

DOES NAGEL'S FOOTNOTE ELEVEN SOLVE THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM?*

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1. INTRODUCTION

Consider

NECESSITATION—There is a necessary connection between physical facts and mental facts: no two worlds alike in physical facts can differ in mental facts.¹

NECESSITATION might be held to be true because it is implicit in the modern scientific world-view, or because it is the best way of explaining certain instances of mental causation, or for some other reason. Whatever the reason, many philosophers hold NECESSITATION.

Now consider

APPEARS CONTINGENT—There appears to be a contingent connection between physical facts and mental facts: it appears to be the case that two worlds alike in physical facts can differ in mental facts.

APPEARS CONTINGENT might be held to be true because it appears that the physical facts could be just as they are and no one feels anyway at all—that everyone is a zombie—or because it appears that someone might know all the physical facts and yet not know some mental facts, or for some other reason. Whatever the reason, many philosophers also hold APPEARS CONTINGENT.

Those holding both NECESSITATION and APPEARS CONTINGENT face an obvious question. An appearance of a proposition's contingency is evidence that that proposition is contingent. But in this case, whatever evidence APPEARS CONTINGENT provides for the falsity of NECESSITATION must be defeated, for NECESSITATION is true. What then is it that defeats this evidence? How, to put the question in the terms made famous by Kripke (1980), is this appearance of contingency to be explained away?

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¹ NECESSITATION stands in need of clarification in at least the following ways: first, one would need to specify what counts as a physical fact; second, as stated it is necessary when many philosophers would hold something like this in only a contingent form. However, these issues will not affect what we have to say and so we will set them aside. As regards the notions of a physical fact, all we require is that it is interpreted broadly to include topic neutral or functional facts; as regards the necessity of NECESSITATION, what we say could be adjusted so that it is defended in a contingent form, but we will not try to do that here. For extensive discussion of these issues, see Stoljar (2010).

Thirty years ago, in footnote 11 of ‘What is it like to be a bat?’, Thomas Nagel outlined a strategy for answering this question—the Footnote Eleven View, as we will call it. Roughly, the strategy is to argue that APPEARS CONTINGENT is true because of certain facts about the imagination, facts that give no reason to deny NECESSITATION. Recently, Christopher Hill and Brian McLaughlin have elaborated and defended Nagel’s idea, and many other philosophers have expressed sympathy with it.² The goal of this paper is to examine the Footnote Eleven View in some detail. As we will see, there are various versions of this view, and some of them are initially plausible. But—we will argue—none of them is true, and none of them is true partly for reasons that apply to other attempts to explain how APPEARS CONTINGENT is defeated.³

2. PRELIMINARIES

We will begin by setting out some preliminaries to the main discussion.

First, some might believe that APPEARS CONTINGENT gives no reason to believe NECESSITATION is false. For them, modal appearances provide no evidence for modal claims, and, hence, one of the questions the Footnote Eleven View answers—“What defeats the evidence APPEARS CONTINGENT provides that NECESSITATION is false?”—is a bad question. In what follows we will set their view aside. Proponents of the Footnote Eleven View believe that the appearance that something is contingent can often be a good reason to believe that it is contingent. They just hold that in this particular case it is not a good reason.

Second, a proposition could appear to us to be contingent for a variety of reasons. A proposition we believe to be true might appear to us to be contingent because we can imagine a case in which it is false. It might, instead, appear contingent not because we can imagine anything but because it is not a priori, or because we find ourselves with the persistent belief that it is contingent, or because someone we trust has told us it is contingent. So when the Footnote Eleven View focuses on imagination, it focuses on one way in which APPEARS CONTINGENT might be supported at the expense of others.⁴ One might therefore object that it ignores relevant aspects of the issue. This is a reasonable line of criticism, but we are going to set it too aside in what follows. While there are reasons having nothing to do with the imagination for why APPEARS CONTINGENT might be true, it is also the case that in philosophy of mind, this appearance often *is* grounded in facts about what we can imagine. So if the Footnote Eleven View manages to explain what defeats the evidence that APPEARS CONTINGENT provides that grounded in facts about the imagination, this would be a substantial achievement.

Third, one might worry that appealing to psychological facts like facts about the imagination could not answer the justificatory question of why the evidence it provides that NECESSITATION is false is defeated. The worry is that appeals to psychology are

² See Nagel (1974), Hill (1997), and Hill and McLaughlin (1999). Block and Stalnaker (1999) cite these ideas approvingly, and both of us have encountered the suggestion often in discussion.

³ In previous work we have made some piecemeal criticisms of the Footnote Eleven View, but have made no attempt at a detailed analysis of the view. The present paper is an attempt to fill that lacuna. For our previous attempts see Doggett (2004) and Stoljar (2005, 2006, 2007).

