CLAS 196/PHIL 196
Stoicism
Prof. Bailly
An Overview of Stoic Ethics
- This overview will, one hopes, raise more questions
than it will answer.
- Please be patient: not every question can be answered at this
time.
- We need to note our questions and see whether in the course of
further readings, we find answers, as well as whether we think
Stoicism really is as it is described here. We may also find
that there is more than one version of Stoicism, just as there
is more than one version of Christianity or moral realism.
- some questions:
- what does the stoic say about justice and
injustice in society: can the stoic simply watch
and do nothing as grave injustices occur around him or
her?
- what is the positive content of virtue and happiness:
the stoics have removed most of the things ordinary people
value from the realm of virtue and happiness: what is left?
- what is the Stoic account of human agency?
- Some, perhaps a great deal, of what is presented here will
seem preposterous, even ludicrous. It will take time to
build up our story of the Stoics to the point where we can see
why they were attracted to these positions. For now, we need to
know about the positions, but we do not need to agree
with them or even feel as if we understand the arguments for
them.
First, a few simple concepts:
- Flourishing as a human being: aka Happiness
- all humans aim at flourishing, that for the sake of
which everything else is done
- That is just what flourishing is as the stoics see it: the
goal of all our activities.
- Thriving.
- IT IS NOT A GIDDY MOMENTARY FEELING: the word for
"flourishing" is most often translated as "happiness," but it
is better translated as "human well-being": please please
please keep that in mind. It will avoid many confusions and
mistakes. When you see "happiness," think "flourishing" or
"human well-being"
- Nature a contested, ambiguous, and even fighting word
- human nature
- rationality in particular is characteristic of
human nature: the thing humans have that makes them human
- cosmic nature
- the larger system of which everything is a part
- this larger system is "governed" by "god"
- Stoics call that god "Zeus"
- DO NOT think this "Zeus" is the guy you learned about in
your mythology class
This "Zeus" could equally well be called "the nature of
the universe" or even "fate": this is not a simple
concept.
- Nevertheless, the Stoics were trying to appropriate the
god Zeus from popular mythology, just as Christians and
other religions very frequently appropriate various other
religious things and repurpose them for Christianity
- the way things are: what things really are or in
optimal conditions could be can be termed
their "nature"
- another word for it might be "essence"
- DO NOT think that everything you think of as "nature" is
what it means in Stoic texts.
- Just as god and Zeus are technical terms in Stoicism, so is
"Nature": we must build it up rather than think we understand
it from the start because we know what we mean when we say
"god" or "nature."
- Virtue
- virtue is the only good and the only
thing which can make anything good
- the word translated as "virtue" could also mean "excellence"
- one good way to think of it is that the virtue of any X
would be being a perfect/excellent X, not just any old
imperfect X.
- Indifferents
- everything in a human life aside from virtue is
indifferent
- that is, it is neither good nor vicious
- it does not matter when compared with virtue and vice
- indifferents come in two sorts
- those which, all else aside, are preferable/promoted/preferred
- e.g. all else considered, I'd rather have breakfast,
live, have happy children, have a nice piece of art, be
healthy, have world peace, etc.
- those which, all else aside, are dispreferable/demoted/dispreferred
- e.g. all else considered, I'd rather not be
hungry, vomit, die, be roasted on a
spit, watch my family die, be poor, have
cancer, cause a world war, etc.
- but they are all indifferents, whether preferable
or dispreferable.
- Vice
- "vice" and "vicious" are just words for "bad," whatever is
not virtuous: there is no big distinction between "bad",
"sinful", "evil," and "(morally) wrong"
- Desire, Dejection, Pleasure, Fear
- emotional disturbances caused by false beliefs about
good and evil
- I fear death because I believe it is bad
- Take away the belief, and the fear itself goes away (say
the Stoics)
- I take pleasure in reputation because I think it is a good
thing
- Take a way the belief that reputation really matters,
and I won't take pleasure in it, or have my life distorted
by worry about it
- note that "desire" here is not completely synonymous with
all the ways we use "desire": be careful not to object based
on your own equivocation: if you object, try to object based
on what the terms really mean in the Stoic view, not what we
mean by them.
