GLOBALIZATION AS HYBRIDIZATION

Jan Nederveen Pieterse

The most common interpretations of globalization are the ideas that the world is becoming more uniform and standardized, through a technological, commercial and cultural synchronization emanating from the West, and that globalization is tied up with modernity. These perspectives are interrelated, if only in that they are both variations on an underlying theme of globalization as Westernization. The former is critical in intent while the latter is ambiguous. My argument takes issue with both these interpretations as narrow assessments of globalization and instead argues for viewing globalization as a process of hybridization which gives rise to a global mélange.

Globalizations in the plural

Globalization, according to Albrow, 'refers to all those processes by which the peoples of the world are incorporated into a single world society, global society' (1990: 9). Since these processes are plural we may as well conceive of globalizations in the plural. Thus in social science there are as many conceptualizations of globalization as there are disciplines. In economics, globalization refers to economic internationalization and the spread of capitalist market relations. 'The global economy is the system generated by globalizing production and global finance' (Cox, 1992: 30). In international relations, the focus is on the increasing density of interstate relations and the development of global politics. In sociology, the concern is with increasing world-wide social densities and the emergence of 'world society'. In cultural studies, the focus is on global communications and world-wide cultural standardization, as in CocaColonization and McDonaldification, and on postcolonial culture. In history, the concern is with conceptualizing 'global history' (Mazlish and Buultjens, 1993).

All these approaches and themes are relevant if we view globalization as a multidimensional process which, like all significant social processes, unfolds in multiple realms of existence simultaneously. Accordingly, globalization may be understood in terms of an open-ended synthesis of several disciplinary approaches. This extends beyond social science, for instance to ecological concerns, technology (Henderson, 1989) and agricultural techniques (for example, green revolution).
Another way to conceive of globalizations plural is that there are as many modes of globalization as there are globalizing agents and dynamics or impulses. Historically these range from long-distance cross-cultural trade, religious organizations and knowledge networks to contemporary multinational corporations, transnational banks, international institutions, technological exchange and transnational networks of social movements. We can further differentiate between globalization as policy and project — as in the case of Amnesty International which is concerned with internationalizing human rights standards — or as unintended consequence — as in the case of the ‘globalizing panic’ of AIDS. Globalism is the policy of furthering or managing (a particular mode of) globalization. In political economy it refers to policies furthering or accommodating economic internationalization (Petras and Brill, 1985); or to the corporate globalization of transnational enterprises (Gurtof, 1988); and in foreign affairs, to the global stance in US foreign policy, in its initial post-war posture (Ambrose, 1971) and its post Cold War stance.

These varied dimensions all point to the inherent fluidity, indeterminacy and open-endedness of globalizations. If this is the point of departure it becomes less obvious to think of globalizations in terms of standardization and less likely that globalizations can be one-directional processes, either structurally or culturally.

Globalization and modernity

Modernity is a keynote in reflections on globalization in sociology. In several prominent conceptualizations, globalization is the corollary of modernity (Giddens, 1990). It’s not difficult to understand this trend. In conjunction with globalization, modernity provides a structure and periodization. In addition, this move reflects the general thematization of modernity in social science from Habermas to Berman. Together globalization and modernity make up a ready-made package. Ready-made because it closely resembles the earlier, well-established conceptualization of globalization: the Marxist theme of the spread of the world market. The timing and pace are the same in both interpretations: the process starts in the 1500s and experiences its high tide from the late nineteenth century. The structures are the same: the nation-state and individualization — vehicles of modernity or, in the Marxist paradigm, corollaries of the spread of the world market. In one conceptualization universalism refers to the logic of the market and the law of value, and in the other to modern values of achievement. World-system theory is the most well-known conceptualization of globalization in the Marxist lineage; its achievement has been to make ‘society’ as the unit of analysis appear as a narrow focus, while on the other hand it has faithfully replicated the familiar constraints of Marxist determinism (Nederveen Pieterse, 1987).

There are several problems associated with the modernity/globalization approach. In either conceptualization, whether centred on capitalism or modernity, globalization begins in and emanates from Europe and the West. In effect it is a theory of Westernization by another name, which replicates all the problems associated with Eurocentrism: a narrow window on the world, historically and culturally. With this agenda it should be called Westernization and not globalization. Another problem is that globalization theory turns into or becomes an annex of modernization theory. While modernization theory is a passed station in sociology and development theory, it is making a comeback under the name of globalization — the 1950s and 1960s revisited under a large global umbrella. Robertson (1992: 138–45) takes issue with the prioritization of modernity, notably in Giddens’ work. Robertson’s approach to globalization is multidimensional with an emphasis on sociocultural processes. At the same time, his preoccupation with themes such as ‘global order’ is, according to Arnason, ‘indicative of a Parsonian approach, transferred from an artificially isolated and unified society to the global condition’ (1990: 222). Neo-modernization theory (Tiryakian, 1991) and the contemporary re-thematization of modernity indicate the continuing appeal of modernization thinking, but the problems remain.

The tendency to focus on social structure produces an account from which the dark side of modernity is omitted. What of modernity in the light of Bauman’s Modernity and the Holocaust (1989)? While the Marxist perspective involves a critical agenda, the thematization of modernity, whether or not it serves as a stand-in for capitalism, does not...

...the ambiguities involved in this discourse are such that it is possible, within it, to lose any sense of cultural domination: to speak of modernity can be to speak of cultural change as ‘cultural fate’ in the strong sense of historical... inevitability. This would be to abandon any project of rational cultural critique. (Tomlinson, 1991: 141)

Generally, questions of power are marginalized in both the capitalism and modernity perspectives. Another dimension which tends to be conspicuously absent from modernity accounts is imperialism. Modernity accounts tend to be societally inward looking, in a rarefied sociological narrative, as if modernity precedes and conditions globalization, and not the other way round: globalization constituting one of the conditions for modernity. The implication of the modernity/globalization view is that the history of globalization begins with the history of the West. But is not precisely the point of globalization as a perspective that globalization begins with world history? The modernity/globalization view is not only geographically narrow (Westernization) but also historically shallow (1500 plus). The timeframe of some of the perspectives relevant to globalization is as follows.