⁴ Hill (1997) focuses on the imagination but also on conceivability, a different source of support for APPEARS CONTINGENT.

beside the point when it comes to answering the justificatory question. To illustrate the worry, suppose we are arguing about whether the world is colored. The observation that appearances of color have a psychological explanation by itself does not prejudice things either way; in particular, it does not in any way suggest that the world is *not* colored. Similarly, if we are arguing about whether NECESSITATION is true, the observation that appearances of contingency have a psychological explanation by itself does not prejudice things either way; in particular, it does not in any way suggest that NECESSITATION is not true. It is this worry that David Chalmers expresses when he says, in an important criticism of the Footnote Eleven View, “There will always be a cognitive explanation of a modal intuition!” (Chalmers (1999): 486))

However, the criticism that appealing to psychology is beside the point depends on the nature of the appeal. True, merely pointing out that there is a psychological explanation of why the connection between mental and physical facts appears contingent is irrelevant to whether that appearance provides evidence that NECESSITATION is false. By contrast, finding out that this appearance is produced by some misfiring in your brain or by a drink you just took or a device implanted in your brain by Cartesians would be finding out some psychological fact that is relevant to whether the appearance justifies denying NECESSITATION. Proponents of the Footnote Eleven View think the psychological facts they point to are like those just mentioned in their relevance to answering the question of what defeats the evidence APPEARS CONTINGENT provides that NECESSITATION is false.

Fourth, even if we focus on specifically epistemological concerns, there are at least two ways in which evidence for a proposition can be defeated—by an undercutting defeater or an overriding defeater.⁵ In the case at hand, an overriding defeater is one that provides general considerations supporting NECESSITATION such as causal closure or the scientific world view, whereas an undercutting defeater is one that provides general considerations about why the appearance of contingency is in this case explained away. As we understand it, the Footnote Eleven View provides an *undercutter* of the evidence that APPEARS CONTINGENT provides; it does not provide an *overrider*, though, of course, there might be overriders, too. As we understand it, the truth of the Footnote Eleven View would not simply establish that APPEARS CONTINGENT is defeasible but, more, would establish that it is defeated.

3. THE NO COMBINATION VERSION

In “What Is It Like To Be A Bat?,” after considering

NECESSITATION—There is a necessary connection between physical facts and mental facts: no two worlds alike in physical facts can differ in mental facts,

Nagel adds, in a footnote,

A theory that [accepted NECESSITATION] would still leave us with Kripke’s problem of explaining why it nevertheless appears contingent. That difficulty seems to me surmountable, in the following way. We may

⁵ For discussion of the undercutting/overriding distinction see Cruz and Pollock (1999).

imagine something by representing it to ourselves either perceptually [or] sympathetically...To imagine something perceptually, we put ourselves in a conscious state resembling the state we would be in if we perceived it. To imagine something sympathetically, we put ourselves in a conscious state resembling the thing itself...When we try to imagine a mental state occurring without its associated brain state, we first sympathetically imagine the occurrence of the mental state; that is, we put ourselves in a state that resembles it mentally. At the same time, we attempt to perceptually imagine the non-occurrence of the associated physical state, by putting ourselves into a state unconnected with the first: one resembling that which we would be in if we perceived the non-occurrence of the physical state. Where the imagination of mental features is sympathetic, it appears to us that we can imagine any experience occurring without its associated brain state, and vice versa. The relation between them will appear contingent even if it is necessary, because of the independence of the disparate types of imagination. (Nagel (1979): 175, fn. 11; we have cut Nagel's mention of a third way to imagine things, symbolically)

The case that Nagel concentrates on here is one where the mental facts are fixed but the physical ones vary, as in disembodiment. He thinks that the relation between mental facts and physical facts appears contingent because he seems to be able to imagine a case in which his psychology is more or less as it is, and yet he does not have a body. The disembodiment case is interesting, but for the most part we will concentrate on the case that Nagel mentions only in passing (“...and vice versa”), i.e., the case in which the physical facts are the same and the mental facts are different—say, because you feel a little different a bit from how you in fact do. Concerning that case, our questions are: why does it seem possible that the physical facts are the same and mental facts are different given that NECESSITATION is true and tells us that it is not possible? What is wrong with the evidence this appearance provides?

Now there are a number of ways of reading this footnote and a number of ways of interpreting the answer to these questions present in it. Hence there are a number of potential versions of the Footnote Eleven View. We are going to start, in this section, by considering what seems to us to be rather straightforward version—we will call it the ‘no combination’ version. Later sections discuss two other versions.