- also note that terms change from translator to translator,
text to text, author to author: be sure to put in the
work to figure out what is meant rather than assume
it.
- Selection, disselection
- these are technical-term translations used for how the stoic
chooses certain indifferents and rejects others
- don't think of this as the same as the ordinary English word
"selection."
- the words are meant to be technical terms for a Stoic
concept
Now for the outline of Stoic ethics promised
- The ultimate goal of all our activities is "happiness"
- Happiness consists in following nature
- the cosmic nature of things as Zeus directs it, within
which each of us exists
- By following nature, we will be happy
- and we will also be virtuous by following
nature.
- Only the virtuous are happy: there is no other way to be
happy than to be virtuous.
- That is because virtue is the ONLY thing that is good.
- virtue is transformative knowledge
- knowing it transforms your life
- if you do know it, you cannot help but have your life
transformed
- we can call this the soteriology
of Stoicism.
- Other candidates for goodness or "good things" are all
mistaken.
- Pleasure
- Moments of Elation (i.e. the most common English meaning
of "happiness")
- Fame
- Money
- Health
- Freedom
- Life
- "Good" Fortune
- all not good
- but also
- Pain
- Disrepute
- Poverty
- Ill health
- Slavery
- Death
- "Bad" Fortune
- all also not good (AND not bad either!)
- "not good" does not mean they are vicious/bad
- Rather, they are all indifferents: they simply have
no particular place in the good/bad division
- They simply have no place as factors in reckonings of good
and evil
- None of them harm us
- None of them make us unhappy
- So what makes us unhappy?
- VICE
- and everyone is vicious
- this means everyone: Socrates, Zeno, Chrysippus, and you and
me
- and not only is everyone vicious, but everyone is equally
vicious!
- Socrates is as vicious as the serial murderer.
- Yes, that is right. All of us, equally, vicious.
- The Stoic Sage (cue heroic exalted music)
- Stoics speak of "the sage," who is the virtuous person,
the perfected Stoic
- no actual person has ever become a sage, except maybe
Socrates (not really) or maybe some other candidate (but
again, not really)
- but the idea of a sage is useful for Stoics in their
discussions of ethics
- and virtue is possible for humans, they claim
- it is not an unrealizable goal
- rather it is extremely difficult and demanding
- think of the ideal of being a "true Christian" or a "true
Muslim" or "perfectly at peace with oneself" or "morally
perfect" or "physically perfect": those who are trying to do
such things are never satisfied with themselves, and they
know they will never fully achieve their goal, but that does
not stop them. Just so, the stoics think everyone falls
short of the goal, but they don't think that means at all
that we should not strive to reach the goal. It's what
humans are here for.
- The stoic sage is perfectly virtuous
- all of her actions are virtuous and equally virtuous
- helping others
- saving the planet
- cutting toenails
- wiping
- equally virtuous
- because they all arise from knowledge
- that knowledge creates the right intentions
- which leads to the right selections
- the selections are sufficient: it does not matter for
the sage whether or not the goals of those selections
actually come to pass
- should the sage be selecting to brush teeth well, that
is sufficient
- it doesn't matter whether actual good teeth brushing
results
- should the sage be trying to save children from a
burning building, that too is sufficient
- it doesn't matter whether children are saved
- So what are we doing when we try to
follow nature?
- we are "progressing"
- think of the person at the bottom of the ocean trying to
swim upward and the person sitting there doing nothing on
the bottom, even if with their head one inch below the
surface: both are drowning, and equally drowning,
but one is "making progress."
- thus we are all vicious, and equally vicious, but some of
us are "progressing."
- "progressing," however, is not becoming more
virtuous
- think of those drowning people: both are drowning, whether
1/2 inch under the surface or chained to the bottom a mile
down. One is not "more drowning."
