CHAPTER I

Culture War?

There is a religious war going on in this country, a cultural war as critical to the kind of nation we shall be as the Cold War itself, for this war is for the soul of America.*

With those ringing words insurgent candidate Pat Buchanan fired up his supporters at the 1992 Republican National Convention. To be sure, not all the assembled delegates cheered Buchanan's call to arms, which was at odds with the "kinder, gentler" image that incumbent President George H. W. Bush had attempted to project. Indeed, Republican professionals expressed concern about the "family values" emphasis of the convention in general, and Buchanan's remarks in particular.1 Their concerns proved well

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* This quotation appears in slightly different forms throughout the literature, probably because it was written up differently by journalists who covered the speech and/or read slightly different versions of it. This version is quoted in Nancy Davis and Robert Robinson, "A War for America's Soul?" In Rhys Williams, ed., Cultural Wars in American Politics (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1997), 39.

founded: elections analysts later included the Convention and Buchanan’s fiery words among the factors contributing to the defeat of President Bush, albeit of lesser importance than the struggling economy and repudiation of his “Read my lips, no new taxes” pledge.2

In the years since Buchanan’s declaration of cultural war the idea of a clash of cultures has become a common theme in discussions of American politics. Most commentators use the culture war metaphor to refer to a displacement or supersession of the classic economic conflicts that animated twentieth-century politics in the advanced democracies by newly emergent moral and religious ones. The literature generally attributes Buchanan’s inspiration to a 1991 book, Culture Wars, by sociologist James Davison Hunter, who divided Americans into the culturally “orthodox” and the culturally “progressive” and argued that increasing conflict was inevitable.3 In a later book provocatively titled Before the Shooting Begins, Hunter writes

. . . when cultural impulses this momentous vie against each other to dominate public life, tension, conflict, and perhaps even violence are inevitable.4

Not surprisingly, no one has embraced the concept of the culture war more enthusiastically than the journalistic community, ever alert for subjects that have “news value.” Conflict, of course,

is high in news value. Disagreement, division, polarization, battles, and war make good copy. Agreement, consensus, moderation, compromise, and peace do not. Thus, the concept of a culture war fits well with the news sense of journalists who cover American politics. Their reports tell us that contemporary voters are deeply divided on moral issues:

. . . the real emotional splits in the country lie in gut-level social issues: They are the topics that move Americans in their everyday lives, and the ones that actually draw the lines separating the two parties today.5

The divide went deeper than politics. It reached into the nation’s psyche. . . . It was the moral dimension that kept Bush in the race.6

And close elections do not reflect indifferent, uncertain, or ambivalent voters; rather, close elections reflect evenly matched blocs of deeply committed partisans:

When George W. Bush took office, half the country cheered and the other half seethed.7

Such political divisions cannot easily be shifted by any president, let alone in two years, because they reflect deep demographic divisions. . . . The 50-50 nation appears to be made

up of two big, separate voting blocks, with only a small number of swing voters in the middle.8

The 2000 election brought us the familiar pictorial representation of the culture war in the form of the red and blue map of the United States reproduced on the inside front cover of this book. Vast areas of the southern and midwestern heartland emerged from the election as Republican red. But the huge expanses of red territory contained relatively few people per square mile. The much smaller areas of Democratic blue contained the more populous cosmopolitan states of the east and west coasts and the Great Lakes. Commentators accompanied such colorful maps with polling factoids intended to illustrate the cultural divide: the probability that a white, gun-toting, born-again, rural southern male voted for Al Gore was about as tiny as the probability that a feminist, agnostic, professional, urban northern female voted for George W. Bush, although few asked how many Americans fell into such narrowly defined categories. For the most part pundits reified the different colors on the map, treating them as prima facie evidence of deep cultural divisions:

_Bush knew that the landslide he had wished for in 2000… had vanished into the values chasm separating the blue states from the red ones._9

_The Year of our Lord 2000 was the year of the map…. This election was Hollywood vs. Nashville, “Sex and the City” vs. “Touched by an Angel,” National Public Radio vs. talk radio, “Doonesbury” vs. “B.C.”, “Hotel California” vs. “Okie From Muskogee.” It was The New York Times vs. National Review Online, Dan Rather vs. Rush Limbaugh, Rosie O’Donnell vs. Dr. Laura, Barbra Streisand vs. Dr. James Dobson, the Supreme Court vs. —well, the Supreme Court._10

