Greenpeace: Storm-Tossed on the High Seas

Fred Pearce

In mid-1994, Greenpeace International was in crisis. With membership and income falling, its leaders had fired one executive director, Paul Gilding, and were attempting to sack staff.1 Angry messages across its sophisticated internal communications system accused its leaders of conducting a ‘reign of terror’. An anonymous press release from its headquarters in Amsterdam told journalists that ‘Greenpeace is now spending more time and money on its own internal wars than on fighting for the environment. If Greenpeace’s own supporters knew what was going on internally they would soon stop sending in subscriptions, the life-blood of the organization.’2 Greenpeace, in its twenty-fifth year, appeared to be suffering a major mid-life crisis.

Yet a year later, the prospects had been transformed. The organization was once again riding high after successfully preventing Shell, the multinational oil company, from towing its redundant Brent Spar platform from moorings in the North Sea and dumping it on to the bottom of the North Atlantic Ocean off Scotland. And it was gaining a new rush of headlines, and widespread international support, for its operations against proposed French nuclear weapons tests at the Mururoa atoll in the Pacific Ocean.3 A decade after French commandos had blown up the original Rainbow Warrior in Auckland harbour in New Zealand, killing a crew member as the vessel prepared to disrupt French tests, its replacement was taking to the waters again on a similar mission.

The roller-coaster year taught Greenpeace’s current generation of activists a lesson their predecessors had often learnt. The organization lives or dies by its deeds, usually on the high seas. Unlike most other environmental organizations, it is not sustained by a broad-based green ideology (like Friends of the Earth), or by extensive scientific and practical conservation activities (like the World Wide Fund for Nature). It exists by spectacular campaigning, and swiftly implodes if the headlines falter.

History: God’s Navy

According to Robert Hunter, a Canadian journalist, early Greenpeace activist and the organization’s first chronicler, Greenpeace began as the Don’t Make a Wave Committee in 1969.4 He was among members who blockaded the US–Canadian border between Seattle and Vancouver to protest at US underground nuclear tests 4,000 kilometres away at Amchitka Island. Using—to be kind—scientific hyperbole, they said the test could cause an earthquake, triggering a tidal wave that could, in Hunter’s words in his own newspaper, ‘slam the lips of the Pacific rim like a series of karate chops’.5 In his book The Greenpeace Chronicles, Hunter later admitted: ‘We painted a rather extravagant picture . . . tidal waves, earthquakes, radioactive death clouds, decimated fisheries, deformed babies. We never said that’s what would happen, only that it could happen . . . Children all over Canada were having nightmares about bombs.’6

The Don’t Make a Wave Committee turned itself into Greenpeace in 1971. That year it hired a boat, and for the first time members sailed into the test zone at Amchitka to protest against renewed tests. This tactic had been used before by Quakers as part of their credo to ‘bear witness’ to events they objected to. Greenpeace transformed it by bringing the world’s TV cameras to bear witness with them. And the effect was explosive. ‘We saw it as a media war,’ said Hunter. Greenpeace was ‘an icon, a symbol from which we might affect the attitudes of millions’. Its weapons were ‘mind bombs’, launched through the international media.7

According to a sage from the organization’s middle years in the 1980s, Nick Gallie, Greenpeace’s unique contribution to environmentalism has been to ‘reduce a political and scientific wrangle that had been going on for years [into] a simple headline and picture’.8 Thus in 1973 it entered the long-running debate about controls on whaling. Greenpeace was far from being the first green group to oppose whaling. But it was the first to ignore the scientific arguments about whale reproduction rates, population dynamics, and how large a sustainable cull might be, in favour of an undiluted ethical argument: save the whale. ‘The scientific debate about whether whales really are in danger of extinction is not one we want to get reduced to,’ said Canadian Patrick Moore, another early leader. ‘The general public is not going to understand the science of ecology, so to get them to save the whale you have to get them to believe that whales are good.’9 And Greenpeace went further, by dramatically attempting to physically prevent the whalers from operating. With cameras rolling and the world watching, they assembled the image that more than any other has sustained Greenpeace through the years. Gallie describes it thus: ‘A whaling ship,
History of Greenpeace

