The "Pugachev Rebellion" in the Context of Post-Soviet Kazakh Nationalization

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Introduction

Freedom from the Soviet empire created an opportunity for elites of each former Soviet Socialist Republic to "nationalize" their newly independent state. Most observers of contemporary Kazakh politics would agree that Kazakhstan has taken advantage of this historic opportunity, and can thus be classified as a nationalizing state. For Rogers Brubaker, a nationalizing state is perceived by its elites as a nation-state of and for a particular nation, but simultaneously as an "incomplete" or "unrealized" nation-state. To resolve this problem of incompleteness and to counteract perceived discrimination, Brubaker argues, "nationalizing elites urge and undertake action to promote the language, culture, demographic preponderance, economic flourishing, or political hegemony of the core ethnocultural nation."1 While the foundation of any Soviet successor state's nationalization program is a cluster of implemented formal policies that privilege the titular nation, these policies are often reinforced by informal practises, primarily discriminatory personnel practices, with the same function. Much has been written about Kazakhstan's nationalization strategy, and not surprisingly scholars rely on what they know about formal policies and informal practises to characterize that strategy.2 Little has been written, however, about the "Pugachev Rebellion" in Ust'-Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan, and nothing has been written about the relationship between the official Kazakh reaction to what I call the "Pugachev incident," and Kazakhstan's nationalization strategy in general. This article sorts out confusing events surrounding the Pugachev incident, and offers an interpretation of the official Kazakh reaction, which is best understood when situated in the broader context of Kazakh nationalization, to the incident.

The Pugachev incident occurred in 1999, when authorities in Kazakhstan arrested 22 individuals, 11 of whom were citizens of Russia, on charges of an attempt to violently overthrow local organs of government in Ust'-Kamenogorsk in order to create an autonomous Russian Altai Republic in the East Kazakhstan oblast. Evidence suggests, however, that the "Rebellion" was most likely an attempt by members of Rus', a watchdog group in Russia that seeks to defend the interests of Russians in the near abroad, to raise controversial issues about the treatment of Russians in East Kazakhstan, rather than to violently seize power. Yet the significance of the Pugachev incident does not concern the motives of these
individuals; instead, it concerns the disproportionate reaction of the authorities to the incident. Within the broader context of an antagonistic nationalization program, certain factors surrounding the Pugachev incident indicate that a likely interpretation of the official reaction to the incident is the following: the authorities seized the opportunity to make an example of the Pugachev incident in order to (1) convey a message to Russians that Kazakhstan will not tolerate opposition to its nationalization program, and (2) stop Pugachev's group from drawing further domestic and international attention to Russians, one of the most aggrieved populations in East Kazakhstan. Ultimately the reaction was an effort to restrict political and economic opportunities for Russians in Kazakhstan by sending a clear message regarding the futility of political mobilization.

This article is divided into four parts. The first section provides background information on Ust'-Kamenogorsk, a small town in northeast Kazakhstan close to the Russian border. The second section tells the story of the Pugachev incident for the first time. Due to a lack of public information and scholarly research, the incident has been shrouded in mystery. As one scholar put it, "There is much controversy over what the [Pugachev] group was and who was responsible for it." The third section analyzes Kazakh nationalization policies, and explains why these policies are antagonistic toward Russians. To offer a more informed interpretation of the Pugachev incident, the fourth section places the incident in the broader context of post-Soviet Kazakh nationalization.

The City of Ust'-Kamenogorsk

Ust'-Kamenogorsk is the capital of East Kazakhstan, one of Kazakhstan's 14 oblasts. Only two oblasts—East Kazakhstan and North Kazakhstan—had a Russian majority from their origin in the 1920s. In terms of ethnic composition and language, Ust'-Kamenogorsk and East Kazakhstan are heavily Russian today. Comprising less than half (48%) of East Kazakhstan's population, Kazakhs barely outnumber Russians, who constitute 45% of the population. Only 11% of the 694,705 Russians who reside in East Kazakhstan speak Kazakh, which has been Kazakhstan's state language since 1989. Located on the Irtysh river due south of Novosibirsk, Russia, Ust'-Kamenogorsk has had a Russian presence since the eighteenth century. Origins of the Russian conquest of the city date back to 1720, when Peter the Great sent Russian troops, led by Major Ivan Vasilievich Liharev, to establish a fort in Ust'-Kamenogorsk. In 1920 Ust'-Kamenogorsk was declared part of present-day Kazakhstan when the Bolsheviks designated it as part of the Kirgiz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. This republic was renamed the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1925, and the "Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic in 1936. While Ust'-Kamenogorsk served as a military fortress during the eighteenth century, it served as a trade center during the nineteenth century, and an industrial
center during the twentieth century. To satisfy the labor demand created by rapid industrial development in Kazakhstan, Stalin implemented a policy of Russian immigration into the area just after World War II. This caused the population of Ust'-Kamenogorsk, by now a thriving mining and metallurgy center, to increase substantially. In 1926 Ust'-Kamenogorsk had 14,000 residents; by 1959 that number had risen to 149,000. Today the city is dominated by Russians, who comprise 74% of the population; Kazakhs constitute only 19% of the city’s population. In comparison, Russians comprise 30% of Kazakhstan’s current total population.

The “Pugachev Rebellion”

The alleged coup attempt in Ust’-Kamenogorsk was dubbed the “Pugachev Rebellion” in the local press not because the incident resembles the Pugachev Rebellion of 1773, but because Viktor Vladimirovich Kazimirchuk, the leader of the Ust’-Kamenogorsk group, calls himself Pugachev. Allegedly the nickname is based on Kazimirchuk’s physical resemblance to Emelian Pugachev, the Don Cossack who led the uprising against the Tsarist regime. To avoid confusion, I refer to Kazimirchuk in this article as Pugachev. While public knowledge of Pugachev’s background is limited a few facts are known. For example, although he is dedicated to defending the interests of Russians, Pugachev is of Polish descent; while he is a citizen of Russia and a permanent resident of Moscow, his wife and son reside in Poland. In addition, we know that Pugachev was fairly wealthy prior to his arrest. According to one of Pugachev’s associates who visited Pugachev’s apartment in Novosibirsk regularly, Pugachev’s apartment was furnished with expensive antiques. This associate also claims that:

Everyone attests to the fact that the host [Pugachev] has considerable financial means: he did things freely with large sums of money, and he paid in full for the trip of the “revolutionaries” up to Kazakhstan.

Pugachev claims that he is the founder of Rus’, an unregistered self-proclaimed patriotic extremist group established in Russia in 1991. According to Pugachev, his intention in Ust’-Kamenogorsk was to inspire local Russians to defend their rights. In conversation with Vladimir Andreevich Nestoianov, a Russian diplomat posted in East Kazakhstan, Pugachev explained that he went to Ust’-Kamenogorsk to liberate Russians from particularly difficult circumstances. According to Nestoianov,

During our meeting, he [Pugachev] told me that he had read a great deal of literature on how badly Russians live in Kazakhstan, and so he decided to come and help them.