- think of virtue like a light with a simple on-off
switch: it's on or it's off. It may reasonably be
called "closer to being on" when the switch is moved a
little bit, but in a very real sense, it is not "closer to
being on," because there is a simple fact of the matter: the
switch is either on or off. If it is off, it is just as off
as any other off.
- or think of it like pregnancy: being "a little bit
pregnant" just doesn't work logically, although having 1) a
willing inseminator or donor or source of 2) viable sperm,
that is 3) put together with your egg, 4) under propitious
conditions, and 5) a desire to get pregnant are all together
perhaps called being "almost pregnant." Still, you're not
pregnant.
- As vicious people
- it is vicious for us to honor our parents, give to others,
rescue children from burning buildings, save the planet, etc.
- it is also vicious for us to murder, lie, cheat, and steal
- equally vicious
- What makes all these things vicious?
- false beliefs about what is good and evil
- we think that rescuing children from burning buildings
is a good because we don't understand that their lives are
(preferred) indifferents and as such are not good or bad:
they just are
- it still might be good, for a stoic sage, to try to
save the children: the stoic sage who tries from
knowledge and the right intentions would be doing good
by trying to do such things.
- the sage might rescue them too, but not under the
illusion that that is good: it's just a thing that the
sage selects as preferred: all things considered, the sage
selects to try to save them
- could it be that the sage distinguishes between
the goodness in the agent (which does depend on the
goodness of the goal) and the goodness of actually
achieving the goal (which is an indifferent)
- but does that really work?
- the sage's actions could be no different in outward
appearance than ours, and still, theirs are good and ours
are vicious
- but if the sage failed to rescue them after trying, the
sage would feel no dejection/pain.
- think of the person who gives money to children's
charities to get access to victimize the children
- we might say "giving the money to them is good" and yet
"victimizing them is bad": the stoics would say that
without the right dispositional knowledge, intentions,
etc., the action is not good: in fact, only actions done
by a truly good person are good
- always remind yourself that the children in this case
are "suffering" and "enduring" things that are
indifferent, according to the stoic: they and we think
the victimization is bad, but if they were good little
stoics, they would be happy anyway and would see their
victimization as indifferent
- and the fact that they are not stoics does not change
things: there is a fact of the matter
- false beliefs are essential for desire, pleasure, fear,
and dejection
- these beliefs are central to being good and evil because
Stoic psychology is strongly monistic: the soul is a
unified single thing
- the soul for a Stoic is the pneuma which holds
you together as you and gives you the qualities that you
have that make you you
(more on this when we get to Stoic physics: for now,
it's pretty mystifying)
- the soul is one thing in rational animals. Stoics
call this one thing "the commanding faculty" (hegemonikon)
- all impulses (desires, fears, selections, etc.) are
movements of this faculty and all involve assent to
propositions, and hence beliefs
- i.e. a human's desires are all acts of the rational
agent
- knowledge of good and evil would transform the
commanding faculty and make it entirely good: soteriology
(theory of salvation).
- in the absence of knowlege of good and evil, the
commanding faculty is vicious
- So how can the sage eat or do anything if the sage
has no desire or pleasure? It seems the sage has no
motivation to do this rather than that.
- desire, pleasure, fear, dejection are what motivate most
of us: we eat mostly to assuage pain or cause pleasure; we
do X to avoid dejection, etc.
- the sage's correct beliefs would banish desire, pleasure,
fear, and dejection
- sages feel no desire, pleasure, fear, or dejection
- instead, in relation to indifferents, the sage
expresses rational selection or disselection
- this is different from desire, etc. because it is accompanied
by no false belief that the thing selected is good
- that thing is merely preferred
- and if the sage does not get what he/she selects, the sage
feels no dejection
- rather, whether the sage gets it or not, the sage
feels a general contentment that the cosmic order of
nature is moving along and he/she is following it
- some things the sage has simply removed from his or her
self: things like ambition, pride, etc. which plausibly do
depend on beliefs about good and evil
- other things, like thirst, hunger, need to pee, want
sex, etc. the sage is subject to and will "select" or
"disselect" depending on the preponderance of
preferreds/dispreferreds, but with the firm knowledge that
they are not good or bad
- rather, they are things that are preferred or
dispreferred
- if they don't happen, too bad, no biggie, wasn't meant
to be, tant pis,
oh well, c'est la vie,
it's neither here nor there, it's all good
- what do you want for breakfast? I'd like pancakes and
bacon, but I'd be happy with anything: that's what the
stoic says about life
- the sage observes the world
- people eat
- it generally is preferable
- sensations get uncomfortable, but not unbearable, if
you don't eat, so eat: why not?
