

The Long Shadow of the Past

History, Memory and the Debate over West Germany's Nuclear Status, 1954–69

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*What is wrong with discrimination against her [Germany] in the use
and possession of nuclear weapons?*

Hugh Gaitskell, 1960¹

Two decades after Auschwitz, two apparently unrelated questions simultaneously preoccupied West Germany and the Bundesrepublik's friends and foes alike: first, whether West Germany should maintain the option of possessing weapons of mass destruction; second, whether mass murderers of the Third Reich could come forward without risking prosecution. In the late 1950s, the mood of "collective silence" about the shared memory of the Nazi past during the immediate postwar era gradually gave way to a more open, self-critical discussion about the German past.² The beginning of a second phase of dealing with the Nazi past was marked most notably by the NS-trials and the acrimonious debates over the extension of the statute of limitations allowing to continue prosecution of war criminals in West Germany.³ This second phase of the West German history of memory coincided with more than a decade of heated debate over West Germany's nuclear status.

In 1954 Chancellor Konrad Adenauer renounced the development of nuclear weapons within the Federal Republic as a precondition for West Germany's admission into NATO and German rearmament. The

late 1950s saw the high tide of the West German peace movement *Kampf dem Atomtod* protesting against the deployment of US nuclear forces on West German soil.⁴ The rise and fall of the Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF)—a mixed-manned NATO nuclear fleet that would have given West Germany a limited say over the control of Western nuclear forces—dominated the nuclear debate throughout the early 1960s. Finally, the signature of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963 and the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 in an age of superpower détente raised the question of German adherence. Joining the NPT meant foreclosing the nuclear option for all time. The nuclear debate and the legacy of the past can not be seen as unrelated issues: the allied restrictions imposed on the rearmament of the Federal Republic resulted from the immediate German past of aggression and extermination. Clearly, the same legal and moral constraints did not apply for Britain and France who continued to develop nuclear forces under sovereign control. West Germany's nuclear status remained at the heart of both intra-alliance and inter-alliance politics.⁵ For many within the Federal Republic, West Germany's inability to manufacture nuclear weapons came to be seen as a symbol of her second-class status, and heated public debates on the attitude of the Bundesrepublik to weapons of mass destruction were conducted in parliament, the press and on protest marches.

West German nuclear policy has attracted a considerable amount of scholarly interest. To date it has been examined primarily in the context of the Cold War, alliance diplomacy and NATO nuclear strategy.⁶ While West German nuclear policy and the imposition of allied restrictions in 1954 were the consequences of the Nazi legacy, little effort has been made to analyze how Germany's past and the politics of memory influenced both the domestic nuclear debate and allied nuclear policy toward West Germany.⁷ The politics of history and memory in postwar Germany and Europe has also generated an increasing amount of scholarly work. A number of studies have recently been published on German attempts to cope with the past and how the legacy of the past influenced postwar politics, society and culture, but its influence on nuclear policy remains to be examined.⁸ Some studies have concentrated on the question of how German history was instrumentalized in the postwar German political debate. For example, Edgar Wolfrum has defined *Geschichtspolitik*, the politics of history, as the act of using history for political aims, of making

political gains by using the mobilizing, politicizing, defaming or scandalizing effect of history.⁹ Little work has yet been done on how *Geschichtspolitik* influenced the debates over nuclear weapons in German hands. This article aims to contribute toward the closure of these gaps in the existing historiography.

The purpose of the analysis is threefold. First, the article examines how history was used as a “weapon” in the nuclear debate of the 1950s and 1960s.¹⁰ Second, it explores direct links between the politics of the past and nuclear issues: how did the statute of limitations debate, the NS-trials and the rise of the far-right-wing National Democratic Party (NPD) influence West German nuclear policy? Third, the article explores the international dimension: how was the nuclear policy of the US and Britain toward the Federal Republic influenced by their understanding of the German past? Bearing in mind the fragmented nature of history and memory, this article attempts to shed light on which German pasts served as reference points in the nuclear debate and what this could tell us about postwar understanding of recent German history in West Germany, Britain and the United States.

AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN GERMANY: “NUCLEARIZATION” OF THE *BUNDESWEHR* AND EARLY NUCLEAR SHARING PLANS (1954–60)

In 1954 the Western allies, still fearful of a future resurgent Germany, demanded renunciation of nuclear weapons as a precondition for German rearmament and admission into NATO. The Federal Government only had to renounce the production of nuclear weapons on West German soil. The options of acquiring nuclear weapons or jointly producing an atomic bomb outside Germany were still open.¹¹ For a number of reasons, from the mid-1950s onwards, Bonn had a growing interest in reaffirming these options and in relaxing the 1954 provisions.¹² First, the threat of some form of West German nuclear capability was seen as a powerful diplomatic lever in negotiations with the Soviets over German reunification. In short, the mere possibility of a West German nuclear capability enhanced Adenauer’s “policy of strength” toward Moscow. Second, the nuclear weapons programs of both Britain and France were seen as reinforcing West Germany’s inferior status within NATO. Regaining sovereignty and

equality with Britain and France was a primary goal of Adenauer's *Westpolitik* and the desire for equality soon translated into demands for nuclear *Mitsprache* (a say in the control of nuclear weapons). Third, lack of influence over NATO nuclear strategy concerned the Germans because a future superpower confrontation was likely to turn Germany (East and West) into a nuclear battlefield over which the Germans would have no control. West German insecurity was intensified by the launch of the Soviet satellite *Sputnik* in 1957, which marked the end of US nuclear invulnerability. *Sputnik* nurtured German (and West European) doubts about the credibility of the American security guarantee for Europe. Under these changing circumstances, West Germany demanded a say in the nuclear defense of the alliance.

To reassure the Europeans in the aftermath of *Sputnik*, the Eisenhower administration offered the deployment of Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) in Europe and devised concepts to give the European allies more responsibility in the nuclear defense of Western Europe.¹³ In addition, NATO plan MC-70 entailing a greater tactical nuclear build-up in Western Europe provided for the equipment of the Bundeswehr with tactical nuclear weapons systems. In March 1958 the Bundestag agreed to the deployment of these systems in West Germany. The missiles were covered by a dual-key system in which the US maintained custody of the nuclear warhead.¹⁴ Thus the West German army was provided with nuclear weapons under ultimate control of the United States.¹⁵ The prospect of nuclear weapons on West German soil sparked off the first major nuclear debate in West Germany. It increased the widespread resentment against German rearmament and led thousands of Germans to protest against nuclear weapons.

Plans for a "nuclearization" of the newly established Bundeswehr refueled the heated debate about Germans in arms that had begun with West German rearmament less than a decade after the end of World War II. Rearmament, NATO membership and deployment of nuclear weapons in West Germany were regarded as steadily diminishing the chances for German reunification. Thus, the protest of the late 1950s against nuclear weapons was the culmination of a wider debate over Adenauer's course of Western integration. However, in all sections of the political spectrum opposition against rearmament was also closely linked to the immediate past.¹⁶ For some, rejection of rearmament reflected the feeling that German

“military honor and integrity had been besmirched” and that the new army would be un-German and commanded by the occupying forces.¹⁷ For others it rekindled fears of the emergence of another mighty reactionary German army—another state within the state.¹⁸ The decision to equip the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons recalled traumas and memories of the devastation of two world wars—inside and outside Germany.