1969  Don’t Make A Wave Committee blocks US Canada border to protest Amchitka nuclear tests.
1971  Greenpeace formed.
1974  David McTaggart first sails to Mururoa atoll to protest French tests.
1975  First anti-whaling confrontation, in which inflatables protest forces Russian whalers to abandon operations.
1976  First anti-sealing campaign in Newfoundland.
1978  First confrontation over dumping nuclear waste in Atlantic.
1985  Rainbow Warrior sunk by French commandos in Auckland Harbour.
1987  Greenpeace establishes base on Antarctica to campaign for declaration of Antarctica as a world park.
1990  Attempt to seize scientific high ground in global-warming debate by publishing own popular version of IPCC report.
1993  First ‘greenfreeze’ fridge manufactured.
1994  Internal crisis as director and staff sacked, funds cut, and priorities questioned.
1995  Scuttling of Brent Spar prevented follow major international campaign. New actions against French at Mururoa.

an explosive harpoon, a fleeing whale, and between them a tiny, manned inflatable with the word Greenpeace emblazoned on the side—it says it all.”

Greenpeace learned another lesson in the early days. It didn’t campaign vaguely against whaling or nuclear tests or toxic waste or whatever. It campaigned for a specific goal. The shutting of a discharge pipe, say, or the moratorium on whaling. This latter goal was achieved when the International Whaling Commission, stacked with Greenpeace-funded delegates from newly registered nations, agreed a moratorium at its 1982 meeting, to take effect in 1985. A decade later it remains in force.

The McTaggart Years

For most of its middle years—the years during which it became one of the ‘big three’ international environment groups alongside Friends of the Earth and the WWF—Greenpeace was dominated by a single man, David McTaggart. A former badminton champion, construction millionaire, and ski-lodge operator, he had taken to sailing the Pacific in his small boat. In 1972 he joined up with the organization, then virtually bankrupt, and provided his boat for its first protest against French nuclear tests at Mururoa.

In the subsequent years, it was McTaggart who moulded the organization, setting up national offices first in Europe and then round the world from Moscow to Latin America, and creating a uniquely powerful central organization, Greenpeace International. He was far removed from Hunter’s description of early campaigners as ‘street freaks, Marxists, Maoists . . . Yippies, and draft dodgers’. As a former businessman, he saw the advantages of a top-down structure. He re-created Greenpeace more in the form of a multinational corporation than the conventional democratic and devolved structure adopted by most green groups that formed during and after the late 1960s. And he insisted that the organization’s many national arms work together on a limited number of focused campaigns, pursuing victory ruthlessly. Combining his organizational skills with the publicity expertise of pioneers such as Hunter, Greenpeace became the most recognized green group in the world. It cherished and nurtured a brand image as assiduously as a soap-powder manufacturer. That brand image, says UK campaign director Chris Rose, is of ‘God’s Navy’.

While still primarily concerned with photogenic sea-based issues—nuclear tests, whaling, and toxic discharges to sea—McTaggart’s Greenpeace also developed some land-based campaigns. And it forged tactics and visual stunts that allowed these, too, to be shown in an heroic form. It used steeplejacks to climb tall chimneys to protest against discharges causing acid rain and, later, the greenhouse effect. As a variant, it hung its banners from Big Ben in London and the Statue of Liberty in New York.

Greenpeace and Science

All this was a logical, and highly effective, extension of the work of the early days. But McTaggart had identified a weak point—preposterous scientific claims which, in the more sophisticated 1980s, and with enemies geared up to respond, could prove a liability. To mend this weakness, Greenpeace began to drop the early aura of hippy karma and tarot cards—which in the past had often dictated policy—and underwent a slow conversion to science. Science was never on top: the ethical agenda still dominated. But it was increasingly ‘on tap’, with Greenpeace press releases increasingly adorned with references to scientific papers and backed up by specially commissioned research and monitoring programmes.

Greenpeace began to employ scientists rather than to rubbish them, giving them leading staff positions. Many
young scientists yearned for a more active role. Gerd Leipold left one of Germany’s top laboratories, the Max Planck Institute, to help set up Greenpeace’s Hamburg office. ‘I just felt that being a scientist wasn’t enough to change things,’ he said. Greenpeace ran mobile laboratories doing instant research on board some of its ships, and endowed and staffed a laboratory at a British university to do its own analysis of pollution. Paul Johnson, head of the laboratory, says: ‘We know more about many of these discharges than the companies themselves.’ It persuaded scientific Nobel prize-winners to sign adverts opposing nuclear power. And in 1990 it went into science publishing, producing a paperback analysis of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s ground-breaking assessment of global warming and the greenhouse effect. Edited by Greenpeace International’s climate campaigner, Dr Jeremy Leggett, formerly a geologist at University College London, its authors included many of the leading authors of the IPCC report itself.

