## Math 259 - Spring 2019 Homework 1 Solutions

- 1. This problem is just to make sure that everyone can do some basic computations using any software they are comfortable with. I am personally using Sage, but anything will do.
  - (a) We have that N = 27894437, and  $\varphi(N) = (p-1)(q-1) = 3700 \times 7536 = 27883200$ . Then we have that  $d \equiv e^{-1} \equiv 443^{-1} \equiv 10259507 \pmod{27883200}$ .
  - (b) To encrypt we simply compute  $c \equiv m^e \equiv 11034007^{443} \equiv 19717832 \pmod{27894437}$ .
  - (c) To decrypt we compute  $m \equiv c^d \equiv 3003890^{10259507} \equiv 12990712 \pmod{27894437}$ .
- 2. To get N=pq from  $\varphi(N)=(p-1)(q-1)$ , we need a relationship between N and  $\varphi(N)$ . Expanding  $\varphi(N)$ , we have that  $\varphi(N)=(p-1)(q-1)=pq-p-q+1=N-p-q+1$ . We can solve this for p+q and say that

$$p + q = N - \varphi(N) + 1 = 3259499 - 3255840 + 1 = 3660.$$

So I'm looking for two numbers p and q such that pq = 3259499 and p + q = 3660. This is two equations in two unknowns, which I should be able to solve. I can say that p = 3360 - q, and substituting into the first equation I get that

$$3259499 = pq = (3660 - q)q = 3660q - q^2,$$

or

$$q^2 - 3360q + 3259499 = 0.$$

This can be solved using the quadratic formula:

$$q = \frac{3660 \pm \sqrt{3360^2 - 4 \times 3259499}}{2} = \frac{3660 \pm \sqrt{357604}}{2} = \frac{3660 \pm 598}{2} = 1531 \text{ or } 2129.$$

Turns out that q can be either, and then p will be the other one (check this using the relation p = 3660 - q). So  $N = 1531 \times 2129$ .

3. Just so we don't have to keep writing such big numbers, let

$$x = 516107$$
,  $y = 187722$ , and  $N = 642401$ .

Then putting the two given congruences together, we get that

$$x^2y^2 = (xy)^2 \equiv 2^2 \cdot 7^2 = 14^2 \pmod{N}.$$

Another way to write this is as

$$(xy)^2 - 14^2 \equiv 0 \pmod{N},$$

or

$$(xy - 14)(xy + 14) \equiv 0 \pmod{N}.$$

To be explicit, we have that

$$xy - 14 = 96884638240$$

and

$$xy + 14 = 96884638268.$$

How does any of this help us? I'm glad you ask. We have that

$$96884638240 \times 96884638268 \equiv 0 \pmod{N}$$

and N=pq for some product of two primes. This means that there is an integer k such that

$$96884638240 \times 96884638268 = kN = kpq.$$

Now since p and q are primes, they don't "break up" any more under multiplication. So it is forced that p divides either 96884638240 or 96884638268, and same for q. In other words, we must have that

$$\gcd(96884638240, N) > 1$$
 or  $\gcd(96884638268, N) > 1$ .

Now we may just hope for the best (that we don't have gcd(96884638240, N) = 1 and gcd(96884638268, N) = N or vice-versa, but graduate students will prove that this doesn't happen ever!) and compute the gcd:

$$\gcd(96884638240, N) = 1129,$$

and

$$\gcd(96884638268, N) = 569,$$

which in fact does factor N.

4. First, we have that for each i = 1, 2, ..., k, we have

$$c_i \equiv m^e \pmod{N_i}$$
.

Therefore, we also have

$$c \equiv m^e \pmod{N_i}$$
,

for each i = 1, 2, ..., k.

Now since this one number works modulo each  $N_i$ , it must also work modulo the product of the  $N_i$ s, i.e.

$$c \equiv m^e \pmod{\prod_{i=1}^k N_i}.$$

This is ensured by the Chinese Remainder Theorem, which states that there is a unique simultaneous "lift" of classes modulo  $N_i$  for each i to a class modulo  $\prod N_i$ .

