The Presidential Election of 2000: A Great Civics Lesson?

The Presidential Election of 2000: A Great Civics Lesson?

by ROBERT L. DUDLEY

Presidential Studies Quarterly, September 2001, volume 31, issue 3

It is an axiom of politics, usually attributed to Otto Von Bismarck, that the public should never see the making of sausages or legislation. Perhaps in the light of the 2000 election, we should add to the list the casting and counting of votes. An election in doubt for thirty-six days after the vote had been cast was not a pretty picture. During this second presidential campaign, Americans were treated to a spectacle that included a concession and its retraction, more than fifty lawsuits (not counting the multitude of appeals), street demonstrations, public hearings, counts and recounts of the votes, and the somewhat less than riveting live broadcasts of ballot counting in action. Not until December 12, when the U.S. Supreme Court ordered an end to manual recounts of Florida votes, did Americans finally have a decision.

Looking for a saving grace, commentators took to referring to the election as a great civics lesson. But what was learned? Certainly the vocabulary of Americans was enriched with terms like undervote, overvote, chad (dimpled, pregnant, and swinging), and butterfly ballots. Americans also learned a great deal more about the workings of the electoral college than the standard textbooks contain. That critics of the electoral college have not simply been crying wolf in their claims that the system could produce a winner contrary to the popular vote probably came as surprise to many. In 2000, the theoretical happened. The runner-up in the popular vote was elevated to the presidency. On the other hand, with hindsight, it appears that the American public is willing to accept as president a candidate who lost the popular vote but won the electoral vote.

Ironically, the workings of the electoral college may have masked some more fundamental civics lessons by turning the second campaign into the War for Florida. From a dramatic perspective, Florida was an ideal state to play out the second campaign. With the state's governor a brother to one of the candidates and a secretary of state who compared herself to the biblical Queen Esther, Florida was a scriptwriter's dream. Dramatic conflict needs a villain and Florida fit beautifully. Interestingly, Illinois had a higher percentage of uncounted votes than Florida and would have made an even better story. A state where the largest city is run by a legendary boss's son, who is also the brother of a presidential candidate's campaign manager, and where there are more than enough colorful characters to eclipse Florida, makes an even better story. But of course the election was not close in Illinois.

Comforting as it may be to blame Florida or to more specifically blame the voting system used in the disputed counties, the problem is far broader and more intractable than demonstrated by a handful of counties. Americans, even many of those who study electoral politics, have for decades taken a complacent view of the mechanics of the electoral process. With the corruption of the nineteenth century long behind us and an ever increasingly sophisticated understanding of voting behavior, the details of election administration faded in importance. To be sure, those who study elections have always recognized that final vote tallies are always approximate. Every election has uncounted votes that should have been counted and votes counted that should not have been. Exactitude has never been a quality of elections, but for the most part these have been treated as random noise in the system.

The 2000 election, then, provides an opportunity to relearn some old lessons about elections. First of all, the 2000 election reminds us that election administration is a local affair. To paraphrase another political axiom, this one from the late Speaker of the House Thomas "Tip" O'Neill, "all elections are local." Of course, state administration of elections is rooted in the Constitution, but the process is further decentralized by the penchant of the states to assign the implementation of elections to cities and counties with little legislative guidance and even less financing. Furthermore, the 2000 election reminds us that the rules matter. The complex sets of rules defined by states and local jurisdictions establish who wins, how candidates campaign, and which votes count. The choices that voters and candidates make are not simply exercises in preference ordering but responses to the electoral environment as defined by those jurisdictions charged with election administration (Dudley and Gitelson 2001).

Three issues of elections administration that emerged in the 2000 presidential election deserve particular attention. Two of these, ballot design and voting mechanisms, received considerable attention in Florida. A third concern, liberalized absentee voting, received less attention but was nevertheless part of the backdrop of the 2000 election.

Designing Ballots

Having learned that all ballots do not look the same, Americans seemingly want a change. Provoked by the infamous butterfly ballot, citizens and many political leaders apparently prefer a uniform ballot across the country. A Washington Post/ABC poll conducted after the election indicated that 88 percent of the respondents would support a federal law requiring the same design and layout for all election ballots (Morin and Deane 2000).