The anti-nuclear campaign of 1958–60 was inexorably linked to Germany’s recent past. It united a broad range of individuals and institutions opposed to Adenauer’s foreign and security policy for a variety of reasons. The German Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, GCND (modeled after the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament), provided a platform for Christians, Social Democrats, trade unionists, nuclear scientists, intellectuals, pacifist and neutralist groups as well as Communists. Many Protestants in the peace movement openly linked their political protest to repentance for the lack of resistance of the Protestant Church during the Third Reich.¹⁹ This was coupled with a frank admission of guilt from the church and the new assertion that the Protestant Church had indeed a political responsibility.²⁰ In short, Protestants renouncing rearmament and nuclear weapons did not only consider preparing for nuclear war a sin against God but also saw their stance as redemption for the sins of the past, the failure to stand up against Nazism. Similarly, some of the trade union activism reflected what members regarded as the failure of the unions to stop the demise of the Weimar Republic in 1932/33.²¹ While less protest came from German Catholics, a group of Catholics signed a declaration stating “that because of Germany’s recent past and its current domestic and international situation, nuclear arms for West Germany would be moral disaster.”²² Thus, some of the protest was clearly based on lessons of the past not to stand aside in silence. These forms of “compensatory resistance” raise the question whether protesting Christians and trade unionists wanted to be seen as good, responsible democrats rather than anti-nuclear campaigners.²³

The Bundestag debate of March 1958 on the supply of nuclear weapons to the Bundeswehr proved to be one of the most emotional and controversial debates in the history of the FRG. Labeled a “battle of annihilation” by some parliamentarians,²⁴ the debate was rich in examples of *Geschichtspolitik*. Fritz Erler, defense expert of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), declared that Franz-Jozef Strauß’s speech in support of the

missile deployment in West Germany reminded him of Goebbels's notorious Sportpalast speech of 1943 culminating in the phrase "do you want total war?"²⁵ But nobody went as far as the Social Democrat Helmut Schmidt who compared the "decision to arm both parts of our fatherland with atomic bombs" to the Enabling Law, thus implying that the Adenauer government was authorized to steer Germany toward another, a nuclear war.²⁶ It may have been evoked because the Bundestag debate coincided with the anniversary of the passing of the Enabling Law and, once again, the Social Democrats felt powerless facing imminent evil.²⁷ At some of the protest marches anti-nuclear campaigners carried banners with the slogan "first Bergen-Belsen, now Bergen-Hohne."²⁸ Bergen-Belsen, the concentration camp, and Bergen-Hohne, the nuclear missile range, were equated as symbols for mass murder. Interestingly, one historical reference point for nuclear extinction was a blend of recent German and ancient history. One of the slogans read: "Ancient Carthage led three wars: it was still mighty after the first, still inhabitable after the second, it had disappeared after the third."²⁹ And the following extract from the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* is just one example of repeatedly expressed concerns that German politicians had not learnt their lessons of the past: "Some German politicians, showing that they have learnt nothing from recent German history, declare that the better armed we are, the higher our international standing will be."³⁰ The measures that were taken against the protesters reminded some commentators of the Nazi methods against political opponents and the undermining of the *Rechtsstaat* at the end of the Weimar Republic.³¹

Beatrice Heuser has argued that "German crimes of the past lie at the heart of the German attitude to the use of force, and thus nuclear weapons."³² As shown above, this is certainly true, yet while there are clear connections between the argument for nuclear abstention and the legacy of the Nazi past, universal condemnation of nuclear weapons was at the core of the non-nuclear campaign. The basis of the anti-nuclear arguments was to some extent specifically German but the target was global. Few in the movement recognized a specific German responsibility for nuclear abstention resulting from the German past. The Göttingen Manifesto, a memorandum of eighteen German physicists opposing nuclear weapons, sought nuclear renunciation due to Germany's size and geography, and Protestant Church leader Martin Niemöller's sermon against

nuclear weapons was based on the conviction that no purpose justified the development and use of such horrific weapons anywhere.³³ The idea of a specific German responsibility to renounce nuclear weapons was not apparent in the GCND manifesto.³⁴ In fact, the Easter March slogans overwhelmingly referred to global disarmament and contemporary issues, for example, playgrounds and social security, instead of nuclear weapons.³⁵ In short, the protest was directed against all nuclear weapons anywhere.³⁶ The evocation of the destructive power of nuclear weapons and a profound sense of helplessness in the face of the nuclear arms race suggest that for many Germans nuclear weapons symbolized the return of the devastation of the past. Michael Geyer has argued that the “occupation of the present with the nightmares of the past is what Cold War angst was all about. Germans had experienced their end of the world and the only remaining question was whether there would be a thereafter.”³⁷ It also reflected the German interpretation of themselves as (passive) victims in devastating wars past and future.

The British viewed the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in West Germany and plans for a NATO nuclear MRBM force with unease. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan reflected in a note to Foreign Secretary John Selwyn Lloyd: “I am quite sure that we are on good ground as regards what we have agreed so far in the arming of German troops with nuclear weapons so long as the key of the cupboard is in American hands.” He continued: “But behind all this there is a feeling that the Germans pursue a rather ambivalent policy. Nobody knows for instance how many ex-Nazis are in fact employed either in the Army, Civil Service or Judiciary.”³⁸ Lloyd regarded the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons as a first step toward loosening the 1954 accords. Soon the Germans might not accept US control over these weapons any longer.³⁹ Despite this, to avoid alienating Germany and disrupting NATO’s defense policy, Lloyd came down against open opposition.⁴⁰ Yet, he was clearly worried about future developments. In 1960, discussing NATO nuclear sharing concepts, he noted: “In no circumstances should we agree to any plans which allow the Germans to have free access to nuclear warheads.... It is true that the present mood in Germany gives no reasonable cause for distrusting present German policies. But it is natural to have doubts about German reliability in the long run.”⁴¹

The Labour opposition was much more outspoken. During a foreign affairs debate in the House of Commons in February 1960, the Labour MPs Denis Healey and Alan Thompson contested fervently against nuclear weapons for Germany. Thompson spoke at length about repeated German aggression, the peculiarity of German nationalism, the lax persecution of war criminals and anti-Semitic incidents in Germany. All these points served as basis for his argument against German control over nuclear weapons.⁴² However, the essence of Thompson's argument was not different from Lloyd's main point: apprehension about German reliability and future stability, or, as Thompson put it, "fear of the Fifth Reich."⁴³ These sentiments were echoed in British tabloids that reported the debate. Concern about Germany was reflected in numerous reports of the anti-Semitic incidents during the winter of 1959/60.⁴⁴ Labour advocated containment, Foreign Secretary Lloyd was clearly torn between containment and rehabilitation of Germany. He countered the Labour attack with the words: "I saw the liberation of Belsen but if we want to create a new Germany we have to treat her as equal without discrimination."⁴⁵ On the one hand there was the need to contain Germany for fear of future developments, on the other hand containment might lead to revival of nationalism and aggression. This quandary came to dominate British nuclear policy toward Germany.