But parts of scientific community remained hostile, and the top science journal Nature accused Greenpeace of engaging in ‘terrorism’ (though this was a charge it later retracted and apologized for). Greenpeace’s handling of science is not always sure, especially at the national level. It can still go ‘over the top’ when it senses a big story. In 1994 it published widely an advertisement showing a photograph of a baby with a grossly enlarged head labelled ‘Kazakhstan nuclear test victim’ and claiming that ‘2,000 people will die because of the radioactive discharges from Sellafield over the next ten years.’ Yet, the British Advertising Standards Authority concluded after complaints, that the child’s condition was not caused by radiation and that the claim of 2,000 deaths could not be substantiated.

Fearful that scientific uncertainty—about such things as the toxicity of chemicals and the likelihood of global warming—might become an excuse for inaction, Greenpeace has promoted the ‘precautionary principle’, which puts the onus on polluters to demonstrate the safety of their activities, rather than on environmentalists to demonstrate damage. It is now being adopted formally in environmental treaties, including the declarations from the Earth Summit.

**Tensions**

The organization’s flirtations with science and industry have created tensions, however, and risk diluting its simple heroic and ethical image. During the convulsions of 1994 McTaggart, who had by then retired from the front line to become honorary chairman of the international organization, circulated a memo to bolster what he called ‘a serious lack of institutional memory’ about Greenpeace’s origins and traditional strengths. Take it or leave it, he said, but this is what made us what we are. The memo provides a fascinating blueprint for an environmental organization, and is clear evidence of how deliberately McTaggart pursued organizational goals.

The goal in building Greenpeace,’ he said, ‘was to build it internationally [through] centralized decision-taking.’ Other groups—he probably meant Friends of the Earth—had tried to set up international organizations without creating a central tier for decision-taking, and as a result had ‘spun out of effective existence on the international scene years ago’. Strong leadership was required, he said. And, slaying another sacred cow of the counter-culture, he insisted that ‘consensus [within Greenpeace] is not the way to build a massive international movement. It needs the bitter, cold-blooded natural selection of argument and debate, not molasses, compromise, and dilution.’ He apologized for such language—language that would never survive with FoE. But, he said, ‘the multinational corporations and governments whose policies we are trying to change fear those words in the context of mass movements and opposition’. Indeed, international mobilization has been the key to many successes. It is international pressure that has tested French resolve to continue with nuclear tests at Mururoa. It was the threat of international consumer boycotts that caused Shell UK to buckle over the scuttling of the Brent Spar.

Campaigning had golden rules, too. ‘No campaign should be begun without clear goals; no campaign should be begun unless there is a possibility that it can be won; no campaign should be begun unless you intend to finish it off.’ Such rules sometimes led the organization into an apparently willing desire to knock its head against brick walls. After declaring in 1979 that it intended to close the British Nuclear Fuels reprocessing plant at Sellafield, it has met unrelenting hostility from BNFL and the British government alike ever since. It has had to defend its actions in courts throughout Europe and paid heavy fines for breach of court orders against blocking the Sellafield discharge pipe and disrupting shipping. Here it seems caught between the second two rules. Probably, the campaign was unwinnable and shouldn’t have been started. But once started, the desire to ‘finish it off’ is unrelenting. In its unstated but discernible macho self-image, nobody at Greenpeace gives up.

Such rules to a large extent define what Greenpeace does and does not attempt to do. They generally rule out involvement in complex issues about environment and economic development in the Third World. You won’t find Greenpeace involving itself in campaigns about desertification or trying to stop destruction of the rainforests, both of which are far too enmeshed in issues of land rights. But it will launch a heavy assault against an individual company’s logging operations, as it did against a Brazilian
Greenpeace and Politics

Greenpeace, McTaggart says, should stay also out of politics. Not just party politics, but also ‘human rights, women’s rights, vegetarianism, abortion, farm subsidies . . . We are not out to save anybody’s version of democracy or justice or fair play; our membership can agree to disagree on all that, as long as they keep the number one goal in mind.’