Of course, in one important sense we already have uniformity in the Australian ballot. Introduced in the late nineteenth century as a reform effort designed to break the hold on the election process of the political parties and reduce the corruption believed to accompany their control, the Australian ballot created the first truly secret ballot in American politics. It is, however, a misnomer to speak of a single Australian ballot. Some states have adopted the "office-block" layout that lists the candidates by office. Alternatively, other states incorporate the style of the old strip ballots produced by the political parties of the nineteenth century into the "party column" ballot.

These differences are instructive for any discussion of a uniform ballot because they teach us that these internal formatting differences have consequences. Split-ticket voting in states adopting the party column format was in the first few years after reform only slightly higher than under the classic strip ballot. The office-block format, on the other hand, early on demonstrated much stronger split-ticket patterns, although the addition of a straight party option to the office-block format decreased split-ticket voting (Rusk 1970). None of this surprises political activists. In 1949, for instance, Ohio Republicans spent more than $85,000 in a successful campaign to replace the party column with the office block, all in an effort to save Senator Robert Taft from defeat in the 1950 election. More recently, the Illinois legislature, under the control of Republicans, eliminated the straight party option on the state's ballots on the presumption that it benefited Democrats.

Another consequence of the office-block format may be to enhance voter fatigue and voter roll-off. Roll-off, of course, has long been associated with the long ballot, but it seems particularly acute when combined with the office-block format. The complexity of the office block over a large number of choices increases voter fatigue, especially among the less educated voters. To Jack Walker (1966, 462) the point was clear: "The more complex the design of the ballot, the greater the tendency for voters to neglect races at the bottom of the ticket."

So what should a uniform ballot look like? Should it encourage ticket splitting? Should it be designed to minimize voter fatigue? The design decision obviously has consequences, and entrenched political forces in the states will certainly work to protect their interests. It is unlikely that the states can agree on a single design because no standard can please all the interests. There is, however, an alternative for standardizing ballot design. Congress could mandate a single design for all elections for federal offices, leaving the states free to adopt whatever design they think appropriate for state and local offices.

This creates a new set of problems, however. It is far from clear that a common design applied to different situations creates the same effect. The now notorious butterfly ballot, for instance, was created to accommodate the unusual situation often presidential candidates in a print style large enough to be read by elderly voters. However flawed it may have been, the butterfly ballot was a response to a particular set of circumstances not present in most states. As long as access to the ballot in federal elections is through the states, ballot options will differ. Even the same format will have different consequences for voters, depending on the length of the ballot. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that states would adopt one design for federal offices and another for local offices. States displeased with the selected design might, however, rearrange their electoral calendars to further separate federal and local elections. Changes in electoral calendars can insulate state and local candidates from the national elections, but most evidence indicates that doing so depresses turnout in the state and local elections (Boyd 1986). A uniform ballot design that results in lower turnout for some offices seems a pyrrhic victory.

Rather than pursuing a uniform ballot, a more reasonable and effective approach would entail a greater attention to basic design principles (National Clearing House on Election Administration 1984). Following the publication of the Florida butterfly ballot, many graphic artists offered alternative versions of the same information. Whether these were better remains an open question. But that is precisely the point. We do not know how much improvement can be achieved by careful attention to design principles. Voting machines are routinely tested for accuracy; there is, however, little testing of the design graphics. Still, it must be admitted that good design can take us only so far. Extremely long ballots with numerous choices may present insurmountable design problems. It is difficult to imagine how even the industry's best design practices could have helped Chicago voters facing a ballot with 456 perforated squares.

Casting and Counting the Vote

The focus on Florida also drew in sharp relief the fact that just as there is no uniform ballot, there is no standard method of voting within or among the states. The Washington Post/ABC poll cited earlier reported that 87 percent of the respondents said that they would support a federal law mandating a single type of voting mechanism (Morin and Deane 2000). Currently only eight states mandate a single ballot medium for use in all jurisdictions. The remaining states leave the choice of the voting mechanisms up to the cities and counties. Although most states certify the equipment, allowing local governments to use only those devices approved by the state, local governments have a wide variety of options. The result is a hodgepodge system based largely on what cities and counties can afford.