Despite the initial success, by the early 1960s the West German anti-nuclear movement had lost most of its drive. A government campaign focusing on the Soviet threat and communist subversion of the West German peace movement had a powerful impact on the population.⁴⁶ The majority of Germans supported Western integration and felt safer in the lap of Adenauer and NATO than outside. In the general election of 1957 the Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian sister-party, the Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), won an absolute majority for the first (and only) time in West German history. The diversity and disunity of the anti-nuclear campaign proved another factor in the decline of the movement. The Trade Union Federation and SPD, who had hoped to win the regional elections in North Rhine-Westphalia in July 1958 on the anti-nuclear ticket, withdrew their support after a remarkable and unexpected defeat at the polls. This marked the end of the first nuclear debate in West Germany. All that remained was a hard core of activists participating in the annual Easter marches.

GERMAN CONTROL OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS? THE RISE AND FALL
OF THE MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR FORCE (1960–66)

While domestic protest against nuclear weapons had more or less evaporated by 1960, the international debate on the Federal Republic's nuclear status was only just beginning. This second nuclear debate centered on plans for a NATO nuclear force. The MLF emerged from various schemes to make NATO the fourth nuclear power that had been advanced in the 1950s. Initiated by the Eisenhower administration and re-offered by Kennedy, the MLF—a multinational, mixed-manned nuclear surface fleet—served a number of purposes: deployment would give Bonn a limited share in NATO's nuclear defense, strengthen alliance cohesion, prevent Franco-German nuclear cooperation (a particular concern after the conclusion of the Franco-German Friendship Treaty of 1963), and eventually bring the British and French nuclear forces under NATO control.⁴⁷ Preventing global nuclear proliferation had become a common interest and top priority of both superpowers. The desire to halt the spread of nuclear weapons manifested itself in the conclusion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in August 1963 and subsequent progress toward a global nonproliferation agreement. Yet, Moscow regarded the MLF as a loophole for a West German nuclear capacity and declared it would only sign a nonproliferation agreement on the condition that the NATO nuclear force never materialized.

Positions throughout Western Europe ranged from lukewarm to outright hostility on the MLF but a majority in the West German government was eager to realize a NATO nuclear force.⁴⁸ The British government paid lip service to the MLF but was hostile to the fleet for a variety of reasons, including West German access to nuclear weapons, financial difficulties and the force's questionable military usefulness. In December 1964, in the afterglow of the first Chinese nuclear test, the Johnson administration agreed to “gradually bury” the MLF. Soviet hostility to the NATO force as well as French and British disquiet led to the decision.⁴⁹ With the main stumbling block removed, superpower agreement on the Nonproliferation Treaty was reached in 1966 contributing to the fall of the Erhard government in Bonn which had put its prestige behind the MLF.

While the short-term goal of the MLF was to prevent possible Franco-German nuclear collaboration under the 1963 Friendship Treaty,⁵⁰ a long-term fear of the Americans was that, without alleviation of their second-class status, the Germans would become disillusioned with NATO and explore the path of neutrality and unity. In short, the prospect of a resurgent, powerful Germany unconstrained by alliance commitments was a significant factor in the plan to grant the West Germans limited control over nuclear weapons. The ultimate worry was that a disgruntled Germany would seek a unilateral arrangement with the Soviet Union. Evoking the specters of Rapallo and the Hitler–Stalin pact, a State Department memorandum titled “Dangers from a Psychotic Germany” argued that a Germany isolated from the club of Western nuclear nations led by a feeling of discrimination might “embark on a romantic but destructive adventure with the East.”⁵¹

Similar thoughts were echoed by British diplomats who argued that keeping West Germany in an inferior position might lead to a revival of nationalism.⁵² The State Department also harbored concerns that, without the MLF, the control of moderate Germans in the government would be weakened.⁵³ However, it was the Germans themselves who had put forward this argument: Sir Frank Roberts, the British ambassador in Bonn, reported that “what the present leaders of Germany fear for internal as well as external political reasons, is the possibility that one day some demagogue will exploit national and not necessarily nationalistic sentiment if Germany remains in a position of inferiority vis-à-vis her allies in NATO in nuclear matters.”⁵⁴ Roberts added, “I would not necessarily cast Strauß for this role.”⁵⁵ Ironically, it was Franz Josef Strauß who championed this argument in Bonn, putting it much more bluntly than the British diplomat. The nuclear discrimination, he argued, could ultimately lead to a neutralized, weak Germany caught between the two blocs. In such a situation, he continued, they knew from historical experience that it might not take long before “a new kind of Führer would both promise and acquire nuclear weapons for Germany.”⁵⁶ He claimed that if special restrictions remained imposed on Germany, this would only promote the emergence of an authoritarian, nationalist German state seeking nuclear weapons. In short, another Versailles leading to another Hitler. In fact, he used the German past as an argument for West German shared control over nuclear weapons and nuclear equality with Britain and France. To some extent this logic

seems to have been accepted by the Western powers. The lines of thinking reveal implicit connections between post-Versailles Germany, Hitler's rise to power and the dangers of keeping postwar Germany in an inferior position which might threaten the Federal Republic's democracy. The Germans were only too willing to nurture this analogy.⁵⁷ Yet, while some in Washington and a few in London accepted the argument, it did not prove strong enough to overcome the objections against German nuclear *Mitsprache*.

MLF opponents inside and outside of Germany also drew from the well of German history to justify their positions. Rudolf Augstein in *Der Spiegel* compared German participation in the MLF to the gradual rearmament of the *Reichswehr* in the Weimar Republic through the back door.⁵⁸ For Augstein, the main concern was that shared control of nuclear weapons in the MLF framework would ultimately lead to a national West German nuclear capability and the revival of German militarism. The British Labour MP Konni Zilliacus took the point further. Zilliacus, a backbencher on the far left of the Labour Party, argued against the MLF "in view of what happened last time when we encouraged and connived at the rearmament and territorial ambitions of German nationalism and militarism in order to use Germany as a bulwark against Communism."⁵⁹ Zilliacus, concerned with British appeasement culminating in the Munich agreement, compared Adenauer's quest for nuclear *Mitsprache* to Hitler's unraveling of the Versailles settlement. He also hit at the core of West Germany's self-perception and -legitimization as a bulwark against communism. Refuting totalitarian rhetoric, Zilliacus rejected Bonn's claims of West Germany's special task as "gatekeeper against the mighty influences from the East."⁶⁰ What Zilliacus suggested was that German foreign policy had remained essentially the same, only racism and anti-Semitism had been dropped from the rhetoric.⁶¹

These themes were reflected in public opinion abroad. In 1965 the American songwriter and comedian Tom Lehrer had a great success with his song "MLF lullaby":

Once all the Germans were warlike and mean
But that couldn't happen again
We taught them a lesson in nineteen eighteen
And they've hardly bothered us since then.

So sleep well, my darling, the sandman can linger
We know our buddies won't give us the finger
Heil— hail—the Wehrmacht, I mean the Bundeswehr
Hail to our loyal ally
MLF will scare Brezhnev
I hope he is half as scared as I.⁶²

Lehrer established a clear link between repeated German aggression and rejection of nuclear weapons for Germany. The Bundeswehr armed with nuclear weapons would constitute the revival of German militarism that could lead to Germany plunging the world into a nuclear war. What these historical analogies have in common is that they focus on German remilitarization potentially leading to another German aggression. They reflect a time when the immediate concern lay with German militarism and aggression, while racism, genocide and criminal warfare were marginal aspects in the public debate on World War II and the Third Reich.

