Suggestions for Papers to Write On for Metaphysics Term Paper

Here are some papers that you might consider using as a basis for your term paper. Pretty much all of these are available in the periodicals section of the library. If you have any trouble, just ask me. Some of these are also available on-line through JSTOR (this has non-recent articles from many philosophy journals). Just fill in the author and part of the title and check the 'Philosophy' box. You must be on campus to use this link: Click Here

Time Travel

Simon Kellor and Michael Nelson, "Presentists Should Believe in Time Travel," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79 (2001), 333-345. Many think that if presentism is true, then time travel would be impossible. This article argues that there is no contradiction between the two.

Tim Maudlin, "Remarks on the Passing of Time," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (2002), 259-274. Argues that time passes. (Our library alphabetizes this journal as if the title is 'Aristotelian Society'.)

Paul Horwich, "On Some Alleged Paradoxes of Time Travel", Journal of Philosophy 72(1975), 432-444.  This is an older article, though a good one.  We've covered most of the material in the article, but you might consider this if you want to argue that time travel is impossible since it defends time travel.

Nichalas J. J. Smith, "Bananas Enough for Time Travel?", British Journal of the Philosophy of Science, 48 (1997), 363-389.  This is much more recent, though we've also covered most of this.  This defends time travel in the face of arguments to the contrary claiming that too many coincidences would result.  Not the easiest to follow. You could, e.g., compare the solution offered here with Sider's.

Personal Identity

Eric Olson, “Why We Need Not Accept the Psychological Approach,” in The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). [I have copies of this chapter (31 pages long) in case anyone wants it.]

Eric Olson, “An Argument for Animalism,” in R. Martin and J. Barresi, eds., Personal Identity. Blackwell 2003: 318-34. Click here.

R. G. Swinburne, “Personal Identity,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society”, 1974, 231-247. Argues against what Parfit (years later) calls a ‘reductionist’ approach. [I have a copy of this if anyone would like it.]

Peter Unger, “The Physical View” (actually, these are excerpts from his book, Identity, Consciousness, and Value). Argues for one version of the physical view. [See me for this.]

Material Constitution

Peter van Inwagen, "The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62 (1981), 123-137.  Argues against the claim that any collection of parts constitutes an object.

Michael C. Rea, “In Defense of Mereological Universalism”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1998), 347-360. Argues for the claim that any collection of parts constitutes an object.

Roderick Chisholm, "Identity through Time", first appeared as Ch. 3 of Person and Object (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1979).  Argues that objects and persons are not strictly identical across times.  Instead of there being an object that exists at various times, there is only a series of instantaneous objects that exist at a particular time.

Eric T. Olson, “Why I Have No Hands”, Theoria 61 (1995), 182-197. Argues that hands, and other parts of humans, don’t exist. (Our library doesn't carry this journal, so see me for a copy.)

Peter T. Geach, excerpts from Reference and Generality (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980).  Argues that identity is always relative to a sort.  It makes no sense to say x is identical to y; it only makes sense to say x and y are the same F, where F is some kind of thing. This is the locus classicus of the view that identity is relative to a sort. Warning: this is not an easy piece to understand. [See me to get a copy of this.]

Mark Heller, “The Best Candidate Approach to Diachronic Identity”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (1987), 434-451. Discusses and rejects closest continuer theory. Argues instead for a temporal parts view.