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\title{Overcoming  Inconstancy}
\author{Louis deRosset}
\date{\today}

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  \maketitle 
  
  \epigraph{\it Inconstancy in representation \emph{de re} is exactly
    what we should expect under the hypothesis that it works by
    comparative overall similarity of complex things.  What would be
    hard to understand, had it been found, is constancy.}{David Lewis,
    \emph{On the Plurality of Worlds}}
  
  \begin{abstract}
    According to skeptics about \emph{de re} modality, the answers to
    \emph{de re} modal questions depend on how we think of the
    individual in question.  No individual bears \emph{simpliciter}
    the sorts of modal properties apparently attributed by \emph{de
      re} modal constructions.  Realists about \emph{de re} modality
    defend the view that individuals bear modal properties
    \emph{simpliciter}, independently of how they are described.  One
    major argument for skepticism highlights the phenomenon of
    \emph{inconstancy}: sometimes \emph{de re} modal attributions
    differ in truth value despite involving the same individual and
    modal predicate.  Skepticism offers a plausible diagnosis: we get
    differences in truth value without differences in referent or
    predicate because there is a hidden third factor on which the
    truth of the utterance depends: the manner in which the individual
    in question is represented or described.  This third factor is
    supplied somehow by context.  In this paper, I argue that
    inconstancy does not motivate scepticism about \emph{de re}
    modality. I claim that (i) skepticism has a difficult time
    explaining related linguistic data; and (ii) the best explanation
    of all of the linguistic data, including inconstancy, supports
    realism.
  \end{abstract}
  
  My mother's dog Maggie has fleas.  Does she have more than 200 fleas
  on her body?  Tough question.  A `yes' answer indicates that Maggie
  has a certain property, \emph{having more than 200 fleas}; a `no'
  that she lacks that property.  And the answer depends only on
  Maggie's relations to her fleas.  Things seem no different when we
  are considering modal questions.  You are human.  Might you have
  been non-human?\linespread{1}\footnote
  %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
  {My use of modal vocabulary in this paper indicates alethic modality
    -- sometimes called ``metaphysical modality'' -- rather than, say,
    epistemic or deontic modality.  In particular, unlike the seminal
    treatment in Kratzer [CITE!], I am not attempting to provide a
    uniform semantics for all the uses to which modal vocabulary may
    be put.  That being said, the theory developed in this paper for
    \emph{de re} alethic modality can be subsumed under a more general
    treatment along the lines Kratzer sketches.}
  %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
  \linespread{1.3} Tough question.  A `yes' answer indicates that you
  have a certain property, \emph{contingent humanity}; a `no' that you
  lack that property.  And the answer depends only on your relation to
  your humanity.  At least, this is how things appear.
  
  \emph{Skeptics} about \emph{de re} modality hold that appearances
  are misleading.  Skeptics claim that there is a big difference
  between modal questions and non-modal questions about particular
  individuals like Maggie or me.  According to skeptics, the answers
  to the modal questions, unlike the answers to non-modal questions,
  depend on how we think of the individual in question.  No individual
  bears \emph{simpliciter} the sorts of modal properties apparently
  attributed by \emph{de re} modal constructions.  \emph{Realists}
  about \emph{de re} modality defend the view that individuals bear
  modal properties \emph{simpliciter}, independently of how they are
  described.
  
  Skepticism about \emph{de re} modality plays a central role in many
  philosophical controversies; see, \emph{e.g.}, \citep[p. 248,
    \emph{passim}]{Lewis:1986}, \citep{Noonan:1991},
  \citep{Schaffer:forthcoming}.  Why believe it?  One major argument
  highlights the phenomenon of \emph{inconstancy}: sometimes \emph{de
    re} modal attributions differ in truth value despite involving the
  same individual and modal predicate.  Skepticism offers a plausible
  diagnosis:  we get differences in truth value without differences in
  referent or predicate because there is a hidden third factor on
  which the truth of the utterance depends:  the manner in which the
  individual in question is represented or described.  This third
  factor is supplied somehow by context.\linespread{1}\footnote
  %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
  {Philosophers who discuss ``\emph{de re} modality'' often have two
    different phenomena in view.  First, there is a certain class of
    \emph{linguistic} items: sentences, constructions, attributions,
    utterances, \emph{etc.}, which involve the application to a
    subject term of a modal predicate, like ``possibly human,'' or
    contain a directly referential term in the scope of a modal
    operator.  When I speak of the linguistic items, I will call them
    \emph{de re} modal constructions or attributions.  Second, there
    is a certain class of \emph{facts}: facts involving the instantiation of modal
    features by an individual independently of any description or
    representation of that individual.  This is what I have been and
    will be calling ``\emph{de re} modality''.  Thus, a skeptic about
    \emph{de re} modality holds that the latter class is empty, but
    accepts that the former class is nonempty.}
  %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
  \linespread{1.3}
  
  In this paper, I argue that inconstancy does not motivate scepticism
  about \emph{de re} modality.  I claim that (\emph{i}) skepticism has
  a difficult time explaining related linguistic data; and (\emph{ii})
  the best explanation of all of the linguistic data, including
  inconstancy, supports realism.
  
  % OUTLINE HERE!
  
  \begin{section}{Skepticism and Inconstancy}\label{sec:SkepticismAndInconstancy}
    Here's a classic statement of skepticism from Quine:\linespread{1}
    \begin{quote}
      Mathematicians may be conceivably said to be necessarily
      rational and not necessarily two-legged; and cyclists
      necessarily two-legged and not necessarily rational.  But what
      of an individual who counts among his eccentricities both
      mathematics and cycling?  Is this concrete individual
      necessarily rational and contingently two-legged or vice versa?
      Just insofar as we are talking referentially of the object, with
      no special bias toward a background grouping of mathematicians
      as against cyclists or vice versa, there is no semblance of
      sense in rating some of his attributes as necessary and others
      as contingent.  \citep[p. 199]{Quine:1960}
    \end{quote}  
    \linespread{1.3} Quine gestures toward a case of inconstancy which
    he claims supports his skepticism.  Suppose that, walking to work
    today, you saw a mathematician riding a bicycle.  Since you're in
    the habit of asking philosophical questions, you consider the
    claim:
    \begin{equation}
      \text{\small The bicyclist I saw is necessarily
        two-legged.}\label{sent2}
    \end{equation}
    Because the description of the individual in question invokes a
    ``background grouping'' of bicyclists, rather than mathematicians,
    Quine suggests that we should accept (\ref{sent2}) as true.
    Suppose instead you consider
    \begin{equation}
      \text{\small The mathematician I saw is necessarily
        two-legged.}\label{sent3}
    \end{equation}
    Now the description of the individual in question invokes a
    ``background grouping'' of mathematicians, rather than bicyclists.
    Quine suggests that we should not accept (\ref{sent3}) as true.
    The same individual and predicate are involved in both cases.
    Thus, inconstancy.
    
    I follow many other commentators in thinking that Quine's
    description of the linguistic phenomenon here does not survive
    sober reflection on the case.  Once we take into account in
    particular the liability of modal constructions to \emph{de
      re}/\emph{de dicto} ambiguities, the appearance of inconstancy
    dissolves.\linespread{1}\footnote
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
    {[CITE!] Plantinga.}
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
    \linespread{1.3} The only sense in which (\ref{sent2}) seems
    sensible is the sense in which it is necessary that anyone with
    the equipment to be the bicyclist I saw has two legs.  This
    reading, the \emph{de dicto} reading of (\ref{sent2}), is
    plausibly true.  This is not, however, the most natural reading of
    (\ref{sent2}), which is that a certain person -- the one I saw
    riding a bicycle -- could not have had fewer than two legs.  I
    don't think we should accept (\ref{sent2}) on this reading as true
    in the context in question.  A standard way of explaining the
    distinction is as a scope ambiguity.\linespread{1}\footnote
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
    {[CITE!] Smullyan.}
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
    \linespread{1.3} Sentences like (\ref{sent2}) are ambiguous
    between
    \begin{equation}
      \text{\small It is necessary that: the bicyclist I saw is
        two-legged.}\label{sent4}
    \end{equation}
    and
    \begin{equation}
      \text{\small the bicyclist I saw is such that: it is necessary
        that he is two-legged.}\label{sent5}
    \end{equation}
    The ambiguity matters because, holding context fixed,
    (\ref{sent4}) and (\ref{sent5}) differ in truth value.  So the
    apparent inconstancy is explained as the result of scope
    ambiguity.  But it would be a mistake to think that all of the
    data can be dismissed by such reflection.  Skeptics seem to be
    onto a real phenomenon.
    