Pugachev’s defense attorney, Sergei Mikhailovich Suprun, claims that Pugachev was particularly dissatisfied with Kazakhstan’s linguistic environment, which he viewed as discriminatory:
Language was the only reason Kazimirchuk sought an autonomous republic, in order to institute the Russian language. This was his exact goal... Not only Kazimirchuk, but others said that the goal of creating an autonomous republic was so that the main language in East Kazakhstan would be Russian... Kazimirchuk wanted to prompt others to create an autonomous republic in East Kazakhstan in order to institute Russian as the main language of the oblast. Theoretically, he simply wanted to help.19

Although details surrounding visits Pugachev made to Ust'-Kamenogorsk are unclear, we know that local authorities were not taken by surprise when Pugachev’s group appeared in Ust'-Kamenogorsk in November 1999.20 One month before this final visit, Pugachev and a few recruits traveled from Novosibirsk to Ust'-Kamenogorsk to gather information about the city and its inhabitants. When Pugachev’s recruits became fully cognizant of their leader’s intention, however, they returned to Novosibirsk and told their story to a journalist at Novaja Sibir’. On 15 October 1999 Novaja Sibir’ published an article, based on interviews with Pugachev’s deserters, that alerted authorities in Russia to the situation. The violent nature of Pugachev’s objectives, as conveyed by a former disciple in the article, compelled Russian authorities to contact their colleagues in Kazakhstan. In this article, entitled “A Confession of Russian Terrorists,” Pugachev’s former recruits claim that their leader’s intention was to achieve

the complete destruction of associated regional departments of internal affairs and of the committees of national security in Ust'-Kamenogorsk, Pavlodar, and Leninogorsk, [and] military activities, and the holding of directors of local organs of power as hostages.21

The original recruits returned to Russia when they realized that Pugachev intended to garner support among Russian residents of Ust'-Kamenogorsk to achieve these militant objectives. Shortly after their departure, Pugachev returned to Russia to procure new allies. Pugachev came back to Ust'-Kamenogorsk one month later with new recruits from various cities in Russia who had allegedly fought in different conflicts, including those in Chechnya, Tajikistan, and Moldova.22 Members of Rus’, these individuals were impoverished, dissatisfied, aggrieved souls who had not found their niche in post-Soviet Russia. Having lost hope in the future, it is not surprising that the recruits were easily led by Pugachev. Nestoianov, the Russian diplomat posted in East Kazakhstan, confirms this assessment:

I do not know what the leaders of the group, Kazimirchuk and Chernyshov, were thinking when they recruited such people to their team ... It is difficult for me to judge which ones are terrorists! ... None of them had any money, many were unemployed. They took bait from Pugachev from desperation and hopelessness. They had simply lost their reference point in life. Poverty drove them into a corner, and they were ready for any kind of work.23

Victor Kunin, the chief of Kazakhstan’s Committee for National Security, stated during a press conference that Pugachev promised his followers financial rewards,
and responsible high-level positions in the new Russian republic in the event of a successful coup.24

Kazakhstan's Department of State National Security arrested Pugachev's group on 19 November 1999 in a local insurance firm called Aviaperekopolis. According to the authorities, the "terrorists" were holding a conference and in the process of role-playing a violent seizure of power at the time of the arrest:

As it has become clear during the course of investigation, this group of terrorists during the night from November 18 to 19 was preparing the seizure of buildings housing the oblast governor administration, the Department of State National Security, and the Department of Internal Affairs. The main goal was the organization of a rebellion in order to separate the region from Kazakhstan, and to organize a "Russian Land" republic here. At the time of the arrest of the group in the insurance office, the scenario of a coup was being played out.25

The authorities claim that Pugachev’s group came to Ust'-Kamenogorsk to implement terrorist acts, which include (1) the violent seizure of power, and (2) the "arousal" of local Russians in support of the creation of an autonomous Russian republic in East Kazakhstan.26 At the time of the arrest the authorities found a small arsenal of weapons, smuggled from Russia, which consisted of 270 gun cartridges, two hunting guns, 14 bottles of an inflammatory substance, a few iron billy clubs, one grenade, and one knife. Investigators also found a map of Ust'-Kamenogorsk, which designated places of strategic significance; a list of people and places to be eliminated; an appeal to residents of East Kazakhstan calling for a transfer of power; and a decree establishing a Russian Altai Republic.27

Prior to the arrest, Pugachev and his partisans held informal conversations with Ust'-Kamenogorsk Russians about the creation of an autonomous Russian republic, and discussions among themselves about how to establish this republic. According to Pugachev's testimony, the group tried to garner support among Russian and Cossack residents for the creation of an autonomous republic, but found few allies.28

Shortly after the arrest, the Akim of East Kazakhstan congratulated residents of Ust'-Kamenogorsk on resisting the calls of the "provocateurs":

The majority of our citizens, whom they tried to provoke for these criminal activities, displayed wisdom and true Kazakh patriotism ... I am convinced that the population of East Kazakhstan has enough wisdom to not yield to [resist] the provocation of political extremists, to preserve peace and quiet in our common home, and to not allow a small group of provocateurs from bringing discord to our many centuries of friendship between the Russian and Kazakh people, or to the relationship between the friendly states of Russia and Kazakhstan.29

Fourteen members of Pugachev's group were charged with violating various articles of Kazakhstan's Criminal Code. All of the accused were charged, first and foremost, with the violent seizure of power, or the violent holding of authorities.30 All of the accused were also charged with (1) calling for a violent overthrow of the constitutional structure, or violent changes in the constitutional structure, or the
violent violation of the unity of the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan; and (2) the illegal acquisition, transfer, sale, storage, transportation, or bearing of weapons, ammunition, explosive matter, and explosive devices. In addition, Pugachev and his two primary accomplices were charged with the creation and management of a criminal organization. The prosecution’s case, however, was based on intention rather than action: the prosecution claimed that Pugachev’s group intended to carry out an armed seizure of power. According to the chief of Kazakhstan’s Committee for National Security, the “Pugachev Rebellion” was a question of concrete preparation for an armed coup. Everything was planned out earlier. The idea was well planned and organized.

Judge Margarita Kislova presided over a trial that began on 11 April 2000, following a four-month-long investigation. Eleven of the accused were citizens of Russia, two were citizens of Kazakhstan, and one was a citizen of Moldova. Although the trial was officially open, its location in an isolated section of a local prison meant that the “courtroom” was accessible only to certain individuals. In reality the trial was closed to the public, including journalists from Kazakhstan and Russia. Participants in the trial were limited to the judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney. All attempts made by the Russian diplomat posted in East Kazakhstan to participate in the trial were blocked by local authorities. Obliged to protect Russian citizens in Kazakhstan, Nestoianov submitted three requests to the authorities: 1) a different trial location so that legal proceedings would be open to journalists and relatives of the accused, 2) the right to participate in the trial as an official from Russia, and 3) the presence of a Moscow attorney if not to participate in the trial, then to at least observe proceedings. Each request was denied.