- people help others
- again, generally preferable
- has no dispreferable consequences
- other preferable things happen because of it
- people try to avoid injury
- people raise children
- children happen to people who have sex
- it's part of life
- preferable to some, but not for everyone
- people kill people
- generally has dispreferable consequences both
internally to the killer and externally
- but sometimes preferable
- so the sage selects some things and disselects others,
because that is "according to human nature," but not
because their accomplishment in themselves are good
- the sage knows that irregularities occur, that fate/the
world throws us a lot of curve balls, that some individuals
have painful lives
- some humans starve, hurt, and/or have their children die
young: there are very occasionally extreme situations
where what is legally murder might be preferable
(persistent spousal and child abuse that is protected
legally?)
- that too is part of nature?
- so the sage accepts them with contentment and a faith:
- the cosmic nature sometimes overrides the nature
of individuals
- cf. Job or Voltaire's Candide.
- the sage understands that things happen as they
happen, but also has faith that they are directed
by Zeus' providence
- From Epictetus' Handbook,
52, the very end:
- Upon all occasions we ought to have these maxims
ready at hand:
"Conduct me, Jove, and you, 0 Destiny,
Wherever your decrees have fixed my station."
(Cleanthes)
"I follow cheerfully; and, did I not,
Wicked and wretched, I must follow still
Whoever yields properly to Fate, is deemed
Wise among men, and knows the laws of heaven."
(Euripides, Frag. 965)
And this third:
"O Crito, if it thus pleases the gods, thus let it be.
Anytus and
Melitus may kill me indeed, but hurt me they cannot."
(Plato's Crito and Apology)
- Chrysippus is said to have claimed that all
things considered, he would select health, but if it
became clear to him that he was to be ill, he would
select illness
- in other words, he wouldn't just make do with whatever
life throws him, he'd be happy with it: he'd make
lemonade: by "make lemonade" is not meant that he
would change the external world into something
preferrable: rather, he would change his internal
disposition into something that
preferred/understood the external world as it is
- it seems that the sage treats life as a big package
tour: we're along for the ride, but not autonomously in
charge of our path unless we choose the path we're given:
might as well choose it, make the best of it: no use
crying over spilled milk: make lemonade
- It is the lack of false beliefs which distinguishes the sage
from us
- sometimes the sage chooses suicide
- it might be tempting to think that the sage chooses
suicide at times of great moment, when it "makes a
difference" or there is some great moral what-not on the line
- not necessarily: the sage chooses suicide simply
based on considering the indifferents: weighing up the
preferred/dispreferred, and then opting out when there is a
preponderance of dispreferred things on the foreseeable
horizon and no particular point in toughing it out
- the sage does not choose suicide in order to do a
virtuous action, as we might think that a soldier who
throws herself on a grenade to save a platoon might "commit
suicide" for a virtuous thing
- that sort of thing has no traction for the stoics: life is
indifferent
- if it becomes impossible to act virtuously, and yet one is
forced to act, I suppose the sage would choose suicide, but
it is hard to imagine how the invulnerable virtue of a sage
could be affected by anything but the sage's own bad action,
so it is hard to imagine how it could be impossible for the
sage to act virtuously and so commit suicide for that
reason.
- Although generally humans do not choose suicide, there are
times when following nature leads to suicide, say the Stoics
- Many find this absurd
- How can there be a preponderance of dispreferred things
that lead one to commit suicide?
- Doesn't that mean that the sage treats these dispreferreds
not as dispreferred indifferents, but rather as Bad things
...