_Tens of millions of good people in Middle America voted Republican. But if you look closely at that map you see a more complex picture. You see the state where James Byrd was lynch-dragged behind a pickup truck until his body came apart—it’s red. You see the state where Matthew Shepard was crucified on a split-rail fence for the crime of being gay—it’s red. You see the state where right-wing extremists blew up a federal office building and murdered scores of federal employees—it’s red. The state where an Army private who was thought to be gay was bludgeoned to death with a baseball bat, and the state where neo-Nazi skinheads murdered two African-Americans because of their skin color, and the state where Bob Jones University spews its anti-Catholic bigotry: they’re all red too._11

Claims of deep national division were standard fare after the 2000 elections, and to our knowledge few commentators have publicly challenged them.12 On the contrary, the belief in a fractured nation continues to be expressed even by high-level political operatives:

8 “On His High Horse,” _Economist,_ November 9, 2002: 25.
11 Clinton adviser Paul Begala, as quoted in Bob Clark, “As You Were Saying…. It’s Time for Gore’s Pit Bull to Practice What He Preaches,” _Boston Herald,_ November 18, 2000: 16.
We have two massive colliding forces. One is rural, Christian, religiously conservative. [The other] is socially tolerant, pro-choice, secular, living in New England and the Pacific coast.\(^\text{13}\)

You've got 80% to 90% of the country that look at each other like they are on separate planets.\(^\text{14}\)

A November 2003 report of the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press led a prominent journalist to comment:

The red states get redder, the blue states get bluer, and the political map of the United States takes on the coloration of the Civil War.\(^\text{15}\)

While Andrew Kohut, director of the Pew Center, reportedly commented that

... the anger level is so high that if the demonstrators of 1968 had felt like this there would have been gunfire in the streets.\(^\text{16}\)

And political commentators see a continuation, if not an intensification of the culture war as the 2004 election approaches.

The culture war between the Red and Blue Nations has erupted again—big time—and will last until Election Day next year. Front lines are all over, from the Senate to the Pentagon to Florida to the Virginia suburbs where, at the Bush-Cheney '04 headquarters, they are blunt about the shape of the battle: "The country's split 50-50 again," a top aide told me, "just as it was in 2000." Translation: They can't win re-election by wooing the (mostly coastal) Blue states, but only by firing up (mostly noncoastal) Reds.\(^\text{17}\)

The election will be a verdict on the determined yet controversial way in which Mr. Bush has steered his country. It also comes at a time when America is more bitterly divided than it has been for a generation.\(^\text{18}\)

In sum, contemporary observers of American politics apparently have reached a new consensus around the proposition that old disagreements about economics now pale in comparison to new divisions based on sexuality, morality, and religion, divisions so deep as to justify fears of violence and talk of war in describing them.\(^\text{19}\)

This short book advances a contrary thesis: the sentiments expressed in the previously quoted pronouncements of scholars, journalists, and politicos range from simple exaggeration to sheer nonsense. Such assertions both reflect and contribute to a widespread mythology about contemporary American politics. The simple truth is that there is no culture war in the United States—no battle for the soul of America rages, at least none that most


\(^\text{16}\) Quoted in John Leo, "Splitting Society, Not Hairs," \textit{US News and World Report Science \& Society}, December 13, 2003: 66. Kohut may be too young to remember, but there was sporadic gunfire in the streets and on college campuses during the 1960s "time of troubles." We have more to say about the Pew Report in Chapter 3.


\(^\text{19}\) Of course, there is nothing new about cultural conflict in the United States—it has been a common element of our politics since the beginning of the Republic. It only seems new to today's generation of political commentators because such issues were relatively muted during the 1930s to the 1960s.
Americans are aware of. Certainly, one can find a few warriors who engage in noisy skirmishes. Many of the activists in the political parties and the various cause groups do, in fact, hate each other and regard themselves as combatants in a war. But their hatreds and battles are not shared by the great mass of the American people—certainly nowhere near to “80–90 percent of the country”—who are for the most part moderate in their views and tolerant in their manner.20 The bulk of the American citizenry is somewhat in the position of the unfortunate citizens of some third-world countries who try to stay out of the crossfire while Maoist guerrillas and right-wing death squads shoot at each other.

