Megan Alderfer
Greco-Roman Political Theory, Clas 158
TR 5-6:15

     “Philosophy often emerges out of what were originally theological disputes, and we shall see that many theological debates are highly philosophical in nature” (Leaman 16).  This is seen through the incorporation of Greek philosophy into Islamic philosophy. Islamic philosophy as no surprise is substantially based on a sort of religious philosophy, which diffuses itself in other branches of philosophy such as politics. Religion, as al-Farabi described, is simply an imitation of true philosophy. The main components of Greek thought that Islam readily accepted were through the works of Plato. One idea of how Plato’s works and ideas were easily incorporated into religion and philosophy was through his rather flexible Theory of Forms. The Platonic and Neoplatonic Theory of Forms found in the Islamic philosophy of al-Farabi and expressed through religion and politics.
    Islamic philosophy, or al-falsafah (falsafah meaning philosophy) comes from the Greek word philosophia or love of wisdom. It is the product of a complex intellectual process in which Syrians, Arabs, Persians, Turks, Berbers, and others took an active part.

It was the Arabs’ enlightened interesting ancient learning, hardly
any intellectual progress could have been made or maintained. 
Moreover it was the Arabs who, while they assimilated the customs,
manners, and learning of their subject peoples, contributed the one
universal element in the whole complex of Muslim culture, i.e., the
Islamic religion (Fakhry 1).

We should be careful as to what people define Islamic philosophy. Islamic philosophy can be considered as the thoughts that prevailed in culture of the Middle East. This broad culture was made up largely by conquered people, Christians and Jews as well as Pagans, and as a result their philosophies were lumped into the term Islamic philosophy. This very broad notion of Islamic philosopher will be steered away from and we will focus on the thought that was displayed by the people of the Islamic religion.  It should also be noted that falasifah, or Islamic philosophers, were theists and not theologians (kalam).  The difference is that for kalam the starting point is revelation, reason is only used to defend the word of God with the Qur’anic view of creation.  On the other hand, for falsafah the starting point is reason, which guides us on a quest for the true nature of things that leads to the God of the Qur’an.
      Many wonder what interest fanatical Muslims, who disapprove of any thought outside of the Qur’an, would have with philosophy. This question arises because of the negative connotation Westerners have about Muslims. Their view is due to the fact that they do not understand that Muslims who display extreme views are radicals and in being radical, their thought is not generally accepted.

It is rather strange to suggest that Islamic philosophy is alien to the
Western traditions of philosophy, because Islamic philosophy has
been so strongly influenced by Greek thought, and in turn has had
much influence on the development of philosophy in Christian
Europe.  It is worth pointing out that many of the sources of Islamic
philosophy are to be found in the links between the growth of the
religion of Islam and Greek culture. (Leaman 15)