Although transcripts of the trial have not been published, we know from the local press and Pugachev’s defense attorney that Pugachev pleaded guilty to the lesser charges, but not to the charge of a violent seizure of power. In closing statements the prosecution argued that Pugachev’s group sought to violently overthrow local authority in East Kazakhstan. The prosecution admitted, however, that the group’s ability to actually seize power was clearly limited by such a small, insignificant arsenal:

In conclusion, the prosecutor pronounced that the state accusation was far from the opinion that the accused, having only fourteen bottles of an inflammatory substance, could seize power. But, if this criminal group had not been rendered harmless, many innocent people might have suffered. Therefore, it was asked that the court consider the heightened public danger of these people.

At the close of the district trial on 8 June, the court delivered the longest sentence to the ringleader of the group. Pugachev was awarded (1) 18 years’ incarceration, the first five to be served in prison and the remaining 13 in a corrective facility with strict conditions; (2) confiscation of property; and (3) a fine of 362,500 tenge. Each of Pugachev’s two main accomplices got 17 years’ incarceration, and a fine of 217,500
THE "PUGACHEV REBELLION" AND POST-SOVIET KAZAKH NATIONALIZATION

tenge. The four youngest members of the group were released on probation, and the remaining seven members got anywhere from seven years' to 11 years and six months' incarceration.41

Kazakhstan's legal system permits the appeal of a district trial verdict to an oblast court.42 Ten of the convicted felons, including Pugachev, challenged the district trial verdict on the grounds that the trial was biased. In July, 2000 the East Kazakhstan court reconsidered the Ust'-Kamenogorsk verdict and reduced each sentence. Pugachev's sentence was reduced by three years, the sentences of his two accomplices were each reduced by four years, and the sentences of the remaining seven were each reduced by anywhere between three and six years.43 Although the convicted felons requested permission to serve time in Russia rather than in Kazakhstan, the lack of an agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan on this issue prevents extradition. Today the prisoners serve time in Kazakhstan.44

Due to the mystery and secrecy surrounding the incident, there is a lack of consensus regarding the Pugachev incident. The authorities claim that Pugachev sought to violently overthrow local organs of government; Pugachev's defense attorney claims that Pugachev sought to help Russians in Ust'-Kamenogorsk defend their rights; Nesterianov claims that Pugachev sought personal notoriety; representatives of Lad and Russian Community, two associations that represent Russians in Kazakhstan, claim that while Pugachev's motives are unclear, one thing is certain: the authorities staged the entire incident. The importance of the Pugachev incident, however, lies not in Pugachev's motives, but in the disproportionate official Kazakh reaction to the incident. While it is highly unlikely that authorities organized the Pugachev incident, there is reason to believe that they made an example of the incident in order to ensure peaceful implementation of antagonistic nationalization policies and practices, and to prevent Pugachev's group from attracting additional attention to the plight of Russians in East Kazakhstan.

Post-Soviet Kazakh Nationalization

Kazakhstan is a nationalizing state with a fairly antagonistic nationalization strategy that aims to privilege members of the titular nationality primarily through two means: (1) policies related to citizenship and language issues; and (2) policies geared toward weakening the demographic preponderance and political hegemony of Russians in Kazakhstan. Because these policies favor Kazakhs and consequently disadvantage Russians, they have an adverse effect on Russians.45

Kazakh Citizenship Policy (see Figure 1)

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan implemented a zero-option citizenship policy that automatically included all permanent residents of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) in the post-Soviet Kazakh demos. Kazakhstan's
1991 law on citizenship defines a citizen as someone who "permanently resides in the Republic of Kazakhstan on the day this law goes into effect, or acquires citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan in accordance with the law." In granting citizenship to all permanent residents of the Kazakh SSR, and in declaring the equality of all citizens before the law regardless of social status, race, nationality, gender, education, language, religion, or political affiliation, the policy bequeaths to Russians the same rights, privileges, and responsibilities that Kazakhs possess.

The fact that Kazakhstan forbids dual citizenship, however, adversely affects Russians. Given the close proximity of northern Kazakhstan to Russia and the subsequent flows of cross-border traffic, the ban on dual citizenship generally disadvantages Russians, rather than Kazakhs, because it hinders individuals who attempt to maintain professional and personal ties in Russia and these individuals tend to be Russian. But Kazakhstan's citizenship regime goes further: The Constitution makes an exception to the ban on dual citizenship for members of the Kazakh diaspora who return to Kazakhstan—repatriates may hold dual citizenship. The fact that returning Kazakhs are granted the right to hold dual citizenship adds insult to injury for Russians who are citizens of Kazakhstan.

**Kazakh Language Policy (see Figure 2)**

Although Kazakh language policy was relatively accommodating toward Russian-speakers in its early stages, it became increasingly less so as the demise of the Soviet Union faded into history. Like other republics, the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic passed legislation in 1989 establishing the titular language as the state language, which aims to implement the state protection of the Kazakh language and show concern for its active use in state organs, public organs, institutions of national education, culture, science, and in spheres of service, mass media, and others.
FIGURE 2
Summary of Kazakh language policy

While this policy designates Kazakh as the state language and thus sets the stage for future policies that increase the mandatory public use of Kazakh, it designates Russian as the language of inter-ethnic communication and ensures "the free functioning of the Russian language equally with the state language." In addition, the policy asserts that (1) the language of state agencies, law enforcement, public organizations, enterprises, legal proceedings, and internal documentation may be Kazakh, Russian, or any other local language, and (2) employees of all state agencies must respond to citizens in the language preferred by the citizen.

Beginning in 1992, elites embarked on a mission to alter the linguistic landscape of Kazakhstan by decreasing the number of spheres of communication in which Russian is tolerated, and increasing the number in which Kazakh is required. For example, a Cabinet of Ministers ruling established a 1995 deadline for the introduction of all documentation in the state language. In retrospect, two considerations make this deadline appear unrealistic. First, a government-sponsored research project revealed that in 1996 only 8% of Russians in Kazakhstan spoke Kazakh. Second,
almost a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, only 16% of Russians in Kazakhstan claim knowledge of two or more languages.\textsuperscript{54} The fact that the first post-Soviet Constitution defines Kazakh as the state language and Russian as the language of inter-ethnic communication, while the second and third versions deprive Russian of \textit{de jure} status further supports the claim that Kazakh language policy has become less accommodating toward Russian-speakers. According to the first (1993) Constitution,

The state guarantees the preservation of the sphere of use of the language of inter-ethnic communication and other languages, and is concerned about their free development. Restrictions on the rights and freedoms of citizens on the basis of not having mastered the state language or language of inter-ethnic communication are forbidden.\textsuperscript{55}

The second (1995) and third (1998) Constitutions fail to designate Russian as the language of inter-ethnic communication. Although each version allows Russian to be used on an equal basis with Kazakh in state agencies and agencies of local administration, these Constitutions further Kazakh nationalization by denying Russian legal status.\textsuperscript{56} Moreover, the President of Kazakhstan and the Chairmen of the houses of Parliament must be fluent in the state language.\textsuperscript{57}

By the mid 1990s elites had begun to expand the spheres of communication in which Kazakh is required. President Nazarbaev’s goals are outlined in a document entitled “A Conception of Language Politics:”

The goal of this conception is the development of a state policy strategy in the sphere of the protection and the functional development of languages in a transitional period, \textit{and the definition of the state’s task is the creation of conditions for the development of the Kazakh language as the state language.}\textsuperscript{58}