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Apparently the broad heading of globalization accommodates some very
different views. The basic understanding is usually a neutral formulation,
such as 'Globalization can thus be defined as the intensification of worldwide
social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings
are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa' (Giddens,
1990: 64). The 'intensification of worldwide social relations' can be thought of
as a long-term process which finds its beginnings in the first migrations of
peoples and long-distance trade connections, and subsequently accelerates
under particular conditions (the spread of technologies, religions, literacy,
empires, capitalism). Or, it can be thought of as consisting only of the later
stages of this process, from the time of the accelerating formation of global
social relations, and as a specifically global momentum associated with
particular conditions (the development of a world market, Western
imperialism, modernity). It can be narrowed down further by regarding
globalization as a particular epoch and formation - as in Tomlinson's view of
globalization as the successor to imperialism (rather than imperialism being a
mode of globalization), Jameson's view of the new cultural space created by
late capitalism, and Harvey's argument where globalization is associated with
the postmodern condition of time-space compression and flexible accumula-
tion.

But, whichever the emphasis, globalization as the 'intensification of
worldwide social relations' presumes the prior existence of 'worldwide social
relations', so that globalization is the conceptualization of a phase following
an existing condition of globality and part of an ongoing process of the
formation of world-wide social relations. This recognition of historical depth
brings globalization back to world history and beyond the radius of
modernity/Westernization.

One way around the problem of modernization/Westernization is the
notion of multiple paths of modernization, which avoids the ous of
Eurocentrism and provides an angle for reproblematicizing Western
development. This has been advanced by Benjamin Nelson as part of his
concern with 'intercultural encounters' (1981) and taken up by others
(e.g. Therborn, 1992). The idea that '...all societies create their own modernity'
also forms part of development discourse analysis, along with the theme of
'reworking modernity' in the context of popular culture and memory (Fred

The modernizations plural approach matches the notion of the historicity
of modernization common in Southeast and East Asia (Singh, 1989). That
Japanese modernization has followed a different path from that of the West is
a cliché in Japanese sociology (Tomioka, 1990) and well established in
Taiwan and China (Li, 1989; Sonoda, 1990). It results in an outlook that
resembles the argument of polycentrism and multiple paths of development
(Amin, 1990). But this remains a static and one-dimensional representation:
the multiplication of centres still hinges on centrism. It's not much use to make
up for Eurocentrism and occidental narcissism by opting for other centrisms
such as Afrocentrism, Indoentrism, Sinocentrism or polycentrism. In effect,
it echoes the turn of the century pan-movements: pan-Slavism, pan-
Islamism, pan-Arabism, pan-Turkism, pan-Europeanism, pan-Africanism
etc, in which the logic of nineteenth-century racial classifications is carried
further under the heading of civilizational provinces turned into political
projects. This may be the substitution of one centrism and parochialism for
another and miss the fundamental point of the globalization of diversity', of
the mélange effect pervading everywhere, from the heartlands to the
extremities and vice versa.

Structural hybridization

With respect to cultural forms, hybridization is defined as 'the ways in which
forms become separated from existing practices and recombine with new
forms in new practices' (Rowe and Schelling, 1991: 231). This principle can
be extended to structural forms of social organization.

It is by now a familiar argument that nation-state formation is an
expression and function of globalization and not a process contrary to it
(Robertson, 1992; Greenfeld, 1992). At the same time it is apparent that the
present phase of globalization involves the relative weakening of nation-
states - as in the weakening of the 'national economy' in the context of
economic globalization and, culturally, the decline of patriotism. But this too is
not simply a one-directional process. Thus the migration movements which
make up demographic globalization can engender absentee patriotism and
long-distance nationalism, as in the political affinities of Irish, Jewish and
Palestinian diasporas and emigre or exiled Sikhs in Toronto, Tamils in

Globalization can mean the reinforcement of or go together with localism,
as in 'Think globally, act locally'. This kind of tandem operation of
local/global dynamics, global localization or globalization, is at work in the
case of minorities who appeal to transnational human rights standards
beyond state authorities, or indigenous peoples who find support for local
demands from transnational networks. The upsurge of ethnic identity
politics and religious revival movements can also be viewed in the light of
globalization. 'Identity patterns are becoming more complex, as people
assert local loyalties but want to share in global values and lifestyles' (Ken
Booth quoted in Lipschutz, 1992: 396). Particularity, notes Robertson, is a
global value and what is taking place is a 'universalization of particularism'
or 'the global valorization of particular identities' (1992: 130).

Global dynamics such as the fluctuations of commodity prices on the
world market can result in the reconstruction of ethnic identities, as
occurred in Africa in the 1980s (Shaw, 1986). State development policies can
gender a backlash of ethnic movements (Kothari, 1988). Thus, 'globalization
can generate forces of both fragmentation and unification... globalisation can
genender an awareness of political difference as much as an awareness of common identity; enhanced international communications
can highlight conflicts of interest and ideology, and not merely remove obstacles to mutual understanding' (Held, 1992: 32).

Globalization can mean the reinforcement of both supranational and sub-national regionalism. The European Union is a case in point. Formed in response to economic challenges from Japan and the United States, it represents more than the internal market and is in the process of becoming an administrative, legal, political and cultural formation, involving multiple Europe: the Europe of the nations, regions, 'European civilization', Christianities, etc. The dialectics of unification mean, for instance, that constituencies in Northern Ireland can appeal to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg on decisions of the British courts, or that Catalonia can outflank Madrid and Brittany outmanoeuvre Paris by appealing to Brussels or by establishing links with other regions (for example, between Catalonia and the Ruhr area). Again there is an ongoing flow or cascade of globalization – regionalism – sub-regionalism. Or, 'Globalization encourages macro-regionalism, which, in turn, encourages micro-regionalism' (Cox, 1992: 34).

Micro-regionalism in poor areas will be a means not only of affirming cultural identities but of claiming pay-offs at the macro-regional level for maintaining political stability and economic good behaviour. The issues of redistribution are thereby raised from the sovereign state level to the macro-regional level, while the manner in which redistributed wealth is used becomes decentralised to the micro-regional level. (Cox, 1992: 35)

What globalization means in structural terms, then, is the increase in the available modes of organization: transnational, international, macro-regional, national, micro-regional, municipal, local. This ladder of administrative levels is being crisscrossed by functional networks of corporations, international organizations and non-governmental organizations, as well as by professionals and computer users. Part of this is what has been termed the 'internationalization of the state' as states are 'increasingly engaged in multilateral forms of international governance' (Held and McGrew, 1993: 271). This approximates Rosenau's conceptualization of the structure of 'post-international politics' made up of two interactive worlds with overlapping memberships: a state-centric world, in which the primary actors are nations, and a multi-centric world of diverse actors such as corporations, international organizations, ethnic groups, churches (1990). These multi-centric functional networks in turn are nested within broader sprawling 'scapes', such as finanscapes and ethnoscapes (Appadurai, 1990).