In the 2000 election, slightly less than 2 percent of the voters used paper ballots, while another 20 percent cast their vote using a mechanical lever machine. On the other hand, a plurality, more than 37 percent, used one of the alternative versions of the much-maligned punchcard system. Another quarter of the voters in 2000 used a system known as Marksense: optically scanned ballots. Finally, about 10 percent of the voters used some version of the newest procedure known as Direct Recording Electronic (DRE). Here voters complete the ballot by use of a touch screen or push button similar to the ubiquitous ATM machines. Touching the screen or the appropriate buttons enters the vote directly into electronic storage (diskette or smart card), where the vote is added to all others.

Does all of this variability matter? Despite the bad reputation that the punchcard received in the 2000 election, the answer to the question is far from clear. The now infamous Florida punchcards make this system seem the least attractive alternative and the most prone to voter error. Indeed these problems are real, although the degree varies by the type of punchcard system used. The Votomatic system, which indicates the locations of the holes only by a number on the card, seems to create more problems for voters than the Datavote system, which lists the names of the candidates or a statement of the issue next to the location of the hole to be punched. But no matter which system is used, chad happens. Chad may not be dislodged because the voter does not push hard enough, or because the stylus is worn, or because the card is not placed in the hole correctly. If, for instance the card is even a quarter of an inch off in the holder, the stylus will not push out the chad, even if the voter punches a hole in the card. The problems are further compounded by the fact that repeated machine counts produce different totals with each count. With each reading, some hanging chad are likely to be dislodged, while others are pushed back in the hole. Illustrative of this problem are the three machine counts in Palm Beach County conducted in 2000. Each count produced different results in the presidential rice.

These problems can be minimized by clear statutory language. California, for instance, specifies that a punchcard vote may be counted if it contains a hanging chad--one attached to the ballot by a single corner. Swinging chad (two corners attached) and tri-chad (three attached comers) cannot be counted. Washington statutes, on the other hand, require local officials to inspect the cards, removing any hanging chad before putting the cards into the counting machines. Unfortunately, few states provide clear standards for counting the votes. The crucial decisions regarding what to count are routinely left to the discretion of local officials.

Furthermore, the punchcard systems are often criticized because they do not prevent overvotes. Overvoting, however, could be significantly reduced if the counties provided each precinct with readers. This so-called "second chance technology" allows voters to run their cards through a reader that can indicate overvotes and even undervotes, allowing them to secure a new ballot and vote again. The issue is not technology, but cost.

Still, the use of punchcards is generally seen as more difficult for voters. There is some evidence, for example, that inexperienced and elderly voters tend to make more mistakes with punchcards than with any other system (Schocket, Heighberger, and Brown 1992; Roth 1998).

The obvious lesson from the 2000 election then seems to be to replace the punchcard systems. Indeed, this has been the reaction of Florida officials. Many of the reform measures introduced at the end of the 106th and beginning of the 107th Congress were also aimed at precisely this target. The question then becomes, What to use as a replacement? Lever machines are not a viable option since they are no longer produced. In Florida, the answer is to replace the punchcard systems with leased Marksense machines. Certainly Marksense has some of the advantages found in punchcards, but without the chad. Like punchcards, Marksense can provide speedy counts while maintaining a paper record for audit purposes. Furthermore, if the tabulation of votes is done at the precinct, ballots can be checked for overvotes before being submitted, allowing voters to obtain and cast another ballot. The attractiveness of Marksense is further enhanced by its relatively low cost. Of course, most jurisdictions keep the cost low by limiting counters to central locations.

Unfortunately, Marksense shares many of the problems of punchcards. Although voters need only fill in a box, circle, or oval, or complete an arrow, many voters circle the candidate's name, or punch holes in the ballot, or write "yes" next to the candidate. Still other voters may press so softly that their shading is too light to be read by the scanner. Once again, whether these votes are counted depends on the decisions of local officials, because few states provide any real statutory guidance on these questions.