US public opinion was not only concerned about the MLF: the revelation that German rocket scientists were assisting Egypt to obtain a ballistic missile capability caused outrage in the American Jewish community. While little was known about what exactly these Germans were doing in Egypt, the concern focused on a possible Egyptian nuclear weapons program aided by Germans and posing a deadly threat to Israel. The exposé coincided with the debate over the statute of limitations in West Germany in 1965. The statute of limitations for murder was fifteen years in the German penal code, which meant that if the Bundestag did not extend or abolish the statute of limitations, Nazi criminals would no longer have to fear prosecution for their crimes. After a series of controversial debates beginning in 1960 and under growing international pressure, the statute was extended in March 1965 (allowing prosecutions until December 1969). It was extended again in 1969 before it was abolished altogether in 1979.⁶³ Jewish communities mobilized US public opinion to exert strong pressure on Germany to abolish the statute of limitations for murder. In 1965 Jewish communities in the US linked German reluctance to continue the prosecution of Nazi criminals to the German rocket scientists in Egypt and attacked Bonn for merely paying lip service to its moral responsibilities:

The West German Government's evasion of its moral responsibilities with respect to the extension of the Statute of Limitations and the withdrawals of German scientists from Cairo undermines our confidence in your government's awareness of the as yet unredeemed obligation of the German people to history and to the survivors of the Nazi Holocaust. Until your government has demonstrated its clear understanding of this obligation and its readiness to discharge it in these two major areas of Jewish and general humanitarian concern, Germany's claim to a genuine rebirth and a new moral posture must be vigorously rejected.⁶⁴

Jewish communities in the US were less concerned with a "German finger on the nuclear trigger" in the form of the MLF than with nuclear weapons made by Germans and directed against Israel. However, the American Jewish Congress publicly reserved the right of opposition to German nuclear development and to German reunification.⁶⁵

For a West Germany eager to regain international respect, the debates over the extension of the statute of limitations were embarrassing against the background of the NS trials of the early 1960s. These trials clearly demonstrated that West German justice for over a decade had failed to try large numbers of war criminals and that there was a need for further investigations. While opponents of the extension of the statute of limitations argued that more trials would damage the FRG's national honor,⁶⁶ supporters were aware that the *Ausland* saw the German decision for or against the extension as a litmus test for the democratization of Germany.⁶⁷ Some German newspapers took the chance to critically analyze the influence of the politics of the past on West Germany's international standing and foreign policy leverage. The *Wiesbadener Kurier* argued that fears about a nuclear Germany were "part of the deep-rooted mistrust" against the Federal Republic that could only be overcome by an active German policy to establish confidence. The extension of the statute of limitations was crucial in that respect.⁶⁸ West Germany simultaneously appearing to seek nuclear weapons and refusing to pursue war criminals reinforced notions of aggression, militarism, self-righteousness and lack of change.

CONFIRMING GERMANY'S NUCLEAR ABSTENTION:
FROM THE PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY (1963) TO BONN'S
SIGNATURE OF THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (1969)

The MLF debate was partly overlapped by the negotiations for a test-stop agreement and the successful conclusion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in summer 1963.⁶⁹ The US, the Soviet Union and the UK had been negotiating since 1957, and the treaty, signed in Moscow in August 1963, constituted the first global agreement designed to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. The Test Ban Treaty, or Moscow Agreement, was to be complemented by a nuclear nonproliferation agreement, but negotiations were deadlocked as the Kremlin declared that the Soviet Union would not sign a nonproliferation agreement as long as NATO pursued the MLF plans. The demise of the MLF facilitated the conclusion of the nonproliferation agreement. The NPT was formally signed on 1 July 1968 in London, but West Germany adhered to the agreement only in November 1969 after a long domestic controversy. Overall, the international debate over West Germany's nuclear status ended with Bonn's confirmation of the 1954 restrictions and acceptance of nuclear abstention in 1969.

Official German reactions to the signature of the Moscow Agreement comprised a range of opinions, showing serious differences with the ruling coalition of CDU/CSU and the Free Democratic Party (FDP). While Foreign Minister Schröder and many in the FDP welcomed the treaty, Chancellor Adenauer strongly opposed it and was joined in his reaction by a number of government members.⁷⁰ Its conclusion was interpreted as American preparedness to place agreement with the Soviets before the interests of its allies. The reasons for German aggravation were threefold: lack of consultation, a reluctance to confirm the 1954 nuclear abstention, and the implicit recognition of the GDR as a second German state because the treaty was open to all states for signature.⁷¹ The Test Ban Treaty threatened to undermine a pillar of Bonn's foreign policy, the Hallstein Doctrine—West Germany's claim of sole representation of all Germans and diplomatic isolation of the GDR, which, in official West German language, was referred to as the "Socialist Zone of Occupation" or just "the Zone." It took weeks of allied consultation and official declarations from Washington and London that the Test Ban Treaty did not imply

Western recognition of the GDR before the Adenauer government grudgingly signed the agreement.⁷²

German opposition to the Moscow Agreement revealed deep-rooted concerns about the German question and the nuclear option which were voiced in comparisons suggesting that, once again, the victors of World Wars I and II coerced Germany into accepting another “diktat.” Disgruntled German politicians and journalists compared the Test Ban Treaty to the Treaty of Versailles, others saw it as a return to Yalta.⁷³ Franz Josef Strauß linked the treaty to the Munich agreement and former Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano lamented “American appeasement” of communist dictatorship.⁷⁴ Germany was now cast in the role of the victim of American appeasement policy toward Moscow. West German nuclear abstention, a long-standing Soviet demand, was fixed in an international agreement with the Soviet Union. It destroyed illusions that the German past was bygone and that the FRG would soon be seen on equal rank with Britain and France. The treaty cemented West German nuclear inferiority, marking a decisive difference in international status. Those who had their illusions about West Germany’s international standing shattered by the Test Ban Treaty reverted to polemics of the “victors’ peace.” Protest about alleged “American appeasement” equally mirrored German reluctance to come to terms with German division. In 1963 the Western consensus of the 1950s that disarmament must include progress toward German unification was eventually sacrificed at the altar of détente with the Soviet Union. The Moscow Agreement implied American acceptance of the status quo in central Europe. In the Federal Republic, negating the existence of “the other Germany” was not just a political strategy; it also clouded painful postwar realities many in Bonn were unwilling to confront: the long-term division of Germany, the abandonment of seventeen million East Germans for the sake of Western integration and prosperity in the FRG, and the fruitlessness of the policy of strength. Growing distrust over American and British resolve to defend German interests nurtured the perception that the Moscow Agreement was forced onto the Federal Republic against her very interests: the German question and the nuclear option.

Neither the US nor the UK had any intention of recognizing the GDR explicitly or implicitly through the test-ban agreement. The Western position was clarified in a joint note to the Soviet Union emphasizing that

the East German signature of the treaty in Moscow would not be confirmed in London or Washington. This indicates that the uproar in Bonn was in equal measure about West German nuclear discrimination. Indeed, Harold Macmillan's letters to President Kennedy show that Macmillan's main interest in securing a test-ban agreement was to stop Germany from acquiring nuclear weapons. Macmillan explained to Kennedy:

My own impression has always been that Soviet fear and even hatred of Germany is one of the few genuine emotions which the Russian leaders permit themselves. Curiously enough this is one subject on which our interests coincide with that of the Russians. For bearing in mind the history of the last 50 years, no American or British Government could view with equanimity a Germany armed with nuclear capacity.