Furthermore, not only these modes of organization are important but also the informal spaces that are created in between, in the interstices. Inhabited by diasporas, migrants, exiles, refugees, nomads, these are sites of what Michael Mann (1986) calls 'interstitial emergence' and identifies as important sources of social renewal.

Also in political economy we can identify a range of hybrid formations. The notion of articulation of modes of production may be viewed as a principle of hybridization. The dual economy argument saw neatly divided economic sectors while the articulation argument sees interactive sectors giving rise to mélange effects, such as 'semi-proletarians' who have one foot in the agrarian subsistence sector. Counterposed to the idea of the dual economy split in traditional/modern and feudal/capitalist sectors, the articulation argument holds that what has been taking place is an interpenetration of modes of production. Uneven articulation has, in turn, given rise to phenomena such as asymmetric integration (Terhalle, 1987). Dependency theory may be read as a theory of structural hybridization in which dependent capitalism is a mélange category in which the logics of capitalism and imperialism have merged. Recognition of this hybrid condition is what distinguishes neo-Marxism from classical Marxism (in which capital was regarded as a 'permanently revolutionizing force'): that is, regular capitalism makes for development, but dependent capitalism makes for the 'development of underdevelopment'. The contested notion of semiperiphery may also be viewed as a hybrid formation. In a wider context, the mixed economy, the informal sector, and the third sector of the 'social economy', comprising co-operative and non-profit organizations (Defourny and Monzón Campos, 1992), may be viewed as hybrid economic formations.

Hybrid formations constituted by the interpenetration of diverse logics manifest themselves in hybrid sites and spaces. Thus, urbanization in the context of the fusion of pre-capitalist and capitalist modes of production, as in parts of Latin America, may give rise to 'cities of peasants' (Roberts, 1978). Border zones are the meeting places of different organizational modes – such as Free Enterprise Zones and offshore banking facilities (hybrid meeting places of state sovereignty and transnational enterprise), overseas military facilities and surveillance stations (Enloe, 1989). Borderlands generally have become a significant topos (Anzaldúa, 1987). The blurring and reworking of public and private spaces in a familiar theme (for example, Helly and Reverby, 1992). Global cities (Sassen, 1991) and ethnic mélange neighbourhoods within them (such as Jackson Heights in Queens, New York) are other hybrid spaces in the global landscape. The use of information technology in supranational financial transactions (Wachtel, 1990) has given rise to a hyperspace of capital.

Another dimension of hybridity concerns the experience of time, as in the notion of mixed times (tiempos mixtos) common in Latin America, where it refers to the coexistence and interspersion of premodernity, modernity and postmodernity (Calderón, 1988; Vargas, 1992). A similar point is that 'intrinsic asynchrony' is a 'general characteristic of Third World cultures' (Högs, 1992: 237).

Globalization, then, increases the range of organizational options, all of which are in operation simultaneously. Each or a combination of these may be relevant in specific social, institutional, legal, political, economic or cultural spheres. What matters is that no single mode has a necessary overall priority or monopoly. This is one of the salient differences between the present phase of globalization and the preceding era from the 1840s to the 1960s, the great age of nationalism when by and large the nation-state was
the single dominant organizational option (Harris, 1990). While the spread of the nation-state has been an expression of globalization, the dynamic has not stopped there.

The overall tendency towards increasing global density and interdependence, or globalization, translates, then, into the pluralization of organizational forms. Structural hybridization and the mélange of diverse modes of organization give rise to a pluralization of forms of co-operation and competition as well as to novel mixed forms of co-operation. This is the structural corollary to flexible specialization and just-in-time capitalism and, on the other hand, to cultural hybridization and multiple identities. Multiple identities and the decentring of the social subject are grounded in the ability of individuals to avail themselves of several organizational options at the same time. Thus globalization is the framework for the amplification and diversification of ‘sources of the self’.

A different concern is the scope and depth of the historical field. The Westernization/modernity views on globalization only permit a global momentum with a short memory. Globalization taken widely, however, refers to the formation of a world-wide historical field and involves the development of global memory, arising from shared global experiences. Such shared global experiences range from various intercultural encounters such as long-distance trade and migration to slavery, conquest, war, imperialism, colonialism. It has been argued that the latter would be irrelevant to global culture:

Unlike national cultures, a global culture is essentially memoryless. When the ‘nation’ can be constructed so as to draw upon and revive latent popular experiences and needs, a ‘global culture’ answers to no living needs, no identity-in-the-making... There are no ‘world memories’ that can be used to unite humanity; the most global experiences to date – colonialism and the World Wars – can only serve to remind us of our historic cleavages. (Smith, 1990: 180)

If, however, conflict, conquest and oppression would only divide people, then nations themselves would merely be artefacts of division for they too were mostly born out of conflict (for example, Hechter, 1975). Likewise, on the larger canvas, it would be shallow and erroneous to argue that the experiences of conflict merely divide humanity: they also unite humankind, even if in painful ways and producing an ambivalent kind of unity (Abdel-Malek, 1981; Nederveen Pieterse, 1990). Unity emerging out of antagonism and conflict is the a, b, c of dialectics. It’s a recurrent theme in postcolonial literature, for example The Intimate Enemy (Nandy, 1983). The intimacy constituted by repression and resistance is not an uncommon notion either, as hinted in the title of the Israeli author Uri Avneri’s book about Palestinians, My Friend the Enemy (1986). A conflictual unity bonded by common political and cultural experiences, including the experience of domination, has been part of the make-up of hybrid postcolonial cultures. Thus the former British Empire remains in many ways a unitary space featuring a common language, common elements in legal and political systems, infrastructure, traffic rules, an imperial architecture which is in

many ways the same in India as in South Africa, along with the legacy of the Commonwealth (King, 1991).

Robertson makes reference to the deep history of globality, particularly in relation to the spread of world religions, but reserves the notion of globalization for later periods, starting in the 1500s, considering that what changes over time is ‘the scope and depth of consciousness of the world as a single’. In his view ‘contemporary globalization’ also refers to ‘cultural and subjective matters’ and involves awareness of the global human condition, a global consciousness that carries reflexive connotations (1992: 183). No doubt this reflexivity is significant, also because it signals the potential capability of humanity to act upon the global human condition. On the other hand, there is no reason why such reflexivity should halt at the gates of the West and not also arise from and be cognizant of the deep history of intercivilizational connections including, for instance, the influence of the world religions.