So far nothing very special has happened. Now comes the magic: Since  $m < N_i$  for each i, and  $e \le k$ , we must have that

$$m^e < \prod_{i=1}^k N_i.$$

This is because on the left there are few small numbers multiplied together and on the right there are many big numbers multiplied together.

We also have that  $c < \prod_{i=1}^k N_i$ . But two numbers that are less than  $\prod_{i=1}^k N_i$  and equal modulo  $\prod_{i=1}^k N_i$ , must be actually equal as integers!

Therefore

$$c = m^e$$

full stop, no congruence. And  $m = \sqrt[e]{c}$ . Now this is a root in the integers (not modulo anything) which is easy to compute.

5. This time we have two ciphertexts,  $c_1$  and  $c_2$ , and we have

$$c_1 \equiv m^e \pmod{N}$$
 and  $c_2 \equiv m^f \pmod{N}$ ,

with the same N and m.

Using the hint, we assume that Eve knows a and b with ae + bf = 1. Then Eve wins by computing  $c_1^a c_2^b \pmod{N}$ , because we have that

$$\begin{split} c_1^a c_2^b &\equiv (m^e)^a (m^f)^b \pmod{N} \\ &\equiv m^{ae} m^{bf} \pmod{N} \\ &\equiv m^{ae+bf} \pmod{N} \\ &\equiv m \pmod{N}. \end{split}$$

6. Bob will send

$$c_1 \equiv g^b \equiv 5^{33} \equiv 7 \pmod{73}$$

and

$$c_2 \equiv m \cdot h^b \equiv 62 \cdot 49^{33} \equiv 68 \pmod{73}.$$

7. I found a = 156 by brute force. It was fast because the numbers are relatively small, but there is nothing really smart I can think to do. However, if you know enough Python it's not too annoying:

- 8. (a)  $\log_3 1 = 0$ 
  - (b)  $\log_3 3 = 1$
  - (c)  $\log_3 5 \equiv \log_3 (7 \times 8) \equiv \log_3 7 + \log_3 8 \equiv 11 + 10 \equiv 21 \equiv 5 \pmod{16}$
  - (d) Since  $1 \equiv 10 \times 12 \pmod{17}$ , we have that  $\log_3 1 \equiv \log_3 10 + \log_3 12 \pmod{16}$  or  $0 \equiv 13 + \log_3 10 \pmod{16}$ . Then  $\log_3 10 \equiv -13 \equiv 3 \pmod{16}$ .
- 9. (a) We have that  $2^7 \equiv 3^3 \pmod{101}$ . Taking  $\log_3$  on each side, this gives the equation

$$\log_3(2^7) \equiv \log_3(3^3) \pmod{100}$$

which we can simplify:

$$7 \log_3 2 \equiv 3 \log_3 3 \pmod{100}$$
  
 $7 \log_3 2 \equiv 3 \cdot 1 \pmod{100}$   
 $7 \log_3 2 \equiv 3 \pmod{100}$ ,

which we can solve to say that  $\log_3 2 \equiv 3 \cdot 7^{-1} \equiv 29 \pmod{100}$ .

- (b) We have b = 6.
- (c) We do the same trick as in part (d) of problem 8: Since  $17 \times 6 \equiv 1 \pmod{101}$ , we have that

$$\log_3 17 + \log_3 6 \equiv \log_3 1 \pmod{100}$$
  
 $\log_3 17 + \log_3 6 \equiv 0 \pmod{100}$ ,

so  $\log_3 17 \equiv -\log_3 6 \pmod{100}$ . Now we notice that  $6 = 2 \times 3$ , so we can break this up further:

$$\log_3 17 \equiv -(\log_3 2 + \log_3 3) \equiv -\log_3 2 - 1 \pmod{100}.$$

From part (a),  $\log_3 2 \equiv 29 \pmod{100}$ , so

$$\log_3 17 \equiv -29 - 1 \equiv -30 \equiv 70 \pmod{100}$$
.