    Consider a perfectly ordinary \emph{de re} modal attribution:
    \begin{equation}
      \text{\small Hoover could not have won the 1932 presidential
        election.}\label{sent1}
    \end{equation}
    I might use (\ref{sent1}) to express some conventional wisdom
    concerning American history.  My colleague might then tease me by
    noting that it was in principle possible for Hoover to have been
    running against an unpopular incumbent in 1932.  So it was
    possible for him to win.  The attribution is inconstant if, as the
    skeptic maintains, the truth value of (\ref{sent1}) differs in the
    pre-teasing and post-teasing contexts.  But it's very plausible to
    think that the truth value of (\ref{sent1}) does differ in the two
    contexts.  Suppose, when teased by my colleague, I respond,
    ``Well, you're right to say that Hoover could have won \emph{in
      principle}; but I didn't mean to deny \emph{that}.''  My
    response is graceless but seems otherwise justified; my colleague
    was right, but so was I.  Importantly, the phenomenon in question
    is pervasive.  If you spend any significant time at all around a
    philosophy department, you will witness someone teased in this
    way.
    
    One might still, however, demur from interpreting this phenomenon
    in the way the skeptic suggests.  One might concede that both my
    original utterance and my colleague's denial were \emph{correct}
    and \emph{appropriate}, without accepting that they are both
    \emph{true}.  Speaking truly is not always required for speaking
    correctly and appropriately; according to the legend, it was
    correct and appropriate for a subject of the kingdom of Siam to
    report gratitude upon receiving the gift of a white elephant, even
    if the report was false.  So perhaps the phenomenon can be
    explained away as a case in which either my colleague or I speaks
    falsely, but correctly.  Inconstancy requires not just the
    correctness but the truth of the relevant \emph{de re} modal
    attributions.  No argument for skepticism from inconstancy will
    get off the ground if the phenomenon involves the variability
    across contexts of correctness instead of truth.  Let us therefore
    assume for the purposes of this paper that the phenomenon in
    question involves the variability across contexts of the truth of
    \emph{de re} modal attributions.

    % SCOPE AMBIGUITY DOESN'T HELP
    
    We are accepting for the sake of argument that the truth-values of
    utterances of (\ref{sent1}) vary.  Notice that this variability is
    not plausibly explained as the result of a \emph{de re}/\emph{de
      dicto} ambiguity.  Assuming that (\ref{sent1}) is ambiguous
    between a \emph{de re} reading and a \emph{de dicto} reading,
    those readings don't seem to differ in truth value in either the
    original context in which I truly asserted (\ref{sent1}) or the
    post-teasing context in which my colleague truly denied it.
    Consider the original context.  We are assuming that my utterance
    of (\ref{sent1}) is true.  And it would be true in this context,
    whether what was at issue was the impossibility of the
    proposition \emph{that Hoover win the 1932 presidential election},
    or instead the impossibility, for Hoover, of being the winner.
    Similarly, even if (\ref{sent1}) suffers from a scope ambiguity,
    the two readings induced
    \begin{equation}
      \text{\small It is impossible that: Hoover won the 1932
        presidential election}\label{sent6}
    \end{equation}
    \begin{equation}
      \text{\small Hoover is such that: it is impossible that he won
        the 1932 presidential election}\label{sent7}
    \end{equation}
    seem to agree on truth value in the context in
    question.\linespread{1}\footnote
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
    {Perhaps you disagree, \emph{e.g.}, on the grounds that ``Hoover''
      abbreviates some definite description whose scope affects the
      truth-value of utterances of (\ref{sent1}).  If so, then it is
      easy to produce a case in which Hoover has been introduced as a
      contextually salient subject of conversation, and I use a
      deictic pronoun to refer to him:
      \begin{equation}
        \text{\scriptsize He could not have won the 1932 presidential
          election.}
      \end{equation}
      If that still won't do the trick, then we can rely, with some
      loss of vividness, on cases in which what is asserted clearly
      involves quantification into the scope of the modal operator,
      explicitly resolving the relevant scope ambiguity:
      \begin{equation}
        \text{\scriptsize Someone is such that: it is impossible that he have won the
        1932 presidential election.}
      \end{equation}
      Ultimately, if we can't come up with a case of genuine
      inconstancy -- rather than just a case of ambiguity -- then
      there will be no argument for skepticism from inconstancy.}
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
    \linespread{1.3} So the variability in the truth value of
    (\ref{sent1}) across contexts is not easily dismissed as the
    result of ambiguity.  Notice also that the inconstancy of
    (\ref{sent1}) is not to be explained by the fact that we use
    different means of referring to one and the same man.  The
    linguistic means of reference are obviously the same in both
    contexts.  Thus, the claim (see \citep{Noonan:1991}) that modal
    predicates like ``could not have won'' are \emph{Abelardian} --
    that their extensions are sensitive to the senses of the subject
    terms of sentences in which they occur -- will not explain the
    inconstancy of (\ref{sent1}).  Some more flexible form of
    context-dependence is required.
    
    How, then, is the variability across contexts of the truth of
    (\ref{sent1}) to be explained?  Skeptics claim that the variation
    is to be explained as a result of variation in an unspoken, but
    contextually-supplied variable.  Despite appearances, an utterance
    of (\ref{sent1}) does not report the possession by Hoover of a
    modal property; instead it reports a \emph{relation} between
    Hoover and a description of him.\linespread{1}\footnote
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
    {There are alternative forms of skepticism, depending on the role
      accorded to description-relativity in the semantics of modal
      predicates.  For instance, it might be held that (\ref{sent1})
      does report the possession of a property by Hoover, but the
      description supplied by context determines in part which
      property that is.  \citep[p. xxx]{Noonan:1991}.  The
      inconstancy of (\ref{sent1}) is thereby explained in terms of
      the contextual variability of the semantic value of the modal
      predicate.  (A difference between the proposal in the text and
      the alternative at hand is whether the description in question
      is part of the content of an utterance of (\ref{sent1}), or
      whether its role is confined to determining the semantic value
      of (\ref{sent1}).)  The sort of skepticism this motivates is one
      which accepts that individuals bear modal properties, but denies
      that they bear the sorts of modal properties apparently
      attributed by \emph{de re} modal constructions.  According to
      this kind of skeptic: (\emph{i}) there is no such property as
      \emph{being necessarily human}; (\emph{ii}) in context the
      predicate ``... is necessarily human'' may pick out a property;
      and (\emph{iii}) which property the predicate picks out is
      determined by which description of the subject of the
      proposition is salient.  The arguments of this paper may be
      adapted to apply to the alternative.\label{fn:Abelardianism}}
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
    \linespread{1.3} Hoover does not bear such modal features as
    \emph{being the possible winner in 1932} independently of how he
    is described.  A skeptic might hold, for instance, that it was
    impossible for Hoover to win under the description
    \begin{equation}
      \text{\small the least popular candidate for president in
        1932.}\label{descr1}
    \end{equation}
    He contingently lost, however, under the description
    \begin{equation}
      \text{\small the Republican candidate in 1932.}\label{descr2}
    \end{equation}
    The truth of an utterance of (\ref{sent1}) turns on which
    description of him is in question.  Somehow the context of my
    original utterance supplied (\ref{descr1}), so my utterance was
    true; and somehow my colleague's teasing altered the context so
    that (\ref{descr2}) was salient instead, so his denial was true.
    