As an alternative to the paper-bound systems, the various versions of DRE and to a lesser extent Internet voting have attracted a great deal of attention. Because these machines can provide almost immediate vote tabulations, they appear quite attractive. The electronic systems are also appealing because they can be easily programmed to block overvoting. Potentially these systems can also reduce undervoting by signaling the offices for which the voter has yet to cast a vote. Nonetheless, one preliminary study of voting systems across the country suggests that DRE systems have a higher incidence of roll-off than Marksense, lever machines, or even paper ballots (Alvarez et al. 2001).

Electronic methods also raise serious questions. Many fear that these systems are vulnerable to fraud and manipulation. Computer scientist Howard Strauss echoed the fears of many when he warned that as the electronic systems centralize vote counting, they increase the opportunity for manipulation. According to Strauss, the security protecting electronic voting is "not a door without locks, it's a house without doors" (Utter and Strickland 1997). This may well be hyperbole, but no software can be certified virus-free. Firewalls can be broached and Trojan horses are difficult to detect. But suspicion of electronic systems is not limited to intentional fraud. The tabulation process is only as good as the software. If the software has bugs, the votes may not be counted accurately. Indeed, in 1998 Dallas County, Texas, discovered the dangers of faulty software when its new electronic system failed to count forty thousand votes. These problems are compounded by the fact that the electronic systems, like the lever machines, leave no paper trail, making it difficult to audit election returns. For backup purposes the machines write the vote counts to two devices, but that simply means that the same results, accurate or not, are written twice. Further checks can be instituted if the software is written to record an anonymous ballot-by-ballot file or provide the voter with a printout for deposit in a sealed box. Still, the greatest impediment to DRE is cost. DRE voting stations and counting equipment are significantly more costly than Marksense or punchcards.

In the final analysis, guaranteeing uniform voting mechanisms will be an expensive proposition. Estimates for providing each jurisdiction with DRE systems, for instance, range from $3.5 to $5 billion. Even replacing punchcards with Marksense will constitute an enormous expense for most jurisdictions. What's more, the diversity of voting systems may be a blessing, albeit one in disguise. The diversity and decentralization of voting systems makes widespread tampering more difficult than if a single system were used. Some observers also argue that a single standard for voting systems would reduce the economic incentives to develop newer technology.

Making Voting More Convenient

The general quest to standardize voting contradicts another apparently widely held view regarding elections. Increasingly, Americans seem to want the voting process to be more convenient. Traditionally, absentee balloting was limited to those who could not physically go to the polls or were planning on being out of the state on election day. Over the past couple of decades, however, several states have liberalized these laws. Indeed, twenty-one states now have ballot-access laws that are so elastic as to constitute a kind of no-fault absentee voting. Moreover, amendments to the Voting Rights Act require all states to permit absentee voting in presidential elections if the voter requests the ballot within seven days of the election and returns it before the polls close. The natural extension of this process is, of course, the mail-in vote. Sixteen states have adopted some version of the mail-in ballot, usually for referenda issues. In most cases, the voters fill out the ballot and mail it in, return it to the polling place on election day, or simply ignore it and cast their vote at a polling place on election day. Oregon, on the other hand, now conducts its elections exclusively by mail.

Like all changes in the voting process, increased absentee voting and mail-in voting have consequences in the electorate. Some early studies suggested that mail-in balloting increased turnout, but the evidence was limited to elections without candidates and only ballot measures (Hamilton 1988; Magleby 1987). The only study that looked at mail-in voting involving candidates for office concluded that in Oregon, the mail-in elections increased registered voter turnout between 1960 and 1996 by 10 percent (Southwell and Burchett 2000). Although a little high, this tracks well with studies of the liberalization of absentee voting. The best evidence on absentee voting and turnout indicates that the more liberalized laws do increase turnout, but only if they are combined with political party efforts to mobilize absentee voters. Without party mobilization efforts, increased absentee eligibility does little to elevate turnout. Moreover, absentee liberalization combined with party activity increases turnout among those already most likely to vote (Oliver 1996). Even the most liberal absentee ballot laws do little to increase the turnout of those least likely to vote.