Islamic philosophers used the language and culture of their religion to explore and explain ideas, which were often originally mediated by Greek thought (which was namely a political theory).  So now the question arises, how did Islamic philosophers become acquainted with Greek thought?
The Islamic empire expanded to areas of the Middle East, which at the time was filled with Greek culture.  The question aroused to whether any ideas that came from the conquered, mainly Greek, culture were of any use to the Muslims. “Greek philosophy is so powerful in what it can do and explain that it proved a temptation too powerful to resist” (Leaman 2). The Muslims were so heavily exposed to the lure and mysticism of Greek thought. With the encouragement of the caliph al-Ma’mun (specifically by his support for the increase of Greek to Arabic translations), they were up for the challenge of incorporating it into Islamic thought.  It is interesting to wonder why Islam, like other religious movements, felt the need to take on systems of thought that came from outside their own movement, especially because of the characteristic of xenophobia and egocentrism found in religious traditions.  But never-the-less Greek thought found a nice home within Islamic philosophy. We should question if Greek thought contradicts Islamic falsafah? In many instances it does.  In many cases Islamic philosophers molded translations to fit their own beliefs and any contradictions that arose “[were] often argued that [they] were more apparent than real” (Leaman 3).
     The Qur’an puts emphasis on reason, and the Muslims in the early years took great pride in their rationality.  The Qur’an raises philosophical problems that need a rational response, which is where Greek ideas helped fill gaps. The question, however, still remains as to what initiated Muslims to translate Greek to Arabic?  “It was thought that the same remarkable culture which had produced natural science of such quality must also have produced rules of thought worth studying” (Leaman 16). Muslims at the time was trying to spread their influence and convince people (namely the older Abrahamic religions, Judaism and Christianity) of the importance and the truths of the Qur’an. To aid them they turned to Greek logic to rationally explain that teachings of Islam should be embraced. Now that we have discussed how Greek thought became incorporated into Islamic philosophy we can move on to discussing the Islamic philosopher, who influence so much of al-falsafah, al-Farabi.   
    Little is known about al-Farabi’s, or better known in classic sources as Abu Nasr (Alpharabius to the Latin scholars), life.  What we do know is that he came from Farab in Transoxiana.  He grew up in Damascus, where he read many books on philosophy.  As a result of his interest in philosophy he moved to Baghdad, which was the leading center for Islamic thought due to the school of Alexandria’s migration.  In Baghdad he met the leading teachers of his day.  He developed his own philosophical views and soon outdid all of his contemporaries.  Greek thought, more specifically ideas that where incited by Plato and Aristotle, were incorperated into his falsafah.  A major influenced on al-Farabi, aside from Greek thought, was al-Kindi. “[Al-Farabi] refined the study of logic and expanded and completed the subtler aspects that al-Kindi had overlooked” (Fakhry 126). 
    Al-Kindi is credited with being the first Arab philosopher.  He implicitly employed Neoplatonic ideas throughout his works.  He was followed by a group of philosophers centered in Baghdad, where his teachings reached al-Farabi.  “The Neoplatonic tendencies implicit in the philosophy of al-Kindi came into full prominence in the work of al-Farabi” (Fakhry 125).  Al-Farabi is described by Majid Fakhry (1983) as ‘the founder of Arab Neo-Platonism and the first major figure in the history of that philosophical movement since Proclus’. Aside from using Neoplatonic ideas he also made use of Platonism and Aristotelian concepts. This paper will, as stated in the thesis, focus on Neoplatonic as well as Platonic ideas that Al-Farabi incorporated into his falsafah. The use, in my thesis, of the terms ‘Neoplatonic’ and ‘Platonic’ raises a rather complex question.  What is the difference between Plato’s teachings, Platonism, and Neoplatonism?  A description of the three will be presented in this paper so we can see how al-Farabi incorporated them into his theories. Al-Farabi does mainly display Neoplatonic ideas, but he does incorporate a lot Platonic thought as well. Many times within a specific thought he will incorporate both methods. I will discuss Plato’s ideas (portrayed mainly through Plato’s middle period placing emphasis on the Republic, Phaedo, Symposium, and the Laws) so we can see how the two branches were influenced by their principle common factor.  The discussion will further be narrowed down with the focus, of the three divisions, on the Idea of the Forms in relation to religion and politics (relative to Islam). Logically I will start from the main source, which incited each of the two branches, which is of course Plato. 
    Plato distinguished himself as a spokesman for Socrates, a teacher, a humanist, and an author of dialogues. Plato’s dialogues mostly always had some relationship to Socrates, who was an influential philosopher in Athens during Plato’s earlier years.  In Plato’s works the use of Socrates is either, to display Socrates’ own ideas, or to use Socrates as a character, or voice to express his own thoughts.  This constitutes a problem, also known as the Socratic Problem, as to how we should know whether Plato was using Socrates as tool or character to displays his own beliefs or if he was merely writing about Socrates’ own beliefs. “To introduce Socrates and Plato is to introduce the problem of the relation between them” (Lane 155). Did Plato ever express his own ideas when referring to Socrates? Was Plato bias when he expressed Socrates’ ideas?  These questions have not been answered, so for now we will continue with interpreting Plato’s works as part of his own philosophy and beliefs. 
It was through Socrates that the Theory of Forms was exhibited, which as Aristotle explicitly says was not a Socratic but a Platonic theory. In Plato’s Letter VII we will suppose (as the majority of scholars) that this Letter is not a forgery, and contains, aside from a general account of his life, an excursus on the Theory of Forms. The Forms are discussed in Plato’s work mainly in his ‘middle period’ dialogues, which included dialogues such as the Symposium, Phaedo, Republic, Philebus, and the Timaeus. Books III-VII of the Laws also seem to fit this period.