The myth of a culture war rests on misinterpretation of election returns, lack of hard examination of polling data, systematic and self-serving misrepresentation by issue activists, and selective coverage by an uncritical media more concerned with news value than with getting the story right. There is little evidence that Americans’ ideological or policy positions are more polarized today than they were two or three decades ago, although their choices often seem to be. The explanation is that the political figures Americans evaluate are more polarized. A polarized political class makes the citizenry appear polarized, but it is only that—an appearance.

In Chapter 2 we show that the red state versus blue state contrast grossly exaggerates the actual differences among their residents. Chapter 3 shows that the United States is not polarized along other traditional cleavage lines either. What has happened is that partisans have become better sorted into the parties than in past decades. Thus, at the highest levels the parties are more polarized, but most commentators fail to realize that this partisan polarization has only a faint reflection in popular polarization, so the latter certainly is not a cause of the former. Chapter 4 shows that the picture of a largely centrist population holds even when we focus on abortion. Chapter 5 addresses a rapidly changing subject—attitudes toward homosexual rights—that exploded on the national scene in the form of the gay marriage issue in the spring of 2004. While there is considerable division in the population about gay rights and gay marriage, the movement toward increased acceptance of gays and lesbians in the past decade has been so strong that we believe the present divisions are largely a transitional state. Chapter 6 shows that the purported replacement of economic cleavages in the electorate by religious ones is a premature conclusion. Chapter 7 shows how the polarization of partisan elites can give the appearance that voters are shifting emphasis from economics to religion and morality, even while voter preferences change not a whit. Finally, Chapter 8 discusses how extreme voices have come to dominate American political discourse, and how their influence might be lessened and the vast middle ground empowered.

20 Thus, our conclusions support the earlier findings of Alan Wolfe, One Nation, After All (New York: Viking, 1998). In some circles Wolfe’s findings have been discounted as reflecting only the views of 200 middle class suburban families. The chapters that follow report similar findings based on an examination of the views of tens of thousands of Americans questioned in national surveys.
CHAPTER 2

A 50:50 Nation?
The Red and the Blue States

In one of the claims quoted in the preceding chapter a writer for the *Economist* refers to "the 50:50 nation." During the late 1990s and early 2000s this phrase began to appear in popular discussions of American politics, as did a similar phrase, "the 49 percent nation."1 Such phraseology referred to the closely divided national elections of the late 1990s, when the winning party's popular vote share repeatedly came in right around 49 percent of the total vote:

- 1996 Clinton Vote
  49.2%
- 1996 Republican House Vote
  48.9
- 1998 Republican House Vote
  48.9
- 2000 Gore Vote
  48.4

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If we consider only the two-party vote, the parties are almost exactly evenly matched nationally—50:50—or at least they were until the 2002 House elections, when the Republicans broke through that ceiling and got to 52.9 percent. Clearly, recent national elections have been exceedingly close. No presidential candidate has won a majority of the popular vote since 1988, the past three elections constituting the longest such streak since the so-called “era of indecision,” when no presidential candidate won a majority of the popular vote in the four elections from 1880 to 1892.

The question is what to make of these recent close elections? For most commentators, the answer is obvious: the American electorate is polarized. In the previously quoted words of the Economist, the close recent U.S. elections “… reflect deep demographic divisions. . . . The 50-50 nation appears to be made up of two big, separate voting blocks, with only a small number of swing voters in the middle.” The top panel of Figure 2.1 depicts this claim graphically. The electorate is highly polarized: a large number of “progressives” on the left support the Democrats, a large number of “orthodox” on the right support the Republicans, and very few people occupy the middle ground. With a polarized electorate like this, elections will be very close, half the voters will cheer, and half the voters will seethe, as USA Today asserts.