    Here's how David Lewis explains some other examples of the
    phenomenon:\linespread{1}
    \begin{quote}
      I think there is a great range of cases in which there is no
      \dots right answer to questions about modality or
      counterfactuals \emph{de re}.  Could Hubert Humphrey have been
      an angel?  A human born to different parents?  A human born to
      different parents in Egypt?  A robot?  A clever donkey that
      talks?  An ordinary donkey?  A poached egg?  Given some
      contextual guidance, these questions should have sensible
      answers.  There are ways of representing whereby some worlds
      represent him as an angel, there are ways of representing
      whereby none do.  Your problem is that the right way of
      representing is determined, or perhaps underdetermined, by
      context -- and I supplied no context.\citep[p. 251]{Lewis:1986}
    \end{quote}
    
    \linespread{1} This sounds like a plausible explanation of a real
    linguistic phenomenon.  How, though, does this help make the case
    for skepticism about \emph{de re} modality?  Grant that sentences
    like (\ref{sent1}) are inconstant.  How do we get from the
    \emph{semantics} of a certain kind of modal sentence to the
    \emph{metaphysics} of a certain kind of modal fact?  Presumably,
    the reason we believe that individuals like Hoover bear modal
    properties is that we think, quite sensibly, that true utterances
    of sentences like (\ref{sent1}) attribute such properties to them.
    But, the skeptic argues, this turns out to be wrong.  It turns out
    that (\ref{sent1}) doesn't really attribute the modal property
    \emph{could not have won in 1932} to Hoover; instead it attributes
    a relation between Hoover and description of him.  The same goes
    for other sentences which appear to attribute modal properties to
    individuals.  So, whenever we go looking for a situation which
    seems correctly described as a case of the possession of a modal
    property by an individual, then inconstancy indicates that we have
    instead a case involving not just the individual but a way of
    describing that individual.
    
    It is useful to emphasize the distinction between the metaphysics
    of modal property possession and the semantics of \emph{de re}
    modal attributions, because it helps us distinguish the skepticism
    I am targeting from other views.  Our skeptic denies that
    individuals possess modal properties independently of how they are
    described.  But the skeptic does not deny the truth or cogency of
    claims made by utterances of (\ref{sent1}).  Quine [CITE!]
    famously took there to be a logical problem with sentences like
    (\ref{sent1}) that merited abandoning their use.  This would be
    one route to denying that individuals bear modal properties, a
    route that denied that, \emph{e.g.}, my utterance of (\ref{sent1})
    was true.  Skeptics like Lewis argue instead for accommodation:
    careful attention to the semantics of (\ref{sent1}) reveals that
    its truth depends not just on how Hoover was, but on how he is
    represented.
    
    Consider the following parallel.  Suppose I am watching the
    wedding of Charles Windsor and Diana Spencer on television.  I
    point to the monitor and observe
    \begin{equation}
      \text{\small Charles is on the left.}\label{sent8}
    \end{equation}
    My colleague, teasing me, indicates another monitor, showing a
    video of the same event from the opposite angle, and says that
    Charles is not on the left.  Clearly, we both speak truly.  The
    difference of truth value is to be explained by the fact that
    (\ref{sent8}) does not attribute a property, \emph{being on the
      left}, to Charles; rather it attributes a relation between
    Charles and a certain point of view.\linespread{1}\footnote
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
    {Alternatively, ``is on the left'' picks out different properties
      in different contexts, and which property it picks out is
      determined by which point of view is salient.  This alternative
      explanation is the analogue of the alternative briefly sketched
      in n. \ref{fn:Abelardianism}.}
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
    \linespread{1.3} My colleague has somehow manipulated the context
    so that a different point of view is salient.  Given this
    explanation, an evident metaphysical upshot is that there is no
    such thing as someone's having the property \emph{being on the
      left} \emph{simpliciter}, independently of any point of view;
    something is on the left or not only relative to a given point of
    view.  Skepticism is the analogous view with respect the
    metaphysics of \emph{de re} modality.
    
    % UPSHOT:  LOTS OF MODAL METAPHYSICS IS BUNK
    
    The parallel between the skeptic's metaphysics of \emph{de re}
    modality and the sensible metaphysics of being on the left
    indicates what's at stake in the debate about skepticism.  If the
    skeptic is right, then a lot of modal metaphysics turns out to be
    bunk.  Suppose my colleague and I got in a big dispute over
    whether Charles was \emph{really} on the left or not.  I claim my
    colleague was wrong, and he claims I am wrong.  This is obviously
    a silly dispute.  There's nothing to argue over.  Each of us is
    correct with respect to one point of view and incorrect with
    respect to the other.  Similarly, disputes over what is
    \emph{really} impossible for Hoover will seem silly if the skeptic
    is correct.\linespread{1}
    \begin{quote}
      \dots I suggest that those philosophers who preach that origins
      are essential are absolutely right -- in the context of their
      own preaching.  [\dots] But if I ask how things would be if Saul
      Kripke had come from no sperm and egg but had been brought by a
      stork, that makes equally good sense.  I create a context that
      makes my question make sense, and to do so it has to be a
      context that makes origins not essential.
      
      Attend to the variety of what we say about modality and
      counterfactuals \emph{de re}, and I think you will find abundant
      evidence that we do not have settled answers, fixed once and for
      all, about what is true concerning a certain individual
      according to a certain (genuine or ersatz) world.  The way of
      representing is not at all constant.  Different answers are
      often right in different contexts, as witness the comfort with
      which we adhere to, or presuppose, different answers.  [\dots]
      Can you really take this as a dispute?  It can very well happen
      that no answer is determinately right, for lack of the
      contextual guidance that normally does the
      determining. \citep[p. 252]{Lewis:1986}
    \end{quote}
    
    % DIST: THE ONE TRUE METAPHYSICS REQUIRES INCONSTANCY
    
    \linespread{1} I am targeting the argument from inconstancy to
    skepticism about \emph{de re} modality.  This is an argument from
    a linguistic phenomenon to a metaphysical conclusion, analogous to
    the sort of argument we ought to give in response to someone who
    insists that there is some viewpoint-independent property of
    \emph{being on the left}, which some individuals have and others
    lack.  But skeptics often also give a very different kind of
    argument.  They argue that certain metaphysical certitudes require
    skepticism.  This is an argument from metaphysical premises.
    Consider, for instance, an argument for skepticism often
    encountered in the debates concerning material coincidence.  In
    the old philosophical chestnut, we imagine that Lumpl and Goliath
    are a statue and a lump, respectively, made of exactly the same
    clay for the entirety of their careers.\linespread{1}\footnote
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
    {[CITE!] Gibbard.}
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
    \linespread{1.3} According to some skeptics, it beggars belief to
    deny that Lumpl and Goliath are numerically identical.  To
    distinguish them ``reeks of double-counting,'' and ``is absurd on
    its face'' \citep[p. 252]{Lewis:1986}.  But these same skeptics
    admit that Lumpl and Goliath appear to differ in their \emph{de
      re} modal features.  For
    \begin{equation}
      \text{\small Goliath could not survive being squashed}\label{sent9}
    \end{equation}
    is true, but
    \begin{equation}
      \text{\small Lumpl could not survive being squashed}\label{sent10}
    \end{equation}
    is false.  These skeptics suggest that we apply skepticism here.
    Lumpl (\emph{i.e.} Goliath) can survive being squashed under the
    description ``the lump of clay,'' but not under the description
    ``the statue.''  Utterances of (\ref{sent9}) and (\ref{sent10})
    differ in truth value because the use of different names makes
    different descriptions of Lumpl salient.
    
    I mention this style of argument in order to set it aside.  Our
    discussion will return to the bearing of inconstancy on this and
    other metaphysical debates.  I will, however, make one remark
    before moving on.  It does not seem dialectically appropriate to
    rely on the identity of Lumpl and Goliath as a premise in this
    argument for inconstancy in the context of the material
    constitution debates.  The claim that Lumpl and Goliath are
    distinct has received such powerful defenses that one commentator
    has termed it ``the standard account'' of material
    constitution.\linespread{1}\footnote
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
    {\citep{Wasserman:2002}.}
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
    \linespread{1.3} It seems inappropriate to characterize this view
    as ``absurd on its face.''  The metaphysical premise in this
    argument for skepticism requires support.\linespread{1}\footnote
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
    {I'm setting aside arguments from the metaphysics of material
      constitution to skepticism.  I also won't discuss arguments from
      the requirements of the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics for
      counterfactuals [CITE!] to skepticism.  These arguments are
      invoked on the fly by Lewis in the passages quoted in the main
      text.  My focus will be squarely on the argument for skepticism
      from the inconstancy of \emph{de re} modal constructions like
      (\ref{sent1}).}
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
    \linespread{1.3}
    
  \end{section}
  

  \begin{section}{\emph{De Re} Constancy}
    My target, then, is the argument from inconstancy to skepticism
    about \emph{de re} modality.  This argument is an inference to the
    best explanation: the best explanation of inconstancy is that
    \emph{de re} modal attributions report a relation involving a
    contextually supplied description, rather than just the possession
    of a modal property to an individual.  I will argue that, when we
    take into account a wider range of linguistic data, we will find a
    better explanation.  In this section and the next, I will bring to
    light the linguistic data in question, and discuss how that data
    is to be explained.
    
