Last time, we saw Becker's initial moves to renovate Stoicism
- An overly long summary of what we covered last time:
- Stoics are committed to an empiricist epistemology and a
materialist ontology.
- That leads them to "follow" science, and accept evolution,
chaos theory, emergent properties, statistic, and other
scientific advances.
- Thus the old Stoic God no longer viable.
- And many aspect of people and world need to be taken into
account.
- Becker looks to science and logic as bedrock.
- Ethics is subordinate to science and logic.
- Ethics works on our purpose, deciding between priorities.
- Building the normative propositions of one's life, from
previous and new projects and purposes
- We make our character over time by doing this
- Ethics is always embedded in particulars: a particular agent,
a particular set of circumstances, a particular history.
- Ethics is a posteriori, not a priori.
- Human nature is a statistical matter
- whatever large numbers of humans generally do is "human
nature"
- there will always be outliers: that doesn't make them good
or bad
- what work will he put "human nature" to?
- Necessity, Impossibility and Possibilities fall into different
kinds: logic-driven, science theory driven, and local
sphere-driven
- "Good" and "bad" are classified: it's not just one good or one
bad. There are several kinds:
- what is good "all-things-considered": stoicism aims to make
a person willingly and effectively construct and follow their
all-things-considered good: this should be our "prime
directive"
- affect (yay broccoli, boo dog poo)
- effect (instrumental value)
- examplarity
- appropriateness
- vaguely good
- good in some mix of the above
- categorical commitments: these are usually of the form "I
should do this, nothing-else-considered" (obey the law, for
instance)
- these need to be put into perspective: don't follow
impossible ones, for instance
The following Continues from where we left off last time:
- "this is good" and "this is better"
- Comparisons
- "X is better than Y" can be a claim within the same value
category, in which case it is not problematic, because a
thing X of one sort of value can most easily be compared
with another thing Y of the same sort
- or it can involve cross-category comparison, which is
problematic: if thing X is good as an effect, but
thing Y as an affect, they are not on same value
scale, it seems, and so claiming that one is better is a
problem.
- there is no solution that makes it OK to compare apples to
tennis shoes, but realizing that we are comparing things
that are not on the same continuum of "goodness" helps us
avoid it and helps us realize which things have motivational
force
- Preferences
- are psychological facts
- they are ordinal relations among things of value
- preferences have motivational force
- sometimes preferences are not "logical"
- an agent may think that Y is superior in every way, but
still choose X when it comes down to it (Becker says that
many marriages survive because of this: is he loving?
cynical? sarcastic? too autobiographical?)
- this situation is called akrasia
- Stoics think that preferences OUGHT to track the facts
about values: that an agent who exhibits akrasia needs
training
- Stoic training aims to
negate the internal motivational force of preferences that
do not track the facts about values or when they conflict
with what is possible, impossible, or necessary
- Projects
- We all have projects, because
- we are all agents, and to be an agent is to be
goal-oriented, to have projects: it's just part of what it
means to be an agent
- humans are statistically overwhelmingly project-full
- Indelible projects have a permanent or lasting effect on the
agent's character or conduct
- Erasable projects have no permanent lasting effect on the
agent's character or conduct
- Enabling projects open opportunities for an agent
- Disabling projects close opportunities for an agent
- Inescapable projects are necessary
- Comprehensive projects include and/or dominate other
projects
- More comprehensive projects dominate less comprehensive
ones
- Becker doesn't say so at this time, but it seems clear
that something like the all-things-considered goal of
human flourishing is THE dominant comprehensive project
in anyone's life, and so it OUGHT to override all
others, and certainly all "nothing-else-considered"
commitments.
- Standards
- "Standards" are conditional commitments defining how an
agent ought to conduct herself in pursuing a project
- they are "Conditional" because they are adopted if and only
if the agent takes on a certain project
- they are "Commitments" because they are experienced as a
constraint
- they lead to normative propositions: Since I am
undertaking this project, I ought to do X,
nothing-else-considered.
- There are very many sorts of standards: quality, efficiency,
stylistic, difficulty, etc.
- Some have motivational force: ("don't do anything you
can't be at least decent at", "good, better, best, never let
it rest, til good is better and better is best")
- they are kind of like categorical commitments that come
along with certain projects and go away if the project goes
away
- Failed Projects and Unmet Standards
- we all fail at some projects and fail to meet various
standards
- That can cause misery (emotion)
- It can also be part of a learning and building process (i.e.
be productive)
- The misery induced can be as harmful or more harmful than
the failure itself
- Stoic training has as an axiom that agents should not
attempt projects that are impossible for the agent or set
standards that are unmeetable for the agent
- BUT that does not preclude using unmeetable ideals as instruments to
enable greater achievement
- failure
- Stoic training recommends "retrospective detachment
from destructive losses"
- in other words, don't let past failures or unmet
standards hinder current or future efforts
- neutralize psychological effects of failure
- BUT sometimes failure produces goods that
countervail the failure
- there are things one must fail at to get good at
- there are failures that lead to greater good
- do not neutralize the harm of a failure if the "harm"
might lead to greater good
- In other words, ignore failures and unmet standards if
they hinder you from good, but pay attention to them if they
are instrumental to some good
- think of failures and unmet standards as tools: you can
use them if you want to: why use one that will do harm?