- ...so bad in fact that they commit suicide to avoid
them?
- The Stoic responds that suicide is not bad: life and
death are both simply dispreferred or preferred. They are
as nothing compared to virtue and they cannot affect
virtue (unless you let them via your false beliefs).
- Choosing one indifferent among many can never amount to
saying that that preferred is good or bad.
- Suicide is merely an example that non-stoics think is
an extreme situation that will make the stoic stop the
stoic charade, admit some "preferables" and
"dispreferables" motivate the stoic: it's not a charade, and
the stoic sees no reason to stop
- And what of the non-sage Stoics?
- They can neither save their virtue nor prevent vice by
committing suicide
- they face the same situation vis-a-vis suicide as the
sage: the preponderance of preferred/dispreferred things may
lead them to it, and Stoics thought it was neither better
nor worse that non-sages commit suicide: all non-sages are
vicious and so are all their actions. Comparing them to try
to find one that is worse or better is the wrong idea.
- Non-sages like us cannot be virtuous, but we can perhaps
ask "what would the sage do?" and do that. It won't make
us virtuous to do the action, however, b/c it is not a matter of
simply doing
the right things: one must also have the right knowledge,
motivations, etc.
- The befitting
- Stoics define a "befitting" action as an action which,
once done, is capable of having a well-reasoned
justification
- all the actions of a sage are befitting (but they are more
than just befitting)
- we who are not sages can do befitting actions
- it does not matter whether the justification is
performed or known by the agent him/herself. WOW
- so this does not amount to a requirement that the sage
engage in constant, never-endable, infinite justification
of each and every action
- the definition of "befitting" also does not say
anything about the agent's motivation for the action:
that is irrelevant for whether the action is befitting or
not.
- correct motivations are what the sage adds to befitting
actions to make them the actions of a sage
- some actions of non-sages are befitting, while some are
not
- if they are the actions which a sage would have done in
the same situation, they are certainly befitting
(remember, a sage has perfected rationality)
- befitting actions are according to nature, but may be
done from incorrect intentions or without an actual or
potential understanding of their justification.
- we are, however, naturally attached to what is
befitting (called oikeios), and we can foster
that attachment.
- it might help us break through to that transformative
knowledge that is virtue
- befitting actions are done by animals and plants
- they are according to the animals' and plants' natures
- but plants and animals lack rationality and the capacity
to have knowledge
- thus the "befitting" is not a moral concept (note
along the way that morality is reserved for rational agents)
- also, thus the person or thing doing the action does not
need itself to actually understand the justification: a
rational agent can understand the well-reasoned
justification for a plant's befitting actions, although the
plant cannot.
- question: could a plant do something that is not
befitting?
- further question: one might even wonder whether a
plant can really engage in action: a rock that falls to
the ground is not said to act: are plants different?
- When it is a sage who does a befitting action, it is a "perfect" action,
because it is a befitting action done with the proper motivation
and the sage can have understanding of how the actions fit with
nature, both human and cosmic.
- does this knowledge have to be perfect?
- if so, doesn't the sage have to be god-like, or at least
super-human in cognitive capacities?
- the stoics do not seem to require that the sage be
omniscient, so they need a way out of this
- in order to make greater progress, the Stoics held that we
non-sages should
- stop thinking of promoted/dispromoted
(preferred/dispreferred) things as good and bad.
- select the
promoted without believing that they are good
- i.e. don't attach importance to them such that we suffer
if they don't occur
- disselect
the demoted without believing that they are bad
- i.e. don't attach importance to them such that we suffer
if they occur
- try to think of what the sage would do and why
- and hence do more and more befitting actions
Our challenge in the course is to be able to formulate explanations
of these doctrines and why reasonable people, or at least stoic
people, might accept them.
To do so, we will go through many topics that seem far-removed from
these ethical doctrines.
We do not need to believe any of this in order to rise to the
challenge but it is hard to come to understand something well
without that understanding having some effect on oneself, and one
common effect of understanding a position is agreeing with it.