3.1. Stating the no combination version

The no combination version holds that you can imagine that the physical facts are as they in fact are. It holds too that you can imagine that you feel a bit different from the way you actually do. What it denies is that you can combine these two episodes of imagining into *one* episode of imagining; that is, the interpretation denies that you can imagine that the physical facts are the same *and* you feel different. The reason is that these two different episodes of imagination are produced by fundamentally different, independent mechanisms. The first is perceptual imagination, the second is sympathetic imagination, and perceptual and sympathetic imaginings cannot be combined into a single act of imagination. You can imagine_{perceptually} that the physical facts are as they are and you

imagine_{sympathetically} that you feel a bit different. But you cannot, according to this version of the Footnote Eleven View, imagine that the physical facts are as they are and you feel a bit different. To do so, you would need some faculty whereby you imagined this. There is no such faculty.

The idea that one can imagine each of two things and not imagine their conjunction might suggest that, according to no combination version of the Footnote Eleven View, imagination is not closed under conjunction; that is, that if you imagine that p and imagine that q it does not follow that you imagine that $p \& q$. However, while it is certainly plausible that imagination is not closed under conjunction, this fact does not play much of a role in this or in any version of the Footnote Eleven View. In particular, the no combination version is not simply saying that from perceptually imagining p and sympathetically imagining q , it does not *follow* that we imagine their conjunction; it says that you *cannot* imagine their conjunction—for doing so would involve bringing together two types of imagination that could not be brought together. The problem with imagining the conjunction is not merely that it does not follow from imagining each of the conjuncts. The problem is that imagining the conjunction is impossible. In fact, rather than seeing the idea behind this first version of the Footnote Eleven View as similar to a point about closure, it is much better to interpret it via an analogy with the distinction between belief and desire. Suppose that you believe that the physical facts are as they are and desire that you feel a bit different. From this, not only does it not follow that you bear some sort of propositional attitude—delief—to their conjunction, it is more plausible that there is no such thing as delief and, hence, you cannot delieve that the physical facts are as they are and you feel a bit different. In view of the differences between belief and desire, there is no attitude that combines both into a single attitude. Likewise, if the first version of the Footnote Eleven View is right, there is no imagining_{perceptuallyandsympathetically}.

In sum, the no combination version of the Footnote Eleven View posits that what makes APPEARS CONTINGENT plausible is that we seem to be able to imagine that two worlds alike in physical facts can differ mental facts. Nevertheless, we cannot imagine that because to do so would require combining imaginative faculties that cannot be combined. Hence, because we cannot imagine what we seem to be able to imagine, there is no reason coming from the imagination to believe that NECESSITATION is false.

3.2. *Assessing the no combination version*

The no combination version is interesting and straightforward. When something appears to be thus and so, and yet we believe things are not that way, it is plausible to seek a psychological explanation of why it appears to be thus and so. Moreover, the imagination is a natural psychological mechanism to blame for the faulty appearance of contingency since the imagination is clearly involved in at least some such appearances, and it is clearly involved in various arguments against NECESSITATION. For these reasons this version of the Footnote Eleven View is plausible. But it is also subject to at least three serious objections.

The first objection is that it *overgeneralizes*. If it were impossible to imagine that the physical facts are as they are and everyone is a zombie, so too it would be impossible to imagine many other things that are, by any account palpably imaginable. We think there are various examples of this. Here are three. (a) Just as it is unimaginable,

according to the no combination view, that the physical facts are just as they are and everyone is a zombie, so it is unimaginable that the physical facts are just as they are and so are the mental facts. To imagine the second, no less than the first, would require the combination of sympathetic and perceptual imagination. But the second, no less than the first, does seem to be imaginable. Likewise, (b) just as it is unimaginable, according to the no combination version, that the physical facts are as they are and everyone is a zombie, so too it is unimaginable that the mental facts are as they are and the physical facts are different, e.g., because we have different bodies. But multiple realizability of this kind is imaginable. Finally, (c) just as it is unimaginable, according to the no combination version, that the physical facts are as they are and everyone is a zombie, so too it is unimaginable that the behavioural facts are as they are, and everyone is a zombie. But the second, no less than the first, would require a combination of the sympathetic and perceptual imagination, i.e. because the behavioural facts are a sub-class of the physical facts. But the second is usually taken to be imaginable in the course of standard arguments against behaviourism, such as Putnam's perfect actor argument.

The second objection to the no combination version of the Footnote Eleven View is that it *undergeneralizes*. According to this view, the episodes of imagination that seem to make APPEARS CONTINGENT plausible involve two kinds of imagination, perceptual and sympathetic. But it is not true that all of the episodes of imagination that make APPEARS CONTINGENT plausible *do* involve these two kinds of imagination; in particular, some of the episodes of imagination that make APPEARS CONTINGENT plausible do not involve sympathetic imagination.