Global mélange: windows for research on globalization

How do we come to terms with phenomena such as Thai boxing by Moroccan girls in Amsterdam, Asian rap in London, Irish bagels, Chinese tacos and Mardi Gras Indians in the United States, or ‘Mexican schoolgirls dressed in Greek togas dancing in the style of Isidora Duncan’ (Rowe and Schelling, 1991: 161)? How do we interpret Peter Brook directing the Mahabharata, or Ariane Mâouchkine staging a Shakespeare play in Japanese Kabuki style for a Paris audience in the Théâtre Soleil? Cultural experiences, past or present, have not been simply moving in the direction of cultural uniformity and standardization. This is not to say that the notion of global cultural syncretism (Hamelink, 1983; Schiller, 1989) is irrelevant – on the contrary – but it is fundamentally incomplete. It overlooks the countercurrents – the impact non-Western cultures have been making on the West. It downplays the ambivalence of the globalizing momentum and ignores the role of local reception of Western culture – for example the indigenization of Western elements. It fails to see the influence non-Western cultures have been exercising on one another. It has no room for crossover culture – as in the development of ‘third cultures’ such as world music. It overrates the homogeneity of Western culture and overlooks the fact that many of the standards exported by the West and its cultural industries themselves turn out to be of culturally mixed character if we examine their cultural lineages. Centuries of South–North cultural osmosis have resulted in an intercontinental crossover culture. European and Western culture are part of this global mélange. This is an obvious case if we reckon that Europe until the fourteenth century was invariably the recipient of cultural influences from ‘the Orient’. The hegemony of the West dates only from very recent times, from around 1800, and, arguably, from industrialization. One of the terms offered to describe this interplay is the creolization of global culture (Friedman, 1990; Hannerz, 1987). This approach is derived
from creole languages and linguistics. ‘Creolization’ itself is an odd, hybrid term. In the Caribbean and North America it stands for the mixture of African and European (the Creole cuisine of New Orleans, etc.), while in Hispanic America ‘criollo’ originally denotes those of European descent born in the continent. ‘Creolization’ means a Caribbean window on the world. Part of its appeal is that it goes against the grain of nineteenth-century racism and the accompanying abhorrence of métissage as miscegenation, as in Comte de Gobineau’s view that race mixture leads to decadence and decay for in every mixture the lower element is bound to predominate. The doctrine of racial purity involves the fear of and dédain for the half-caste. By stressing and foregrounding the mestizo factor, the mixed and in-between, creolization highlights what has been hidden and valorizes boundary crossing. It also implies an argument with Westernization: the West itself may be viewed as a mixture and Western culture as a creole culture.

The Latin American term mestizaje also refers to boundary-crossing mixture. Since the early part of the century, however, this has served as a hegemonic elite ideology, which, in effect, refers to ‘whitening’ or Europeanization as the overall project for Latin American countries: while the European element is supposed to maintain the upper hand, through the gradual ‘whitening’ of the population and culture, Latin America is supposed to achieve modernity (Graham, 1990; Whitten and Torres, 1992). A limitation of both creolization and mestizaje is that they are confined to the experience of the post-sixteenth-century Americas.

Another terminology is the ‘orientalization of the world’, which has been referred to as ‘a distinct global process’ (Featherstone, 1990). In Duke Ellington’s words, ‘We are all becoming a little Oriental’ (quoted in Fischer, 1992: 32). It is reminiscent of the theme of ‘East wind prevailing over West wind’, which runs through Sultán Gaïev, Mao and Abdel-Malek. In the setting of the ‘Japanese challenge’ and the development model of East Asian Newly Industrialized Countries, it evokes the Pacific Century and the twenty-first century as the ‘Asian century’ (Park, 1985).

Each of these terms—‘creolization’, ‘mestizaje’, ‘orientalization’—opens a different window on the global mélange. In the United States ‘crossover culture’ denotes the adoption of black cultural characteristics by European-Americans and of white elements by African-Americans. As a general notion, this may aptly describe global intercultural osmosis and interplay. Global ‘crossover culture’ may be an appropriate characterization of the long-term global North–South mélange. Still, what is not clarified are the terms under which cultural interplay and crossover take place. Likewise in terms such as ‘global mélange’, what is missing is acknowledgement of the actual unevenness, asymmetry and inequality in global relations.

Politics of hybridity

Given the backdrop of nineteenth-century discourse, it’s no wonder that arguments that acknowledge hybridity often do so on a note of regret and loss—loss of purity, wholeness, authenticity. Thus, according to Hisham Sharabi (1988: 4), neo-patriarchal society in the contemporary Arab world ‘is a new, hybrid sort of society/culture’, ‘neither modern nor traditional’. The ‘neo-patriarchal petty bourgeoisie’ is likewise characterized as a ‘hybrid class’ (1988: 6). This argument is based on an analysis of ‘the political and economic conditions of distorted, dependent capitalism’ in the Arab world (1988: 5), in other words, it is derived from the framework of dependency theory.

In arguments such as these hybridity functions as a negative trope, in line with the nineteenth-century paradigm according to which hybridity, mixture, mutation are regarded as negative developments which detract from prelapsarian purity—in society and culture, as in biology. Since the development of Mendelian genetics in the 1870s and its subsequent adoption in early twentieth-century biology, however, a reevaluation has taken place according to which crossbreeding and polygenic inheritance have come to be positively valued as enrichments of gene pools. Gradually this then has been seeping through to wider circles; the work of Bateson (1972), as one of the few to reconnect the natural sciences and social sciences, has been influential in this regard.

In post-structuralist and postmodern analysis, hybridity and syncretism have become keywords. Thus hybridity is the antithesis to essentialist notions of identity and ethnicity (Lowe, 1991). Cultural syncretism refers to the methodology of montage and collage, to ‘cross-cultural plots of music, clothing, behaviour, advertising, theatre, body language, or . . . visual communication, spreading multi-ethnic and multi-centric patterns’ (Canevacci, 1992; 1993: 3). Interculturality, rather than multiculturalism, is the keynote of this kind of perspective. But it also raises different problems. What is the political portée of the celebration of hybridity? Is it merely another sign of perplexity turned into virtue by those grouped on the consumer end of social change? According to Ella Shohat (1992: 109), ‘A celebration of syncretism and hybridity per se, if not articulated in conjunction with questions of hegemony and neo-colonial power relations, runs the risk of appearing to sanctify the fait accompli of colonial violence’. Hence a further step would be not merely to celebrate but to theorize hybridity.