But the U-shaped distribution in the top panel of the figure is not the only electoral configuration that will produce close elections. Most obviously, consider the bell-shaped distribution in the bottom panel of Figure 2.1, which is the inverse of the U-shaped distribution in the top. In the lower figure most people hold moderate or centrist positions and relatively few are extreme partisans. But if the Democratic and Republican parties position themselves equidistant from the center on opposite sides, then the bottom configuration too produces close elections. In both examples the electorate is closely divided, but only in the top panel of the figure would we say that the voters are deeply divided. In the top panel it would be accurate to say that voters are polarized, but in the
bottom panel we would more accurately call most voters ambivalent or indifferent.

When an election results in a near 50:50 outcome, the standard interpretation seems to be that the electorate is polarized as in the top panel of Figure 2.1. Why should that be the default interpretation? When an individual voter reports that he or she is on the fence (50:50) about whom to vote for, everyone understands that there are a number of plausible interpretations: the individual likes both candidates equally, dislikes both candidates equally, or really doesn’t give a damn. No one suggests that the individual is polarized. But the aggregate and individual situations are analogous. In each case a continuous variable (percent of the vote/probability of voting for a given candidate) is compressed into a dichotomous variable (Republican or Democratic victory/Republican or Democratic vote), with enormous loss of information. To illustrate, consider the map on the inside back cover of this book, which differs from the red and blue map on the front cover in that a state is colored red or blue only if it was won by a margin of 55:45 or greater, a standard political science definition of marginality. Now a great deal of the map is gray, reflecting the fact that many states are marginal and not securely in the camp of one party or the other. In language analogous to that used to describe individual voters, we might call such states “ambivalent” or “uncertain.”

In sum, close elections may reflect equal numbers of voters who hate one candidate and love the other, voters who like both, voters who do not care much at all about either candidate, or various combinations of these conditions. Without taking a detailed look at voter attitudes, we cannot determine whether close elections reflect a polarized electorate that is deeply divided, or an ambivalent electorate that is closely divided between the choices it is offered. So, let us take a closer look at the public opinion that underlies the knife-edge elections of the past few years. Is it as divided as election outcomes seem to suggest?

IS THE COUNTRY POLARIZED?

You’ve got 80% to 90% of the country that look at each other like they are on separate planets.” (Bush reelection strategist, Matthew Dowd).²

Is America polarized? Strictly speaking the question should be “has America become more polarized?” for that is the claim. But if the country is not polarized to begin with, the question of whether it has become more polarized is moot. Barely two months before the supposed “values chasm separating the blue states from the red ones” emerged in the 2000 election, the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press conducted an extensive national survey that included a wide sampling of issues, a number of those which figure prominently in discussions of the culture war.³ We have divided the Pew survey respondents into those who resided in states that two months later were to be categorized as blue states and states that two months later were to be categorized as red states. The question is whether there is any indication in these data that the election results would leave one half the country “screaming” and one half “cheering,” as USA Today reports.

TABLE 2.1
Red Versus Blue States: Political Inclinations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BLUE</th>
<th>RED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vote intention: Bush</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic self-ID</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican self-ID</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal self-ID</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative self-ID</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1 indicates that the residents of blue and red states certainly intended to vote differently: the percentage expressing an intention to vote for George Bush was ten points higher in the red states. Reminiscent of our discussion of dichotomous choices, however, the partisan and ideological predispositions underlying these voting differences were less distinct. The difference between the proportions of red and blue state respondents who consider themselves Democrats is not statistically significant, and the difference in the proportions who consider themselves Republicans is barely so—in both red and blue states self-identified independents are the largest group. Similarly, about a fifth of the respondents in both red and blue states consider themselves liberals (the four point difference is not statistically significant), and while there are more conservatives in the red states, there are more conservatives than liberals even in the blue states. In both the red and blue states the largest group of people classified themselves as moderates. In sum, while the aggregate voting patterns of red and blue states


would turn out to be quite distinct in November, the underlying patterns of political identification were much less so.