For example, while it might be true that imagining that the physical facts are as they are but you feel a bit different does involve sympathetic imagination, try to imagine that the physical facts are as they are but you, and perhaps everyone, have no conscious states at all; that is, try to imagine that everyone is a zombie. This does not require you to sympathetically imagine anything. To imagine that everyone is a zombie is not to imagine_{sympathetically} that all is dark within. How would that work? Nagel says, "To imagine something sympathetically, we put ourselves in a conscious state resembling the thing itself." So, if you use your sympathetic imagination to imagine that you have no conscious states at all, you put yourself in a conscious state resembling the state of having no conscious states. Whether or not there is a conscious state resembling the state of lacking conscious states, why think that to imagine the second you *have to* put yourself in the first?

Compare: imagine that you are blind. Let us say that imagining_{visually} is one way of imagining_{perceptually}. When you imagine that you are blind, you need not imagine_{visually} that it is very dark. In fact, that seems like not the best way to imagine being blind. There is a difference between imagining that you are blind and imagining that you are in darkness. Likewise, to imagine that everyone is a zombie, you do not imagine_{sympathetically} that no one is conscious. Imagining that everyone is a zombie, you can turn the sympathetic imagination off just as to imagine that you are blind, you can turn your visual imagination off.

In response, it might be suggested that to imagine that you are a zombie, you have to sympathetically imagine that you are having mental states and then think to yourself, "It's not like that." So even though imagining that you are a zombie does not require you to put yourself in a conscious state resembling a lack of conscious states, it does require

sympathetic imagination. But as against this, imagine that you are looking at a colourless liquid. Did you have to imagine the liquid having some colour, then think, “Not like that”? Obviously not. Our view is that the zombie case is like this transparency case or the blindness case above. One reason APPEARS CONTINGENT is true is that it appears to be imaginable that the physical facts are as they are and everyone is a zombie. The no combination version of the Footnote Eleven View does not get off the ground as regards this appearance of possibility. It presupposes that to imagine that the physical facts are just as they are but everyone is a zombie, you have to engage two sorts of imagination, perceptual and sympathetic. That presupposition is false.

Our final objection is that this version of the Footnote Eleven View is under-motivated. Consider a view inconsistent with it, on which (a) there is a single faculty of imagination but (b) this faculty comprises various sub-faculties that can be combined together in various ways. The Footnote Eleven View might allow this within, say, the perceptual faculty. To imagine_{perceptually} that there is a lemon near you is to imagine yourself having a perceptual experience that there is a lemon near you. You can do this visually or you can do it tactilely. Does this show that there are two further kinds of disparate, independent imagination, imagination_{visual} and imagination_{tactile}? Either way, it is not impossible to combine imagination_{visual} and imagination_{tactile}. It is easy enough to imagine_{visuallyandtactilely} that there is a lemon near you. The imagination_{visual} and the imagination_{tactile} are subfaculties of which the imagination_{perceptual} is a superfaculty. So a question for the first version of the Footnote Eleven View is: what is wrong with the idea that the perceptual and sympathetic imagination are subfaculties of the imagination_{consciousstate} superfaculty, and, hence, can be combined? Without an answer to that, there is no reason to adopt this view.

4. THE NO RELIABLE COMBINATION VERSION

So there are three things wrong with the no combination version of the Footnote Eleven View: it is under-motivated and both over- and undergeneralizes. But, as we noted above, there are several ways to interpret Nagel’s footnote and the no combination version is just one way. Accordingly we now turn to a second version of the view which we will call the no reliable combination version, a version prominent in Hill 1997, and Hill and McLaughlin 1999, at least as we read them.

4.1 Stating the no reliable combination version

Like the no combination version of the Footnote Eleven View, the no reliable combination version agrees that there is a perceptual faculty of the imagination and a sympathetic faculty. But the no reliable combination version asserts, while the no combination version denies, that it is possible to combine the two types of imagination. So, for example, it is possible to imagine that you are in pain without a brain by imagining_{sympathetically} that you are in pain while imagining_{perceptually} that you have no brain.

If it is possible to combine these two types of imagination, how does the no reliable combination version answer our question, i.e. how the appearance of contingency may be explained away? Not because you can’t imagine what you think you can. Rather, what the no combination version says is that, while the two types of imagination may be combined, their conjunction is not a reliable guide to the modal facts. The no

combination version says that the two kinds of imagination cannot be combined at all; the no reliable combination version says instead that they can be combined but cannot be *reliably* combined. Combining sympathetic and perceptual imagination leads to modal error, and, thus, the appearance of contingency they produce is undercut.