The introduction of irrational parts in the soul is accompanied, on
most accounts of a ‘middle period’ Plato, by the introduction of a
metaphysics of ‘Forms’: objects intelligible to reason which are the
ultimate source of explanation for contradictory appearances in the
phenomenal world (Lane 156).

    Plato’s Theory of the Forms is very complex and therefore the general description of the Forms must be narrowed down to ideas that relate to religious and political components.  The Theory of Forms is very broadly defined as

The constituents of real being [which] are not the transient mutable
objects apprehended by our senses, but immaterial Forms, immutable
and eternal, the objects of thought or reason, existing independently
of any mind, and in some way participated in, or imperfectly imitated
by, sensible objects.  In apprehending these Forms the world finds
its proper activity and its full satisfaction; but it cannot adequately
apprehend them while clogged and hampered by the body; hence the
need for renunciation of the body’s desires and pleasures (Hackforth 5)

With this definition we see how many religious components relate to the Forms, by the mention of terms such as ‘transient’ and ‘eternal’. This passage also describes need to reject the body, and its desires (which runs very parallel to Sufi thought). The Forms show that they also constitute a ‘higher’ or perfect state of earthly objects. The Forms offer a rationalization for the problem of initial cause “infinite regress of some elements need to be viewed as self-explanatory” (Moravcsik 6). Plato’s political ideas are also displayed in the previous passage by Hackforth, when he shows that understand the Forms is the world’s, or state’s, primary function. We should notice that the Theory of Forms ties very nicely into the religious aspects. A.E. Taylor wrote about Plato’s Laws X when he described the work as “the foundation of all subsequent ‘natural’ theology, the first attempt in the literature of the world to demonstrate God’s existence and moral government of the world from the known facts of the visible order” (Introduction to his translation of the Laws). Plato believed, as displayed in the Republic, that religion should be integrated into the ideal state.
The Forms are presented on a large scale (politics), while the other is on an individual level (religion).  Plato believes that the philosopher is the person who can understand the Forms the best, due to his pursuit of knowledge. The philosopher should necessarily, in the ideal, state be ruler because of his ‘higher knowledge’. The broad description of the Theory of the Forms will now lead us into an explanation of Platonic thought and their views on the Theory of the Forms.
    Platonism differs from Plato mainly because it does not concern itself largely with historical details, such as the problems that faced people during his life (the political condition of Athens, the Peloponnesian War, the tyrannical rule of the Thirty). Plato, like Karl Popper who criticized Plato because of his influence on Marxism, was influenced to write about how current situations can be improved or avoided.  Would Plato’s philosophy differ if the times were different? Platonism, ignoring this question, instead displays Plato’s ideas as timeless truths. Platonism has ignored the reasoning in Plato’s ideas, which stem from historical problems.
    Platonism, defined in general terms, demonstrates a metaphysical philosophy that concentrates on a transcendent reality. This focus shows the rational side of Platonism, which believes that thought is directly related to understanding transcendent realities.  Platonism believes in the immortality of the soul, like Plato demonstrated in Phaedo.  Platonists view the Forms in much of the same way Plato defined them except that they made the Forms into a universal truth. This universality makes it easy for Platonist to apply and relate the Forms to God to the Theory of Forms. It is stressed, that actual things are copies of transcendent ideas and that these ideas are the objects of true knowledge. 
Their views on politics are really only displayed through al-Farabi and other Arab Platonists as well as nineteenth century English idealists, because Platonists were mainly concerned with mathematics and religion.  As a result I will discuss Platonic views, later in this paper, on political theory when applied to al-Farabi.  As we have just discussed, Platonism is a slight variation from Plato in that it links the Theory of the Forms more to religion.

As we shall see, explicating [the Forms] is the primary task of Platonic
epistemology, rather than sketching the structure of prepositional
knowledge and information processing. The ethics, too, reflects
the Platonic division between reality and appearances.  It centers
on finding an adequate ideal for life.  This involves an appropriate
overall aim, a character that goes with pursuing such an aim or goal,
and the resulting happy discovery that in being that kind of a human
one can find meaning in life (Moravcsik 6-7).