Table 2.2 reports similar results for the group evaluations reported by residents of red and blue states. Unsurprisingly, red state residents regard the Republican Party more favorably than the Democrats, but 55 percent of them regard the Democratic Party favorably. Conversely, blue state residents regard the Democratic Party more favorably than the Republicans, but 50 percent report favorable evaluations of the Republican Party. Evangelical Christians are evaluated equally positively by solid majorities in both red and blue states, as are Jews and Catholics. Muslims fare less well overall and red state residents regard them lower still, but one wonders how much experience many people have with actual Muslims—especially in many of the red states—as opposed to the abstract concept of a Muslim. Finally, in a standard finding, neither red nor blue state residents like atheists: Americans do not
TABLE 2.3
Red Versus Blue States: Beliefs and Perceptions:
(Percent strongly supporting statement)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>BLUE</th>
<th>RED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gov't almost always wasteful and inefficient</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination main reason blacks cannot get ahead</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants strengthen our country</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fight for country right or wrong</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too much power concentrated in large companies</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporations make too much profit</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Gore is more liberal than he lets on</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Bush is more conservative than he lets on</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wish Clinton could run again (strongly disagree)</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

care very much what or how people believe, but they are generally negative toward people who don’t believe in anything.

Across a range of other matters, blue and red state residents differ little, if at all. Figures in Table 2.3 indicate that similar proportions regard the government as almost always wasteful and inefficient—relative to the red states, the blue states clearly are not wellsprings of support for big government. Only small minorities in either category regard discrimination as the main reason that African Americans can’t get ahead—the blue states are not hotbeds of racial liberalism. Immigrants receive a warmer reception among blue state residents, but multiculturalism remains a minority position even in the blue states. Blue state residents are less likely to endorse unqualified patriotism.

On the other hand, red state residents are just as likely as blue state residents to believe that large companies have too much power and to think that corporations make too much profit—the red states are not the running dogs of corporate America. Amusingly, majorities in both red and blue states agree that Al Gore is more of a liberal than he lets on, and that George Bush is more of a conservative than he lets on—they were not fooled by all the talk about “progressives” and “compassionate conservatives.” And finally—and counter to suggestions of numerous Democrats after the election—majorities in both red and blue states strongly disagree with the proposition that they wish Bill Clinton could run again. Clinton was more favorably regarded in the blue states, but Clinton fatigue by no means was limited to the red states.

When it comes to issue sentiments, Table 2.4 shows that in many cases the small differences we have seen so far become even smaller. Contrary to Republican dogma, red state citizens are equally as unenthusiastic about using the surplus (har!) to cut taxes as blue state citizens. Nearly equal numbers of blue and red state residents think the surplus should be used to pay off the national debt, increase domestic spending, and bolster Social Security and Medicare. Contrary to Democratic dogma, blue state citizens are equally as enthusiastic as red state citizens about abolishing the inheritance tax, giving government grants to religious organizations, adopting school vouchers, and partially privatizing Social Security. Overwhelming majorities in both red and blue states favor providing prescription drugs through Medicare, and solid majorities endorse protecting the environment, whatever it takes. Neither red nor blue state residents attach high priority to increasing defense spending. Looking at this series of issue items, one wonders why anyone would bother separating respondents into red and blue categories—the differences are insignificant.
TABLE 2.4
Red Versus Blue States: Issue Sentiments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Sentiment</th>
<th>BLUE</th>
<th>RED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Should use the surplus to cut taxes</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... pay off the national debt</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... increase domestic spending</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... bolster S and Medicare</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favor abolition of inheritance tax</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... gov't grants to religious organizations</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... school vouchers for low and middle income parents</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... partial privatization of S</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... Medicare coverage of prescription drugs</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... increasing defense spending</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do whatever it takes to protect the environment</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But, we have not considered the specific issues that define the culture war. Table 2.5 brings us to the heart of the matter—questions of religion, morality, and sexuality. The proportion of Protestants is significantly higher in the red states, of course, as is the proportion of respondents who report having a "born again" experience. There is a real difference here between the heartland and the coasts. But the significance of this difference fades when we dig deeper. Only a minority of red state respondents report being very involved in church activities—only marginally more than those blue state respondents who report heavy involvement. A higher proportion of red state respondents report that religion is very important in their lives, but a healthy 62 percent majority of blue state respondents feel similarly. Very similar proportions think churches should stay out of politics, and the minority of red state residents who approve of the clergy talking politics from the pulpit is slightly smaller than the minority in the blue states. Book-burners are only slightly more common in the red states. Finally, there is a clear difference in one of the major issues of the culture war, homosexuality, but probably less of a difference than many would have expected. The level of support for societal acceptance of homosexuality is ten percentage points higher in the blue states (twelve points if we add those who waffle to those who fully accept homosexuality). The difference is statistically significant, but it hardly conjures up an image of two coalitions of deeply opposed states engaged in a culture war. Opinion is almost as divided within