    The first datum: some \emph{de re} modal constructions are
    \emph{constant}.  That is, the truth of some sentences involving
    the attribution of a modal predicate to a certain individual is
    immune to the kinds of contextual variability characteristic of
    (\ref{sent1}).  I will argue that there is a kind of \emph{de re}
    constancy that proves difficult for the skeptic to handle.  But I
    will start with two kinds of \emph{de re} constancy that are
    fairly easy for the skeptic.  This will help give us a fuller
    picture of the skeptic's explanatory strategy.
    
    \begin{subsection}{Impossible Predicates}
      First, consider \emph{de re} modal constructions involving
      \emph{impossible predicates} -- predicates that couldn't be true
      of anything.
      \begin{equation}
        \text{\small Hoover could be both red and not red.}\label{sent11}
      \end{equation}
      The truth of (\ref{sent11}) would require the possibility of a
      contradiction.\linespread{1}\footnote
      %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
      {Perhaps there are ways of reading ``both red and not red'' so
        that it turns out to be possible for something to be that way.
        Those aren't the readings I am interested in.}
      %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
      \linespread{1.3} It will be false on any occasion on which it is
      uttered.  (\ref{sent11}) is constant.  Skeptics should not say
      otherwise.  
      
      A skeptic presumably would argue that there is no description
      under which Hoover or anything else has the property
      \emph{possibly both red and not red}.  Being both red and not is
      not a possibility for any particular individual, no matter how
      it's described.  How can this view be supported?  Answering this
      question requires getting a little clearer on what it is for an
      individual to bear a modal property under a description.  Skeptics
      seem to have in mind some such idea as this:
      \begin{description}
      \item[(POSS)] $x$ bears \emph{possibly $\phi$} under a
        description $D$ iff it is possible that there be an individual
        that both satisfies $D$ and bears $\phi$.
      \item[(NEC)] $x$ bears \emph{necessarily $\phi$} under a
        description $D$ iff it is necessary that any satisfier of $D$
        bear $\phi$.
      \end{description}
      On this proposal, the semantics of \emph{de re} modal
      constructions are given in terms of \emph{de dicto} modal facts
      -- facts which do not in the first instance involve the
      possession of a modal property by any particular individual.
      The falsity of (\ref{sent11}), for instance, results from the
      impossibility of there being \emph{something or other} which is
      both red and not red, whatever other description it may satisfy.
      With (POSS) in hand, skeptics can likewise affirm the constancy
      of any claim of the form `$\alpha$ is possibly $\phi$,' where
      $\phi$ picks out a property that nothing could bear.  For
      instance, skeptics can easily explain the constancy of:
      \begin{equation}
        \text{\small Hoover could have contained water but no
          hydrogen.}\label{sent20}
      \end{equation}
      The constancy of negations of such claims are also easily
      handled.  For instance,
      \begin{equation}
        \text{\small Hoover could not have been a married
          bachelor}\label{sent21}
      \end{equation}
      will be true in any context because it negates a claim that is
      false in any context.  (POSS) enables skeptics to explain why
      impossible predicates generate \emph{de re} constancies.  An
      explanation along similar lines using (NEC) will accommodate the
      constancy of \emph{de re} constructions that involve properties
      necessarily instantiated by everything, like
      \begin{equation}
        \text{\small Hoover had to be self-identical.}\label{sent22}
      \end{equation}
    \end{subsection}
    
    % Tyranny of the actual.
    
    \begin{subsection}{The Tyranny of the Actual}
      There is another kind of constancy which skeptics can easily
      explain.  Suppose I claimed
      \begin{equation}
        \text{\small Hoover could not have been
          president in 1930.}\label{sent12}
      \end{equation}
      My colleague might correct me by noting that, since Hoover was
      president, he could have been.  I should acknowledge that my
      colleague is right.  This is not a case of inconstancy, it's a
      case of falsity.  \emph{De re} modal constructions are governed
      by what we might call \emph{the tyranny of the actual}: if
      Hoover in fact bears a property $\phi$, then a \emph{de re}
      modal construction of the form `Hoover could have been $\phi$'
      is true, no matter what description of him is contextually
      salient.  Thus, any utterance of (\ref{sent12}) is simply false,
      no matter which description of Hoover is salient.
      
      The skeptic can use (POSS) to explain why.  But she needs a
      further claim to carry the explanation through.  She needs to
      claim that the salience of a description $D$ in context is
      governed by
      \begin{description}
      \item[(ACCURACY)] $D$ is a salient description of $x$ only if
        $x$ satisfies $D$.
      \end{description}
      Suppose that context makes some description $D$ of Hoover
      salient.  (ACCURACY) guarantees that Hoover satisfies $D$.  Now
      apply (POSS): (\ref{sent12}) is true iff it is impossible for
      something to be both a satisfier of $D$ and the president in
      1930.  But, given our assumptions, it is obviously possible for
      something to be both, because Hoover actually is both.  Thus, no
      matter which description of Hoover is salient, (\ref{sent12})
      will turn out to be true.  The tyranny of the actual is
      explained.
    \end{subsection}
    
    
    \begin{subsection}{Substantial \emph{De Re} Constancies}
      We have examined two kinds of \emph{de re} modal constructions
      whose constancy poses no great challenge to skepticism.  I used
      the discussion of these cases to flesh out in a little more
      detail the explanatory picture available to the skeptic.  I now
      turn to \emph{de re} modal constancies that pose a bigger
      problem.
      
      Suppose, for instance, I correctly guess that my colleague Sin Yee
      is thinking of her father, and I coyly assert, of the individual
      she has in mind,
      \begin{equation}
        \text{\small He, she, or it could not have been a twin prime
          number.}\label{sent13}
      \end{equation}
      What I say is true.  Further, there is no way for my colleague to
      manipulate the context to raise to salience a description of her
      father under which it is possible for him to have been a twin
      prime.  Of course, Sin Yee could raise to salience \emph{some
        other individual} -- the number 3, say -- and pass it off as the
      individual she had in mind.  But this is not inconstancy; it's
      deception.
      
      If skepticism were true, it would be puzzling why it should not
      be possible for Sin Yee to raise to salience a description of
      her father under which it is possible for him to have been a
      twin prime.  The description of her father most salient in
      context, \emph{the individual Sin Yee has in mind}, certainly
      does not rule out being a twin prime.  That is, the application
      of (POSS) to the claim that he could have been a twin prime
      number under the description \emph{the individual Sin Yee has in
        mind} predicts that it will be true: it is possible that there
      be a twin prime that satisfies \emph{the individual Sin Yee has
        in mind}.  The invocation of (ACCURACY) does not help, of
      course, because my colleague's father does satisfy the
      description in question.  There are limits to the inconstancy of
      \emph{de re} modal attributions that go far beyond impossible
      predicates and the tyranny of the actual; not just anything
      goes.
      
      I have claimed that \emph{the individual Sin Yee has in mind} is
      the description of my colleague's father most salient in
      context.  Perhaps a skeptic might object that I have given only
      a very incomplete description of the context in which I utter
      (\ref{sent13}).  When we fill in the details, the skeptic
      argues, it simply isn't plausible to think that this is the
      description of the man that will be most salient.  Instead, the
      skeptic will urge, some description which rules out being a twin
      prime will be salient.  This objection is irrelevant to the
      phenomenon in question.  The problem is not that some
      description of the man which fails to rule out his being a twin
      prime is salient; it is that, barring outright deception, my
      colleague cannot manipulate context in such a way as to secure
      the falsity of an utterance of (\ref{sent13}) in the new
      context.  There are, however, accurate descriptions of my
      colleague's father that she could bring to salience that do not
      rule out being a twin prime.  So the skeptic's view predicts
      that (\ref{sent13}) should be inconstant, when it isn't.
      
      % Restrictions on which descriptions can come to salience.
      