While Nazarbaev’s Conception permits the use of Russian on an equal basis with Kazakh under certain conditions, it clarifies the President’s intention to build a society based on the Kazakh language.\textsuperscript{59}

The development of languages is provided for by the State Program, which envisions the priority of the state language, and the phased transition of all documentation into the Kazakh language ... A list of professions, specialties, and positions for which knowledge of the state language is necessary to a certain degree, in accordance with qualification demands, will be set forth in the laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan.\textsuperscript{60}

Kazakhstan’s second language law, passed in 1997, furthers these goals. The policy reiterates the fact that Kazakh is the state language, and designates certain spheres of communication in which Kazakh is required, such as state administration, legislation, legal proceedings, and all documentation.\textsuperscript{61} The policy also states that “The duty of every citizen of the Kazakh Republic is the mastery of the state language, as this is an important factor in the consolidation of the people of Kazakhstan.”\textsuperscript{62} By 2000 this mandate was displayed throughout Almaty, on large billboards, in Kazakh and in Russian.
In 1998 the government established a State Terminology Commission to modernize Kazakh so that it could function as the country's sole state language. The Commission’s task was to submit a proposal outlining the development of an economic, scientific, technological, and cultural Kazakh vocabulary. That same year a government ruling mandated the development and implementation of a series of measures to encourage the transition of all documentation from Russian into Kazakh. The ruling also called for a list of professional requirements for specialists, including knowledge of the state language.

The apex of linguistic nationalization, however, is a presidential decree comprising a series of steps to increase the compulsory public use of the state language by 2000. The decree mandates the provision of free Kazakh language instruction; the creation of conditions conducive to the use of the state language in all spheres of public life, but especially in science, education, culture, mass media, state administration, legal proceedings, and international relations; the establishment of a practical foundation for the conversion of all documentation into the state language; the expansion of the use of the state language in public life; and the protection and development of a citizen’s native language through a choice in language of communication, upbringing, training, and creative activity. With the exception of the last clause, these stipulations indicate the regime’s intention to expand the obligatory public use of Kazakh. Although less severe than extremely antagonistic nationalization strategies, such as the one adopted in Latvia, Kazakhstan’s language policy is antagonistic toward Russians because it significantly widens the public sphere in which Kazakh is required, and narrows the public sphere in which Russian is permitted.

Kazakhization Policies

As part of its nationalization strategy, Kazakhstan has implemented a series of political and demographic change policies that seek to promote the political hegemony and demographic preponderance of Kazakhs within Kazakhstan. Personnel policies favoring Kazakhs, and consistent efforts to ensure that Kazakhs retain important political positions are the means through which political hegemony is accomplished. According to Taras Kuzio, “Russians have been re-defined from ‘elder-brothers’ to colonizers and removed from the public sector, business, banking, and law.” Many Russians have been ousted from key city and oblast administrative positions and replaced by politically loyal Kazakhs, particularly in the Russian-dominated northern region of the country. The director of Kazakhstan’s Center for Humanitarian Research, Valentina Kurganskaia, claims that Russians face particularly acute problems in the sphere of personnel policy, such as disproportionate representation in organs of authority. Comparing the political exclusion of Russians in Latvia to the political exclusion of Russians in Kazakhstan, Pel Kolsto argues that Russophones in Kazakhstan

97
M. E. COMMERCIO

have every reason to expect that they may become just as politically marginalized as the Russophones in Latvia. Even today it is clear that they are being pressed out of most positions of power in Kazakhstani society.71

The demographic change aspect of Kazakhization consists of migration and territorial administration policies that aim to attract Kazakhs to northern Kazakhstan in order to weaken the Russian presence in that region. Migration policies target Kazakh residents of Kazakhstan, and the roughly four million Kazakhs residing abroad.72 The government encourages Kazakhs in southern Kazakhstan to resettle in northern Kazakhstan through incentives, including subsidized housing, guaranteed jobs, and placements in Kazakh-language schools.73 The government also encourages the repatriation of Kazakhs who fled Kazakhstan during the early twentieth century.74

Beginning in the early 1990s, the government established an annual Kazakh immigration quota.75 Though quotas are never met, members of the Kazakh diaspora have migrated to Kazakhstan. For example, 94% of the quota was met in 1993; 64% was met in 1994; 73% was met in 1995; and 88% was met in 1998.76 A 1992 Cabinet of Ministers ruling declared the state’s policy to promote Kazakh repatriation:

[The state will] conclude agreements with government agencies, departments, enterprises, institutions, and organizations of other states regarding the question of conditions for the voluntary resettlement to the Republic of Kazakhstan of members of the indigenous nationality, and care about the national diaspora, its voluntary settlement in its native land, adaptation, and job placement, and the creation of appropriate conditions of life.77

The ruling also established the state’s commitment to fund repatriation expenses. Two years later an immigration land fund was established to identify suitable territory for immigrant Kazakhs, taking into account the need to resettle them in compact areas and provide them with favorable living conditions.78

In 1997 the government intensified its campaign to stimulate Kazakh repatriation. During that year a presidential decree defined four priorities of migration policy, the second of which was “the assistance in the repatriation of Kazakhs, their settlement, and their adaptation.”79 In addition, the 1997 law on migration guarantees returningKazaks benefits, including free transportation to Kazakhstan, legal protection of property, assistance in job and school placement, training to improve skills or acquire new skills, unemployment and pension benefits, assistance with learning the state language, and the means to acquire land and a home.80 In short, the government funds the transportation, settlement, and adaptation of all returning Kazakhs.81 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, many oralmen (meaning “people who came back” in Kazakh) have returned from various Soviet successor states, Mongolia, China, and Iran.82 An estimated 170,000 Kazakhs returned to their historic homeland between 1991 and 1998.83

The second component of the demographic change aspect of Kazakhization is territorial administration policy. Thus far Kazakhstan has executed two reforms. The
first, implemented in 1997, sought to strengthen the Kazakh presence in heavily Russianized regions of the country by incorporating Russian-dominated oblasts into Kazakh-dominated oblasts, or vice versa. For example, Semipalatinsk, a predominantly Kazakh oblast, was incorporated into East Kazakhstan to increase the size of the Kazakh population in East Kazakhstan. This reform has increased the share of Kazakhs in the northern part of the country considerably. By 1999 the share of Kazakhs in Akmola was 37.5% (22.4% in 1989); in East Kazakhstan it was 48.5% (27.2% in 1989); in Karaganda it was 27.5% (17.1% in 1989); in Kustanai it was 30.9% (22.8% in 1989); and in Northern Kazakhstan it was 29.6% (18.6% in 1989).84

The second reform, also implemented in 1997, involved the transfer of the capital from Almaty, a city in southern Kazakhstan, to Astana, a city in northern Kazakhstan. Nurbulat Masanov, President of Kazakhstan’s Association of Political Science, claims that territorial-administrative reforms are crucial to Kazakh nationalization, and that the primary goal of moving the capital was ethnodemographic:

Moving the capital to the north, to predominantly Russian-language oblasts, was in accord with the aim of stimulating the resettlement of the predominantly Kazakh political elite to the northern Russian-language region and thereby changing the ethnodemographic situation, increasing the number of Kazakhs among the population of northern Kazakhstan.85

