Matt Weiner is interested in epistemology and the philosophy of language, especially the epistemology of testimony, the norms of assertion, epistemic norms and the value of knowledge, and the nature of justification.
"The (Mostly Harmless) Inconsistency of Knowledge Ascriptions." Philosophers' Imprint vol. 9 no. 1.
"Norms of Assertion." Philosophy Compass vol. 2 no. 2.
"Practical Reasoning and the Concept of Knowledge." In The Value of Knowledge, ed. Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (Oxford University Press).
"Must We Know What We Say?" Philosophical Review vol. 114 no. 2.
"Are All Conversational Implicatures Cancelable?" Analysis vol 66 no. 2.
"How Causal Probabilities Might Fit into Our Objectively Indeterministic World" (with Nuel Belnap). Synthese vol. 149 no. 1.
"Why Does Justification Matter?" Pacific Philosophical Quarterly vol. 86 no. 3.
"Accepting Testimony." Philosophical Quarterly vol. 53 no. 211.
Professor Weiner has taught courses in epistemology, logic (introductory or intermediate), and other topics including the later philosophy of Wittgenstein.