A theory of hybridity would be attractive. We are so used to theories that are concerned with establishing boundaries and demarcations among phenomena—units or processes that are as neatly as possible set apart from other units or processes—that a theory which instead would focus on fuzziness and mélange, cut-and-mix, crisscross and crossover, might well be a relief in itself. Yet, ironically, of course, it would have to prove itself by giving as neat as possible a version of messiness, or an unhybrid categorization of hybridities.

By what yardstick would we differentiate hybridities? One consideration is in what context hybridity functions. At a general level hybridity concerns the mixture of phenomena which are held to be different, separate;
hybridization then refers to a cross-category process. Thus with Bakhtin (1986) hybridization refers to sites, such as fairs, which bring together the exotic and the familiar, villagers and townsmen, performers and observers. The categories can also be cultures, nations, ethnicities, status groups, classes, genres, and hybridity, by its very existence, blurs the distinctions among them. Hybridity functions, next, as part of a power relationship between centre and margin, hegemony and minority, and indicates a blurring, destabilization or subversion of that hierarchical relationship.

One of the original notions of hybridity is syncretism, the fusion of religious forms. Here we can distinguish, on the one hand, syncretism as mimicry – as in Santería, Candomblé, Vodun, in which Catholic saints are adapted to serve as masks behind which non-Christian forms of worship are practised (for example, Thompson, 1984). The Virgin of Guadalupe as a mask for Pacha Mama is another example. On the other hand, we find syncretism as a mélange not only of forms but also of beliefs, a merger in which both religions, Christian and native, have changed and a ‘third religion’ has developed (as in Kimbangism in the Congo).

Another phenomenon is hybridity as migration mélange. A common observation is that second-generation immigrants, in the West and elsewhere, display mixed cultural patterns – for example, a separation between and, next, a mix of a home culture and language (matching the culture of origin) and an outdoor culture (matching the culture of residence), as in the combination ‘Muslim in the daytime, disco in the evening’ (Feddem, 1992).

In postcolonial studies hybridity is a familiar and ambivalent trope. Homi Bhabha (1990) refers to hybrids as intercultural brokers in the interstices between nation and empire, producing counter-narratives from the nation’s margins to the ‘totalizing boundaries’ of the nation. At the same time, refusing nostalgic models of precolonial purity, hybrids, by way of mimicry, may conform to the ‘hegemonized rewriting of the Eurocentre’. Hybridity, in this perspective, can be a condition tantamount to alienation, a state of homelessness. Smadar Lavie comments: ‘This is a response-oriented model of hybridity. It lacks agency, by not empowering the hybrid. The result is a fragmented Otherness in the hybrid’ (1992: 92). In the work of Gloria Anzaldúa and others, she recognizes, on the other hand, a community-oriented mode of hybridity, and notes that ‘reworking the past exposes its hybridity, and to recognize and acknowledge this hybrid past in terms of the present empowers the community and gives it agency’ (1992: 92).

An ironic case of hybridity as intercultural crossover is mentioned by Michael Bérubé, interviewing the African American literary critic Houston Baker, Jr: ‘That reminds me of your article in Technoculture, where you write that when a bunch of Columbia-graduate white boys known as Third Bass attack Hammer for not being black enough or strong enough . . . that’s the moment of hybridity’ (1992: 551).

Taking in these lines of thought, we can construct a continuum of hybridities: on one end, an assimilationist hybridity that leans over towards the centre, adopts the canon and mimics the hegemony, and, at the other end, a destabilizing hybridity that blurs the canon, reverses the current, subverts the centre. Hybridities, then, may be differentiated according to the components in the mélange. On the one hand, an assimilationist hybridity in which the centre predominates – as in V.S. Naipaul, known for his trenchant observations such as there’s no decent cup of coffee to be had in Trinidad. A posture which has given rise to the term Naipaulitis. And on the other hand, an hybridity that blurs (passive) or destablizes (active) the canon and its categories. Perhaps this spectrum of hybridities can be summed up as ranging from Naipaul to Salman Rushdie (cf. Brennan, 1989), Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak. Still, what does it mean to destabilize the canon? It’s worth reflecting on the politics of hybridity.

Politics of hybridity: towards political theory on a global scale

Relations of power and hegemony are inscribed and reproduced within hybridity for wherever we look closely enough we find the traces of asymmetry in culture, place, descent. Hence hybridity raises the question of the terms of mixture, the conditions of mixing and mélange. At the same time it’s important to note the ways in which hegemony is not merely reproduced but refuged in the process of hybridization. Generally, what is the bearing of hybridization in relation to political engagement?

At times, the anti-essentialist emphasis on hybrid identities comes dangerously close to dismissing all searches for communal origins as an archaeological excavation of an idealized, irretrievable past. Yet, on another level, while avoiding any nostalgia for a prelapsarian community, or for any unitary and transparent identity predating the ‘fall’, we must also ask whether it is possible to forge a collective resistance without inscribing a communal past. (Shohat, 1992: 109)

Isn’t there a close relationship between political mobilization and collective memory? Isn’t the remembrance of deeds past, the commemoration of collective itineraries, victories and defeats – such as the Matanza for the FMLN in El Salvador, Katipunan for the NPA in the Philippines, Heroes Day for the ANC – fundamental to the symbolism of resistance and the moral economy of mobilization? Still, this line of argument involves several problems. While there may be a link, there is no necessary symmetry between communal past/collective resistance. What is the basis of bonding in collective action – past or future, memory or project? While communal symbolism may be important, collective symbolism and discourse merging a heterogeneous collectivity in a common project may be more important. Thus, while Heroes Day is significant to the ANC (16 December is the founding day of Umkhonto we Sizwe), the Freedom Charter, and more specifically, the project of non-racial democracy (non-sexism has been added later) has been of much greater importance. These projects are not of a ‘communal’ nature: part of their strength is precisely that they transcend communal boundaries. Generally, emancipations may be thought of in the plural, as a project or ensemble of projects that in itself is diverse,
The argument linking communal past/collective resistance imposes a unity and transparency which in effect reduces the space for critical resistance, for plurality within the movement, diversity within the process of emancipation. It privileges a communal view of collective action, a primordialist view of identity, and ignores or downplays the importance of intragroup differences and conflicts over group representation, demands and tactics, including reconstructions of the past. It argues as if the questions of whether demands should be for autonomy or inclusion, whether the group should be inward or outward looking, have already been settled, while in reality these are political dilemmas. The nexus between communal past/collective engagement is one strand in political mobilization, but so are the hybrid past/plural projects, and in actual everyday politics the point is how to negotiate these strands in round-table politics. This involves going beyond a past to a future orientation—what is the point of collective action without a future? The lure of community, powerful and prevalent in left as well as right politics, has been questioned often enough. In contrast, hybridity when thought of as a politics may be subversive of essentialism and homogeneity, disruptive of static spatial and political categories of centre and periphery, high and low, class and ethnos, and in recognizing multiple identities, widen the space for critical engagement. Thus the nostalgia paradigm of community politics has been contrasted to the landscape of the city, along with a reading of politics as relations among strangers (Young, 1990).