The organization knows well the perils that lie in these territories. One early casualty can be central control within the organization. This was stretched to breaking-point in the mid-1980s, by a campaign developed in Europe and spearheaded from Britain to shut down the trade in furs from North America. In classic media-solicitous style, the campaign centred on a brilliant poster featuring a photograph from the fashion photographer David Bailey of an elegantly dressed woman dragging behind her a fur coat from which blood streamed. The copy-line read: ‘It takes up to 40 dumb animals to make a fur coat. But only one to wear it.’ The sexism didn’t trouble many. But the big problem was that the fur trade was a major livelihood for American Indians, one of whose legends had originally given the name to the Rainbow Warrior, Greenpeace’s most famous ship. Greenpeace in Canada, the organization’s original home and at that time working hard to build links with native communities, was horrified and demanded that the campaign be stopped.21

On the face of it, McTaggart’s rules suggest that the human rights of Canadian Indians are of no concern to Greenpeace and cannot impinge on its simple rule of saving nature. But in this situation he appeared to ignore this rule. A higher imperative of maintaining internal cohesion applied. He sacked Greenpeace UK’s staff after they refused to halt the campaign. Greenpeace had thus freed itself from a publicity trap as deadly as the leg-hold animal trap its British officers so loathed. But it had done so at the expense of revealing national organization as, in the last resort, franchises in the manner of a fast-food chain, allowed to hold the Greenpeace name only as long as head office decrees.

It had also revealed one of the more fundamental ideological divides within both Greenpeace and many other environmental organizations: between those who are, at heart, animal-right activists, and those concerned with the wider environment. This divide had been there from the start. In the early years, the anti-whalers and anti-nuclear activists were often barely on speaking terms. The ‘Save the whale’ campaign had been the organization’s biggest money-spinner and the source of its fame. Yet McTaggart, in his 1994 memo, sidelines anti-whaling as a ‘soft issue’—not central, though valuable. Greenpeace, he says, ‘must have at least one soft issue to draw the public’s awareness, to take the edge off our “whack-em” image, and to show the positive side of what we are fighting for. Anybody who has ever tried to sell Greenpeace to the public knows that dreams are better than nightmares at winning people over.’ The campaigns to ‘save the whales and to preserve Antarctica,’ he says, ‘win people into the fold, leading them into other heavy issues. Hundreds of thousands of people who may have been ambivalent about nuclear power joined Greenpeace to save the whales. Who knows how many of them heard the message about nukes?’22

But Greenpeace in the 1990s has had to think hard about its future role. While it can act on a grand scale on the international field, deploying large resources and great sophistication, it can sometimes appear remote and slow to respond to new issues. Moreover, the 1990s has seen an upsurge in highly local campaigning on what are sometimes called ‘not in my backyard’ (or ‘Nimby’) issues.

Moving Ground

A new generation of young eco-warriors in both Europe and North America wants little to do with a large, centralized organization such as Greenpeace. And there are many ecological campaigning niches in which they operate.

A decade ago, Greenpeace with its monitoring-ship cruising the beaches, led campaigns against sewage in British bathing waters. But now a small Cornwall-based group called ‘Surfers Against Sewage’ has taken over the action—harrassing local officials, handing out leaflets on beaches, taking its large inflatable turd to water company annual meetings, and so on.23 And as car traffic rises up the environmental agenda, Greenpeace’s grand statements about the role of car pollution in causing global warming count little against angry direct-action activists, squatting in tree-houses erected along the lines of proposed new roads, blocking off streets. In this way environmental issues have reconnected with people’s everyday lives in a way that images on TV screens, beamed by satellite from far-flung parts of the globe, cannot.

Many in Greenpeace believe that it should cede this territory. During the 1990s it has pushed a new agenda, seeking to promote solutions to environmental problems.
Its first exercise was the ‘greenfreeze’ refrigerator. Following the Montreal protocol and subsequent agreements to phase out CFCs, the main chemical refrigerant world-wide, most manufacturers began to switch to substitutes such as HCFC which still destroy the ozone layer, only more slowly. Greenpeace in Germany discovered that research into a totally ozone-friendly refrigerant—a mixture of butane and propane similar to lighter fuel—had been halted, and a prototype refrigerator left abandoned in the basement of the Dortmund Institute of Hygiene, where it had been built. Greenpeace swiftly funded the resumption of its development and, despite being cold-shouldered by the rest of the industry, persuaded an East German manufacturer to begin production. The first ‘greenfreeze’ fridge rolled off the production line in March 1993.