If it is true that combining sympathetic and perceptual imagination leads to modal error, we have the following explanation of why APPEARS CONTINGENT does not defeat NECESSITATION: APPEARS CONTINGENT is true only because it is grounded in an episode of imagination which brings together sympathetic and perceptual imagination, and episodes of imagination of this kind are not reliable guides to the modal facts. Hence, APPEARS CONTINGENT is true, but the reason it gives to deny NECESSITATION is defeated.

4.2. *Assessing the no reliable combination version*

This version of the Footnote Eleven View is, like the previous version, interesting, straightforward, and plausible. Moreover, because it does not limit what is and what is not imaginable it does not face the three objections we raised for Nagel's proposal in the form that we raised them. However, in our view it is open to slightly different versions of these objections.

First, it *over-generalizes*. If were impossible to *reliably* imagine that the physical facts are as they are and everyone is a zombie, then it would be impossible to *reliably* imagine many other things that are, by any account palpably reliably imaginable. We think there are various examples of this. Here are three. (a) Just as it is not reliably imaginable, according to the no reliable combination view, that the physical facts are just as they are and everyone is a zombie, so it is not reliably imaginable that the physical facts are just as they are and so are the mental facts. To reliably imagine the second, no less than the first, would require the combination of sympathetic and perceptual imagination. But the second, no less than the first, does seem to be reliably imaginable. Likewise, (b) just as it is not reliably imaginable, according to the no reliable combination view, that the physical facts are as they are and everyone is a zombie, so too it is not reliably imaginable that the mental facts are as they are and the physical facts are different, e.g., because we have different bodies. But multiple realizability of this kind is usually taken to be reliably imaginable. Finally, (c) just as it is not reliably imaginable, according to the no reliable combination view, that the physical facts are as they are and everyone is a zombie, so too it is not reliably imaginable that the behavioural facts are as they are, and everyone is a zombie. To reliably imagine the second, no less than the first, would require a combination of the sympathetic and perceptual imagination, i.e. because the behavioural facts are a sub-class of the physical facts. But the second is usually taken to be reliably imaginable in the course of standard arguments against behaviourism, such as Putnam's perfect actor argument.

Second, the no reliable combination view *under-generalizes*: as we stressed when discussing Nagel, to imagine that the physical facts are as they are but everyone is a zombie need not involve the sympathetic faculty. So the no reliable combination version is silent on whether the appearance of contingency is defeated in this central case.

Finally, the view is under-motivated in that it invites the question: why is it the case that combining sympathetic and perceptual imagination results something modally untrustworthy? Why is an appearance of possibility produced by combining these faculties defeated?

Nagel suggests, in the Nagel (1976) footnote, that it is the independence of the faculties that defeats the appearance of possibility.⁷ But this seems implausible in a number of ways. First, return to the lemon case from section 3.1. You imagine that a lemon is in front of you, doing so visually and tactilely. It seems as plausible as that there are sympathetic and perceptual faculties that there are perceptual_{visual} and perceptual_{tactile} subfaculties. But, again, it seems as plausible that these subfaculties are independent of each other as that the faculties are. Imagining, using your visual imagination, that the lemon is in front of you, it is easy to modify what it feels like, tactilely. Is combining subfaculties untrustworthy because of their independence? That would lead to rather a lot of defeated modal appearances. Imagining that you are whistling while you work gives you the appearance that that's possible—that's defeated. Imagining that you could hear a smoke alarm through a closed door gives you the appearance that that's possible—that's defeated. Imagining that the smell is coming from outside that window gives you the appearance that that's possible—that's defeated. This is too much defeat. There must be another reason why combining the sympathetic and perceptual faculties is untrustworthy.

Hill (1997) notes that we seem to be able to combine any bit of sympathetic imagining with any bit of perceptual imagining. For example, we seem to be able to imagine that these words are thinking about functionalism by imagining_{perceptually} that there are these words and imagining_{sympathetically} that they are thinking about functionalism. Since we can so readily imagine impossibilities when we combine the two types of imagining, Hill suggests that—whatever the reason *why* combining is untrustworthy—combining them defeats any appearance of contingency they produce.

The problem with this is that while it is true that combining the two sorts of imagination leads us to imagine impossibilities, it is also true that combining them sometimes leads us to justified claims about what is possible. We admit we are simply assuming that the imaginability of a perfect actor shows, with some pretty weak further claims, that behaviourism is false, but this assumption is widely shared. And the imaginability crucially involves combining the perceptual and sympathetic faculties, if there are such things. So it can't be that *any* imaginative episode combining them is modally untrustworthy.