    So now we are left to discuss the last branch, which is Neoplatonism.  Neoplatonism stems off from Platonic thought in that it further incorporates religion into its ideas. Neoplatonists differ from Platonist because they use more allegory; incorporate more religion into their philosopher, and places emphasis on the infinite. I must bring up the fact that there was two schools of Platonic thought in al-Farabi’s time, the Athenian and the Alexandrian. We will focus on the Alexandrian school because this is the school that surrounded al-Farabi in Baghdad. People who talk about Neoplatonism sometimes do not realize that they are referring to a long, complex, and many-sided tradition. The Athenian school focused more on the teachings of Plato through Proclus, whereas the Alexandrian school puts emphasis on Plotinus.
 
The Alexandrian scientific and philosophic traditions are historically
crucial to everything that happened later on in science and philosophy
in the Islamic world…These philosopher, commentators, and
thinkers—“Alexandrian” thought they were in certain respects—were
the ones who handed down to the Muslims the books and the tradition
of reading or studying these books and interpreting them; this took the
form of a clearly defined scholarly tradition, not vague connections
with earlier thought as was the case in the first stages of Islamic
[thought] (Mahdi 55)

Another distinction we must make is of the different kinds of Neoplatonism that was adopted by different religions. As assumable we will concentrate on Neoplatonic views of religion that assimilate into Islamic falsafah.  However “Oriental Christian mysticism had long ago accepted the ideas…of the Neoplatonists.  Thus Christianity, already saturated in Neoplatonism, brought a large share of its [moods] and ideas to [Islam]” (Saeed 24).  Largely it was Plotinus who, in his work the Enneads, systemized Neoplatonism.  His main notion is that the natures, as influenced by the Neopythagorean Numenius, are in descending in order and are decay with each level much like Plato’s Forms decay into the material world.  Plotinus upheld the belief of the transcendence of a supreme mind and being called theos, or God.  This supreme mind incorporates the Forms, and is translated into divine Ideas.  Neoplatonists believe that the One, or Good, is the object of religious aspiration and is transcendent, infinite, and attainable through mystical experience.  

Neoplatonism does as a doctrine fit rather neatly into religion,
especially a religion such as Islam.  For instance, there is an
emphasis on the existence of one supreme being or principle,
out of which everything else emerges in such a way as not to
interfere with the absolute unity of the One.  This philosophical
issue mimics a theological problem in Islam: namely, now we
should link the one God of revelation with the multiplicity of
existence without compromising God’s absolute perfection and
self-subsistence (Leaman 4). 

Since we have described the ideas of Plato, Platonism, and Neoplatonism we surely wonder which ones will be applied to this paper, as was questioned earlier. As a result from al-Farabi reading translations and interpretations of Plato’s work it is hard for him to apply a strict doctrine in accords to a literal approach of Plato’s works. “Plato’s dialogues are filled with analogies and myths” and “symbolism is a way to conceal the truth from those incapable of understanding it, to introduce the philosophical path” (Walbridge 9). As a result of the symbolism used it is hard for even a philosopher to grasp what Plato was really trying to convey. We can therefore generally assume that al-Farabi was focusing more along the lines of Neoplatonism and Platonism. Neoplatonism also brings about more trouble.  The two schools of Neoplatonism are very complex and therefore tricky to distinguish which is Athenian or Alexandrian.  And we can further display the complexity when focusing on the Alexandrian school; becasue at certain periods of time different teachings was emphasized. “There was the Neoplatonism of Plotinus’s successors” and then there was the Neoplatonism presented by some scholars who “were primarily teaching the works of Plato and Aristotle” (Mahdi 54). As a result of the deep-rooted complexity Neoplatonism and Platonism will be used somewhat broadly. I will do my best in attempting to differentiate between the two branches of thought, because of the lack of clarity between the braches. With all this being said I will narrow Islamic philosophy down by discussing the particular philosophies of Plato that apply to Neoplatonism and Platonism.
We will first look at al-Farabi’s religious views in accords with the two branches of Plato’s Theory of Forms. We should note that al-Farabi’s religious philosophy is displayed and largely influenced in his political theories. We should also take notice that Al-Farabi was a Sufi, in which there were many relationships to the Islamic mysticism in his philosophies. Sufism also fits very nicely into Neoplatonic thought, because in certain aspects Neoplatonism promotes a kind of mysticism.
Al-Farabi’s falsafah is very vast. To save my paper from becoming a book discuss essence and existence which branch off into other aspects of al-Farabi’s ideas. First we might want to look at al-Farabi’s conception of God, apart from what the Qur’an tells us.  He thinks that in God essence and existence fuse. 