Macmillan went on to explain that given German history, all allies were anxious as to what might happen in some future Germany, especially if armed with nuclear weapons. He argued that if the Germans were now to voluntarily sign with many other states the test-ban agreement and a nondissemination agreement, they could do so without loss of face. Then, "a future Nationalist leader" could not present current restrictions on German armament imposed in 1954 as "another Versailles."⁷⁵ Ironically, Macmillan made this argument just before members of the German government publicly called the test-ban agreement another Versailles. Macmillan, like his former Foreign Secretary Lloyd, was not worried about present-day Germany but about long-term developments.

Macmillan saw the test-ban agreement as a first step toward German nuclear renunciation that should be followed by a nonproliferation agreement. In this position he was in complete agreement with Labour leader Harold Wilson who became British prime minister in 1964.⁷⁶ Consequently, the successful conclusion of a nonproliferation agreement remained a key foreign policy objective after the Labour Party came to power. While news of superpower agreement on a draft treaty in 1966 was welcomed in London, it produced a broad range of reactions in Bonn. Willy Brandt, the SPD foreign minister in the Grand Coalition government under Chancellor Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, welcomed a nondissemination agreement provided that certain conditions were met, such as unrestrained

use of civil nuclear energy and a superpower obligation to disarmament.⁷⁷ Yet, the treaty had the potential of splitting the coalition as it caused outrage among the CSU and parts of the CDU. The NPT was described as “worse than the Morgenthau plan,” “a Versailles of cosmic dimension” and “another Yalta.”⁷⁸ These historical analogies show an attempt to draw a line from Versailles to the Morgenthau plan, the Yalta Conference and the signature of the Nonproliferation Treaty. German reactions reflected those to the Test Ban Treaty. Germans shouted “diktat!” claiming that there was a continuity from the Versailles Treaty to the NPT, a continuity in German history of Germany’s unfairly harsh treatment by the Western powers. This time the Western powers had hatched a plot even worse than the Test Ban Treaty: the NPT would bar the Federal Republic from the most modern weapons. Its provisions ruled out national nuclear capabilities and concepts of nuclear *Mitsprache* for a duration of twenty-five years. Moreover, its opponents argued, the discriminative nature of the controls the NPT imposed on non-nuclear-weapon states would seriously impede the Federal Republic’s technological advance in the field of civil nuclear technology. Consequently, the NPT would epitomize the final realization of Morgenthau’s plans to turn Germany into a country of peasants and shepherds and therefore mean not only nuclear abstention and defenselessness but also economic punishment.

The nationalist rhetoric toned down after negative international responses. But it weakened the case of the very legitimate criticisms of the NPT the FRG shared with many other non-nuclear-weapon states. These centered on restrictions on the civil nuclear programs, security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon states, the duration of the treaty (which was set longer than the NATO treaty) and the option of developing a European deterrent within a future United Europe.⁷⁹ The journalist Reinhard Appel emphasized the importance of a sober debate in an article called “The Treaty and National Issues.” He pleaded for a constructive but critical approach toward the treaty focusing on the real issues of concern for West Germany and other non-nuclear-weapon states. He argued that the CDU should not pretend that West Germany could conduct world power politics while the SPD should not “try so hard to wear the hair shirt of the nation.” Appel continued: “That for which we have to atone for affects us all; and of course we still have much to atone for, whether we like that or not.”⁸⁰ He stated clearly that in the negotiations about nuclear renunciation

the Federal Republic was a special case due to her recent past and that this reality had to be accepted. Therefore, Bonn could not stand aside like France or India, but should join the debate with constructive criticism to achieve a fair treaty for the non-nuclear-weapon states.

A number of left-liberal journalists and newspapers opposed the outcry against another imagined “encirclement,” pointing out that a country with “the moral burden of two world wars on its conscience” was ill-advised to lead international opposition against the treaty.⁸¹ However, the peace movement was fairly silent on the MLF, the Test Ban Treaty or the NPT. Since 1965, the Easter Marches had been dominated by the war in Vietnam, and West German nuclear abstention was only a marginal issue. Instead, the student movement was comparing the American War in Vietnam to Hitler’s war of extermination, and, more generally, the USA to the Third Reich, while the generation of the fathers accused the allies of another Versailles.⁸² The irony was not lost on *Der Spiegel* which observed: “Red and Black are marching separately against the same enemy, the Americans.”⁸³

The fact that West Germany was indeed a special case because of its history was underlined by the role the election successes of the ultra-nationalist right-wing NPD between 1966 and 1968 played in the NPT debate.⁸⁴ Support for the NPD caused fears abroad that sooner or later extreme German nationalism would raise its head again in the shape of a German government including a neo-Nazi party. In the wake of the NPD success a government analysis on the consequences of a West German refusal to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty came to the conclusion that “a combination of NPD gains and West German abstention from the NPT could lead to complete international isolation.”⁸⁵ The NPD was strongly opposed to the Nonproliferation Treaty. Therefore, the CDU and CSU feared that they would lose “a significant number of votes to the NPD” if the treaty was signed before the elections in autumn 1969.⁸⁶ Yet, the problem was clearly not only about losing votes to the far right but also increasing international embarrassment if the NPD achieved another great election result. Chancellor Kiesinger raised the issue of the NPD gains and West German signature of the nonproliferation treaty in discussion with Lyndon Johnson’s special adviser, John McCloy, and British Prime Minister Wilson.⁸⁷ Wilson indicated that he was not too worried about the NPD, which, he declared, reminded him of the Welsh Nationalist

Party.⁸⁸ Yet, Wilson left no doubt that his government wished Bonn's signature of the NPT.

Internationally, West Germany was in the limelight of the NPT negotiations and, while West Germany was listed alongside India, Pakistan and Israel as key threshold countries whose signatures would be crucial for the success of a global nonproliferation regime, it was clear that the German case was different. The *New York Times* stated, "if there is one government on earth that can not abstain from the treaty, it is the West German government."⁸⁹ The same idea was expressed more bluntly by Soviet Foreign Secretary Gromyko, who declared that West Germany had to sign the treaty whether Bonn liked it or not. Gromyko's remarks made during a visit in London were not disputed by his British hosts.⁹⁰ The marathon of bilateral negotiations between the US and West Germany also indicated that Germany was a special case.⁹¹ So did Soviet claims—made during the NPT negotiations—on a right of intervention in Germany as sanctioned by Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter on the aggressive policy of enemy countries of World War II.⁹² For the Soviets, German signature of the NPT constituted one of the most important elements of a peace treaty with Germany that, due to German division, had been postponed indefinitely. In the US State Department officials and military experts advanced the idea whether West Germany would not be the ideal country to lead countries to voluntarily sign the NPT and call for renunciation of nuclear weapons, thus regaining moral respect and international leverage.⁹³ Significantly, these ideas were not discussed in the Federal Republic. In the late 1960s enforced abstention from nuclear weapons signified a unilateral concession toward the Soviet Union and a stigma that still separated West Germany from Britain and France. The NPT, it seemed, was the ghost of Germany's past haunting the increasingly successful Republic so eager to declare "the end of the postwar era."⁹⁴

CONCLUSION: INCENDIARY *GESCHICHTSPOLITIK*—FROM "VERSAILLES," "MUNICH" AND "EUROSHIMA" TO A "NUCLEAR AUSCHWITZ"