Many Western scholars agree with this interpretation. Writing about the proposal before it came to fruition, Ian Bremner and Cory Welt emphasized the symbolic aspect of transferring the capital:

a central government seated in Akmola [Astana] would be well situated to monitor and influence political developments in the region where ethnic Kazakhs are thinnest on the ground. Coupled with the relocation of state ministries to other major cities in the north, the selection of Akmola as a new capital would drive home an unmistakable message about who rules Kazakhstan.86

For Taras Kuzio, an important aspect of moving the capital was the effort to strengthen Kazakh identity in the north.87 Henry R. Huttenbach argues that the influx to Astana of government officials, bureaucrats, and staff—a change that quickly increased the number of Kazakhs in the region—is indicative of

the unspoken intentions lying behind the decision to move the capital closer to the Russian population center. The emergence of a young and increasingly vibrant Kazakh capital at the doorstep of the Russian populated north speaks volumes.88

Finally, Richard L. Wolfel claims that motives for moving the capital include the desire to weaken the Russian presence in the north, prevent the development of secessionist movements, and increase the state’s ability to observe local Russians.89

As part of a nationalization strategy that seeks to promote members of the titular nation, Kazakhization policies reinforce aspects of citizenship and language policies
that privilege Kazakhs. The gradual, but consistent implementation of policies aimed to achieve political, economic, cultural, and demographic Kazakh domination that Robert Kaiser and Jeff Chin refer to in the quotation below is antagonistic toward Russians:

Since the collapse of the USSR and Kazakhstan’s independence in December 1991, Kazakh political elites have become less accommodative, as they have become more intent on reconstructing their state to serve primarily if not exclusively the interests of the Kazakh nation.⁹⁰

The Pugachev Incident: An Example

Although the East Kazakhstan court reduced the sentences declared at the district trial, Pugachev still got 15 years’ incarceration, and his two primary accomplices each got 13 years’ incarceration. In light of the limited nature of Pugachev’s actual activity in Ust’-Kamenogorsk, this is a disproportionate reaction to the Pugachev incident. To make sense of it, the official Kazakh reaction must be analyzed in the context of Kazakhstan’s nationalization strategy. Given the government’s intention to reconstruct the state to serve the interests of the Kazakh nation, it is not surprising that the regime does not compromise with organizations that represent Russians in Kazakhstan, such as Lad and Russian Community.⁹¹ Nor is it surprising that the regime chose to make an example of the Pugachev incident; in doing so, the authorities sent a clear message that Kazakhstan will not tolerate opposition to its nationalization program, and they prevented Pugachev’s group from drawing further domestic and international attention to an aggrieved population in East Kazakhstan.

Within the context of an antagonistic nationalization program, three factors surrounding the Pugachev incident suggest that the authorities set Pugachev’s group up so that they could make an example of the incident. First, authorities in Kazakhstan exaggerated the level of threat Pugachev’s group posed to Ust’-Kamenogorsk and its residents. In fact, evidence indicates that the group posed no immediate threat to the city or to its inhabitants: Pugachev’s group not only failed

| TABLE 1 |
| How would you characterize the events of November 1999? |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Attempt to gain personal notoriety | Provocation by the local authorities | Serious attempt to violently seize power | Other |
| Russian residents of Ust’-Kamenogorsk (%) | 46 | 24 | 21.5 | 8.5 |

Source: BRIF public opinion poll conducted in December 2000.
THE "PUGAČEVI REBELLION" AND POST-SOVIET KAZAKH NATIONALIZATION

to drum up local support, but also possessed a clearly inadequate weapons arsenal to seize power.

A public opinion survey, conducted by a social and market research agency in Almaty called BRIF in December 2000, of 200 Russian residents of Ust'-Kamenogorsk indicates that local Russians did not consider Pugachev a security threat. Less than a quarter of the respondents consider the Pugachev incident a serious attempt to seize power, and almost half view it as nothing but a failed attempt by Pugachev’s group to become famous (see Table 1).

Given these data, it is not surprising that Pugachev was unable to garner support among Russians in Ust’-Kamenogorsk for the creation of an autonomous Russian republic. A local newspaper article confirms the assessment that Pugachev’s group stood alone in its quest for regional autonomy:

According to Kazimirkhuk’s testimony, the terrorists planned on the support of the local Russian-speaking population, and specifically of the Cossack and Russian populations. The miscalculation of the extremists became extra confirmation of the fact that the organization did not find mutual understanding with residents of Ust'-Kamenogorsk.

In fact, Pugachev’s defense attorney claims that the group had decided to return to Moscow prior to the arrest, precisely because they were unable to drum up support in Ust'-Kamenogorsk:

According to Kazimirkhuk, by the time of the arrest all of them had planned to go back to Moscow because they had already been here for a month and a half, and no one supported them. So they had decided to go back ... He found some support here, but only a few people. Most people did not support him ... The people [of Ust’-Kamenogorsk] did not support them; they did not even understand them.

The leader of the East Kazakhstan branch of Lad, Aleksandr Shushanikov Pavlovich, confirms this assertion:

By November 15, three days before his capture, Kazimirkhuk planned to leave with his group because he had not found support here ... According to the people who were convicted, they had gotten ready to leave because Kazimirkhuk had openly and publicly declared that they were leaving since their goals and objectives—to organize an autonomous republic—well, they were convinced now that these goals were unrealistic, and so they had decided to terminate their activities directed toward creating an autonomous republic.

The BRIF survey mentioned above reveals little support for such a republic. Although they view themselves as victims of discrimination and thus resent Kazakh nationalization, Russians in Ust’-Kamenogorsk do not think that the creation of an autonomous region within Kazakhstan would solve these problems. One challenge Russians in Ust’-Kamenogorsk face is linguistic. When asked whether the fact that Kazakh is the sole state language is problematic for Russian-speakers in Ust’-Kamenogorsk, almost three-quarters of the respondents said yes (see Table 2). When
TABLE 2
Is the fact that Kazakh is the state language problematic for Russian-speakers in Ust'-Kamenogorsk?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes, definitely</th>
<th>More or less</th>
<th>No, not really</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian residents of Ust'-Kamenogorsk (%)</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BRIF public opinion poll conducted in December 2000.

TABLE 3
Is language legislation used as a tool of discrimination in Ust'-Kamenogorsk?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes, definitely</th>
<th>More or less</th>
<th>No, not really</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian residents of Ust'-Kamenogorsk (%)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BRIF public opinion poll conducted in December 2000.

asked if language legislation is used as a tool of discrimination in Ust'-Kamenogorsk, over half of the respondents said yes; only a quarter said no (see Table 3). Despite the fact that Russians in Ust'-Kamenogorsk are dissatisfied with (1) the fact that Kazakh is the sole state language, (2) the fact that Russian has no legal status, and (3) the regime's intention to transfer all documentation from Russian into Kazakh, they do not support the creation of an autonomous republic within Kazakhstan. Thirty-seven percent of the respondents think that East Kazakhstan should remain a constituent part of Kazakhstan, while only 11% thinks that the oblast should be an autonomous region within Kazakhstan (see Table 4).