Essence is the reason why a thing is and what it is; existence is the
actuality of essence.  Thus existence is one thing and essence quite
another.  If essence and existence were one thing we should be unable
to conceive the one without the other. In the case of created beings, we
find that essence does not necessarily imply the existence of a thing,
for it is possible to think of its essence without knowing whether it
exists of not.  There is one Being alone whose essence is His very
existence and that is God.  The logical separation between essence and
existence with regard to all created beings was insisted upon by
al-Farabi to distinguish them from God who is self-existent and
necessary being and who is pure actuality and thus perfect (Saeed 59). 

In this passage we see that God is the initial cause, which al-Farabi fully explains through proof from motion, the proof from efficient causation, and the proof from contingency, which if you notice closely if not almost identically relates to Thomas Aquinas’ Five Ways to Prove that God Exists.  We also take notice of the Theory of Forms incorporated into the idea of essence and existence.  To display this we must further deluge into al-Farabi’s idea of essence and existence. So lets take what we already know, essence is why something has a form and existence is the actuality of that form. With created things, there can be a form of it (ie the form of a body) that has potential for existing, and that matter cannot exist without form.  With God he is the true form of an essence that is in existence who is exists not out of a cause or potential form and is necessary for all of the existence of the forms.  We should also note that the soul, which is also included in essence and existence is eternal.  This runs parallel to Plato’s views as express in Book X of the Republic (609b-612e) With this we find a rough outline of the Theory of Forms, in that existence of creations are ‘blueprints’ of Forms, which are constant.  We also see that God is the ultimate Form. 
Al-Farabi says in his sixty-eighth aphorism that

The first divisions are three: what cannot possibly not exist, what
cannot possibly exist, and what can possibly exist and not exist. 
The first two are extremes, and the third is intermediate between
them.  It is an aggregate that requires the two extremes.  All existing
things fall under two of these three [division].  For some beings
cannot possibly not exist, and some can possibly exist and not exist
(trans. Butterworth 45)

Al-farabi further explains this conception when he says in his sixty-ninth aphorism that

What cannot possibly not exist is such in its substance and nature. 
And what can possibly exist and not exist is also such in its substance
and nature.  For it is not possible that what cannot possibly not exist
becomes like that due to its substance and its nature being otherwise
and its happening to become like that.  So, too, with what can possibly
exist and not exist.  There are three genera of existing things: those
devoid of matter, celestial bodies, and material bodies.  What cannot
possibly not exist is of two types: for one, it is in its nature and its
substance to exist at a [certain] moment, anything else not being
possible for it; the second is what cannot possibly not exist at any time
whatsoever.  The spiritual are of the second of the sorts that cannot
possibly not exist and the celestial of the first, while the material are the
division of what can possibly exist and not exist.  There are three worlds:
spiritual, celestial, and material (Butterworth).

