rather circular or indeterminate, so that can be less productive than simply riffing off of whatever issues he raises and what you think he might be saying. I’m speaking, of course, of reading him in a non-scholarly way: scholars want to do the archaeology of his thought, and we’ll do a lot of that. Bailly (Prof. B).

  • Euthyphro’s role seems similar to that of Hippius, which we called a “cipher” in class. He appears to be an empty character, which makes the reader question what Plato actually believes the pious to be. I was also curious if Plato intentionally did not have his characters reach a firm conclusion. Why did he choose to end the argument abruptly? -Winters

    • Hard to say why he did that with any confidence. What I think is that these "aporetic" dialogues are meant to hook the reader and get them started doing philosophy, but just as Socrates doesn't want to hand you answers on a platter, so Plato doesn't want to do that, until you are good and ready to question and argue with him. That is, until you are hooked on philosophy. ProfB
  • I found Euthyphro’s argument about prosecuting his father to be interesting enough--the fact that family should be penalized no differently from strangers. Even more interesting was the fact that part of the basis of Euthyphro’s argument revolved around absolving himself of his own “pollution” by bringing his father to justice, introducing an element of self-preservation. If Euthyphro hadn’t felt it necessary to do this, would he still have indicted his father in the pursuit of justice? -Slade

    • Excellent observations! I'll have more to say about this in class. ProfB
  • Similar to Slade’s comment, I too thought Euthyphro’s response to Socrates when discussing the differentiation of father to stranger was of particular interest. When Socrates questions Euthryphro’s motives for prosecuting his own father, Euthyphro brings to attention that regardless of whom the killer is, he is still a killer; it does not make the killer’s actions any more morally-permissible. Socrates believes Euthryphro truly does hold the answer to what is pious and what is not - the meaning of piety and impiety - whether Euthyphro’s hidden convictions of piety and impiety are true or not. However, though he felt Euthyphro to be a somewhat “expert” on the subject, why did Socrates remain complicit (or unphased, maybe) with Euthyphro repeating and reflecting his very own answers back onto him? I’m assuming (and quite certain of it) that the pursuit of knowledge gets in the way of realizing when conversations are constructive and when they are not. - Danshi \

    • Oh boy, more excellent observations. We'll be exploring these issues a lot. What you are doing is what I call "meta-dialogue" observations: you are not arguing with or agreeing with what is said, but seeing how it is said, what the rules are for the game that is being played in a Platonic dialogue. ProfB
  • I asked the question about Justice being equity or equality during class. I continued thinking deeply about this and began to realize it may be a translation issue rather than Plato not giving us a clear answer. I am interested to know how to define the Greek term for justice. Furthermore, if everyone is just, are they equally just or is that justice within them different based on social, physical, and emotional status? I am interested to know how broad of a claim Plato can make without it being too naive. -Fensterer 

    • Thanks for this very good observation. We are going to have to read the whole of the Republic to approach an answer to what justice is for Plato, and that may not even be the only answer Plato has: he wrote many dialogues over a long life. Perhaps he changed his mind? Justice is a huge topic. ProfB
  • When it comes to defining what justice is, I think Plato would define it as a type of knowledge. His Theory of Forms and the Doctrine of Recollection can be used to argue in favour of this interpretation. However, I have heard that in later dialogues Plato goes against these theories. I am looking forward to developing a better understanding of Plato’s greater body of work.Michael Scott.

    • You're jumping ahead, way ahead, Michael, and you are right to do so, but we'll have to wait for the Meno and the Phaedo to really dig into this. Prof B
  • It's kind of funny that Socrates is essentially making all of Euthaphro's arguments for him. Had Euthaphro truly known what was pious and what was not then he would be able to make a case for himself easily, however, as we learn rather quickly Euthaphro has no idea what he is talking about. It's interesting to note as well that Socrates is acting in purely good faith and humility (though it’s clear he finds the whole exchange humorous) . He truly wants to learn, especially from a man who claims to have great wisdom and so asks questions and makes arguments for Euthaphro in order to nail down what he believes. On another point, I think it was said in class that Plato believes “Justice” is something that exists within an individual. Does this mean that Plato believes Justice is a subjective thing, that each person makes their own kind of Justice? Or does he believe that Justice is an external or objective thing that people tap into through logic and rationality?  - Trauben

    • Such great observations, but are they right? I don't think so, when I see this as a piece of writing and "Euthryphro" as a tool for Plato. From your perspective, treating Euthyphro as a person, you may be absolutely right. And yet, I think Euthyphro has some very good ideas: they just don't fit with Socrates' agenda. ProfB
  • While Plato presents one form or another of epistemic humility in a number of the Socratic dialogues, his telling of Euthaphro’s second idea of piety is particularly relevant (and entertaining). It’s refreshing that Euthaphro and Socrates both are at least a little charitable to the participants of an argument. However, it seems that Euthaphro rolls over and (reluctantly) accepts an assumption made by Socrates that I would have liked to see discussed further. That is, Socrates implies that, because of their internal quarrels, the gods must disagree about the forms of the pious and impious. Instead of suggesting that the gods might have narrower, more specific disagreements than this sweeping picture of two opposite and contradictory systems, Euthaphro accepts Socrates’ claim offering only an exception to that rule pertaining to the murder committed by his father. -Todt

    • So right. Euthyphro has several very good ideas that Socrates does not really explore fully. ProfB
  • (14c) " The lover of inquiry must follow his beloved where it may lead him". This part feels to me that Socrates is speaking of himself, and I am not sure how, but seems important in relation to (910c) "is something loved either something changed"...but I'm a bit twisted around... Is he asking if love changes by being loved? if so, If Socrates 'loves' inquiry, can he also change it by loving it? If love does change, then is it measurable? I am not sure I fully understand what Socrates is trying to establish in the love section…-MaryDove

    • Another great thicket of questions. Too much to address in one go. "Love" will be VERY important in the Symposium, and elsewhere in Plato, but I don't have a grand theory to tell you about here. ProfB
  • I thought this discussion was really annoying because the question they were trying to solve is essentially what is right and wrong and what is the purpose of our existence.  I feel like their religion got in the way of actually coming up with a satisfactory answer.  They only briefly actually talked about morals and values that are important to living a meaningful and just life and instead was mainly from my perspective, Socrates just messing around with Euthyphro.  To me the main message of the passage was that figuring out the answer to life takes more than a simple conversation. Lampert

    • Many people feel what you feel. I hope I can convince you otherwise as the semester goes on. ProfB
  • I like how there is a summary at the beginning of the writing explaining what is happening. I felt like I was having a difficult time understanding some of the dialogue throughout the writing and I spent a lot of time focusing on little things that were not too significant to the story line. I think for the next piece I will wait until the end to read the summary so I can see if my interpretation is the same as the summary. C. Johnson
    • The source of all known true verified absolutely reliable facts, Wikipedia, has a page for each dialogue. It's usually pretty good for starters. ProfB.