To some extent the allies' nuclear policy toward West Germany was based on bearing the "lessons of the past" in mind. This is not only true when it came to imposing respective arms restrictions on postwar Germany. The

allies were concerned that in the long term restrictions which “smacked of Versailles or another diktat” might have serious consequences for the future development of the Federal Republic. Fears that West Germany would not accept nuclear inferiority forever, would break out of the alliance and seek a settlement with the Soviet Union, were always tangible. The MLF had been partly designed to counter another German *Sonderweg*. In the end these fears were not strong enough to give the idea of nuclear sharing sufficient weight. A non-nuclear Germany was “the ultimate touchstone” in reaching détente with the Soviet Union and stability in the Cold War system.⁹⁵ Détente, stability and prevention of global nuclear proliferation proved more important than German nuclear aspirations. Paradoxically, nuclear sharing was designed to address West German inferiority in NATO which might result in an unstable nationalist Germany dangerously loose between the blocs. But the idea of a German “finger on the nuclear trigger” reinforced concerns about the long-term stability of the Federal Republic. The scenario of a future nationalist leader threatening to leave NATO was all the more worrying if West Germany had a say in the nuclear defense of the West. While West Germany was considered a reliable ally at the time, trust in the long-term stability of the Bonn Republic was not firmly rooted.

West German outcries about another *diktat* in form of the Test Ban Treaty and the Nonproliferation Treaty went beyond outrage about nuclear inferiority and nationalist noise in an election year. Accepting nuclear inferiority went hand in hand with accepting the status quo in Europe. Both treaties implicitly recognized the postwar status quo in central Europe. They reflected the erosion of the German position that progress on disarmament was inseparable from progress on the German question—a position that the West had firmly supported during the 1950s. Increasing distrust about allied willingness to defend German positions (and West Germany) led to fears that nuclear renunciation would only be a first step leading to the recognition of the GDR and the acceptance of the Oder-Neisse border as final by the Western allies. British and American willingness to talk about a nonaggression pact and the Oder-Neisse line in Moscow while the final touches were put to the Test Ban Agreement seemed to confirm these fears.⁹⁶ Thus, the nuclear renunciation was intertwined with an *Ostpolitik* that had been stuck in the 1950s and termed the acceptance of the postwar realities “unilateral concessions” toward Moscow.

To what extent was West German nuclear policy linked with the politics of the past? At first sight there were not too many blatant links. In fact, the links were more implicit but always tangible. A Foreign Ministry memorandum of 1968 highlights that international embarrassment proved a particularly significant concern. It argued that German non-signature of the NPT would have “a cumulative effect with other issues that currently damage West Germany’s image abroad, like the increase of the NPD and the possible end of the statute of limitations for NS crimes.”⁹⁷ International protest during the debate about the extension of the statute of limitations forced the Germans to reflect on public opinion abroad and its potential impact on allied nuclear policy. The NPD election success fueled concerns about the long-term stability of the Republic and raised the danger of international isolation. Trust in a real change of Germany was low and this was related to (alleged) quests for nuclear weapons and the politics of the past. The issue of Germany’s nuclear status was still widely associated with aggression and militarization, not with a contribution to the collective defense of the Western alliance.

In the 1950s and 1960s much of the political right in Germany had portrayed nuclear policy as the continuation of Versailles and Yalta or as another Munich and appeasement. The Western allies were conscious of the perceived “lessons of the past” in their dealings with the Germans—and the Soviet Union.⁹⁸ In the discourse “Versailles” and “Munich” became “icons of *Geschichtspolitik*” applied universally and indiscriminately to this day.⁹⁹ For those in and outside of Germany opposed to nuclear weapons in German hands or on German soil historical analogies centered on German aggression and militarism. By the early 1980s references to the Holocaust dominated yet another debate over nuclear weapons in Germany. The NATO two-track decision of 1979 and the subsequent debate whether Germany should accept the deployment of US Pershing and cruise missiles in response to Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe resulted in a revival of the West German peace movement and wide public protest against nuclear weapons. Anton-Andreas Guha, defense correspondent of the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, described NATO’s two-track decision as “Europe’s Holocaust”¹⁰⁰—notwithstanding that this decision and missile deployment were designed to enhance deterrence and thus make nuclear war less likely. The term “nuclear Holocaust” became widely used by the German peace movement and members of the

Green Party in an attempt to blur the difference between Nazi genocide and the superpower concept of nuclear deterrence.¹⁰¹ Protest against “Euroshima”¹⁰² in 1958 had turned into protest against a nuclear Auschwitz. Student protesters of the 1960s were among the first to discover Auschwitz as a tool of *Geschichtspolitik*, displaying slogans “then Auschwitz, now Vietnam.”¹⁰³ The linkage of Nazi genocide and nuclear deterrence portrayed Germans east and west as future victims of another Holocaust. Plans to arrange “a Nuremberg trial of the superpowers”¹⁰⁴ reflected the equation of Nazi war criminals with the Cold Warriors in the Pentagon and the Kremlin. By 1980, the Holocaust had become a more central element in public debate about World War II in Europe and America, and Auschwitz gradually turned into a “universal paradigm” for the ultimate evil.¹⁰⁵ And who, if not Germans, had a special duty to warn of future evils? Rejecting the two-track solution, Oskar Lafontaine, future party hopeful of the SPD, argued that “the loss of personal responsibility allowed mass murder under Hitler, the refusal to accept personal responsibility today will lead to mass murder through nuclear weapons.”¹⁰⁶ By the 1980s Germany’s past had become a legitimization for moral righteousness—Germans felt themselves called upon to warn of future mass murder by likening Nazi genocide to imminent nuclear devastation.

NOTES

1. Hansard Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th ser., vol. 617, cols. 776–77, 11 Feb. 1960.

2. Ute Frevert and Aleida Assmann, *Geschichtsvergessenheit—Geschichtsversessenheit* (Stuttgart, 1999), 143. The notion that the period from the late 1950s to the mid-1960s marked the beginning of a change in the West German approach to the recent past is widely accepted. See, for example, Peter Reichel, *Vergangenheitsbewältigung in Deutschland: Die Auseinandersetzung mit der NS Diktatur von 1945 bis heute* (Munich, 2001), 204; Antonia Grunenberg, *Die Lust an der Schuld* (Berlin, 2001), 148–50. It has been contested however, to what extent the 1950s were characterized by silence about the past. For a historiographical survey see: Hartmut Berghoff, “Zwischen Verdrängung und Aufarbeitung,” *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 49 (1998): 96–114.

3. Assmann and Frevert call the second phase, lasting from 1958 to 1985, “Kritik der Vergangenheitsbewältigung” (*Geschichtsvergessenheit*, 144). The term *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* (coming to terms with the past), often used to describe German efforts to cope with or overcome the recent past, is problematic since it implies “to overcome and leave behind” and to cope with the past in a way that people “cope with workload or debt.” Grunenberg, *Die Lust an der Schuld*, 57.

4. See Mark Cioc, *Pax Atomica: The Nuclear Defense Debate in West Germany during the Adenauer Era* (New York, 1988); and Alice Holmes Cooper, *Paradoxes of Peace: German Peace Movements since 1945* (Ann Arbor, MI, 1996).