      This suggests another response on behalf of the skeptic.  The
      skeptic is already committed to the strong constraint on
      descriptions we can bring to salience articulated by (ACCURACY).
      According to (ACCURACY), my colleague cannot bring certain
      descriptions to salience.  The skeptic may urge that the lesson of
      (\ref{sent13}) is that we need more such constraints: the extra
      constraints prevent my colleague from manipulating the context so
      as to bring \emph{the individual Sin Yee has in mind} to salience.
      Perhaps a skeptic could claim that this description is difficult
      or impossible to bring to salience because it is too complicated.
      The problem with this suggestion is that the sorts of descriptions
      whose salience is needed to underwrite the inconstancy of
      (\ref{sent1}) are likewise complicated.  In order to secure the
      truth of my original utterance of (\ref{sent1}), we had to appeal
      to the salience of some such description as \emph{the least
        popular candidate for president in 1932}.  The appeal to the
      complexity of the relevant description won't help the skeptic
      explain away the constancy of (\ref{sent13}).  There doesn't seem
      to be any other difference between the descriptions that can be
      brought to salience in the case of (\ref{sent1}) and the ones
      that pose a problem for the skeptic in the case of (\ref{sent13}).
      So the skeptic seems not to have any plausible means of explaining
      the constancy of (\ref{sent13}).\linespread{1}\footnote
      %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
      {Perhaps it is plausible to think that some descriptions are too
        complicated, subtle, or sophisticated to bring to salience.
        For instance, Lewis \cite[p. 251]{Lewis:1986} points us to a
        phenomenon that is a kissing cousin of \emph{de re} constancy,
        the existence of what we might call \emph{repugnant
          combinations}.  Lewis asks us to consider a context in which
        I claim that Humphrey could have been a poached egg, but could
        not have been born of different parents.  My utterance is
        false, and there is no way, it seems, for me to manipulate
        context so as to make it true.  But there is a description
        true of Humphrey that should do the trick: \emph{being an
          individual $x$ such that, if $x$ has any parents at all,
          then $x$'s parents were Hubert Humphrey, Sr., and Ragnild
          Sannes} is true of Humphrey, does not rule out being a
        poached egg, and does rule out being born to parents other
        than Hubert, Sr., and Ragnild.  But I find it difficult to
        imagine how one might manipulate context to bring such a
        monster to salience.  Even if one could, it's hard to see how
        to do so without also bringing to salience \emph{being an
          individual who has parents}.}
      %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
      \linespread{1.3}
      
      % Deny the data.
      
      Alternatively, the skeptic might simply deny the data:
      (\ref{sent13}) is not really constant.  Our intuitive judgments
      concerning the truth of (\ref{sent13}) are somehow leading us
      astray in this case.  But the argument from inconstancy to
      skepticism depends on the reliability of just such judgments.
      In the absence of some special reason for doubting their
      reliability in this particular case, the skeptic can't insist on
      this point without undermining her own position.
      
      % x is possibly F, y is necessarily not-F, and x = y 
      
      So we have a number of forms of \emph{de re} constancy.  One of
      them poses big problems for the skeptic because her view does
      not seem equipped to explain it.  This gives us reason to object
      to skepticism.  It also undercuts the skeptic's argument from
      inconstancy: skepticism may better explain \emph{de re}
      inconstancy, but realism evidently better explains \emph{de re}
      constancy.  But, at this stage of the argument, it looks like
      the views are equally bad: realism falters on inconstancy and
      skepticism on constancy.  Our argument looks like a wash so far.
      But there are more linguistic data to consider.
    \end{subsection}
  \end{section}
  
  \begin{section} {\emph{De Dicto} Inconstancy}
    Some \emph{de dicto} modal constructions display a phenomenon
    quite similar to inconstancy.  Recall that a pair of \emph{de re}
    modal attributions is inconstant if they differ in truth value
    despite involving the same individual and modal predicate.
    Defined in this way, this phenomenon only arises in the case of
    \emph{de re} modal attributions; by definition it cannot arise for
    \emph{de dicto} modal constructions, \emph{e.g.}, of the form,
    ``it is impossible that some $F$ be $G$.''  But this is just a
    matter of how we chose to define the notion.  We can define a
    parallel notion to capture essentially the same phenomenon in the
    case of \emph{de dicto} modal constructions: \emph{de dicto} modal
    attributions are inconstant if they differ in truth value, despite
    involving the very same sentence.
    
    % EASY INCONSTANCY
    
    Some \emph{de dicto} modal attributions are inconstant.  Suppose I
    express some conventional wisdom concerning American history by
    asserting
    \begin{equation}
      \text{\small It was impossible for a Republican to win the 1932
        presidential election.}\label{sent14}
    \end{equation}
    My colleague might then tease me by noting that it was in
    principle possible for there to have been a Democratic president
    in office at the onset of the Great Depression, and so it is
    possible for a Republican to have won.  (\ref{sent14}) is
    inconstant if its truth value differs in the pre-teasing and
    post-teasing contexts.  But it's very plausible to think that the
    truth value of (\ref{sent14}) does differ in the two contexts.
    Suppose, when teased by my colleague, I respond, ``Well, you're
    right to say that it was possible \emph{in principle} for a
    Republican to win; but I didn't mean to deny \emph{that}.''  My
    response is graceless but seems otherwise justified; my colleague
    was right, but so was I.  This seems, in fact, to be the very same
    phenomenon that led us to conclude that \emph{de re} modal
    constructions are inconstant.  The only salient difference between
    (\ref{sent14}) and the skeptic's example (\ref{sent1}) is that
    (\ref{sent14}) concerns the impossibility of victory by a certain
    class of individuals (Republicans), while (\ref{sent1}) concerns
    the impossibility of victory by a member of that class (Hoover).
    This difference, it seems, makes no difference to their
    inconstancy.
    
    How is \emph{de dicto} inconstancy to be explained?  Nothing
    similar to the skeptic's explanation of \emph{de re} inconstancy
    will do.  In a sentence like (\ref{sent14}), no appeal to a
    contextually-supplied description seems at all relevant.  What
    would it be a description \emph{of}?  Some other explanation seems
    called for.
    
    A plausible and familiar explanation of \emph{de dicto}
    inconstancy appeals to contextually supplied facts that constrain
    what one may say is possible on a given occasion.  For any context
    $c$, call these contextually supplied facts the \emph{constraints
      in $c$} (alternatively, \emph{the constraints in force in $c$}).
    Then the underlying idea is something like this:
    \begin{description}
      \item[($\lozenge$)] ``It is possible that $\phi$'' is true in a
        context $c$ iff it is possible both that $\phi$ is true and
        that all of the constraints in $c$ are true.
      \item[($\square$)] ``It is necessary that $\phi$'' is true in a
        context $c$ iff it is necessary that, if all of the
        constraints in $c$ are true, then $\phi$ is true.
    \end{description}    
    Thus, the constraints in $c$ are treated in context \emph{as if}
    they are necessities.\linespread{1}\footnote
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
    {The constraints in a given context $c$ are not to be identified
      with what is, in Stalnaker's [CITE!] terms, presupposed in $c$.
      If we identified constraints and presuppositions, then the
      updating of a context to include new presuppositions would
      preclude the true assertion that things might have been
      otherwise.  For instance, on Stalnaker's view, if an assertion
      of
      \begin{equation}
        \text{\scriptsize No Republican won in 1948}\label{sent15}
      \end{equation}
      is accepted, it is added to what is presupposed in the context.
      But then the application of ($\lozenge$) would predict that a
      subsequent utterance of
      \begin{equation}
        \text{\scriptsize But it is possible that a Republican have
          won in 1948}
      \end{equation}
      would be false if the presupposition of (\ref{sent15}) were also
      a constraint.}
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
    \linespread{1.3} The constraints in the context of my original
    utterance of (\ref{sent14}) presumably include the realities of
    the political situation at the time of the 1932 election.  What I
    say is true, because it was necessary, given those political
    realities, that no Republican have won.  All the possibilities
    that include a Republican victory also include divergences from
    these political facts.  Some of those divergences are fairly
    pedestrian -- a Democrat won in 1928; others are just bizarre --
    American voters suffer from a mass hallucination in the ballot
    box.  My colleague's reminder that a Democrat could have been the
    incumbent relaxes some of these constraints.  That's why the truth
    of his denial of (\ref{sent14}) does not count against the truth
    of my utterance.
    