For al-Farabi, the world is an eternal emanation from God, forming a hierarchically ordered series of existents.  These three divisions display a Neoplatonic element that Plotinus theorized (which was related to the Neopythagoreanism Numenius’ three gods) that there is the first, a supreme One; the second is the intellect, and the third is matter.  Al-Farabi further breaks down his initial three into the hierarchy of being all, which emanate from God.  The first to emanate, and therefore the closest to God, is a first intelligence.  The first intelligence then breaks off into further.  First the intelligence undergoes two acts of cognition, the first act is ‘knowing’ God and the second is an act of self-knowledge.  It is from these two acts that produce two existence: a second intelligence (celestial world) and body (body of the universe).  The second intelligence also goes through an act of knowing God and itself, which causes a third intelligence and the sphere of the fixed stars.  The cognitive process repeats itself and then produces the existence of the planets, the sun, the moon, and finally, from the last of the intelligences, the Active Intellect, which is our material world.  Within al-Farabi’s framework, both philosophic illumination and its translation into symbols, which are forms of revelation, emanate from the Active Intellect, the tenth separate intelligence, which is symbolized in Islamic terms by the angel Gabriel, who communicated revelation to Muhammad. In this way, he vests Plato’s philosopher-king and lawgiver with the garb of a prophet, which is displayed in his political philosophy. With development of al-Farabi’s religious philosophy we see it relates and leads nicely into his political philosophy.
Al-Farabi demonstrated that politics and ethics are conceived as an extension or development of metaphysics or the science of God, (philosophy of religion).  As we left off, in the discussion of religious philosophy, we see that each part is governed by an intelligence. We also notice this through the Forms, in which everything emanates from a true form and that it is the soul’s purpose to realize these forms.  But as Plato demonstrates in Phaedo, when it is discussed that “the philosopher attempts to acquire knowledge of the Ideas, but to gain such knowledge he must practice a kind of death, freeing the soul so that it can discover Ideas” (Magill 82). This relates to al-Farabi’s ideas, which are a general Sufi view displayed eloquently in The Conference of the Birds with the description of the Fifth Valley (valley of unity) (Attar 114).  Al-Farabi believes that to know God the prophet must seek an almost mystical, which is very Neoplatonic, death of the soul through the rejection of the material world, which upon death will be unified to fully understand the ultimate truth, God.  Plato, in the Symposium, further portrays the question as to how the philosopher can fully apprehend the true forms when Socrates talks about understanding beauty.

[The] description of the dialectical ascent to vision of absolute beauty
would apply to knowledge of the other Ideas or Forms as well, [when]
Diotima’s description of beauty is recalled by Socrates.  The proper
procedure in the apprehension of beauty of one object, letting this
inspire fair thoughts; from this, one should grow into the realization
that the beauties of all physical things are related, and thus transcend
narrow devotion to one.  The next level is the insight that beauty of
mind is preferable to that of outward appearance.  Then he is prepared
to ascent to the next that in which the beauty of institutions and laws
becomes evident.  The beauty of the sciences is even higher, and he
who perceives this will then proceed to a vision of a unique science,
that of beauty.  The final reward and the goal of this laborious ascent
is apprehension of the nature (which Plato in other contexts calls the
Form of Idea) of beauty: “a nature which in the first place is everlasting,
not growing and decaying…(Magill 79-80). 