TABLE 4
In your opinion, what should the status of East Kazakhstan be?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituent part of Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Autonomous part of Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Constituent part of Russia</th>
<th>Autonomous part of Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian residents of Ust'-Kamenogorsk (%)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BRIF public opinion poll conducted in December 2000.

The interesting finding is that just over half of the respondents—52%—thinks that East Kazakhstan should either be a constituent or an autonomous part of Russia. This suggests considerable support among Russian residents of Ust'-Kamenogorsk for
THE "PUGACHEV REBELLION" AND POST-SOVIEt KAZAKH NATIONALIZATION

territorial unification with Russia. These findings confirm findings of another survey that was conducted by a local market research firm. In late 2000, Vesti conducted a survey of Russians in Ust'-Kamenogorsk that showed that while respondents did not endorse the creation of an autonomous East Kazakhstan oblast, they did endorse territorial unification of East Kazakhstan and Russia.\textsuperscript{96} Two factors explain why Russian residents of Ust'-Kamenogorsk oppose regional autonomy within Kazakhstan, but support territorial unification with Russia: (1) a widespread fear among these Russians that conditions would rapidly deteriorate in a newly created autonomous region of Kazakhstan as punishment for that creation; and (2) an expectation among these Russians that conditions would improve in a region united with Russia, if territorial unification were endorsed by Russia.

Another indication that authorities in Kazakhstan exaggerated the level of threat Pugachev’s group posed to Ust'-Kamenogorsk and its residents is the fact that the group possessed an obviously inadequate weapons arsenal. It is unlikely that 270 gun cartridges, two hunting guns, 14 bottles of an inflammatory substance, a few iron billy clubs, one grenade, and one knife could even compromise Kazakh security forces. One information agency, PoliTon, surveyed “experts” working on the Pugachev incident and found that these individuals hardly consider Pugachev’s group a threat to Kazakhstan’s national security:

It is noteworthy that at the time of the arrest they did not find weapons or money necessary for any extremists to carry out activity. Experts do not consider the presence of ammunition cartridges, bottles of inflammable substance, and metal clubs among the so-called “separatists” a serious factor in the bringing of charges of the overthrow of power of the East Kazakhstan oblast.\textsuperscript{97}

Leaders of Lad and Russian Community also question the level of threat posed by the group. According to Lad’s regional representative, Shushanikov,

There was no disorder, no one was killed, they didn’t kill anyone, they didn’t even slap anyone in the face. All their thoughts, deeds, actions—they didn’t continue past discussion. Look, you and I are discussing the question of autonomy, and they also sat and discussed this. They didn’t do anything … they didn’t even have the means, the force, or the possibility to seize power.\textsuperscript{98}

Maslennikov Oleg Ivanovich, the leader of Russian Community’s East Kazakhstan branch, expressed similar sentiments:

They tried them [the accused] in court not on the basis of actions, but on the basis of their ideas. They didn’t do anything. In actual fact, they did nothing. They did something only in words, like if we say: “We wish that there was a Russian Altai republic here. We wish that there were more jobs, that they wouldn’t oppress Russians on the basis of language.” People came here, but they had nothing—only two-hundred seventy cartridges and two or three iron billy-clubs. Is it possible to pull of a coup with such means?\textsuperscript{99}
After describing the meager weapons arsenal, Pugachev’s defense attorney posed the following question to make the same point: “What can you accomplish, with these weapons, against our police? About what kind of coup can we even speak?” In Sergei Suprun Mikhailovich’s opinion, the alleged putschists were far from a security risk:

These people who came from Moscow were not serious, especially Kazimirchuk. Anyone can think of these things, even children. But to establish autonomy with one grenade and two-hundred seventy cartridges without any guns? Is it even possible? It is nothing but a child’s babble.

The second factor that suggests the authorities made an example of the Pugachev incident is that certain aspects of the official reaction to the incident raise the question of a set-up. For example, why was Pugachev allowed to cross the border after authorities in Kazakhstan knew of his alleged objective? And why did the authorities postpone Pugachev’s arrest until 1999? Pugachev and his recruits initially came to Ust'-Kamenogorsk in April or May of 1998, and they talked openly about secession during this visit. Even Kazakhstan’s Committee on National Security admits that Pugachev’s group visited East Kazakhstan a minimum of three separate times prior to the arrest. Lad’s regional representative claims that during the first visit to Ust'-Kamenogorsk, in 1998, Pugachev registered at a hotel under the name “Pugachev,” in spite of the fact that his documented name was “Kazimirchuk.” According to Shushanikov, this immediately aroused suspicion. The fact that Pugachev also discussed his idea of an autonomous Russian territory with opposition organizations and local residents raised further suspicion. Based on these facts and the powerful nature of Kazakhstan’s security system, Shushanikov argues, there is no doubt that authorities in Kazakhstan knew of Pugachev and his intentions a year and a half before the arrest. Even if Shushanikov is wrong and the authorities were unaware of Pugachev’s prior visits to Ust'-Kamenogorsk, they were aware of Pugachev and his stated objectives before he entered Kazakhstan in November, owing to the fact that authorities in Russia contacted them when the Novaya Sibiri article appeared in October.

In addition, claims that local authorities delayed Pugachev’s departure from Ust'-Kamenogorsk right before the arrest raise the question of a set-up. According to Lad, Pugachev testified that he and his recruits were purposely delayed in Ust'-Kamenogorsk by Kazakhstan’s Committee for National Security:

By November 15, three days before the arrest, Kazimirchuk and his group had planned to leave [East Kazakhstan], since he had not found support here. But as he himself stated at the trial, with efforts of investigators from the Committee for National Security his group was delayed here for three days … they were forced to be under the capture of the Committee for National Security.

Russian Community not only confirms this assertion, but also suggests that the representative from Kazakhstan’s Committee for National Security was under cover at the time:
THE "PUGACHEV REBELLION" AND POST-SOVIET KAZAKH NATIONALIZATION

As they [Pugachev] claim, they had already planned and prepared to leave, but one of their comrades from the local administration—he was an instigator, that comrade, a provocateur—asked them to wait until the 19th. And then, when they had already planned to leave, the KNB arrived and arrested them.106

Whether or not this is true, the rumor raises suspicion regarding the motives of authorities in Kazakhstan.

The third factor that suggests the authorities made an example of the Pugachev incident is the fact that neither the original nor final sentences correspond to the realistic level of threat posed by Pugachev's group. An anonymous journalist did acknowledge this lack of fit between a harsh verdict and a weak plan to seize power:

Many in Kazakhstan are inclined to think that the harsh verdict, in relation to the unsound plan to carry out a coup is revealing, considering that the Russian-speaking population predominates in East Kazakhstan, and that traditionally there has been a separatist mood there [in East Kazakhstan]. Officials do not admit this.107

Neither Pugachev nor his recruits took concrete action to violently seize power, which is the charge that landed them behind bars for such lengthy amounts of time. According to Pugachev's defense attorney, the group discussed various ways to achieve their goal, including constitutional means, but never reached any decision except to abandon the project and return to Russia:

Discussions were had in which they spoke about a violent coup, and also a legal route through the authorities of the republic. They spoke about all sorts of things. But no decisions were made ... I repeat, they discussed different options—violent and constitutional routes. But they did not prepare a violent plan ... Kazimirchuk claimed that different routes were discussed—peaceful, parliamentary, presidential—all options were discussed, but only discussed. For this group to overthrow the authorities with violent means? It was just not possible.108

When I asked Ivanovich, the leader of Russian Community's East Kazakhstan branch, what Pugachev and his followers actually did in Ust'-Kamenogorsk, he replied, "They did nothing, absolutely nothing. But they arrested them! Nothing happened."109 Lad's regional representative, Shushanikov, gave a similar answer: "They did nothing realistic to prepare for the activities, and they did not have the capability to seize power."110 Journalists writing in local newspapers also fail to identify concrete actions taken by Pugachev or his recruits to achieve the alleged goal of creating an autonomous republic within Kazakhstan.