Liberalization of absentee voting has created an entirely new campaign practice in which the parties send out thousands of absentee applications along with their campaign literature. The parties love this because absentee voters are so easy to track. Fellow partisans can be identified, provided with the ballot applications, and then pursued until they return the forms. Moreover, since they know who received the ballots, the campaign organizations can encourage voting by targeting calls, mailings, and even home visits to this particular group. Although the disputes over Florida absentee balloting in the 2000 election tended to be lost in the partisan rhetoric, they should serve as a caution. Disputes over access to voter registration information in Seminole County and debates over how many of the overseas absentee ballots should be counted demonstrate the vulnerability of these procedures.

The increase in remote voting that comes with mail-in votes and liberalized absentee voting raises serious questions about the rules for counting. Generally, states require that the ballot must be postmarked no later than election day, but the number of days after the election that it may be received and still count varies. Most often left out is a clear rule regarding ballots that arrive within the allowable time but with no discernable postmark. As is so often the case, most state laws leave the decision to the discretion of local election officials. Additionally, the image of political parties sending out absentee ballot applications and following them up with personal contacts raises some serious questions about the integrity of the voting process. At the very least, the widespread use of absentee ballots provides the opportunity for vote buying. The Australian ballot made vote buying problematic since what was actually cast was secret. No such secrecy is guaranteed with absentee or mail-in ballots.

Ironically, this all balanced against a vote-counting system that, when done properly, takes longer than any of the on-site voting mechanisms. Since each vote has to be verified, the counting process can be painfully slow even when the ballots appear on a Marksense form. Of course, off-site Internet voting could change this, but few scholars who have looked at the issue believe that the technology is sufficiently advanced to support off-site versions of Internet voting (see, in particular, Internet Policy Institute 2001).

Lessons Learned?

Even as the War for Florida was going on, political leaders at all levels began to talk of the need for significant changes in the electoral process. More than thirty separate pieces of legislation were introduced at the end of the 106th and the beginning of the 107th Congress. Similarly, state leaders across the country promised to make electoral reform a high priority in their states. By the spring of 2001, however, the steam had seemingly run out of many of the reform efforts. President Bush's budget included no funds for election reform, congressional legislation seemed stalled, and few changes had been made by the states.

Not surprisingly, Florida made the most striking changes. The package of election reforms passed in 2001 eliminates the punchcard system and provides financial help to counties for upgrading equipment. Smaller counties will receive $7,500 per precinct to purchase optical scanners; larger counties will receive $3,500. Counties that can afford the more expensive DRE systems can use them instead of the optical scanners. Florida also committed $2 million to create a central database of registered voters and another $6 million for voter and poll-worker education. Finally, in what must seem like bitter irony to Al Gore, the new law mandates hand recounts.

Florida has made a good start worthy of emulation. In particular, Florida's commitment to improving voter registration records is long overdue in Florida and most states. Although it received only sporadic attention in 2000, registration is clearly the weakest link in the election process. Similarly, the attention to voter and poll-worker education is an important step in guaranteeing the integrity of the voting process. Technology cannot save a system in which voters and poll workers lack the knowledge necessary to use it. For too long we have assumed that voters know how to use the technology. We have also assumed that poll workers are equipped to do the job. Neither assumption is accurate. Enhanced technology without increased effort to educate voters and poll workers is doomed to fail.

Finally, we need to know more about the interface between voters and the technology. A ballot presents information used in decision making under substantial time constraints. Unfortunately, we know little about the human factors and how they interface with ballot design and technology. Although voting systems are routinely tested for technical accuracy, we do not have systematic evidence from users. Technological and design decisions must be informed by knowledge of how voters actually use the systems.

References

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Boyd, Richard. 1986. Election calendars and voter turnout. American Politics Quarterly 14:89-104.

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Internet Policy Institute. 2001. Report of the National Workshop on Internet Voting (Prepared for the National Science Foundation). College Park: University of Maryland. Retrieved from the World Wide Web: http// www.internetpolicy.org/research/e_voting_report.pdf.

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Robert L. Dudley is associate professor of government at George Mason University. He is coauthor of the fortcoming book American Elections: The Rules Matter.