5. See Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945–1963* (Princeton, 1999).

6. The following can only represent a selection of key works: Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000* (London, 1997); Christoph Bluth, *Britain, Germany and Western Nuclear Strategy* (Oxford, 1995); Christoph Hoppe, *Zwischen Teilhabe und Mitsprache: Die Nuklearfrage in der Allianzpolitik Deutschlands 1959–66* (Baden Baden, 1993); Matthias Küntzel, *Bonn und die Bombe: Deutsche Atomwaffenpolitik von Adenauer bis Brandt* (Frankfurt, 1993); Catherine Kelleher, *Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons* (New York, 1975).

7. Beatrice Heuser has examined historical and cultural influences on nuclear policy in Britain, France and West Germany in her *Nuclear Mentalities? Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG* (London, 1998); and idem, “Historical Lessons and Discourse on Defence in France and Germany 1945–1990,” *Rethinking History* 2, no. 2 (1998): 199–237.

8. To name a few more recent studies besides Reichel, *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, Grunenberg, *Die Lust an der Schuld*, and Assmann and Frevert, *Geschichtsvergessenheit*: Norbert Frei, ed., *Bekennen und Beschweigen: Die deutsche Nachkriegsgesellschaft und der Holocaust* (Göttingen, 2001); Mary Fulbrook, *German Identity after the Holocaust* (Oxford, 1999); Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys* (Cambridge, MA, 1997).

9. Edgar Wolfrum, *Geschichtspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Der Weg zur bundesrepublikanischen Erinnerung* (Darmstadt, 1999), 25–26.

10. Edgar Wolfrum, *Geschichte als Waffe: Vom Kaiserreich bis zur Wiedervereinigung* (Göttingen, 2001).

11. See Kelleher, *Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons*, 28–32; Küntzel, *Bonn und die Bombe*, 19–23.

12. Kelleher, *Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons*, 10.

13. For early US concepts on nuclear sharing within NATO, see, for example, Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, *Planning Armageddon: Britain, the US and the*

Command of Western Nuclear Forces 1945–64 (Amsterdam, 2000); David Schwartz, *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas* (Washington, DC, 1983).

14. Christian Tuschoff, *Die MC-70 und die Einführung nuklearer Trägersysteme in der Bundeswehr* (Ebenhausen, 1990); Detlef Bald, *Die Atombewaffnung der Bundeswehr* (Bremen, 1994).

15. To what extent the US maintained ultimate control has been questioned. See Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 194–96.

16. Michael Geyer, “Cold War Angst: The Case of West-German Opposition to Rearmament and Nuclear Weapons,” in Hanna Schissler, ed. *The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949–1968* (Princeton, 2001), 383–85.

17. *Ibid.*, 382–83.

18. Cioc, *Pax Atomica*, 70.

19. The Protestant Church remained divided over nuclear weapons and never managed to agree on a unified position; see *ibid.*, 112–15.

20. Holmes Cooper, *Paradoxes of Peace*, 35–37.

21. *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, 17 May 1958.

22. *Hamburger Echo*, 27 May 1958.

23. On this theme see also Heuser, *Nuclear Mentalities?* 192.

24. Eugen Gerstenmaier, quoted in Alexandra Rese, *Wirkung politischer Stellungnahmen von Wissenschaftlern am Beispiel der Göttinger Erklärung* (Frankfurt/Main, 1999), 141.

25. *Ibid.*, 139–40.

26. Quoted in Heuser, “Historical Lessons,” 222.

27. Rese, *Wirkung politischer Stellungnahmen*, 142.

28. Ostermärsche in der Bundesrepublik, 1961, Dokumentation und Photos, undated [1961], Militärarchiv Freiburg, BW2/20203 (This slogan is also discussed in Heuser, *Nuclear Mentalities?* 180–81.)

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 5 Feb. 1960.

31. *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 15 May 1958.

32. Heuser, *Nuclear Mentalities?* 185.

33. Martin Niemöller, *Zur atomaren Rüstung* (Darmstadt, 1959), 30. For the Göttingen Manifesto see Elisabeth Kraus, *Von der Uranspaltung zur Göttinger Erklärung* (Würzburg, 2001), 187–245; Rese, *Wirkung politischer Stellungnahmen*, 45–94.

34. Cioc, *Pax Atomica*, 119.

35. Ostermärsche in der Bundesrepublik, 1961, Dokumentation und Photos, undated [1961], Militärarchiv Freiburg, BW2/20205.

36. Holmes Cooper, *Paradoxes of Peace*, 41.

37. Geyer, “Cold War Angst,” 398.

38. Harold Macmillan, *Pointing the Way*, 1959–61 (London, 1972), 98.
39. Memorandum by the Secretary of State, 3 Nov. 1958, Public Record Office, London (hereafter PRO), CAB 131/20.
40. Ibid.
41. Memorandum by the Secretary of State, 23 March 1960, PRO, CAB 131/23.
42. Hansard Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th ser., vol. 617, cols. 507–15, 10 Feb. 1960. Dr. Alan Thompson was the MP for Dunfermline Burghs, Scotland.
43. Ibid.
44. *Daily Mirror*, 30 Dec. 1959; *Daily Herald*, 18 Jan. 1960; *Daily Herald*, 23 Jan. 1960; *Daily Express*, 11 and 12 Feb. 1960. See also Ulrich Brochhagen, *Nach Nürnberg: Vergangenheitsbewältigung und Westintegration in der Ära Adenauer* (Hamburg, 1994), 299–313.
45. *Daily Express*, 12 Feb. 1960.
46. Rese, *Wirkung politischer Stellungnahmen*, 182–83.
47. The literature on the MLF is vast. A few more recent studies include Twigge and Scott, *Planning Armageddon*, 184–93; Helga Haftendorn, *NATO and the Nuclear Revolution* (Oxford, 1996), 115–45; Hoppe, *Zwischen Teilhabe und Mitsprache*; Pascaline Winand, *Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe* (London, 1993), 221–43; Colette Barbier, “La force multilatérale dans le débat atomique français,” *Revue d’Histoire Diplomatique* 107, no. 1 (1993): 55–89.
48. Without going into detail here, it should be noted that ideas on the framework and structure of a future multilateral nuclear force greatly varied within the West German government. For details see: Hoppe, *Zwischen Teilhabe und Mitsprache*, 127–35.
49. Memorandum by McGeorge Bundy, 6 Dec. 1964, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin (hereafter LBJL), National Security File (NSF), country file: UK, box 214. For the demise of the MLF see Susanna Schrafstetter and Stephen Twigge, “Trick or Truth? The British ANF Proposal West Germany and US Non-proliferation Policy,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 11, no. 2 (2000): 161–84.
50. Hoppe, *Zwischen Teilhabe und Mitsprache*, 100.
51. “Dangers from a Psychotic Germany,” undated [1965], LBJL, NSF, Spurgeon Keeny file, box 7. Similar ideas can be found in “Unattributable Talking Points on Germany’s Role in the Nuclear Defense,” 3 Jan. 1966, PRO, FO 953/2211.
52. Memorandum of Conversation, 9 Dec. 1964, PRO, PREM 13/027.
53. Memorandum, 22 May 1964, LBJL, NSF, subject file: MLF, box 22.
54. Sir Frank Roberts to FO, 2 Aug. 1963, PRO, PREM 11/4561.
55. Ibid.
56. *Rheinischer Merkur*, 27 Aug. 1965.

57. Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 396.
58. *Der Spiegel*, 16 Dec. 1964.
59. Hansard Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th ser., vol. 678, col. 1312, 29 May 1963. Zilliacus was the MP for Gorton (Manchester).
60. Konrad Adenauer quoted in Assmann and Frevert, *Geschichtsvergessenheit*, 142.
61. The argument was popular on the Labour left. Labour MP Jenny Lee suggested that Adenauer's policy toward Poland was no different from Hitler's. Hansard Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th ser., vol. 617, cols. 716–17, 11 Feb. 1960.
62. Tom Lehrer, lyrics from the CD *That Was the Year That Was*, recorded July 1965 at the Hungry i, San Francisco, Reprise Records, a Warner Communications Company, record no. 6179-2.
63. For details see Reichel, *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, 182–98; Peter Steinbach, *Nationalsozialistische Gewaltverbrechen: Die Diskussion in der deutschen Öffentlichkeit nach 1945* (Berlin, 1981), 54–68.
64. Letter from the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations to West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder, 21 Dec. 1964, Bundesarchiv Koblenz, B136/3169.
65. Shlomo Shafir, *Ambiguous Relations: The American Jewish Community and Germany since 1945* (Detroit, 1999), 249.
66. Herf, *Divided Memory*, 338.
67. The large number of references to foreign newspapers in the debates of the Bundestag shows that parliamentarians were concerned about how the debate would influence the international standing of West Germany. Helmut Dubiel, *Niemand ist frei von der Geschichte: Die nationalsozialistische Herrschaft in den Debatten des Deutschen Bundestages* (Munich, 1999), 105.
68. *Wiesbadener Kurier*, 22 Jan. 1965.
69. On the Partial Test Ban Treaty, see Kendrick Oliver, *Kennedy, Macmillan and the Nuclear Test Ban Policy* (London, 1998); Ilse Dorothee Pautsch, “Im Sog der Entspannungspolitik: Die USA, das Teststopp-Abkommen und die Deutschland-Frage,” in Rainer Blasius, ed., *Von Adenauer zu Erhard* (Munich, 1994), 118–53.
70. Prominent opponents included Heinrich von Brentano (former foreign minister, leader of the CDU in the Bundestag); Heinrich Krone (minister for special affairs); Franz Josef Strauß (former defense minister and CSU leader) and Rainer Barzel (minister for all-German affairs). Hoppe, *Zwischen Teilhabe und Mitsprache*, 147.
71. For details see, Pautsch, “Im Sog der Entspannungspolitik,” 131–33.
72. *Ibid.*, 141–46.

73. For a reference to “Versailles,” see Heinrich Krone, “Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschland und Ostpolitik, 1954–69,” in Rudolf Morsey and Konrad Repgen, eds., *Adenauer Studien III: Untersuchungen und Dokumente zur Ostpolitik* (Mainz, 1974), 177. Franz Josef Strauß linked the treaty to the Munich Agreement. Hoppe, *Zwischen Teilhabe und Mitsprache*, 147.

74. Strauß to Brentano, 2 Aug. 1963, Bundesarchiv Koblenz, NL 239 von Brentano, fiche 181; Brentano to Erhard, undated [1964], *ibid.*, fiche 170. See also Hoppe, *Zwischen Teilhabe und Mitsprache*, 147; Küntzel, *Bonn und die Bombe*, 66–67.

75. Macmillan to Kennedy, 12 March 1963, PRO, FO 371/171235. See also Macmillan to Ormsby Gore, 12 March 1963, *ibid.*

76. Susanna Schrafstetter, *Die dritte Atommacht: Britische Nichtverbreitungspolitik im Dienst von Statussicherung und Deutschlandpolitik* (Munich, 1999), 139.

77. Haftendorn, *NATO and the Nuclear Revolution*, 159–60.

78. Adenauer called the treaty a “Morgenthau-Plan squared,” Strauß referred to it as a “Versailles of cosmic dimension.” The comparison with Yalta, which originated in France, was widely used. See, for example, *Die Welt*, 24 Feb. 1969. For the Morgenthau plan and Versailles, see *Welt am Sonntag*, 12 Feb. 1967; and Küntzel, *Bonn und die Bombe*, 157.

79. See Haftendorn, *NATO and the Nuclear Revolution*, 148–66.

80. *Vorwärts*, 8 Aug. 1968.

81. *Der Spiegel* 27 Feb. 1967. For similar arguments see *Westfälische Rundschau*, 10 July 1968; *Die Zeit*, 22 March 1968; and *Der Spiegel*, 15 July 1968.

82. Slogans included: “USA, SA, SS,” “Denke an 1939, KZ und Vietnam.” Ostermarsch 1968 in Schleswig-Holstein, 16 April 1968, Militärarchiv Freiburg, BW2/20358.

83. *Der Spiegel*, 18 March 1968.

84. The NPD gained over 7% of the votes in Landtagswahlen in Hesse and Bavaria in 1966, and 9.8% in Landtagswahlen in Baden-Württemberg in 1968.

85. Folgen einer Nichtunterzeichnung durch die Bundesregierung, 13 Sept. 1968, Bundesarchiv Koblenz, B106/40644.

86. Arbeitsgruppe Innenpolitische Grundsatzfragen, Kabinettsache Atomwaffensperrvertrag, 16 April 1969, *ibid.*

87. Rostow to Johnson, 6 March 1967, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–68*, vol. 13 (Washington, DC, 1995), 538–44.

88. Record of Conversation, 16 Feb. 1967, PRO, PREM 13/1478.

89. *New York Times*, 8 July 1968.

90. *The Times*, 15 Feb. 1967.

91. For a detailed account see Küntzel, *Bonn und die Bombe*, 161–68.

92. Aufzeichnung des Staatssekretärs Duckwitz, 28 Aug. 1968, *Akten zur auswärtigen Politik des Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1968*, doc. 272, 1053–55. Articles 53 and 107 contain provisions for action against former enemy states in case of “a renewal of aggressive policy on part of any such state” (Art. 53).

93. Memorandum by Francis Bator, 4 April 1966, LBJL, NSF, country file: Germany; and Thomas Schelling, “Kontinuität und Neubeginn in der NATO,” *Europa-Archiv* 21, no. 13 (1966): 461–73.

94. Chancellor Erhard quoted in Dubiel, *Niemand ist frei von der Geschichte*, 98.

95. Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 392.

96. *Ibid.*, 389.

97. Folgen einer Nichtunterzeichnung, 5 Sept. 1968, Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes Berlin, B43, Bd.107250.

98. For the references to Munich during the Cuban Missile Crisis, see Ernest May, ed., *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Cambridge, MA, 1997).

99. Most recently in the debate on war against Iraq. See Gerhard Weinberg’s article “No Road from Munich to Iraq,” *Washington Post*, 3 Nov. 2002.

100. Guha quoted in Jeffrey Herf, *War by Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of the Euromissiles* (New York, 1991), 133.

101. *Ibid.*, 186.

102. Lorenz Knorr, *Geschichte der Friedensbewegung in der Bundesrepublik* (Cologne, 1983), 109.

103. Ostermarsch Munich, 1965, undated, Militärarchiv Freiburg, BW2/20259.

104. Herf, *War by Other Means*, 186. Apparently, the plan to organize a “Nuremberg trial” of the United States and the Soviet Union originated in the Green Party (*Die Grünen*).

105. Grunenberg, *Die Lust an der Schuld*, 202; Reichel, *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, 209–10.

106. Oskar Lafontaine quoted in Heuser, “Historical Lessons,” 222. Similarly, German writer Günter Grass, quoted in Herf, *War by Other Means*, 175–76.

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