This leads use to conclude that through the Theory of the Forms Plato, as well as al-Farabi believes that one should always be in pursuit of knowing or at best understanding, a form or intelligence. In al-Farabi’s Opinions of the Inhabitants of the Virtuous City opens with a Neoplatonice (mainly Plotinus) discussion of the First Being, as described earlier.  The first possesses unity, which is a theory like Sufism in the oneness with God, wisdom, and life, and is part of its own essence (Form).  Similarly the First is of reason in which should be strived for.
    “It is said that the Republic drew too graphic a parallel between the state and the individual and exploited it in [Plato’s] portrayal of man as an individual, on the one hand, and as a social animal, on the other” (Fakhry 135).  Like Plato we can also say that al-Farabi did the same.  For al-Farabi demonstrated that politics and ethics are conceived as an extension or development of metaphysics or the science of God, (philosophy of religion).  Al-Farabi “presents to us a Plato who is neither mystical nor metaphysical but who is primarily and massively political.  Here is a Plato who’s Timaeus is not a work on cosmology but a political work meant to instruct the citizens in correct opinions” (Mahdi 56).  This thought is displayed by al-Farabi through his work, Philosophy of Plato. 
Al-Farabi in his philosophy, as portrayed in the Attainment of Happiness, shows the conflict between theoretical knowledge and realization.  This problem questions how practical knowledge, such as happiness, can be attained.  “To know is one thing; to realize what is known—that is, what is known to be possible or realizable—to bring it about, to have it actually exist among humans and cities and nations, that is something else” (Mahdi 56).  This thought means to know is to realize something in your mind, but realization has a higher level, which is to understand and see it exist in cities and nations.  How does one attain this higher-level thinking?  Does al-Farabi believe that it is possible to exist?  These questions are also raised when dealing with Plato’s Republic.  Plato, in Book IV, divides the soul into three parts: appetitive, spirited, and rational and corresponds them to the three major classes in the ideal state: the producers, guardians, and rulers.  This also is a hierarchical display of the soul as well as the classes of the ideal state, which can be seen as a result of the Theory of Forms.  As we have talked about previously, a person should always be in pursuit of a higher understanding, which “might be indifferently described as the pursuit of truth in so far as it conduces to happiness” (Fakhry).  It is hard to be certain as to whether al-Farabi’s believes a higher level of thinking can be achieved, he doesn’t seem to explicitly say, and if he does many times he contradicts himself. 
    Al-Farabi followed Plato as well as the Platonic, idea that in order to be a virtuous ruler (which is the same as the individual gaining a ‘intelligent’ knowledge of virtue), he must be a philosopher as (Plato puts it), or a prophet (as al-Farabi puts it).  Can we really relate a philosopher and a prophet, surely they both hold ‘truths’ but one is received through a sort of revelation while the other is through, as Plato describes in the Republic, many years of training (in order to be Guardians).  Al-Farabi would answer this by describing that a result of visions of law, that represent philosophical knowledge, which is received through the prophet aspect of the ruler, like Muhammad, the brand new truth is an imitation of philosophy.  We also wonder what al-Farabi’s definition of virtue is.  Again he exhibits thoughts similar, if not identical, to Plato in that he believes humans have a perfect state to which their functions should fall.  He says in his third aphorism that “The traits of the soul by which a human being does good things and noble actions are virtues” (Butterworth 3). In order to attain virtue, or happiness, which also parallels to the good or virtue of the city, man should strive to attain his pure Form, or function.  Al-Farabi felt that it is a man’s duty to come as close as he can to the likeness, or ‘goodness’, of God.
This is displayed by discussing one aspect of al-Farabi’s religious philosophy, essence and existence, the relationship to his political philosophy. The concept of essence and existence, which was first displayed as a religious component, evolved to incorporated and display the Theory of Forms that evidently lead into the discussion of al-Farabi’s political theory. Just as there is a hierarchy is established in his religious philosophy, there is a hierarchy in his political philosophy, and it is through his religious hierarchy that his political hierarchy can be developed and explained.  Al-Farabi believes that just, in religion, has the highest ‘good’ that a person can get. This is achieved through God. In politics al-Farabi, as for Plato (or Neoplatonists), the highest ‘happiness’ that can be reached is through the ideal state, were the philosopher, or prophet rule. So we can safely assume that the ideal state can only be achieved through knowledge of God. This causes a question to whether al-Farabi’s religious philosophy differs in any way from his political philosophy? I would think it doesn’t disagree much, because after all we are studying an Islamic philosopher. It should also be pointed out that Sufism incorporates itself, through many Neoplatonic ideas, implicitly into al-Farabi’s falsafah, which was only briefly mentioned in this paper. Farid Ud-uin Attar wonderfully displays, in The Conference of the Birds, the Sufi path, or tariqua in Arabic, through Sufi thoughts and questions that run parallel to al-Farabi’s philosophy. Examples of the correlation are presented through the description of the Seven Valleys (97-133).
In studying, generally, al-Farabi’s philosophy, as to studying most philosophers, we come across many unanswered questions. These questions not only are a problem to al-Farabi but also to many other religious philosophers and also to Plato and the braches of his influence. If creation is generally identified with emanation, which is a continual process with no beginning or end, why should there be a specific point in which everything was created through God? We could answer this with a mathematical definition of what infinite is, (i.e. infinite is spherical), but I am not sure if this concept was available in al-Farabi’s or Plato’s day. But even if we grant a starting point for creation, if God is perfect why did he create imperfect ‘blueprints’ of the Forms, how could his perfection allow imperfections? A last question that I will raise is that since everything is essentially a ‘blueprint’ of a Form, are all the ‘blueprints’ equal? Since the philosopher has a greater understanding of the Forms he is closer to knowing God, is Plato and al-Farabi encouraging inequality throughout society? How do you distinguish what is closest in representation of the forms? It is philosopher, being the ruler and closest to understand the Forms, that singly holds the responsibility  (as one would assume from Plato and al-Farabi) to decide who is the closest ‘blueprint’ to the Form, should we really put this much faith into an extremely small group of people with biased views? 

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