    One feature of the explanation of \emph{de dicto} inconstancy in
    terms of ($\lozenge$) and ($\square$) bears special mention.
    These two principles make use of the very possibility and
    necessity operators whose semantics in the object language are
    being characterized.  Homophony of this sort is not generally an
    obstacle to doing semantics.  No problematic circularity is
    indicated if our semantic theory takes as fundamental such claims
    as ```Aristotle' refers to Aristotle.''  Furthermore, no skeptic
    who accepts (POSS) and (NEC), which also use the possibility and
    necessity operators, will eschew their use in ($\lozenge$) and
    ($\square$).  Finally, those who hanker after an analysis of these
    modal idioms may apply their favorite such analysis; many
    presumably will appeal to possible worlds analyses of the idioms.
    There is nothing in the present approach to stop them.
    
    I have just argued that the interpretation of \emph{de dicto}
    modal attributions is context-sensitive, so I should say how the
    attributions in ($\lozenge$) and ($\square$) are to be
    interpreted.  The use of ``possible'' in the metalanguage
    indicates what Kripke [CITE!] calls possibility \emph{tout court}
    -- utterly unrestricted possibility (and likewise for
    ``necessary'').  That is, the constraints in the context in which
    ($\lozenge$) and ($\square$) are propounded are stipulated to be
    null.  If those operators are analyzed as quantifiers over
    possible worlds, that quantification is stipulated to be utterly
    unrestricted.  So, for instance, instances of the right-hand side
    of ($\lozenge$) should be taken to express claims about what's
    possible, given, well, \emph{nothing}.  In what follows, I will
    indicate utterly unrestricted possibility by using the vernacular
    ``possible \emph{period}'' (and similarly for necessity).
    
    This explanation of the inconstancy we find in \emph{de dicto}
    modal attributions is both plausible and common (see, for
    instance, \citep[pp. 7-8]{Lewis:1986}).  It has the advantage of
    also being able to accommodate the constancy of certain \emph{de
      dicto} modal attributions.  For instance, the following are all
    constant:
    \begin{equation}
      \text{\small It is possible for something to be both red and not
        red}\label{sent16}
    \end{equation}
    \begin{equation}
      \text{\small It is necessary that there are no married
        bachelors.}\label{sent17}
    \end{equation}
    Their constancy is explained by ($\lozenge$) and ($\square$).  For
    instance, since it is impossible \emph{period} for something to be
    both red and not red, no manipulation of context can relax
    constraints enough to make an utterance of (\ref{sent16}) true.
    Likewise, since it is necessary \emph{period} that there are no
    married bachelors, the truth of (\ref{sent17}) is impervious to
    changes in which constraints are in force.
    
    In order to accommodate the analogue of the tyranny of the actual
    for \emph{de dicto} modal attributions, the constraints in $c$
    should be governed by an analogue of (ACCURACY):
    \begin{description}
      \item[(CORRECTNESS)] $\phi$ is a constraint in $c$ only if
        $\phi$ is true.
    \end{description}
    This will secure the constancy of 
    \begin{equation}
      \text{\small It was impossible for a Republican to have been
        president in 1930.}\label{sent18}
    \end{equation}
    Whatever constraints are in force in the context of an utterance
    of (\ref{sent18}), (CORRECTNESS) requires that they be true (in
    the actual world).  Since it is also true (in the actual world)
    that a Republican was president in 1930 the application of
    ($\lozenge$) yields the constant falsity of (\ref{sent18}).  If it
    were possible to manipulate context so that one of the constraints
    was that no Republican was president in 1930, then an utterance of
    (\ref{sent18}) in that context would turn out to be true on
    ($\lozenge$).
    
    Notice also that, if this standard explanation of \emph{de dicto}
    inconstancy is accepted, then inconstancy gives us no case for
    skepticism about \emph{de dicto} modality on a par with the case
    for scepticism about \emph{being on the left} from the linguistic
    data.  On the contrary, the explanation of the inconstancy of
    \emph{de dicto} modal attributions presupposes the notion of
    possibility \emph{period}, the very phenomenon targeted by
    scepticism about \emph{de dicto} modality.  The standard
    explanation does not support a case against the reality of
    possibility \emph{period}; it instead bolsters the case in its
    favor by giving it a role in explaining certain linguistic
    phenomena.
  \end{section}
  
  \begin{section}{Inconstancy Explained}
    The \emph{de dicto} inconstancies we find are explicable by appeal
    to the constraints in force in a given context.  But we also
    encounter \emph{de dicto} constancies.  We have seen that the
    explanation we give of the inconstancies also explains the
    constancies.  This explanatory strategy can be adapted to the case
    of \emph{de re} modal attributions.  When it is, I will argue, we
    get an explanation that does as well as the skeptic's at
    explaining \emph{de re} inconstancies, but does better than the
    skeptic's at accommodating \emph{de re} constancies.
    
    Our strategy for explaining \emph{de dicto} inconstancy relied on
    the idea that there were certain constraints imposed by context.
    For instance, I have imagined that the constraints in the context
    of my original utterance of (\ref{sent14}) included the realities
    of the political situation in 1932.  Importantly, there is no
    reason to think that these realities cannot include claims
    concerning particular individuals.  For instance, these political
    realities presumably include the fact that \emph{Hoover} was an
    unpopular incumbent president in 1932, that \emph{Roosevelt} was
    more popular than Hoover, \emph{etc.}  Further, the sceptic's own
    explanation of inconstancy requires it to be possible to raise
    descriptions true of Hoover to salience in a context.  But any
    context in which, by the sceptic's lights, a description $D$ of
    Hoover is salient can be characterized instead as a context in
    which one of the constraints is `Hoover is $D$'.  Facts concerning
    particular individuals, then, are as well-poised to constrain
    possibilities concerning Hoover as they are possibilities
    concerning Republicans in general.  That is, there is no reason to
    think that the constraints in a given context don't affect
    \emph{de re} modal attributions in the same way they affect
    \emph{de dicto} modal attributions.
    
    In fact, there is plenty of reason to think they do.  The
    similarity of the inconstancy phenomena with respect to utterances
    of
    \begin{equation*}
      \tag{\ref{sent1}} \text{\small Hoover could not have won the
        1932 presidential election.}
    \end{equation*}
    and
    \begin{equation*}
      \tag{\ref{sent14}} \text{\small It was impossible for a
        Republican to win the 1932 presidential election.}
    \end{equation*}
    is suggestive.  The idea might be carried out in this way:
    \begin{description}
      \item[($\lozenge^{DR}$)] ``$t$ is possibly $\phi$'' is true in a
        context $c$ iff the referent of $t$ is possibly such that both
        it is $\phi$ and all of the constraints in $c$ are true.
      \item[($\square^{DR}$)] ``$t$ is necessarily $\phi$'' is true in
        a context $c$ iff $t$ is necessarily such that if all of the
        constraints in $c$ are true, then it is $\phi$.
    \end{description}    
    
    Two comments I made about ($\lozenge$) and ($\square$) apply also
    to ($\lozenge^{DR}$) and ($\square^{DR}$).  First,
    ($\lozenge^{DR}$) and ($\square^{DR}$) use the very \emph{de re}
    modal locutions whose semantics is being given.  This sort of
    homophony is harmless for semantic purposes.  Those who hanker
    after an analysis of such locutions may apply their favorite
    analysis; many presumably will appeal to possible worlds analyses
    of the idioms.  There is nothing in the present approach to stop
    them.  Second, given that I have argued that the interpretation of
    \emph{de re} modal constructions is context-sensitive, I owe an
    explanation of how to interpret the \emph{de re} modal locutions
    on the right-hand sides of ($\lozenge^{DR}$) and ($\square^{DR}$).
    As before, the use of ``$x$ is possibly $F$'' in the metalanguage
    indicates the possibilities \emph{period} for $x$ -- the utterly
    unrestricted possibilities for $x$ (and likewise for
    ``necessary'').  That is, the constraints in the context in which
    ($\lozenge^{DR}$) and ($\square^{DR}$) are propounded are
    stipulated to be null.  If these are to be analyzed in terms of
    quantification over possible worlds (plus representation by worlds
    of $x$'s having or lacking certain properties) then that
    quantification is stipulated to be utterly unrestricted.
    