Representatives of Lad and Russian Community are adamant in their position that the Pugachev incident was a provocation of the authorities to warn East Kazakhstan Russians of the dire consequences of mobilization. According to Ivanovich,

... We think that most likely it was all simply a staging, some kind of provocation [by the Kazakh government]. We think people [were] provoked, or exposed, in order to display a very efficient and well-coordinated security force ... Most likely it was a
M. E. COMMERCIO

provocation of the authorities to intimidate the rest, so that no one will raise this issue [of autonomy] again. To teach.\textsuperscript{111}

Shushanikov shares the same perspective:

The authorities of Kazakhstan needed such a seizure to show the Russian population that notions of separatism or integration with Russia have no prospects here ... I think this group was the brainchild of the authorities, that they brought these people here, coordinated the activities of this group, and then at the necessary moment carried out its capture—mainly to show the separatist mood that it is without prospects. We condemn the authorities and consider the whole incident fabricated and organized by the authorities.\textsuperscript{112}

Shushanikov is not shy when it comes to his position on the Pugachev incident. In an article published by \textit{Lad’s} newspaper, he asserts that “The authorities of Kazakhstan, without a doubt, implemented these measures in order to show the Russian population of East Kazakhstan that separatism has no prospects.”\textsuperscript{113}

Although this claim is exaggerated, it is not entirely unfounded. It seems likely that authorities in Kazakhstan took advantage of the Pugachev incident to warn local Russians about the futility of mobilization. In the eyes of the authorities, Ust’-Kamenogorsk is a potentially unstable region. In 1992 there was a referendum among Ust’-Kamenogorsk city deputies on the question of establishing an autonomous territory; Slavic deputies voted for creating such a territory.\textsuperscript{114} Moreover, the BRIF survey reveals that although there is little support among Ust’-Kamenogorsk Russians for regional autonomy within Kazakhstan, secession sentiments linger. Current research reveals dissatisfaction among Russians in Ust’-Kamenogorsk with linguistic aspects of Kazakh nationalization, and support among these Russians for some degree of territorial unification with Russia. In light of potential instability in Ust’-Kamenogorsk, and the regime’s goal to reconstruct the state to serve the interests of the Kazakh nation, it is not surprising that authorities seized the opportunity to make an example of the Pugachev incident.

Conclusion

It is impossible to know Pugachev’s real intentions, or the authorities’ real motives. However, as social scientists our job is to offer informed interpretations of political, economic, and social phenomena, even under conditions of limited evidence. In this case, a likely interpretation is that the Pugachev incident was most likely a badly conceived, even farcical, symbolic act intended to raise controversial issues regarding the treatment of Russians in East Kazakhstan which was seized upon by authorities in Kazakhstan. Pugachev was a threat not because he had the potential to compromise Kazakhstan’s national security or seize local power, but because he drew attention to an aggrieved population in East Kazakhstan and to the linguistic
THE "PUGACHEV REBELLION" AND POST-SOVIET KAZAKH NATIONALIZATION

discrimination that population confronts on a regular basis. This threatened to bring
unwelcome attention to Kazakhstan’s antagonistic nationalization program.

When Pugachev’s group arrived in Ust’-Kamenogorsk in November 1999, local
authorities were already aware of its objectives. In forgoing an arrest during past
visits to Ust’-Kamenogorsk made by Pugachev, officials elected to make an example
of Pugachev during his final visit. Because authorities lacked strong evidence against
the accused, the trial was held in closed quarters and very little information regarding
the trial or the accused was leaked to the general public. The official reaction to the
so-called “Pugachev Rebellion,” then, was an effort to pre-empt opposition to
Kazakh nationalization in the future, and stop Pugachev’s group from drawing
further attention to the plight of Russians in Kazakhstan. In sum, the reaction was an
effort to restrict political and economic opportunities for Russians in Kazakhstan by
sending a clear message regarding the futility of political mobilization.

NOTES

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Callaghan, Rudra Sil, Edward A. Schatz, and Charles King for their comments.

1. Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the

2. See, for example, Ian Bremmer, “Nazaraev and the North: State-Building and Ethnic
Anatoly M. Khasanov, “The Ethnic Problems of Contemporary Kazakhstan,” Central
The Politics of National Identity (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995);
Robert Kaiser and Jeff Chin, “Russian–Kazakh Relations in Kazakhstan,” Post-Soviet
Cambridge University Press, 1996); Martha Brill Olcott, “Kazakhstan: Pushing for
Eurasia,” in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, eds, New States, New Politics: Building the
Post-Soviet Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 547–570; and
Sue Davis and Steven O. Sabol, “The Importance of Being Ethnic: Minorities in
Post-Soviet States—The Case of Russians in Kazakhstan,” Nationalities Papers, Vol. 26,

3. Unfortunately Olcott’s discussion of the Pugachev incident is brief. Martha Brill Olcott,
Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 2002), p. 79.