5. THE NO RELIABLE COMBINATION OF CONTENT VERSION

We have so far considered two versions of the Footnote Eleven View, and argued that both are subject to serious objections. We have not so far, however, taken up two of the central ideas present in Hill, and in Hill and McLaughlin's, development of the Footnote Eleven View.

One of these has to do with the distinction between direct and indirect perception. Hill points out, quite correctly, that weakness in the idea of Nagel's footnote is that it is limited to direct perception, and that this causes a problem since it is quite unclear that we have direct perceptual access to brain states and other physical phenomena that seem to be relevant in this case. In response to this, Hill suggests that the Footnote Eleven View can be interpreted loosely so that the reference to perception involves both direct

⁷ Robbins and Jack (2006) gives some empirical support to this. In conversation, Robbins suggested that the data support not merely that the faculties are independent of one another but, further, that the use of one inhibits the use of the other.

and indirect perception. The suggestion that the Footnote Eleven View should be widened in scope in this way seems to us a reasonable thing to say in response to the objection. But it does not seem to affect any of the things we have said about the view so far, and so we will set it aside.

There is, however, a different idea present in Hill's discussion that requires separate treatment. This is the connection he draws between the Footnote Eleven View and two kinds of content, commonsense and theoretical. In this section, we will set out and assess this view, which we call the no combination of content version. This is the last version of the Footnote Eleven View that we will consider in this paper.

5.1. Stating the no reliable combination of content version

Consider the proposition that the physical facts are as they are, but you feel a bit different. According to the no reliable combination version of the Footnote Eleven View, imagining this proposition combines sympathetic and perceptual imagination. But Hill also notes that the proposition in question has a certain sort of content: part theoretical—that the physical facts are as they are—and part commonsensical—that you feel a bit different.

By “theoretical,” Hill has in mind content the truth of which is verified “only via theory construction and laboratory apparatus” (*Ibid.*: 71). That the physical facts are as they are counts as theoretical because its truth can only be verified, in part, by lab apparatus checking if all the atoms are in positions they actually are or whether the watery stuff comprises hydrogen and oxygen, not XYZ.

By “commonsensical,” Hill has in mind content whose truth can be verified “by a commonsense faculty of awareness, such as introspection or visual perception.” (*Ibid.*) That you feel a bit different is commonsensical: its truth can be verified by introspection.

So you are imagining, using your sympathetic and perceptual imagination, a proposition with a certain sort of content, part theoretical and part commonsensical. Because you imagine it, the proposition thereby appears possible to you. You can imagine its negation, too, and, hence, the proposition appears contingent. When it appears possible that something is the case, and this is because you are imagining that it is the case and the content of what you are imagining is part theoretical, part commonsensical, the proposition's being part commonsensical and part theoretical defeats the evidence it provides that its negation is contingent. So the combined content proposal is that when we imagine that the physical facts are as they actually are but you feel a bit different, we are bringing together contents with theoretical and commonsense components, and imaginative episodes that combine together these components are not to be trusted.

Some objections that we raised to the no reliable combination version (and indeed to the no combination version) now fall away. First, the combination of content version can allow that we can imagine that there is a behavioral duplicate of you who is not a mental duplicate.

Second, the idea that the two faculties are unargued for is not a problem for the combined content proposal because the existence of two faculties plays no crucial role in the combined content proposal. What does the work is the commonsense/theoretical distinction. Likewise the idea that combining the outputs of the two faculties is modally

untrustworthy is not a problem, because in the combined content proposal, the existence of two faculties is not crucial.

Of course, the fact that some objections to the previous versions of the Footnote Eleven View fall away owes partly to a point that may have occurred to you: the factor that separates the combined content versions from the previous versions has little to do with the alleged distinction between perceptual and sympathetic imagination. The combined content proposal has no crucial connection to the idea of two faculties of imagination. It relies simply on the ideas that (a) when you imagine, say, that the physical facts are just as they are but everyone is a zombie, you imagine a proposition with a certain kind of content, and (b) that seeming possibilities with that kind of content are not to be trusted. Whereas the first two versions of the Footnote Eleven View turn on *how* you (try to) imagine that something is the case, the combined content versions turns only on *what* you are imagining. It is not too surprising that some objections to the first two don't apply to the third.

5.2. *Assessing the no reliable combination of content version.*

We think that other objections do apply to it; moreover, these objections are variations on the ones already considered.

