Kripke on Analyticity, Designators, and Possible Worlds

1. Kripke on analyticity:

[L]et’s just make it a matter of stipulation that an analytic statement is, in some sense, true by virtue of its meaning and [necessarily true] in virtue of its meaning. Then something which is analytically true will be both necessary and 
a priori.

(That’s sort of stipulative.) (p. 39)

Example:
(1) No bachelor is married.
This sentence is supposed to be true “in virtue of its meaning.”

Remarks:

(a) No falsehoods: Only true sentences are “true in virtue of their meanings.”

(b) True in virtue of meaning: What does this mean? Here’s a stab (call this access analyticity):

(ACCESS ANALYTICITY) \( S \) is “true in virtue of its meaning” iff knowing the syntax of \( S \), its meaning, and some logic will enable you to discern its truth.

(c) No contingent truths: Analytic truths are stipulated by Kripke to be necessary. THIS IS NOT STANDARD. And it raises the question:

Are there any sentences which are true in virtue of meaning, but also only contingently true?

[BTW: I have no idea what motivates this stipulation.]

(d) Analyticity is defined in modal terms.

(e) Do analytic sentences state a priori facts? According to the philosophical tradition, they do. But on the gloss of “true in virtue of meaning” that I have offered above, it is not obvious that they always do. It depends on whether knowledge of \( S \)’s syntax and meaning is a priori. Kripke assumes throughout that analytic sentences state a priori facts.

(f) A Priority without analyticity: If someone tells me that (1) is false, they must misunderstand either “bachelor” or “married.” But failing to know, e.g.
(2) \[ 87^2 = 7569. \]

does not indicate that you have misunderstood one expression or another. Thus, (2) seems to be a priori without being analytic.

2. **Kripke on designators:**

   Designators include:

   **Names** The proper names of natural language; and

   **Def. Descriptions** expressions of natural language which refer to a unique individual by describing that individual.

**Remarks:**

(a) **Paradigm cases of definite descriptions:** Expressions of the form “the so-and-so”, *e.g.* “the shortest spy,” “the man who corrupted Hadleyburg.”

(b) **There are other cases:** *e.g.* “Aristotle’s mother.”

(c) **Names that look like Definite Descriptions:** Some expressions seem to have the “right form,” but don’t refer by describing. Kripke’s examples: “The Holy Roman Empire,” “The United Nations.” Other cases: “The Coalition of the Willing,” “The Evening Star.”

(d) **Referring by Describing:** What is it to refer to something by describing it? It is to express a condition which that individual, and only that individual, satisfies.

   [**TERMINOLOGY**]: I will say that a condition \( C \) singles out an individual \( x \) iff \( x \) satisfies \( C \), and nothing else does.

   [**FOR EXAMPLE**]:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expression</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Individual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“The shortest spy”</td>
<td><em>being a spy shorter than any other</em></td>
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<tr>
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“The shortest spy” expresses a condition, *being a spy shorter than any other*. 
than any other, which singles out a certain individual. [DRAW
THE TRIANGULAR CARTOON]

(e) NOTICE: The semantic bond between definite descriptions and their referents is easily explained. Something is
the referent of a definite description in virtue of being sin-
gled out by the condition the definite description expresses.

3. Possible Worlds
There are only three things you need to know about possible worlds.

(a) Possible worlds are “opinionated”: every possible world
decides every question. [BLACKBOARD]: For every
world \( w \), and every sentence \( P \), either \( P \) or its negation
\( \neg P \) is true at \( w \).

(b) Possible Worlds are not IMpossible: whatever is the
case at some possible world might have been the case.
[BLACKBOARD]: If there is a possible world at which
\( P \) is true, then \( P \) is possible.

(c) Possible worlds “cover all the possibilities”: There’s
at least one possible world witnessing every possibility;
whatever might have been the case is the case at some
possible world. [BLACKBOARD]: If \( P \) is possible, then
there is a possible world at which \( P \) is true.

Putting all of this together yields a systematic correspondence
between what possible and what sorts of worlds there are:

(SC) It is possible that \( P \) iff \( P \) is true at some possible world.
Kripke on Analyticity, Designators, and Possible Worlds

1. **Kripke on analyticity:**

   Let’s just make it a matter of stipulation that an analytic statement is, in some sense, true by virtue of its meaning and [necessarily true] in virtue of its meaning. Then something which is analytically true will be both necessary and \textit{a priori}. (That’s sort of stipulative.) (p. 39)

   (1) No bachelor is married.

   **Remarks:**

   (a) No falsehoods
   
   (b) “True in virtue of meaning”:

   \textbf{(ACCESS ANALYTICITY)} \( S \) is “true in virtue of its meaning” iff knowing the syntax of \( S \), its meaning, and some logic will enable you to discern its truth.

   (c) No contingent truths
   
   (d) Analyticity is defined in modal terms.

   (e) Do analytic sentences state \textit{a priori} facts?

   (f) \textit{A Priori} without analyticity

   (2) \( 87^2 = 7569 \).

2. **Kripke on designators:**

   **Names** The proper names of natural language; and

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   (b) \textbf{There are other cases}: \textit{e.g.} “Aristotle’s mother.”

   (c) \textbf{Names that look like Definite Descriptions}: Kripke’s examples: “The Holy Roman Empire,” “The United Nations.” Other cases: “The Coalition of the Willing”, “The Evening Star”, “The Mississippi River”.

   (d) \textbf{Referring by Describing}

   \textbf{[TERMINOLOGY]}: A condition \( C \) \textit{singles out} an individual \( x \) iff \( x \) satisfies \( C \), and nothing else does.
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(e) **Definite Descriptions and the Semantic Bond**: Something is the referent of a definite description in virtue of being singled out by the condition the definite description expresses.

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   (a) **Possible worlds are “opinionated”**: every possible world decides every question.

   (b) **Possible Worlds are not IMpossible**: whatever is the case at some possible world might have been the case.

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