    Reliance on the idea of what's possible \emph{period} for a given
    individual makes the present approach inimical to skepticism about
    \emph{de re} modality.  The present approach presumes realism
    about \emph{de re} modality: there must be such a thing as what's
    possible \emph{period} for Hoover -- descriptions simply don't
    enter into the question.  The disanalogy with attributions of ``on
    the left'' could not be starker.  The semantics for attributions
    of ``is on the left'' do not rely on any such notion as what's on
    the left \emph{period}, independently of any point of view.  One
    could avail oneself of a theory that had the explanatory
    advantages I claim for the present proposal while preserving the
    letter of skepticism.  One would have to claim that, though
    nothing is possible \emph{period} for Hoover, there is a canonical
    description $D_H$ of Hoover such that the possibilities for Hoover
    under $D_H$ play the role of what's possible \emph{period} for
    him.  (For vividness, we might think of $D_H$ as the description
    of Hoover in the mind of God.)  One might then replace
    ($\lozenge^{DR}$) and ($\square^{DR}$) with the principles you get
    by swapping out the claims about what's possible for $x$ for
    claims about what's possible for $x$ under its canonical
    description.  Given this view, there's an obvious way to specify
    what's possible \emph{period} for Hoover: what's possible
    \emph{period} for Hoover is what's possible for Hoover under his
    canonical description.  For present purposes, I set this view
    aside, because it won't have the sorts of upshots for metaphysical
    debates involving \emph{de re} modal attributions usually claimed
    by skeptics.  For instance, it won't have the upshot noted above
    that a lot of the controversies concerning what's possible for
    Humphrey turn out to be bunk.
    
    The inconstancy of \emph{de re} modal attributions like
    (\ref{sent1}) can now be explained by the fact that the
    constraints in force in a given context can be manipulated in all
    the ways skeptics have emphasized.  My original utterance of
    (\ref{sent1}) is true because the constraints in that context
    include such claims as
    \begin{equation}
      \text{\small Hoover was the least popular candidate for
        president in 1932}\label{sent19}
    \end{equation}
    together with some generalities concerning how relative popularity
    affects the outcomes of presidential elections.  If (POSS)
    successfully predicts the truth of my utterance, then so does
    ($\lozenge^{DR}$): Hoover could not have been both the least
    popular candidate and the winner, given that least popular
    candidates never win.  My colleague's teasing effects a change in
    what constraints are in force.  In particular, it removes
    (\ref{sent19}) from the constraints in force, perhaps replacing it
    with
    \begin{equation}
      \text{\small Hoover was the Republican candidate for president
        in 1932.}
    \end{equation}
    As a result, the application of ($\lozenge^{DR}$) predicts that an
    utterance of (\ref{sent1}) would be false in the new context.
    Thus, inconstancy.
    
    ($\lozenge^{DR}$) and ($\square^{DR}$) are well-placed to explain
    the \emph{de re} constancies.  Consider first \emph{de re} modal
    attributions which involve impossible predicates, like
    \begin{equation*}
      \tag{\ref{sent11}}\text{\small Hoover could be both red and not red.}
    \end{equation*}
    This sentence is constant because, no matter what constraints are
    in force in a given context, it is not possible \emph{period} for
    Hoover to have a property that nothing could have.  So the
    application of ($\lozenge^{DR}$) correctly predicts that
    (\ref{sent11}) is false in every context.  Similar comments apply
    to the explanation of the constancies we find for (\ref{sent20}),
    (\ref{sent21}), and (\ref{sent22}).
    
    Given that the constraints in a given context are governed by
    (CORRECTNESS), the tyranny of the actual is also easily handled.  
    \begin{equation*}
      \tag{\ref{sent12}}\text{\small Hoover could not have been
        president in 1930}
    \end{equation*}
    is false in any context $c$ because all of the constraints in $c$
    have to be true.  Since they are true, Hoover is (in the actual
    world) such that they are actually true.  And, likewise, Hoover
    was president in 1930.  So Hoover is actually both president in
    1930 and such that the constraints in $c$ are true, and thus
    possibly so.  Applying ($\lozenge^{DH}$) yields the falsity of
    (\ref{sent12}).
    
    So ($\lozenge^{DR}$) and ($\square^{DR}$) can explain the same
    \emph{de re} constancies that the sceptic's principles (POSS) and
    (NEC) can, and for essentially the same reasons.  They do better
    than the sceptic's view, however, on the last kind of constancy we
    discussed.  Consider again my utterance of
    \begin{equation*}
      \tag{\ref{sent13}}\text{\small He, she, or it could not have
        been a twin prime number.}
    \end{equation*}
    Recall that the pronouns refer to the individual my colleague is
    thinking about, and I have correctly guessed that the individual
    in question is my colleague's father.  (\ref{sent13}) is constant:
    raise any description of him to salience that you like;
    (\ref{sent13}) will still be true.  I have argued that the skeptic
    has a difficult time accommodating this constancy.
    ($\lozenge^{DR}$) accommodates it easily.  This constancy is to be
    explained by the fact that the possibilities \emph{period} for my
    colleague's father do not extend to his being a twin prime number.
    Since it is not possible \emph{period} for him to be a twin prime
    number, it is not possible \emph{period} for him to be a twin
    prime number and such that some constraints are true.  The story
    couldn't be simpler.\linespread{1}\footnote
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
    {Skeptics hold that there are deep problems with the idea that
      some things are possible \emph{period} for Hoover.  A skeptic
      might therefore complain that the reliance on what's possible
      \emph{period} for Hoover means that the realist-friendly
      explanation of constancy faces these deep problems.  Perhaps so.
      But at least one reason to suspect the notion of the
      possibilities \emph{period} for Hoover -- the reason given by
      Quine in the passage I quoted in
      \S\ref{sec:SkepticismAndInconstancy} -- has been defanged: the
      fact that there are inconstant \emph{de re} modal attributions
      provides no reason for suspicion.  The charge that the
      realist-friendly explanation of constancy faces deep problems
      requires alternative support.}
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
    \linespread{1.3}
    
    Two clarifications are in order.  First, on the realist-friendly
    proposal on offer, our \emph{de re} modal attributions suffer from
    two sources of indeterminacy.  First, it is sometimes
    indeterminate whether something is possible \emph{period} for a
    given individual.  There are borderline cases of baldness.  It is
    plausible to hold that these cases involve indeterminacy.  Now
    consider someone who is completely bald.  A certain amount of hair
    growth would render him a borderline case of baldness.  It will
    then be indeterminate whether, for that person, it is possible
    \emph{period} to experience that amount of hair growth and yet
    remain bald.  A second source of indeterminacy: it may be
    indeterminate whether a certain claim is a constraint in a given
    context.  It may be indeterminate, for instance, whether Hoover's
    having been the U.S. Secretary of Commerce is a constraint in a
    given context.  If so, it may be indeterminate whether an
    utterance of
    \begin{equation}
      \text{\small Hoover could not have failed to be the Commerce
        Secretary}
    \end{equation}
    is true.\linespread{1}\footnote
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
    {Thus, the realist-friendly explanation employing
      ($\lozenge^{DR}$) and ($\square^{DR}$) predicts the same kinds
      of indeterminacies as the skeptical view; see
      \citep[p. 254]{Lewis:1986}.}
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
    \linespread{1.3} Commitment to realism thus implies neither that
    every question concerning Hoover's modal properties has a
    determinate answer, nor that it is always determinate which modal
    property a given utterance attributes to Hoover.
    
    Now for the second clarification.  I have argued against the
    skeptic's explanation of \emph{de re} inconstancy on the grounds
    that there is a realist-friendly alternative that provides as good
    an explanation of \emph{de re} inconstancies, and a better
    explanation of \emph{de re} constancies.  The skeptic's
    explanation is often implemented using counterpart-theoretic
    analyses of \emph{de re} modal
    attributions.\linespread{1}\footnote
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
    {\citep[esp. pp. 248-63]{Lewis:1986}, \citep{Noonan:1991}.}
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
    \linespread{1.3} The idea is that the description of a given
    individual that's salient in context picks out a particular
    counterpart relation, and then the question of how the individual
    could be is analyzed in terms of how its counterparts are.
    Suppose once again that the description of Hoover salient in my
    original utterance of (\ref{sent1}) is
    \begin{equation*}
      \tag{\ref{descr1}}\text{\small the least popular candidate for
        president in 1932.}
    \end{equation*}
    This description restricts Hoover's counterparts to those who were
    the least popular candidates for president in 1932.  Then,
    according to this implementation of skepticism, the question of
    whether Hoover could have won is answered by considering whether
    any of those counterparts won his or her 1932 election.
    Importantly, the argument against skepticism is not an argument
    against counterpart-theoretic analyses of \emph{de re} modal
    claims.  The objection is only to the use of counterpart theory to
    implement skepticism about \emph{de re} modality.  For all I have
    said here, there might be other reasons to be a counterpart
    theorist.  For instance, we would need something along the lines
    of counterpart theory if it turns out that there are
    counterexamples to the necessity of identity or distinctness.
    Counterpart theory and skepticism are typically found together,
    but they are in principle separable.