What is the significance of this outlook in the context of global inequities and politics? Political theory on a global scale is relatively undeveloped. Traditionally political theory is concerned with the relations between sovereign and people, state and society. It's of little help to turn to the 'great political theorists' from Locke to Mill for they are all essentially concerned with the state–society framework. International relations theory extrapolates from this core preoccupation with concepts such as national interest and balance of power. Strictly speaking international relations theory, at any rate neo-realist theory, precludes global political theory. In the absence of a concept of 'world society', how can there be a notion of a world-wide social contract or global democracy? This frontier has opened up through concepts such as global civil society, referring to the transnational networks and activities of voluntary and non-governmental organizations: 'the growth of global civil society represents an ongoing project of civil society to reconstruct, re-imagine, or re-map world politics' (Lipschutz, 1992; 391). Global society and postinternational politics are other relevant notions (Shaw, 1992; Rosenau, 1990). A limitation to these reconceptualizations remains the absence of legal provisions that are globally binding rather than merely in interstate relations.

The question remains as to what kind of conceptual tools we can develop to address questions such as the double standards prevailing in global politics: perennial issues such as Western countries practising democracy at home and imperialism abroad; the edifying use of terms such as self-determination and sovereignty while the United States are invading Panama or Grenada. The term 'imperialism' may no longer be adequate to address the present situation. It may be adequate in relation to US actions in Panama or Grenada, but less so to describe the Gulf War. Imperialism is the policy of establishing or maintaining an empire, and empire is the control exercised by a state over the domestic and foreign policy of another political society (Doyle, 1986: 45). This is not an adequate terminology to characterize the Gulf War episode. If we consider that major actors in today's global circumstance are the IMF and World Bank, transnational corporations and regional investment banks, it is easy to acknowledge their influence on the domestic policies of countries from Brazil to the Philippines, but the situation differs from imperialism in two ways: the actors are not states and the foreign policy of the countries involved is not necessarily affected. The usual use of terms such as recolonization or neocolonialism to describe the impact of IMF conditionality on African countries remains just that, casual. The situation has changed also since the emergence of regional blocs which can potentially exercise joint foreign policy (for example, the European Community) or which within themselves contain two or more 'worlds' (for example, NAFTA, APEC). Both these situations differ from imperialism in the old sense. Current literature on international political economy shows a shift from 'imperialism' to 'globalization'. The latter may be used with critical intent (for example, Miliband and Panitch, 1992) but is more often used in an open-ended sense. I've used the term 'critical globalization' as an approach to current configurations (Nederveen Pieterse, 1993). According to Tomlinson (1991: 175),

the distribution of global power that we know as 'imperialism' . . . characterised the modern period up to, say, the 1960s. What replaces 'imperialism' is 'globalisation'. Globalisation may be distinguished from imperialism in that it is a far less coherent culturally directed process. . . . The idea of 'globalisation' suggests interconnection and interdependency of all global areas which happens in a less purposeful way.

This is a particularly narrow interpretation in which globalization matches the epoch of late capitalism and flexible accumulation; still, what is interesting is the observation that the present phase of globalization is less coherent and less purposeful than imperialism. That does not mean the end of inequality and domination, although domination may be more dispersed, less orchestrated, more heterogeneous. To address global inequalities and develop global political theory a different kind of conceptualization is needed. We are not without points of reference but we lack a theory of global political action. Melucci has discussed the 'planetarization' of collective action (1989; Hegedus, 1989). Some of the implications of globalization for democracy have been examined by Held (1992). As regards the basis of a global political consensus, the UN Declaration of Human Rights, and its subsequent amendments by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, may be a point of reference (Parekh, 1992).
Post-hybrivity?

Cultural hybridization refers to the mixing of Asian, African, American, European cultures: hybridization is the making of global culture as a global mélange. As a category hybridity serves a purpose on the basis of the assumption of difference between the categories, forms, beliefs that go into the mixture. Yet the very process of hybridization shows the difference to be relative and, with a slight shift of perspective, the relationship can also be described in terms of an affirmation of similarity. Thus, the Catholic saints can be taken as icons of Christianity, but can also be viewed as holdovers of pre-Christian paganism inscribed in the Christian canon. In that light, their use as masks for non-Christian gods is less quaint and rather intimates transcultural pagan affinities.

Ariane Mâouchine’s use of Kabuki style to stage a Shakespeare play leads to the question, which Shakespeare play? The play is Henry IV, which is set in the context of European high feudalism. In that light, the use of Japanese feudal Samurai style to portray European feudalism (Kreidt, 1987: 255) makes a point about transcultural historical affinities.

‘Mexican schoolgirls dressed in Greek togas dancing in the style of Isidora Duncan’, mentioned before, reflects transnational bourgeois class affinities, mirroring themselves in classical European culture. Chinese tacos and Irish bagels reflect ethnic crossover in employment patterns in the American fast food sector. Asian rap refers to cross-cultural stylistic convergence in popular youth culture.

An episode that can serve to probe this more deeply is the influence of Japanese art on European painting. The impact of Japonisme is well known: it inspired impressionism which in turn set the stage for modernism. The colour woodcuts that made such a profound impression on Seurat, Manet, Van Gogh, Toulouse Lautrec, Whistler belonged to the Ukiyo school—a bourgeois genre that flourished in Japan between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, sponsored by the merchant class. Ukiyo-e typically depicted urban scenes of ephemeral character, such as streetlife, entertainments, theatre, or prostitution, and also landscapes. It was a popular art form which, unlike the high art of aristocracy, was readily available at reasonable prices in book stores (rather than cloistered in courts or monasteries) and therefore also accessible to Europeans (Budden, 1999).

This episode, then, is not so much an exotic irritation in European culture, but rather reflects the fact that bourgeois sensibilities had found iconographic expression in Japan earlier than in Europe. In other words, Japanese popular art was modern before European art was. Thus what from one angle appears as hybridity to the point of exoticism, from another angle, again, reflects transcultural class affinities in sensibilities vis-à-vis urban life and nature. In other words, the other side of cultural hybridity is transcultural convergence.