5 Unfortunately, there was no question about abortion views in the Pew Survey, only an item on "which party would better represent your views?" Such items are contaminated by projection and rationalization. We deal with the question of abortion at length in Chapter 4.
the red and the blue states as it is between them. Significantly, this ten- to twelve-point difference on the issue of homosexual acceptance is about as large a difference as we found between red and blue state respondents in the survey. Readers can judge for themselves whether differences of this magnitude justify the military metaphors usually used to describe them.

A legitimate objection to the preceding comparisons is that they include all citizens rather than just voters. Only about half of the age-eligible electorate goes to the polls in contemporary presidential elections, and far fewer vote in lower-level elections. It is well known that partisanship and ideology are strong correlates of who votes: more intense partisans and more extreme ideologues are more likely to vote. Thus, it is possible that the voters in red states differ more from the voters in blue states than the residents do. To consider this possibility we turn to the 2000 National Election Study which—after the election—asks individuals whether and how they voted. In 2000, the NES reported a vote distribution reasonably close to the actual national division: 50.6 percent of the respondents reported voting for Gore, 45.5 percent for Bush, and the remainder for minor candidates.

Tables 2.6 and 2.7 report differences among reported voters in the NES that are only marginally larger than those reported among all respondents in the Pew Survey. Again, the largest difference is for the vote itself. To reiterate, even if an individual feels 55:45 between the two candidates, she has to vote one way or the other. The reported vote for Bush is 54 percent in the red states versus 37 percent in the blue states—a seventeen-point gap, which is larger than the ten-point gap in vote intention in the earlier Pew Survey. Self-identified Democrats were significantly more common among blue state voters and self-identified Republicans significantly more common among red state voters, but in neither case does the difference reach double digits; independents and minor party affiliates were a third of the actual electorate in both categories. Self-identified liberals are more common in the blue states, but self-identified conservatives were at least as numerous as liberals in blue states. Again, moderates or centrists were the majority

| TABLE 2.6 |
| Red Versus Blue States: Political Inclinations |
|-----------|-------------------------------|----------------|
|           | BLUE                          | RED             |
| Bush vote | 37%                           | 54%             |
| Democratic self-ID* | 40%              | 32%             |
| Republican self-ID    | 25%                           | 34%             |
| Liberal self-ID       | 20%                           | 11%             |
| Conservative self-ID  | 24%                           | 31%             |
| Clinton job approval** | 71%                           | 57%             |
| Clinton foreign policy job approval | 70%          | 63%             |
| Clinton economic job approval | 81%          | 74%             |
| Democrats better able to handle economy | 35%          | 27%             |
| Republicans better able to handle economy | 24%          | 29%             |
| Prefer unified control | 24%                           | 24%             |

* Party identifiers include strong and weak identifiers, not independent leaners. Liberal identifiers are scale positions 1-2, conservative identifiers 6-7.
** Unless otherwise noted approval figures in the table combine "strongly approve" and "approve."

Footnotes:
6 For time series data see Figures 2a–2b and 3a–3b in Morris Fiorina, "Whatever Happened to the Median Voter?" available at http://www.stanford.edu/~mfiorina/.
7 http://www.umich.edu/~nes/. The National Election Studies is a research and data-distribution organization located at the University of Michigan and supported by the National Science Foundation. Surveys have been conducted in every national election year since 1952.
in both categories. An overwhelming majority of blue state voters approved of Bill Clinton’s general job performance as well as his foreign policy job performance and his economic job performance, but so did a heavy, if smaller, majority of red state voters. Only minorities of both blue state and red state voters thought that one party could better handle the economy. Finally, rather than blue state residents favoring Democratic control of the Presidency and Congress and red state residents favoring Republican control, nearly identical majorities of both prefer divided control.