Extra problems for graduate credit:

1. (a) Say that  $k = \ell \varphi(N)$ . We have that  $\varphi(N) = (p-1)(q-1)$ , so  $a^k \equiv a^{\ell(p-1)(q-1)} \equiv (a^{p-1})^{\ell(q-1)} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$ ,

where here we used Fermat's Little Theorem, which we can apply because gcd(a, N) = 1 implies that gcd(a, p) = 1. Similarly for q in place of p.

- (b) Again the same argument will apply with q in place of p so we only show that  $a^{k+1} \equiv a \pmod{p}$ . If  $\gcd(a,p) = 1$ , by part (a) we are done by simply multiplying both sides of the congruence by a.
  - If  $gcd(a, p) \neq 1$ , then it must be the case that gcd(a, p) = p, since p is prime and its only divisors are 1 and p. In particular, this means that p divides a or  $a \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$ . Therefore  $a^{k+1} \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$  and  $a \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$ , from which it follows that  $a^{k+1} \equiv a \pmod{p}$ .
- (c) From part (b), since  $a^{k+1} \equiv a \pmod{p}$  and  $a^{k+1} \equiv a \pmod{q}$ , by the Chinese Remainder Theorem it follows that  $a^{k+1} \equiv a \pmod{N}$  as well, for arbitrary a and arbitrary k a multiple of  $\varphi(N)$ .
  - Now if e and d are encryption and decryption exponents for RSA with modulus N, this means that  $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\varphi(N)}$ , or that there is an integer k which is a multiple of  $\varphi(N)$  with ed = 1 + k. Now the result follows.
- 2. Note that actually for this problem to be correct, p and q must be odd primes. We always choose odd primes for RSA, as otherwise it would be easy to see that one of the primes is 2 and therefore to factor N. So let's assume p and q are both odd primes.
  - (a) First we show that if p is an odd prime and gcd(a, p) = 1, then  $x^2 \equiv a \pmod{p}$  has either no solution or two solutions. Suppose that it has a solution, call it b. Then it has another solution, namely -b. (Note that  $b \not\equiv -b \pmod{p}$ , otherwise we would have  $2b \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$  which since p is odd would force  $b \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$ . But  $b^2 \equiv a \not\equiv 0 \pmod{p}$ , so  $b \not\equiv 0 \pmod{p}$  since  $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$  is a field and doesn't have zero divisors.)

However,  $x^2 \equiv a \pmod{p}$  cannot have more than two solutions. Suppose there were a third solution c (and therefore also a fourth solution -c). Choose both b and c such that  $0 < b, c < \frac{p}{2}$  (if either b or c does not satisfy this, -b or -c will satisfy this, just switch them out). Then  $b^2 \equiv c^2 \equiv a \pmod{p}$  (after all, b and c are both solutions of  $x^2 \equiv a \pmod{p}$ ), so

$$b^{2} - c^{2} \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$$
$$(b - c)(b + c) \equiv 0 \pmod{p}.$$

But we have that 0 < b + c < p, so p does not divide b + c and therefore p must divide b - c or  $b \equiv c \pmod{p}$ , and c is not a new solution. We have therefore proved that if p is an odd prime and  $\gcd(a, p) = 1$ , then  $x^2 \equiv a \pmod{p}$  has either no solution or two solutions.

Now  $x^2 \equiv a \pmod{N}$  is assumed to have a solution. Therefore  $x^2 \equiv a \pmod{p}$  and  $x^2 \equiv a \pmod{q}$  both have solutions too. They each therefore have exactly two solutions, say b and -b are solutions to  $x^2 \equiv a \pmod{p}$  and c and -c are solutions to  $x^2 \equiv a \pmod{q}$ . By the Chinese Remainder Theorem, this gives four solutions to  $x^2 \equiv a \pmod{N}$ : The solution that lifts  $x \equiv b \pmod{p}$  and  $x \equiv c \pmod{q}$ , the one that lifts  $x \equiv b \pmod{q}$ , the one that

lifts  $x \equiv -b \pmod{p}$  and  $x \equiv c \pmod{q}$  and finally the one that lifts  $x \equiv -b \pmod{p}$  and  $x \equiv -c \pmod{q}$ .