4. Pauline Jones Luong, Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet


6. In comparison, of the 742,765 Kazakhs who reside in East Kazakhstan, 86% speak
Russian. National’niy Sostav naseleniia Respubliki Kazakhstan, 2 Tom: Narodny Perepisi
Naseleniia 1999 Goda v Respublike Kazakhstan (Almaty: Agency of the Republic of
7. In 1920 the Kirgiz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was part of Russia. Personal interview with Aleksandr Alekseevich Nikolaeivich, Director of the Scientific Research Institute of Demography at the East Kazakhstan State University, 18 July 2000.
10. The Kazakh census provides population statistics for each oblast, but not for cities within each oblast. Population and migration statistics were obtained from the Informational-Statistical Center of East Kazakhstan in Ust'-Kamenogorsk.
12. In the fall of 1773, during the reign of Catherine the Great, a Cossack by the name of Emelian Pugachev led aggrieved Ural Cossacks in a rebellion against tsarist authorities. Pugachev’s movement spread beyond the Urals, and eventually became a mass rebellion that encompassed workers, serfs, and other minority groups. The rebellion ended in late 1774 with the defeat of Pugachev’s troops, and Pugachev’s escape to the Urals. Ultimately Pugachev was handed over to the authorities, then tried and executed in Moscow. Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 260–261.
20. Most likely Pugachev and a few recruits initially came to Ust’-Kamenogorsk in April or May 1999. It is reported that Pugachev talked openly about secession during this visit, which was a year and a half before the November 1999 arrest. Valentina Dudkova, “Razboinik Byl v BKO esheche Poltora Goda Nazad,” Ekspres K, 30 November 1999, p. 2; Nikolai Ivanov, "Nikoii Ivanov: Pugachev—Eto Stoprotsentnyi Provokator," Ustinka, 3 December 1999, p. 4. Kazakhstan’s Committee on National Security claims that Kazimirkhuk and his comrades visited East Kazakhstan at least three times before the arrest. Tat’iana Bendz’, "Perevorot—Khronika Ust’-Kamenogorska Dela," Ekspres K, 8 December 1999, p. 3.
34. I was unable to find information on Judge’s Margarita Kislova’s background.
40. Mira Alipinova, “Vynenec Prigovor,” Rudnyi Altai, 10 June 2000, p. 1. Given that there were 143 tenge to the U.S. dollar in early 2000, Pugachev’s fine is equivalent to roughly U.S.$2,535.
42. Kazakhstan’s legal system is based on three levels of authority: the district court, the oblast court, and the supreme court, which is located in Astana. The oblast court verifies the legality of the district trial, serving primarily as a supervisory court, and has the right to change a decision of a district trial only in favor of the convicted. Personal interview, Sergei Mikhailovich Suprun, 19 July 2000.
44. Vladimir Sergeev, "Pugachevtsy Otmotatj Srok v Kazakhstane," Novoe Pokolenie, 28 January 2000, p. 1. Although President Putin occasionally appealed to President Nazarbayev on behalf of the accused, he did not interfere with the legal proceedings.

45. Although I do not have data on the effect of informal nationalization practices on Russians in Ust'-Kamenogorsk, extensive research I conducted in Almaty indicates that Russians are highly dissatisfied with Kazakh nationalization, and in particular with informal discriminatory personnel practices. Interview data suggest that informal personnel practices greatly disadvantage Russians, and thus create a widespread sense of perceived ethnic discrimination among Almaty Russians.


47. The right to hold dual citizenship is denied in the Law on Citizenship (Article 3), and all three Constitutions: 1993, Article 4; 1995, Article 10; 1998, Article 10.


50. Ibid., Article 2.

51. Ibid., Articles 8, 10, 13, 16.


55. Konstitutsia Respubliki Kazakhstan, 28 January 1993, eighth point of the section entitled "Bases of Constitutional Formation."


57. The Kazakh Constitution does not, however, demand that parliamentary deputies be fluent in the state language. Ibid., Articles 41, 51, 58.


59. When necessary, Russian may be used on an equal basis with Kazakh in state organs, agencies of local administration, official documentation, responses to citizen appeals, and legal proceedings. Ibid., Article 5.

60. Ibid., Article 23.


62. Ibid.


64. Postanovlenie Pravitel'stva o Raszhireniu Sfery Upotreblenija Gosudarstvennogo Iazyka v Gosudarstvennykh Organakh, 14 August 1998.
THE "PUGACHEV REBELLION" AND POST-SOVET KAZAKH NATIONALIZATION


66. It should be noted that linguistic nationalism has not penetrated Kazakhstan's educational system. Since 1989 formal policy has permitted Kazakh and Russian instruction in institutes of education. An analysis of informal practices, however, may reveal a different story.


70. Elena Brusilovskaya, "Poligon Dlia Demokratii," Argumenti i Fakti, No. 4, 2000, p. 3.


73. Bremmer, "Nazarbait and the North."


75. For example, the quota in 1993 was 10,000 families, in 1994 it was 7,000 families, in 1995 it was 5,000 families, in 1996 it was 4,000 families, in 1997 it was 2,180 families, and in 1998 it was 3,000 families. The 1993–1996 figures are from Eraln Karin and Andrei Chebatarev, "The Policy of Kazakhization in State and Government Institutions in Kazakhstan," in The Nationalities Question in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan (Chiba, Japan: Institute of Developing Economies, 2002), pp. 95. The 1997 and 1998 figures are from presidential decrees issued in 1997 and 1998, respectively. Ukaz Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstana o Kvote Immigratsii na 1997 god, 27 March 1997, and Ukaz Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstana o Kvote Immigratsii na 1998 god, 3 April 1997.


78. Postanovlenie Kabineta Mirov Respubliki Kazakhstana ob Utverzhdenii Poriadka Sozdaniiia Immigratsionnogo Zemle'noi Fond, 2 August 1994, point 2.


81. It should be noted that, despite state assistance, immigrant Kazakhs confront numerous problems in Kazakhstan. Many immigrants are unable to secure homes and jobs, partly because they do not speak Russian or Kazakh. For example, in 1998, 4,700 families who had returned to Kazakhstan lacked housing, and 54% of the immigrants that year were unable to find a job. Interview with Zaurbek Turisbekov, Chairman of the Agency for Migration and Demography, Argumenty i Fakti, No. 46, 1998, p. 3. In addition, many
returning Kazakhs lack Kazakh citizenship, despite the fact that the law on citizenship grants them the right to obtain citizenship. The problem is the complex process required for immigrant Kazakhs to obtain Kazakh citizenship—a total of 18 documents must be filled out and processed. Immigrant Kazakhs often give up prior citizenship because many countries, such as Mongolia, do not permit dual citizenship; they arrive in Kazakhstan without citizenship and remain in Kazakhstan without citizenship for at least two years. These immigrants have trouble finding work, and are denied unemployment benefits because they are not citizens of Kazakhstan. For more information, see Tulegen Izdibaev, "Zakon o Migratsii v Kazakhstane Fakticheski ne Ispolnizetsia," Panorama, 24 December 1999, p. 4; Antynasha Dzhagannova, "Vernost' Otchei Zemle," Kazakhstanskaja Pravda, 23 October 1999, p. 2.


85. Ibid.


91. For example, Lad and Russian Community have fought for years, without success, for the creation of a Russian University in Kazakhstan similar to the Slavic University in Kyrgyzstan. Personal interviews with furious Zakharovitch Bunakov, Chairman of Russian Community, Almaty, 23 May 2000, and Mikhailov Viktor Petrovich, Chairman of Lad, Astana, 14 April 2000.

92. I hired BRIF, a social and market research agency in Almaty, to conduct a public opinion survey of 200 Russian residents of Ust'-Kamenogorsk in December 2000. BRIF conducted face-to-face interviews with respondents who comprised a sample that corresponded in gender and age to the demographic parameters of the Ust'-Kamenogorsk population, according to the 1999 census.


THE "PUGACHEV REBELLION" AND POST-SOVIET KAZAKH NATIONALIZATION

97. No details of this survey were provided in the newspaper article that discusses various interpretations of the Pugachev incident. Ina “Pollion,” “Kommentarii k Sobytlam v Ust’-Kamenogorske,” Nashe Delo, 6 January 2000, p. 2.


100. Personal interview, 19 July 2000.

101. Ibid.


114. This referendum highlighted the difference in Kazakh and Russian views on secession: while Kazakh deputies voted unanimously against secession, Slav deputies who were willing to make their view public voted in favor of secession. Ian Bremmer, “Nazarbaev and the North: State-Building and Ethnic Relations in Kazakhstan,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1994, p. 625.