Robin Waterfield's introduction to his Penguin translation of those of Xenophon's works in which Socrates plays a part has inspired these notes.
Xenophon cannot figure out how the prosecution obtained a conviction in the case against Socrates. Neither can we. We have only Plato and Xenophon as primary witnesses, but neither of them give or even purport to give the arguments made by the prosecution. We have no clear reason to think that Socrates was guilty, nor any to think he was innocent. The issues which we know about do not tell us enough. For example, that he rejected the do ut des concept (Latin for "I give so that you give in return"), a fundamental tenet of Greek religion, seems sufficient to pronounce him a heretic. And yet, the very idea of a heretic is questionable in Athens, for the Greek Religion was a varied one which involved sacrifice and prayer to many different gods. Each person made choices as to what to sacrifice to whom. In addition, the Greek religion seems to have been much more ritualistic than doctrinal: correct action was more important than correct belief. We are told by Xenophon, and shown by Plato on occasion, that Socrated did engage in the normal Athenian religious actions. And so he was not clearly heretical, nor was there a clear concept of hereticism at the time against which to judge him.
The first part of the charges is that Socrates did not believe in the gods of Athens. So we ask in what sense Socrates did not believe/cultivate the gods of the state. By "believe/cultivate," I mean that the Greek word used in the charges could mean "to believe," but it also could mean something more like "to hold in honor." In other words, the word is not exclusively confined to mental or emotional states that we associate with religious belief, but spills over into the actions that might be normal religious actions in Athens. And yet Socrates in both Plato and Xenophon speaks of the Greek gods and is said to engage in rituals, none of which are particularly unusual.
The charges also say that he introduced new deities. Perhaps the "new deities" or "new divine matters" are the real core of the charge that he did not observe the gods of the state. So what are these new gods or new divine matters? Xenophon thinks it might have been Socrates' mantic practices (techniques to ascertain the future from divine signs), whatever they were, but Xenophon also claims that all of Socrates' mantic practices were normal Greek mantic practices. Hence, we are left with no reason to think the charges were fair.
The third charge is that Socrates corrupts the youths. He may have done so by teaching them his religious beliefs, but we have no way to know that, because we do not see him teaching the youths things that are clearly grounds for conviction. We can tell plausible stories about how what Socrates says puts Greek beliefs into radical question, but they are still only plausible stories. We cannot reach knowledge on this issue. Plausibility, however, is a powerful tool and can get us some ways towards thinking that we understand something. Nonetheless, given that both Plato and Xenophon's portrait of Socrates is of a man who may be annoying, but fundamentally works to improve his fellow humans, even if that work be not unquestionable, it is hard to see why his teaching offers clear grounds for conviction.
In sum, the historian who wants to know, or at least reasonably reconstruct, the reasons for Socrates' conviction, is left with a paucity of evidence. The two major witnesses are severely biased and are clearly engaged in defensive tactics.
The translator of the Penguin volume of Xenophon, Conversations of Socrates, Robin Waterfield, is a noted scholar. He thinks that Socrates' communication with divinity offers justification for the conviction. On Pages 32 and following, he points out that Athenian state religion involved public gods and religion was for the good of the community. Socrates, by claiming that a god or gods acted for his good alone, was claiming a lot. Furthermore, in a democracy, it is every citizen's duty to act in politics. By saying not only that he thought being politically active was a bad idea, but that the god forbade him from it, Socrates was questioning the fabric of Athenian democracy and religion. That may be so. And yet, there were "quiet Athenians," Athenians who were not active in politics. It was not a prosecutable thing to be "quiet." Hence not being politically active was not objectionable. What is more, there were surely instances where a person claimed that divine Aphrodite favored him orher in particular (or some other god): it cannot have been prosecutable to think that a god or gods might favor an individual. Perhaps the whole complex of a privately-oriented god who forbade politics was the problem. In that case, then Plato and Xenophon do not understand or highlight that as much as would be expected if it were the real reason for prosecution.
Robin Waterfield goes on to claim that corrupting the youth may have consisted in making them into individuals intellectually, not just in the wrestling ground or at the Olympics. By questioning the nomos or customs of Athens, Socrates made young men from rich and influential families question the wisdom of their elders and their culture as a whole. That made those young men into individuals with their own ideas who no longer thought that the traditional way to do things was the right way. In a democracy threatened from within by rich and influential oligarchs as well as subject states, and from without by the hostility of Sparta and other states outside of her empire, perhaps espousing the standard line was considered a legal duty. And yet other sophists were not put to death for their new ideas. Perhaps that is because they did not, like Socrates, eschew politics and resolutely question those in power. They seem to have been more likely to either be in power themselves or to be friendly with those in power.
In all, Robin Waterfield does an admirable job of putting together as good a case as one can against Socrates. It is an interesting and laudable effort. Remember, however, that the legal definition of "believing in the gods of the state," "introducing new divinities," and "corrupting youth" was not hard and fast, precise and easily applied. Robin Waterfield tries to find a plausible definition of them under which Socrates was guilty. He does that because Socrates WAS convicted. We know that for a fact. He, as we all should do, is taking what he knows and trying to explain it.