Table 2.7 indicates that issue preferences in the two categories of states are surprisingly similar in many instances. Four in ten voters in both red and blue states agree that immigration should decrease, and seven in ten believe that English should be the official language of the United States (the proportion is actually slightly higher in the blue states). Four in ten voters in both categories put environmental considerations above employment considerations, a surprising similarity in light of the image of red states as hotbeds of clear-cutters and blue states as strongholds of tree-huggers. Narrow majorities of voters in both categories support school vouchers, and large majorities support the death penalty. In neither blue nor red states are people wildly in favor of government intervention to ensure fair treatment of African Americans in employment, and virtually identical (small) proportions support racial preferences in hiring.

Again, when we turn to the specific issues that define the culture war, larger differences emerge, but there also are numerous surprises. A solid majority of blue state voters support stricter gun control laws, but so does a narrow majority of red state voters. Support for women’s equality is overwhelming and identical among voters in both categories of states. Although regular church attenders are significantly more common in the red states, similar proportions in both red and blue states believe the moral climate of the country has deteriorated since 1992, and identical proportions believe that others’ moral views should be tolerated. Support for unrestricted abortion is eleven points higher among blue state

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>BLUE</th>
<th>RED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigration should decrease</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make English official language</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment over jobs</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favor school vouchers</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favor death penalty</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government should ensure fair treatment of blacks in employment</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks should get preferences in hiring</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stricter gun control</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal women’s role</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend church regularly</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral climate: much worse</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>somewhat worse</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerate others’ moral views</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abortion—always legal</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow homosexual adoption</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No gay job discrimination</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favor gays in military (strongly)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Unless otherwise noted, the figures in the table combine “strongly” or “completely agree” responses with “mostly” or “somewhat agree” responses

**Scale positions 1–2**
voters, but such unqualified support falls short of a majority, and more than a third of red state voters offer similarly unqualified support. The 2000 NES is particularly rich in items tapping people’s views about matters related to sexual orientation. Here we find differences between blue and red state voters that are statistically significant, though smaller in magnitude than regular consumers of the news might have expected. A narrow majority of blue state voters would allow homosexuals to adopt children, but so would four in ten red state voters. Solid majorities of voters in both categories support laws that would ban employment discrimination against gays. Sixty percent of blue state voters fully support gays in the military, contrasted with 44 percent of red state voters. This 16 percent difference is the single largest disparity we found between the issue preferences of red and blue state voters. Perhaps Bill Clinton picked the one issue in the realm of sexual orientation that was most likely to create controversy. But the evidence supports the alternative hypothesis that Clinton’s executive order polarized the electorate: according to Gallup data, popular support for gays in the military rose through the 1980s and had reached 60 percent in 1989 before plummeting in the wake of Clinton’s executive order.⁸

All in all, the comparison of blue and red state residents who claim to have voted in 2000 seems consistent with the picture reflecting comparisons of all residents of blue and red states. There are numerous similarities between red and blue state voters, some differences, and a few notable differences, but little that calls to mind the portrait of a culture war between the states.

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RED STATES VERSUS BLUE STATES: A SUMMARY

Since 1972 the National Election Studies have included an item that asks respondents to place themselves on a seven-category liberal-conservative scale that runs from “extremely liberal” on the left to “extremely conservative” on the right. If the “two nations” metaphor accurately describes the electorate, red state residents should overwhelmingly position themselves on the right of the scale, and blue state residents on the left. Figure 2.2 compares the ideological distributions of red and blue state residents (top panel) and voters (bottom panel).⁹ As seen, the distributions of self-placements in the red and blue states are very similar—both are centered over the “moderate” or “middle-of-the-road” position, whether we consider all residents or just voters.¹⁰ Moreover, as Figure 2.3 shows, the respondents in red and blue states are in almost complete agreement about the positions of the two parties: large pluralities place the Democratic Party at scale position 2 (“liberal”), and majorities place the Republican Party at scale position 6 (“conservative”). When combined with the data presented earlier in this chapter we think the evidence is compelling that the bottom panel of Figure 2.1 (p. 13) better describes the current state of American politics than the top panel. Elections are close, but voters are not deeply or bitterly divided. In both red

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⁹ Figures 2.2 and 2.3 are based on the half of the 2000 sample that received the traditional seven-point scale. Because of a question wording experiment the other half of the sample received a branching format question.