    Let's take stock.  The skeptic's view does a good job explaining
    the \emph{de re} inconstancies we find.  It also does fine
    explaining some \emph{de re} constancies.  But there are other
    \emph{de re} constancies it can't easily explain.  The
    realist-friendly alternative relies on the same mechanisms as the
    skeptic's view for raising various facts concerning the
    individuals in question to salience.  This enables it to do as
    well as the skeptic's view on \emph{de re} inconstancies.  But it
    also can explain all of the constancies we have found.  The
    realist-friendly explanatory strategy does a better job explaining
    all of the linguistic data, including both constancy and
    inconstancy.  Thus, the very linguistic phenomena that were
    thought to lend support to skepticism turn out to favor realism
    instead.
  \end{section}
  
  \begin{section}{The Lessons of \emph{De Re} Inconstancy}
    I have been concerned for the bulk of this paper with showing that
    a certain argument for skepticism about \emph{de re} modality
    actually leads instead to realism.  \emph{De re} modal
    attributions figure centrally in some current debates concerning
    the nature of material objects.  The skeptical explanation of
    \emph{de re} inconstancy is invoked in these debates.  But suppose
    instead that we accept the realist-friendly explanation of
    \emph{de re} inconstancy instead.  How would that affect our
    assessment of these debates?
    
    We have already encountered a use for skepticism in the debates
    concerning the nature of material constitution.  \emph{Monists}
    hold that materially coincident objects in general, and Lumpl and
    Goliath in particular, are identical.  Monism faces a problem.  It
    seems inconsistent with two evident facts:
    \begin{equation*}
      \tag{\ref{sent9}}\text{\small Goliath could not survive being squashed}
    \end{equation*}
    and
    \begin{equation}
      \text{\small Lumpl could survive being squashed.}\label{sent23}
    \end{equation}
    Monists invoke skepticism in their defense: Lumpl (\emph{i.e.}
    Goliath) bears \emph{could survive squashing} under the
    description brought to salience by the use of `Lumpl' in
    (\ref{sent23}), but it also bears \emph{couldn't survive
      squashing} under the description brought to salience by the use
    of `Goliath' in (\ref{sent9}).
    
    The first lesson of our discussion is that this defense of monism
    does not require skepticism.  It only requires inconstancy.  And
    we have seen that inconstancy is no part of a case against
    realism; on the contrary, it's part of a case for it.  What the
    skeptic does with the description of Lumpl salient in context the
    realist can do instead with the constraints concerning Lumpl in
    force.  \emph{First moral: monism about material constitution does
      not motivate skepticism about \emph{de re} modality.}
    
    Also, in this case, we don't encounter the usual symptoms of
    inconstancy.  Suppose I utter (\ref{sent9}) when discussing the
    Lumpl/Goliath case.  Suppose my colleague then attempts to tease
    me, by noting that it was \emph{in principle} possible for the
    individual in question to have been gathered out of the riverbed
    by an assistant, subsequently shaped by its sculptor, and
    thereafter squashed into a ball.  So it is possible for it to
    survive squashing after all.  To my mind, the colleague's attempt
    to convince me fails utterly.  It would not be correct for me to
    acknowledge the justice of my colleague's remark, admit that
    Goliath could \emph{in principle} have survived squashing, but
    deny that I ever meant to say otherwise.  The claim of inconstancy
    in the Lumpl/Goliath case is implausible.  \emph{Second moral: the
      claim of inconstancy in the Lumpl/Goliath case is implausible,
      and should be reckoned as an intuitive cost of any view that
      embraces it.}
    
    Even if the inconstancy of (\ref{sent9}) and (\ref{sent23}) is
    accepted, however, the monist still owes us an account of what the
    possibilities \emph{period} for Lumpl (\emph{i.e.} Goliath)
    include.  Surely critics of monism who appeal to (\ref{sent9}) and
    (\ref{sent23}) intend those claims to be taken as indicating that
    Lumpl and Goliath differ with respect to what's possible
    \emph{period} for them.  Monism's opponents also presumably intend
    those claims to be true.  The monist argues that there is no way
    for both intentions to be satisfied.  Taken as indicating what the
    possibilities \emph{period} for Lumpl and Goliath are, one of
    (\ref{sent9}) and (\ref{sent23}) is false.  Which one?
    ($\lozenge^{DR}$) requires that, if (\ref{sent23}) is true in any
    context, then surviving squashing is possible \emph{period} for
    Lumpl (\emph{i.e.} Goliath).  \emph{Third moral: the alleged
      inconstancy of (\ref{sent9}) and (\ref{sent23}) does not acquit
      the monist of the necessity of accepting that surviving
      squashing is a possibility \emph{period} for Goliath.}
    
    Consider now the view (recently defended by
    \citep{Schaffer:forthcoming} and Skow [CITE!]) that ordinary
    physical objects are identical to the regions of spacetime that
    they occupy.  I'll call this view \emph{cartesianism}, in honor of
    Descartes's claim that extension is the essence of body.  (In the
    literature [CITE!], it is also called
    \emph{supersubstantivalism}.)  Suppose, for instance, that $c$ is
    a homogeneous cube, exactly occupying a spacetime region $r$.
    Cartesians claim that $c$ and $r$ are identical.  Cartesianism
    faces a problem.  It seems inconsistent with two evident facts:
    \begin{equation}
      \text{\small $r$ does not necessarily coincide with any material
        object}\label{sent24}
    \end{equation}
    and
    \begin{equation}
      \text{\small $c$ necessarily coincides with some material
        object.}\label{sent25}
    \end{equation}
    Cartesians invoke scepticism in their defense [CITE!].  The region
    $r$ (\emph{i.e.} $c$) bears \emph{necessarily coincides with a
      material object} under the description ``material object'', but
    not under the description ``spacetime region.''  
    
    As above, the appeal to skepticism is unnecessary; all the
    cartesian needs is inconstancy. \emph{Fourth moral: cartesianism
      doesn't support skepticism either.}  The cartesians's allegation
    of inconstancy in the present case seems to me utterly incredible.
    (\ref{sent24}) and (\ref{sent25}) are both focal cases of \emph{de
      re} constancy.  Take (\ref{sent25}).  Intuitively, if an
    utterance of (\ref{sent25}) is accepted, then there simply isn't
    any way to manipulate context so as to make it correct to concede
    both the truth of the original utterance, and the falsity of a new
    utterance.  I am sympathetic with the idea that we might be
    profoundly mistaken about the nature of material objects or
    spacetime.  So we might plausibly attribute a mistake about the
    \emph{truth} of (\ref{sent24}) or (\ref{sent25}) to cartesianism's
    critics.  But intuitions about the nature of spacetime are one
    thing; intuitions about the variability of truth values across
    contexts are another.  Insofar as we take the linguistic data
    seriously at all, we should not acknowledge the \emph{truth} of
    (\ref{sent24}) and (\ref{sent25}) and instead attribute a mistake
    about their \emph{constancy}.  \emph{Fifth moral: the cartesian is
      better off stumping for the falsity of one of (\ref{sent24}) and
      (\ref{sent25}) than acknowledging their truth and claiming
      inconstancy.}
    
    Inconstancy is useless to the cartesian.  It doesn't seem to help
    the monist out, either: the claim of inconstancy is implausible,
    and the monist still has to make a controversial commitment
    concerning what's possible \emph{period} for Lumpl (\emph{i.e.}
    Goliath).  So claiming that (\ref{sent9}) and (\ref{sent23}) are
    inconstant incurs an implausible commitment to inconstancy, and
    ultimately does not help the monist avoid the allegedly
    implausible commitment concerning what's possible for Goliath.
    \emph{Final moral: claims of inconstancy exacerbate rather than
      ameliorate the counter-intuitive consequences of these views.}
    
    
  \end{section}

  % TODO: Not obvious that Lumpl/Goliath cases are constant.
  
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