This was no small venture. By 1994 Germany’s largest fridge manufacturers were announcing that most of their production would use greenfreeze technology, and Greenpeace was promoting the idea to manufacturers round the world. In early 1995 China—a country that had announced a national programme to put a refrigerator in every home—manufactured its first greenfreeze fridge.

Financially, Greenpeace gains nothing directly from this. The technology is not subject to patent since it uses existing chemicals and techniques. That, suggests Greenpeace, is why manufacturers ignored it as a replacement for CFCs in the first place. But the story suggests a dramatic, and somewhat unexpected, new chapter for Greenpeace. ‘We call this new type of campaigning ‘solutions interventions’, says UK campaign director Chris Rose. ‘It is a case of working with some parts of industry against others.’

But Greenpeace persists in solutions interventions. In 1995, in time for the major Climate Conference in Berlin, the first meeting of the Climate Change Convention, its global-warming campaign had shifted ground in a similar manner. Its leading climate campaigner, Jeremy Leggett, had been recycled as solar-power campaigner. In Berlin, as conventional Greenpeace campaigners climbed up power-station chimneys to unfurl their banners, Leggett was working the corridors selling the virtues of solar power as the best substitute for fossil fuels as a solution to global warming, for all the world like a conventional industry lobbyist.

And Leggett was showing another new aspect of working with parts of conventional society. In Berlin, he chaired a conference of insurance companies worried that global warming was increasing the cost of pay-outs for major climatic disasters. Leading speaker was the president of the Reinsurance Association of America, who said of the twenty-five largest US insurance catastrophes, ‘21 had occurred in the past decade and 16 involved hurricanes and flooding.’ Cynics suggested the insurance companies were playing along with Greenpeace in order to gain government help for unusually large insurance claims. For Leggett, who had spent three years courting the insurance industry, the story was simple: ‘These are the people who notice the changes first.’

In the mid-1990s Greenpeace remains divided between adopting a ‘back to basics’ philosophy along the lines advocated by McTaggart and a more collaborationist solutions-oriented approach. It was one of the issues at the heart of the 1994 crisis. Gilding, the chief executive who resigned under pressure early in 1994, had wanted to increase the level of co-operation with industry faster than the international board was willing to consider.

To some extent Greenpeace can have it both ways. An organization with an annual budget approaching US$150 million, most of it concentrated on four or five major campaigns, can afford to cover the angles. But it is hard to devise direct-action tactics around strategies aimed at solutions interventions, especially for an organization dedicated to conveying simple messages. Solutions interventions are also difficult to reconcile with Greenpeace’s traditional reluctance to become embroiled in long-term relationships with government or industrial organizations. Likewise, detailed scientific work does not always produce the simple analysis required by an organization that is still ethically based.

Its campaign against the scuttling of the Brent Spar revealed some of the tensions. The campaign was essentially a headline-grabbing action in the organization’s grand tradition, though one costing hundreds of thousands of dollars—not bad for an organization cutting staff and pleading poverty. But behind the grabbing action, its scientific staff insist, there was considerable scientific underpinning. Before the actions got under way, Greenpeace had commissioned studies into how to dismantle the rig and recycle parts of its structure. But its lack of attention to scientific detail led to its having to apologize publicly for making false claims at the height of the drama about the oil content of the platform. When confronted with this mistake, the organization retreated to its ethical position that, whatever the toxicity of the material involved, it was the principle of opposition to sea dumping that mattered. A sympathetic marine scientist, John Gray of the University of Oslo, wrote to Greenpeace complaining that ‘Greenpeace have not presented to the public (or given a scientific rationale for) what the alternative options to deep sea disposal are, and what environmental risks are associated with such options. It is not good enough to campaign against deep sea disposal without giving the alternatives, with risks and costs.’
Certainly, the Brent Spar campaign was not a ‘solutions intervention’, by any stretch of the imagination.

Greenpeace Politics

Greenpeace is also being buffeted by a move within the environment movement to politicize itself. Europe’s Green Parties, especially in Germany, have for more than a decade been drawing up broad ‘green’ agendas that go far beyond environmentalism, encompassing human and minority rights, devolved regional government within Europe, theories of no-growth economics, and fundamental redistribution of wealth both within and between nations.