¹⁰ We omit those respondents who reply that they do not think of themselves in these terms or do not know what they are—generally about 30 percent of the sample. Political scientists often add this group to those in the middle scale position, which, of course, would make the case for a centrist electorate even stronger.
FIGURE 2.2
Both Red and Blue State Residents Are Basically Centrists

I ideological Self-Placement of All Respondents Living in Red and Blue States

Source: Calculated from the 2000 National Election Studies.

FIGURE 2.3
Red and Blue State Residents Agree That the Parties Are Not Centrist

Voter Placements of the Democratic Party

Source: Calculated from the 2000 National Election Studies.

Voter Placements of the Republican Party

Source: Calculated from the 2000 National Election Studies.
and blue states a solid majority of voters see themselves as positioned between two relatively extreme parties.

**THE OBVIOUS HYPOTHESIS**

Given the surprisingly small differences between red and blue states that are apparent in survey data, what underlies all the discussion about the clash of cultures? The most plausible explanation is that culture wars, two nations, and similar exaggerations make an excellent story line for the media, so differences are systematically exaggerated to support the story line. Consider an extensive follow-up report on the 2000 elections published in *USA Today.* Rather than conduct a comprehensive examination of representative survey data, *USA Today* chose two towns—Montclair, New Jersey, and Franklin, Tennessee—to exemplify the cultural differences assumed to exist between the red and blue states. The three-day report discussed public opinion in the towns and reported in detail on the residents and their views. The resulting profile painted a vivid portrait of an America deeply divided by both values and lifestyle.

Montclair, where Gore got three-quarters of the vote, is described as a bustling suburb. With jazz clubs, art museums, and coffee bars it is “reeling with energy and interaction.” According to the profile, the local interest groups and associations are prominently left of center: “Montclair has its own gun control, abortion rights, and antiwar groups, its own chapters of Amnesty International and the NAACP.” The Council for Secular Humanism recently opened up a “faith-free” Center for Inquiry.

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12 Jill Lawrence, “One Nation, Divided” *USA Today,* February 18, 2002: 10A.
pains us to give USA Today an “F” on this report, although we
hasten to add that it is not atypical of what one finds in the
media.\textsuperscript{13} Repeatedly subjected to “analyses” like this one, people
can hardly be blamed for believing in a culture war between the
states—at least those who pay attention to politics.\textsuperscript{14} We have
read a great deal of popular commentary on the red and blue
states and in our view the journalistic analysis that best reflects the
statistical portrait we have painted is contained in David Brooks’s
sensitive contrast of life in Montgomery County, Maryland, with
life in Franklin County, Pennsylvania. Our conclusion mirrors his:
“Although there are some real differences between Red and Blue
America, there is no fundamental conflict. There may be cracks,
but there is no chasm.”\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{13} As this book was going to press, the Washington Post published a series of articles on the red and the
blue states which made USA Today’s analysis look comprehensive by comparison. See David Von

\textsuperscript{14} We doubt that the notion of a culture war extends any deeper than the journalistic community and the
political class in this country. On numerous occasions when we have tried to describe the research
question addressed in this book to neighbors, relatives, and friends, the reaction has been incomprehen-
sion. The idea of a culture war is something completely unfamiliar to most Americans.

\textsuperscript{15} “One Nation, Slightly Divisible,” The Atlantic, December 2001: 65.

CHAPTER 3

A 50:50 Nation? Beyond the Red and the Blue States

Despite the attention the red state/blue state categorization has
received in the media, few professional analysts would be
surprised by the lack of major differences in the preceding chap-
ter’s contrasts of public opinion in the red and blue states. A state
is a large aggregation, a gross unit of comparison. California is a
blue state, but as the map (on page 34) of county election returns
shows, most of the state’s counties are red. Similarly, Texas is a red
state, but there is considerable blue in its large cities and along its
border with Mexico. For this reason, we doubt that many profes-
sional analysts have taken the red states/blue states distinction
very seriously. Thus, one can accept the argument that the division
of the country into red and blue is a gross exaggeration but still
believe that the country is polarized, increasingly so. We simply
need to examine other, more precisely defined categories or
dimensions in order to find the expected polarization.