- practice detachment from the emotions of failures/unmet
standards
- Social roles, Conventions, Institutions
- Facts about expectations people have of each other
- Defined by various sorts of rules: 10 kinds, with some
examples
- Participation rules: who can take part, and to what degree
- must be 18 or older: must have a C rating in something:
must be able to do a pullup, etc.
- Deontological rules: deont- means "should/must"
in Greek: this is about what is required and forbidden
to participants
- must not sexually harrass: must wear appropriate attire:
must stay at least 1 hour, etc.
- Valuational commitments: what does the institution value,
given its goal, and to what degree
- UVM has our common ground and other attempts to specify
what is of value to anyone who joins
- Generative and Transformational rules: how does the
institution come to be and change
- amendment requires a 2/3 majority, wait at least a day
before enacting any big decisions, don't take on a new
project until you finish at least one existing one, etc.
- Administrative rules: who enforces the other rules and how
- police force, umpire, parents, etc.
- Regulative rules: how are the rules applied
- tests will be conducted biweekly, only fellow members
can make complaints, etc.
- Legitimation assumptions: how to adopt new rules or decide
whether a rule is a rule of the institution
- if it's not in the bylaws, it's not a rule; whatever
your mother says goes; if it's not against the law, it's
OK
- Connectedness: how are the participants connected to each
other
- hierarchies, equal-status, kinship
- Closure: to what extent and how are participants related
only to other participants or to outsiders
- Mutuality levels: ...
- Rules lead to institutional normative propositions
- nothing-else-considered
- what does "nothing-else-considered" mean
- think of a game: it has rules within it, and when we
play it, we are in it and subject to its rules. Only by
considering something outside of the game do we get
outside of the rules.
- so we make most decisions about playing the game as
"nothing else considered" decisions
- once in a while, we need to consider things outside of
the game (biological things like sleep and hunger and
broken bones)
- publishing, camping,
slavery, basketball, stamp clubs, this class, your family,
your dorm/apartment: all can be seen as institutions
with rules and resulting normative propositions, and can be
approached with "nothing-else-considered" reasoning (i.e.
reasoning that is limited to things within the institution or
game or project)
- Control
- The stoics hold that one ought to prefer having control
over one's own situation (environment, actions, outcomes
of actions) to lacking control
- It does not follow that one ought to prefer either having
control over other people or not having control over other
people
- It does not follow that one ought to exercise that control
(sometimes it's best to "let go", but it's always preferred
that that be a choice, not a necessity)
- It does not follow that one ought to seek control over
one's own situation (not sure I understand this one: must be
about taking steps to get control as opposed to simply
preferring it)
- One ought merely to prefer it
- Stoic moral training
leads one to seek out institutions (roles, conventions, etc.)
in which one has more rather than less control (unless it is
clear that having less control is better for one,
all-things-considered)
- Stoic's prime directive
- A stoic ought to pursue a good
life as a categorical
commitment that overrides all others
- stoicism does not champion any one particular good life
- One ought to be able to salvage from any situation some form
of good life
- In any case where the commitment to the good life conflicts
with another normative proposition, one of two things occurs:
- The commitment to the good life ought to prevail
- The choice is an indifferent one and is unresolvable by
practical reason (not sure I understand how this conflict
occurs)
- In any case, Reason has, or at least should have,
controlling powers: reason is the exercise of our agency
powers and virtue is the perfection of that agency :
that is why it is called 'virtue'
- The aim is the creation of one spatio-temporally extended
object, called "your life"
- one cannot fully judge one's own life: others will have to
(i.e. there is no perspective outside of it available to
you)
- aesthetics and excellence are the criteria of judgement
(hopefully more on that later!)
- how well I think my life is going is only one part
of what goes into evaluating it
- Virtue is what will create the best life possible
- , no matter what life it is, because virtue is the
perfection of rational agency, the perfection of practical
reason
- There are many good lives: Stoicism does not think that any
particular one is the best life.
A word about Physics from Becker's notes to chapter 3:
"Ancient stoics were physicalistic 'entity-but-not-substance
dualists,' in the sense that they held that body and mind were 2
(hence 'dual') material bodies of different (i.e. 'dual') sorts,
blended or fused together in a conscious being. See Long, 'Soul and
Body in Stoicism.' The difference between then and now is of course
in the causal account we now suppose will one day be given about the
origin of mind. Empirical science, beginning in this case at least
with Galen (On the Doctrines of
Hippocrates and Plato I-II), has convinced us that the
origin of mental phenomena is to be found in neurological
processes--not in ... breath... . But that sort of change in
doctrine is nothing new for us. Sedley ... argues that ancient stoic
doctrines about the corporeality of the soul may be read as
'attempts to update [Platonic dualism] in the light of the latest
science.'" P. 29