Many green advocates, such as Jonathon Porritt, former head of Friends of the Earth International, say that ‘if the environment only equals animals, trees, and pretty views, then campaigning on those lines soon hits a limit. Environment groups will have to accept that the next phase is going to be much more people-oriented.’

Yet this is precisely the route the McTaggart’s generation of Greenpeace leadership decreed to be off-limits—and still do. McTaggart, in his 1994 memo, saw making such linkages as a hindrance, rather than a help, to action. He stated that ‘there are thousands of important issues in the world today that require urgent attention. But we can’t do it all. And if we try, we won’t get any of it done. The original idea was to keep it simple; to limit ourselves to a handful of important environmental goals without compromise or complications: to just get on with it.’

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But 1995 undoubtedly saw the fundamentalist camp back in the ascendancy with the organization’s uncompromising attitude to Shell over the Brent Spar. It refused to be distracted by the ‘solutions’ debate and hit the public’s gut instinct that poisons should not be dumped at sea. Its commandos repeatedly boarded the Spar as it was towed from the North Sea to its intended scuttling-ground, gathering the world’s media attention as it went. Until, just a day before intended sinking, Shell’s resolve broke—its German arm forcing Shell UK to call off the operation. Shell UK’s chairman, Christopher Fry, shortly afterwards uncannily echoed the language of Hunter two decades before when he admitted to The Financial Times that Greenpeace had successfully portrayed the Brent Spar as ‘a powerful icon for the misuse of the high seas’. And, like others before him, he raised the spectre of Greenpeace as a guerrilla force able to strike anywhere, anytime to disrupt industry. ‘It is not just the oil industry this is under threat,’ he said. ‘It is a problem for all of industry.’

The truth is more prosaic, of course. Many Greenpeace campaigns have foundered. Efforts to boycott Icelandic fish during the whaling campaign failed utterly. Attempts to halt logging in the Russian far east have been notably unsuccessful. British Nuclear Fuels is still reprocessing. And so on.

Greenpeace and the Future

For the future, one of the fundamental questions Greenpeace must resolve is the relationship between national and international organizations. The relationship was behind many of the arguments during 1994. For, while national organizations only function with the permission of the International organization, they do have the right to retain funds that they gather.

McTaggart for one regrets the ambiguity of this relationship. In his 1994 memo he admits that ‘national offices should never have been allowed to have full control over the funds they raised’. He also regrets giving national offices certain powers of veto over central decision-taking.

Some within the organization argue for Greenpeace to turn into a federation of national offices, more in the manner of Friends of the Earth. Others fear that the richer national offices could use their hold over funds to put an armlock on International activities. The German office, for instance, is said to have a reserve of $US90 million. One memo circulated in 1994 complained that ‘many offices are already shunning international campaigns, due to disagreement over campaign strategies and the desire to fund-raise on national issues’.

Pressure from the centre for national offices to become financially self-sufficient was pushing this fragmentation. The memo-writers said: ‘We fear a trend towards greater and greater nationalistic campaigning which does not take advantage of Greenpeace’ s unique niche in the environmental movement as a multinational NGO.’

The successes of 1995 have to some extent obliterated
these complaints, though tensions remained. The staff cuts first canvassed in 1994 were still made. And the impoundment of three of their ships by the French on the edge of the exclusion zone round the Mururoa atoll led to fierce recriminations within the organization. Though the organization denied it, most observers assumed that these lay behind the resignation of the organizer of the campaign, Ulrich Jürgens, in September, after he had been accused of disobeying rules designed to prevent giving the French an excuse for seizing the ships. Another organizer was publicly demoted over the affair.

But for the public at large, the organization’s success over Brent Spar (notwithstanding its own goal over the lab analysis of samples), and its heroic failures in the South Pacific raised the organization’s profile once again as the only green organization capable of mounting such campaigns before a global audience.

Notes and References
5. Ibid. 12.
6. Ibid. 109.
7. Ibid. 67.
18. David McTaggart (1994), internal memo, 26 Sept., subsequently circulated externally in Anon. press release, see n. 2, above.
20. McTaggart, internal memo, 26 sept. 1994; see n. 18, above.
22. McTaggart, internal memo, 26 Sept. 1994; see n. 18, above.
30. Ibid.
31. McTaggart, internal memo, 26 Sept. 1994; see n. 18, above.
33. McTaggart, internal memo, 26 Sept. 1994; see n. 18, above.
34. Anon. press release; see n. 2, above.