First, the no reliable combination of content version over-generates. If the proposition that there is a behavioural duplicate of you who is not a mental duplicate does not mix commonsense and theoretical content, the No Reliable Combination of Content Proposal gives us no reason to reject the perfect actor argument against behaviourism. But the proposition *does* mix content! That the behavioural duplicate is not a mental duplicate is something you can verify, to a point, at least, using introspection. And that its behaviour duplicates yours is, again, something you can verify, to a point, using commonsense methods like looking at it. But verifying that it behaves *exactly* like you isn't something you can tell just by looking at it. Extremely subtle differences in, say, facial tics or the position of your limbs might only be picked up via lab apparatus or more humble technology like a camera. So that there is a behavioural duplicate of you who is not a mental duplicate combines commonsense and theoretical content and, hence, the combined content proposal falsely implies the proposition that there is a behavioural duplicate who is not a mental duplicate is impossible.

Second, the no reliable combination of content version undergenerates. Take the proposition that the physical facts are as they are, but everyone is a zombie. That this seems possible is one reason supporting APPEARS CONTINGENT. So this proposal should be able to defeat this seeming possibility. How? The content doesn't seem to be commonsensical at all: that everyone is a zombie is not something that can be verified by introspection. Anyone introspecting is not a zombie. Neither can it be verified by other "commonsense faculties of awareness." So the proposition does not seem to have mixed content and, hence, doesn't seem to be covered by the no reliable combination of content proposal.

To take another example, we are currently aware of a computer screen. The notion of being aware of a computer screen is commonsensical, but there is surely a theoretical way of conceiving it, t-awareness of a computer screen. It appears contingent that the physical facts are as they are but we are not aware of the computer screen because we can imagine that the physical facts are as they are but we are not t-aware of

the computer screen. This is some reason to think that APPEARS CONTINGENT is true, and it does not involve imagining a proposition with part-commonsensical, part-theoretical content. The crucial proposition is simply theoretical. So as with the No Reliable Faculty proposal and Nagel's proposal, the combined content proposal does not cover all the relevant cases that support APPEARS CONTINGENT.

Finally, the proposal is under-motivated. As in the case of the other versions of the Footnote Eleven View we have considered, there is a question that this version needs to answer, viz., why does combining the perceptual and sympathetic imagination defeat the appearance of contingency the combination produces? The no reliable combination of content proposal answers, "Because doing so in certain cases involves imagining a proposition with commonsense and theoretical content." But now the question arises, "Why does combining commonsense and theoretical content defeat the appearance of contingency that imagining such a proposition produces?"

Hill (1997) points out that, whatever the reason, combining the two contents does lead to plenty of modal error. In many cases, we have been misled by apparent episodes of imagination that combine commonsense and theoretical content. For example, we have been misled by episodes that involve the idea of water without H₂O, of heat without molecular motion, of that's being a lump of gold without having atomic number 79, and so on. The episodes of imagination that ground APPEARS CONTINGENT do combine commonsense and theoretical content. Conclusion: it is likely that we have been misled by the episodes of imagination that ground APPEARS CONTINGENT too because of the combination of content. The argument does not explain why we are misled, but it at least shows *that* we are likely to be misled in certain cases.

We agree that in many cases in the past we have been misled by apparent episodes of imagination that combine commonsense and theoretical content. We disagree that we have been misled *because* the episodes combined this sort of content. The door is open to a view according to which combining content is modally trustworthy as long as it is done with care.

If we are not misled because we combine certain sorts of content, why else might we be misled? The natural explanation to reach for at this point is one of Kripke's in *Naming and Necessity*.

Take the proposition that there is heat without molecular motion. According to Kripke, that there is heat without molecular motion can seem possible because (a) the proposition that there is something that feels like heat without there being molecular motion is imaginable and (b) we confuse that proposition with the proposition that there is heat without molecular motion. When you are imagining that there is something that feels like heat without there being molecular motion, Kripke thinks, it is easy to misidentify what you are imagining as the proposition that there is heat without there being molecular motion. For the situation you would be in if the one were true is epistemically exactly like the other.

Hill explicitly disagrees with Kripke here:

As I see it, [Kripke's explanation of why it seems possible that there is heat without molecular motion] is fundamentally misguided; for as I see it, in non-pathological circumstances introspection gives us pretty accurate

access to the contents of our own states of imagination. (Hill (1997): 83, fn. 10; cf. McLaughlin (2000))

With Kripke's explanation out of the way, proponents of the Footnote Eleven View offer their own.

But there are two reasons for resisting this line of thought. First, if Hill were correct about us having pretty accurate access to the contents of what we are imagining, it is a bit of a mystery why so many philosophers *think* they did and do confuse propositions just as Kripke says.