What makes it difficult to discuss these issues is that two quite distinct concepts of culture are generally being used indiscriminately. The first concept of culture (culture 1) views culture as essentially territorial; it assumes that culture stems from a learning process that is, in the main, localized. This is culture in the sense of a culture, that is the culture of a society or social group. A notion that goes back to eighteenth-century romanticism and that has been elaborated in nineteenth-century anthropology, in particular cultural relativism—with the notion of cultures as a whole, a Gestalt, configuration. A related idea is the organic or tree model of culture.

A wider understanding of culture (culture 2) views culture as a general human software (Banuri, 1990: 77), as in nature/culture arguments. This notion has been implicit in theories of evolution and diffusion, in which culture is viewed as, in the main, a translocal learning process. These understandings are not incompatible: culture 2 finds expression in culture 1, cultures are the vehicle of culture. But they do reflect different emphases in relation to historical processes of culture formation and hence generate markedly different assessments of cultural relations. Divergent meta- assumptions about culture underlie the varied vocabularies in which cultural relations are discussed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumptions about culture</th>
<th>Territorial culture</th>
<th>Translocal culture</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>endogenous</td>
<td>exogenous</td>
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<tr>
<td>orthogenetic</td>
<td>heterogenetic</td>
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<tr>
<td>societies, nations, empires</td>
<td>diasporas, migrations</td>
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<td>locales, regions</td>
<td>crossroads, borders, interstices</td>
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<tr>
<td>community-based</td>
<td>networks, brokers, strangers</td>
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<td>organic, unitary</td>
<td>diffusion, heterogeneity</td>
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<td>authenticity</td>
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<td>inward looking</td>
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<td>community linguistics</td>
<td>contact linguistics</td>
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<td>race</td>
<td>half-caste, mixed-breed, métis</td>
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<tr>
<td>ethnicity</td>
<td>new ethnicity</td>
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<td>identity</td>
<td>identification, new identity</td>
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Culture 2 or translocal culture is not without place (there is no culture without place), but it involves an outward-looking sense of place, whereas culture 1 is based on an inward-looking sense of place. Culture 2 involves what Doreen Massey calls a 'global sense of place': 'the specificity of place which derives from the fact that each place is the focus of a distinct mixture of wider and more local social relations' (1993: 240).

The general terminology of cultural pluralism, multicultural society, intercultural relations, etc. does not clarify whether it refers to culture 1 or culture 2. Thus, relations among cultures can be viewed in a static fashion (in which cultures retain their separateness in interaction) or a fluid fashion (in which cultures interpenetrate).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Cultural relations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Static</td>
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<tr>
<td>plural society (Furnivall)</td>
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<tr>
<td>multiculturalism (static)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fluid</td>
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<tr>
<td>pluralism, melting pot</td>
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<tr>
<td>multiculturalism (fluid), interculturalism</td>
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Hybridization as a perspective belongs to the fluid end of relations between cultures: it’s the mixing of cultures and not their separateness that is emphasized. At the same time, the underlying assumption about culture is that of culture/place. Cultural forms are called hybrid/syncretic/mixed/creolized because the elements in the mix derive from different cultural contexts. Thus Ulf Hannerz defines creole cultures as follows: ‘creole cultures like creole languages are those which draw in some way on two or more historical sources, often originally widely different. They have had some time to develop and integrate, and to become elaborate and pervasive’ (1987: 552). But, in this sense, would not every culture be a creole culture? Can we identify any culture that is not creole in the sense of drawing on one or more different historical sources? A scholar of music makes a similar point about world music: ‘all music is essentially world music’ (Bor, 1994: 2).

A further question is: are cultural elements different merely because they originate from different cultures? More often there may be at issue, as argued above, is the similarity of cultural elements when viewed from the point of class, status group, life-style sensibilities or function. Hence, at some stage, towards the end of the story, the notion of cultural hybridity itself unravels or, at least, needs reworking.

To explore what this means in the context of globalization, we can contrast the vocabularies and connotations of globalization-as-homogenization and globalization-as-hybridization.

**Globalization/homogenization**
- cultural imperialism
- cultural dependence
- cultural hegemony
- autonomy
- modernization
- Westernization
- cultural synchronization
- world civilization

**Globalization/diversification**
- cultural planetarization
- cultural interdependence
- cultural interpenetration
- syncretism, synthesis, hybridity
- modernizations
- globalization
- creolization, crossover
- global ecumene

What is common to some perspectives on both sides of the globalization/homogenization/heterogenization axis is a territorial view of culture. The territoriality of culture, however, itself is not constant over time. For some time we have entered a period of accelerated globalization and cultural mixing. This also involves an overall tendency towards the ‘deteriorization’ of culture, or an overall shift in orientation from culture 1 to culture 2. Introverted cultures, which have been prominent over a long stretch of history and which overshadowed translocal culture, are gradually receding into the background, while translocal culture made up of diverse elements is coming into the foreground. This transition and the hybridization processes themselves unleash intense and dramatic nostalgia politics, of which ethnic upsurges, ethnicization of nations, and religious revivalism form part.

Hybridization refers not only to the crisscrossing of cultures (culture 1) but also and by the same token to a transition from the provenance of culture 1 to culture 2. Another aspect of this transition is that due to advancing information technology and biotechnology, different modes of hybridity emerge on the horizon: in the light of hybrid forms, such as cyborgs, virtual reality and electronic simulation, inter-cultural differences may begin to pale to relative insignificance – although of great local intensity. Biotechnology opens up the perspective of ‘merged evolution’, in the sense of the merger of the evolutionary streams of genes, cultural evolution and information technology, and the near prospect of humans intervening in genetic evolution, through the matrix of cultural evolution and information technologies (Goonatilake, 1994).

**Conclusion: towards a global sociology**

Globalization/hybridization makes, first, an empirical case: that processes of globalization, past and present, can be adequately described as processes of hybridization. Secondly, it is a critical argument: against viewing globalization in terms of homogenization, or of modernization/Westernization, as empirically narrow and historically flat.

The career of sociology has been coterminous with the career of nation-state formation and nationalism, and from this followed the constitution of the object of sociology as society and the equation of society with the nation. Culminating in structural functionalism and modernization theory, this career in the context of globalization is in for retooling. A global sociology is taking shape, around notions such as social networks (rather than ‘societies’), border zones, boundary crossing and global society. In other words, a sociology conceived within the framework of nations/societies is making place for a post-inter/national sociology of hybrid formations, times and spaces.