(b) In complete contradiction with our notation above, let the four solutions of  $x^2 \equiv a \pmod{N}$  be b, -b, c and -c. Then we have that

$$b^2 \equiv c^2 \equiv a \pmod{N}$$
,

or

$$b^2 - c^2 \equiv (b - c)(b + c) \equiv 0 \pmod{N}.$$

It suffices to show now that gcd(b-c, N) = p and gcd(b+c, N) = q (or vice versa). Note that since  $(b-c)(b+c) \equiv 0 \pmod{N}$ , we know that

$$\gcd(b-c, N) > 1$$
 or  $\gcd(b+c, N) > 1$ ,

as in problem 3 above. The issue here is to prove that N does not divide b-c or b+c. If this were the case the gcd computation would just give us back N and not a factor of N.

However, we know that N does not divide b-c, because we have assumed that b and c are different modulo N. In the same way, we know that N does not divide b+c because we have assumed that b and -c are different modulo N. Therefore we know that N divides neither b+c nor b-c and so that p must divide one and q the other for their product to be zero modulo N.

Note that this, in retrospect, shows that we did not get lucky in problem 3. Since  $xy \not\equiv 14 \pmod{N}$ , we could have known in advance that the gcd would yield a nontrivial factor of N.

3. (a) Write  $a \equiv g^A \pmod{p}$ ,  $b \equiv g^B \pmod{p}$  and  $ab \equiv g^C \pmod{p}$ , where  $0 \leq A, B, C < p-1$  (this is possible since g is a primitive root of p). We have therefore that  $g^C \equiv g^A g^B \equiv g^{A+B} \pmod{p}$ . Since g is a primitive root of p, we have that  $g^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$ , but no lower power of g is congruent to 1 modulo p. In particular, this means that  $g^C \equiv g^D \pmod{p}$  if and only if  $C \equiv D \pmod{p-1}$  (one direction is because  $g^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$ , and the other is because  $g^k \not\equiv 1 \pmod{p}$  for any 0 < k < p-1). Therefore

$$C \equiv A + B \pmod{p-1}$$

or in other symbols,

$$\log_a(ab) \equiv \log_a(a) + \log_a(b) \pmod{p-1}.$$

(b) Let p = 7, then 6 is not a primitive root modulo 7. We also have

$$2 \equiv \log_6 6 + \log_6 6 \not\equiv \log_6 (36) \equiv \log_6 1 \equiv 0 \pmod{6}.$$

The correct equation is that, if  $\operatorname{ord}_p a$  is the multiplicative order of a modulo p (i.e. the smallest positive integer k such that  $a^k \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$ , then

$$\log_q(ab) \equiv \log_q(a) + \log_q(b) \pmod{\operatorname{ord}_p a}.$$

It just so happens that if g is a primitive root of p, then  $\operatorname{ord}_p g = p - 1$ , by definition.

- (c) i. We have that  $g^0 \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$  and  $g^1 \equiv g \pmod{p}$ , so the result follows by the definition of  $\log_q$ .
  - ii. Since  $aa^{-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$ , taking  $\log_g$  on both sides and using parts (a) and (c)i.we get

$$\log_q a + \log_q(a^{-1}) \equiv 0 \pmod{p-1},$$

or  $\log_g(a^{-1}) \equiv -\log_g a \pmod{p-1}$ .

Now we can prove the general power formula: If r > 0, the formula follows by repeated application of part (a). If r = 0, the formula follows by part (c)i. And if r < 0, the formula follows by writing  $a^r \equiv a^{-1} \cdot \ldots \cdot a^{-1} \pmod{p}$ , where  $a^{-1}$  appears -r times and applying parts (a) and the formula  $\log_g(a^{-1}) \equiv -\log_g a \pmod{p-1}$  proved above.