Second, Kripke's explanation turns on people not imagining what they believe they are imagining; Hill believes this feature of the explanation is implausible. Various people, convinced by Kripke's explanation, think they cannot imagine that there is heat without molecular motion. If they attempt to do so, they believe they fail and, instead, are actually imagining that there is something that feels like heat without molecular motion. If Hill is correct, though, these people are mistaken. When these people try to imagine that there is heat without molecular motion, if Hill is right about how the imagination works, there is no barrier to success. So if they try, they should succeed. But they wrongly believe they fail. In addition, these people think that when they used to believe they were imagining that there is heat without molecular motion, they were wrong. If Hill is right about how imagination works, though, they really were imagining what they thought they were imagining. But, then, these people don't have very reliable access to what they are and were imagining: they are and were imagining what they believe they aren't and weren't. Whether or not Kripke's explanation or Hill's is correct, there is some confusion about what we are imagining.

So there is no reason to prefer the no reliable combination of content version to Kripke's explanation of why we go wrong when going in for modal reasoning about heat and molecular motion. Indeed, there is some reason to prefer Kripke's. For while it used to seem to us that there could be heat without molecular motion, no longer. If Kripke's explanation for why it used to seem to us this way is correct, this is as we would expect. Now that we know to distinguish between imagining that there is heat without molecular motion and imagining that there is something that feels like heat without molecular motion, we are not tempted to think it seems that there could be heat without molecular motion.

By contrast, if the combined content proposal is correct, it should still seem to us that there could be heat without molecular motion. After all, we can imagine that there is heat without molecular motion and this produces the appearance of possibility that there is heat without molecular motion. Of course, if we know the combined content proposal is correct, we possess a defeater for this appearance. Still, the appearance should persist. That it does not is some reason to think the combined content proposal is not correct.

6. CONCLUSION

There appears to be a contingent connection between physical and mental facts. That is,

APPEARS CONTINGENT—There appears to be a contingent connection between physical facts and mental facts: it appears to be the case that two worlds alike in physical facts can differ in mental facts

is true. For someone who accepts

NECESSITATION—There is a necessary connection between physical facts and mental facts: no two worlds alike in physical facts can differ in mental facts,

this appearance must be defeated. How so? According to the Footnote Eleven View, the appearance is defeated because it is generated by two distinct kinds imagination, perceptual and sympathetic. We looked at three versions of the view: the no combination version, the no reliable combination version, and the no reliable combination of content version. We argued that each faces compelling objections.

But of course, this style of argument raises an inevitable question. We have objected to various versions of a view, but we have not so far argued that no version of the view could succeed. Do the considerations we have advanced apply to any version of the Footnote Eleven View? We think not, and will close by formulating a general argument that no version of the Footnote Eleven View could possibility succeed.

In general, it seems clear that whatever answer to these questions that the Footnote Eleven View provides, they will be contained in the last sentence of the footnote where Nagel says “because of the independence of the disparate types of imagination”. Unfortunately, however, there are a number of different ways of interpreting this idea. In particular, there are two key distinctions to bear in mind.

In the first place, when Nagel talks of two types of imagination, he might have in mind two types of imaginings, i.e. two types of acts or modes or faculties of imagining; or else he might have in mind two types of things imagined, i.e. two types of content the relevant acts or modes or faculties of imagining.

In the second place, when Nagel says that because of the difference between these two types of imagination, a relation will appear contingent even if it is necessary, he might have in mind that we cannot combine the two types of imagination together at all, and so that when we describe ourselves as imagining in this sense we must be mistaken; or else he might have in mind that, while we can combine these two types of imagination together we cannot reliably do so.

These two distinctions—faculty versus content, impossibility versus unreliability—are independent of another; hence in principle any version of the Footnote Eleven View will fall into one of four categories, as represented on this table:

| | Faculty | Content |
|---------------|---------|---------|
| Impossibility | A | B |
| Unreliability | C | D |

Figure 1. Versions of the Footnote Eleven View

But the material we have introduced clearly shows that none of these versions could possibility be right. The no combination version is an A-type view; the no reliable combination version is a B-type view; and the no reliable combination of content view is a D-type view. None of these work, so that means that the only version of the Footnote

Eleven View that could possibility work is a C-type view, according to which it is impossible to bring together contents of the sort associated with perceptual and sympathetic imagination. But while we have not considered this view in detail it seems to us quite clear that this will not do either. In general, it is not the case that it is impossible to bring together commonsense and theoretical contents, and certainly this version of the Footnote Eleven View has provided no reason why it is impossible. Putting this claim together with our earlier discussion yields a very strong conclusion against the Footnote Eleven View. There are four versions of the view, and none of them work. So the view itself does not work.

If we are right, the answer to our title question is no. To solve the mind-body problem—i.e. to square NECESSITATION and APPEARS CONTINGENT—we will need to go look in a direction different from the one indicated in Nagel’s footnote.⁸

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⁸ For some suggestions about where to look, see Doggett 2004, and Stoljar 2006.

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