Structural hybridization, or the increase in the range of organizational options, and cultural hybridization, or the doors of erstwhile imagined communities opening up, are signs of an age of boundary crossing. Not, surely, of the erasure of boundaries. Thus, state power remains extremely strategic, but it is no longer the only game in town. The tide of globalization reduces the room of manoeuvre for states, while international institutions, transnational transactions, regional co-operation, sub-national dynamics and non-governmental organizations expand in impact and scope (Griffin and Khan, 1992; Walker, 1988).

In historical terms, this perspective may be deepened by writing diaspora histories of global culture. Due to nationalism as the dominant paradigm since the nineteenth century, cultural achievements have been routinely claimed for ‘nations’ – that is, culture has been ‘nationalized’, territorialized. A different historical record can be constructed on the basis of the contributions to culture formation and diffusion by diasporas, migrations,
strangers, brokers. A related project would be histories of the hybridization of metropolitan cultures, that is a counter-history to the narrative of imperial history. Such historical inquiries may show that hybridization has been taking place all along but over time has been concealed by religious, national, imperial and civilizational chauvinism. Moreover, they may deepen our understanding of the temporalities of hybridization: how certain junctures witness downturns or upswings of hybridization, slowdowns or speed-ups. At the same time it follows that, if we accept that cultures have been hybrid all along, hybridization is in effect a tautology: contemporary accelerated globalization means the hybridization of hybrid cultures.

As such, the hybridization perspective remains meaningful only as a critique of essentialism. Essentialism will remain strategic as a mobilizational device as long as the units of nation, state, region, civilization, ethnicity remain strategic: and for just as long hybridization remains a relevant approach. Hybridity unsettles the introverted concept of culture which underlies romantic nationalism, racism, ethnicity, religious revivaisl, civilizational chauvinism, and culturalist essentialism. Hybridization, then, is a perspective that is meaningful as a counterweight to the introverted notion of culture; at the same time, the very process of hybridization unsettles the introverted gaze, and accordingly, hybridization eventually ushers in post-hybridity, or transcultural cut and mix.

Hybridization is a factor in the reorganization of social spaces. Structural hybridization, or the emergence of new practices of social co-operation and competition, and cultural hybridization, or new translocal cultural expressions, are interdependent: new forms of co-operation require and evoke new cultural imaginaries. Hybridization is a contribution to a sociology of the in-between, a sociology from the interstices. This involves merging endogenous/exogenous understandings of culture. This parallels the attempt in international relations theory to overcome the dualism between the nation-state and international system perspectives. Other significant perspectives are Hannerz' macro-anthropology and his concern with mapping micro-macro linkages (1992) and contemporary work in geography and cultural studies (for example, Bird et al., 1993).

In relation to the global human condition of inequality, the hybridization perspective releases reflection and engagement from the boundaries of nation, community, ethnicity, or class. Fixities have become fragments as the kaleidoscope of collective experience is in motion. It has been in motion all along and the fixities of nation, community, ethnicity and class have been grids superimposed upon experiences more complex and subtle than reflexivity and organization could accommodate.

Notes
1. An equivalent view in international relations is Morse, 1976. After having argued for globalization in the plural, I will still continue to use globalization singular in this text because it matches conventional usage and because there's no need to stress the point by way of indulgent grammar.
2. The mêlange element comes across for instance in the definition of semiperiphery of Chase-Dunn and Hall (1993: 865-6) ‘(1) a semiperipheral region maybe be one that mixes both core and peripheral forms of organization; (2) a semiperipheral region may be spatially located between core and peripheral regions; (3) mediating activities between core and peripheral regions may be carried out in semiperipheral regions; (4) a semiperipheral area may be one in which institutional features are in some ways intermediate between those forms found in core and periphery. Interestingly, Chase-Dunn and Hall also destabilize the notions of core and periphery, pointing for instance to situations 'in which the “periphery” systematically exploits the “core”' (1993: 864). I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer of International Sociology for alerting me to this source and to the relevance of semiperiphery in this context.
3. Elsewhere I’ve argued this case extensively (Nederveen Pieterse, 1994; also 1990: Ch. 15).
4. As against peninsulae, born in the Iberian peninsula, indigenes, or native Americans, and ladosos and cholos, straddled between those of European and native American descent.
5. In Pour Rouchia (1993), a collection of essays by Arab and Islamic intellectuals in support of freedom of expression, Paris is referred to as a ‘capitale arabe’. This evokes another notion of hybridity, one that claims a collective ground and is based on multiple subjectivities in the name of a universal value.
6. Mary Louise Pratt distinguishes between a linguistics of community and a linguistics of contact (quoted in Hannan, 1989: 210-11).
7. Several of the ‘primitive isolates’, the traditional study objects of anthropology, may be possible exceptions, although even this may be questioned in the context of the long stretch of time.

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GLOBAL MODERNITIES


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GLOBAL SYSTEM, GLOBALIZATION AND THE PARAMETERS OF MODERNITY

Jonathan Friedman

Two versions of the global

There are today many versions of global theorizing and analysis and there is all too often a tendency to conflate them, even where they represent virtually opposing views of the nature of the 'global'. Below I should like to distinguish two very different approaches to global process. The first is a rather recent development combining interests from literary studies, Birmingham inspired cultural sociology, which has focused on globalization as a recognition of what is conceived as increasing world-wide interconnections, interchanges and movements of people, images and commodities. The second is what I shall refer to as the global systems approach, which developed somewhat earlier as a kind of global historical political economy and which has more recently begun to tackle questions of culture and identity in global systemic terms. There is, of course, some overlap in these very broad approaches, but there has often been a critique levelled by the former at the latter, one that is less argued than asserted. Researchers such as Robertson (1992) and, to a lesser degree, Hannerz (1987) have complained of the lack of culture in the analyses of world system researchers, often as if to imply that the point of departure of such analyses was somehow wrong. While it is surely the case that world system theorists have been primarily concerned with political economic phenomena, this does not exclude an adequate approach to so-called issues of culture in such a framework, nor even a unified approach in which cultural specificity is an aspect of other social phenomena. We shall be arguing that many of the categories of globalization discourse are ideological products of a specific form of identity space, often referred to as 'modernity', which is itself a product of the modern world system.

1) Globalization

In recent years there has developed a relatively large literature dealing with globalization. Much of this discussion has centred on what at first appeared